Monthly Meeting September 2026

2026089

28 May 26

1447

Typhoon

(HQ Air (Ops)

Drone

5319N 00043E

19NM NE of Skegness

FL105

London FIR

(G)

The Typhoon pilot reports that they were flying the third and last aircraft in a non-standard trail formation heading to [destination]. Whilst being handed over to Coningsby ATC they saw a drone, which was dark coloured with a rectangular body in the Head-Up Display (HUD), then pass over them by a few hundred feet. They believed it was a quadcopter drone although the opportunity to inspect it was fleeting. The vehicle was sizeable enough to be seen in the HUD replay. They estimated the solid body of it to be approximately 40-50cm long. They reported the occurrence to Swanwick Mil very shortly afterwards. From the range they saw it, evasive action was possible but not necessary and it's a reminder to keep a lookout at all stages of flight.

They also reported that they did ‘jink’ down slightly, but further manoeuvres were not required to achieve avoidance, and that only their lookout picked it up. The 2 other formation aircraft had passed it.

Reported Separation: 300ft V/0ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

The Swanwick (Mil) controller reports that they were the controller during this event. The pilot reported to them that they had encountered a drone, approximately 500ft above their level, meaning that the drone was around FL105. The aircraft returned to base without further incident. D&D were informed as per SOPs.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 2, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

C

2026096

14 May 26

1241

Phenom

(HQ Air (Trg)

Drone

5301N 00029W

RAF Cranwell

700ft

Cranwell ATZ

Within Cranwell FRZ

(G)

The Phenom pilot reports that, whilst teaching a low-level circuit at RAF Cranwell (in an empty visual circuit), what was initially perceived to be a bird of prey was spotted well ahead and just to the left of their flightpath, around 20-50ft low. With the 'bird' in sight, the teach of using visual downwind features to aid lookout in a busy circuit was continued but as they passed it by (around 50-100ft south of the 'bird' and slightly above), the Instructor realised it was actually a small dark drone with quad propellers. The drone sighting was called to Tower and as the circuit was empty, they elected to complete a touch-and-go. They notified Tower of their intention to conduct a tower-to-tower to Waddington at 1300Z or whenever Waddington could take them for, but were informed by Tower that the practice diversion was not available. On the next visual circuit, they continued looking out for the drone but nothing was seen whilst downwind. With the weather deteriorating (showers in the area) and no availability for a tower-to-tower to enable visual circuits at a local airfield, they elected to land and curtail the sortie 20min early.

Reported Separation: 20-50ft V/50-100ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: Low

The Cranwell Tower controller reports that during a quiet period with 1 Phenom in the visual circuit, as the Phenom turned downwind the pilot notified them of a drone operating near to their current position, which would have placed it within the SW portion of the ATZ. A visual search was conducted from the Tower but no drone was seen. The Phenom pilot requested a Tower to Tower to Waddington but this was denied due to priority traffic. They informed the Phenom pilot of this fact and they elected to land on their next circuit. The Supervisor engaged with Stn Ops and the MGR and, following discussion with the Duty Pilot, no further restrictions were imposed.

The Cranwell ATC Supervisor reports that they were the Supervisor but were not present in the VCR at the time of the initial drone sighting. They immediately contacted Stn Ops to clarify there hadn't been a drone request approved in the vicinity that ATC had not been made aware off. After confirming there were no drone requests approved, they contacted the main guard room to request deployment of RAF Police. On positioning in the VCR, they were informed there had been no further sightings. On discussion with the Prefect Duty Pilot, the visual circuit remained open, subject to approval from all platforms’ DDH.

A Cranwell Investigation reports that a drone was operating illegally within the Cranwell visual circuit. The drone was described as a small dark drone with quad propellers.  The operator has not been traced. 3FTS AST will highlight the hazard of drones and the risk to safety they can cause which differs to that of birds. Crews will also be invited to consider that when flying in proximity to a drone and safety and/or LoSS has been compromised, that an Airprox is to be declared and reported. Guidelines should be introduced to assist ATC when to consider stopping or restricting flying operations within the ATZ when a drone is confirmed within it and the subsequent route to recommencing flying operations.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7

Risk: The Board considered that safety had been much reduced below the norm to the extent that safety had not been assured.

B

2026109

14 Jun 26

1430

Evektor Sportstar

(Civ FW)

Drone

5312N 00418W

~3-4NM south of Llangefni

~1050ft

Valley/Mona CMATZ

(G)

The Evektor Sportstar pilot reports that they had been established in the cruise transiting Mona – Caernarfon. In the course of routine lookout/ attitude/instrument scan they noticed a very thin silhouetted shape presenting as potentially large in their 1130/12 o’clock with little relative movement. Within a second or so they observed a small movement which belied straight wings and a slight left-right track across their track and quickly noticed its size rapidly increasing. The pilot applied full left aileron and left rudder to provide lateral deconfliction. They [had then] rolled wings level and applied moderate down elevator to re-establish visual contact. Both the pax (qualified pilot) and the pilot observed an aircraft banking to the left away from them in a mirroring manoeuvre. It then began to turn back toward them. [The pilot states that] they were able to match its turn [and] climbed to achieve approximately 200ft vertical and 500m lateral separation and circled the aircraft briefly to visually ID it before breaking off.

The pilot reports that the other aircraft had been ‘a UAV, single-engine, fixed-wing, V-tail and had been white or grey, with orange-stripe markings on its wings and tail.

The Evektor Sportstar pilot noted that they had carried a branded electronic conspicuity system but had received no alert from the other aircraft.

Reported Separation: 0ft V/ 300m H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

The Caernarfon Ops Manager reports that this is the first they had heard of this Airprox. They have spoken to the pilot of the Evektor Sportstar who confirmed that they had just left Mona’s frequency and had been about to switch to Caernarfon when the incident took place. They confirmed that they had not mentioned to any of the ops crew or the duty Air/ Ground Operator of the incident.

*Despite positive exchanges with known drone operators in this area, the UKAB Secretariat was unable to trace the operator/pilot of this aircraft.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 4, 7

Risk: The Board considered that safety had been much reduced below the norm to the extent that safety had not been assured.

B

2026112

12 Jun 26

0851

A350

(CAT)

Drone

5136N 00015W

IVO Elstree

FL074

London TMA

(A)

The A350 pilot reports that on descent, under control by Heathrow Director, they saw a drone within 1/4 mile on the nose that then passed down the left-hand-side of the aircraft, at the same level. They were unable to see clearly total number of rotors but estimate the size at between 30 and 50cm total diameter. After reporting the drone to Director and getting further clearance below 7000ft a second drone was seen just above the cloud line in the aircraft’s 10 o’clock, but they were unable to determine distance due to the perspective and cloud cover and it was only seen briefly. It is possible, although unlikely, that this was the same drone twice. Both were reported to Heathrow and police met the aircraft on arrival to take details.

Reported Separation: 0ft V/ 0.25NM H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

The Heathrow INT controller reports that at 0851 a pilot reported a drone sighting off its nose at FL70 around 2NM south of Elstree. Details were then taken and pilots were informed for the following 30min, with headings given to best avoid that area.

A NATS Investigation reports that the A350 reported on frequency; “we just saw a drone on the nose, we think it’s gone down the left-hand side, by about quarter of a mile.” The pilot then described the drone as: “couldn’t tell how many rotors it had, it went by pretty fast, it was definitely a drone.”

The A350 pilot submitted an Airprox report in response to the sighting of drone whilst abeam Elstree Aerodrome, whilst descending through FL074. It has been estimated that the UAS was at 7400ft. Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts associated with the drone report visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

C

2026114

19 Jun 26

1815

S92

(Civ Comm)

Drone

5446N 00155E

~125NM east of Middlesborough

FL040

London FIR

(G)

The S92 pilot reports that during the descent for Cygnus B, the crew were descending through Dogger Bank South at 4000ft and became visual with a medium-size drone at 3500ft flying [in the] opposite direction. Anglia Radar, Scottish Control or Swanwick Military were not aware of any scheduled flights at that time or level.

They described the drone as ‘1 large Quadcopter, approximately 1.5m span’.

The S92 pilot reports that they had carried a TCAS unit but had received no alert.

Reported Separation: 300ft V/ 0ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: Low

The Aberdeen controller reports that they had taken over the sector at 1830. Nothing had been on frequency, and the only traffic was [S92 C/S] from […-…] with a stop at the Cygnus A platform in the southern North Sea. They had been descending to land on the Cygnus A platform offshore, having already transferred their flight watch to the platform,

so was not receiving a service from Anglia. The crew made a call to the Anglia northern frequency (128.925MHz) to ask if they were aware of any drones in the area. The controller informed them that they were not, and the crew informed them that they had just sighted a drone flying below them. The controller requested details of the sighting. The crew informed them that the drone was red, approximately 1.5m in width, quadcopter type. The crew said that, due to the fast relative speeds and distance, it was hard to be certain of these details, but that the drone appeared to be approximately 3500ft altitude, when they had been at 4000ft, so 500ft below them when sighted. It was believed to be tracking northwest. The crew said they would check with the Cygnus A field to ask if they were aware of any drone activity, but this had been inconclusive at the time of writing this report.

The NATS Safety Investigation reports that Aberdeen ATC had no knowledge of any UAS activity in the area of the reported drone sighting, and subsequent enquiries confirmed that no other appropriate agencies were aware of any UAS operations taking place at the time. [S92 C/S] had already transferred from the Anglia Radar frequency when the UAS was sighted and only re-established contact to enquire whether there was any known UAS activity in the area. No primary radar contact associated with the reported drone was visible on the radar display, and the Anglia Radar controller only became aware of the sighting when it was reported by the crew of [S92 C/S]. At the time of the sighting, no other aircraft were in communication with Anglia Radar and there were no other aircraft operating in the vicinity. Consequently, there was no requirement to pass Traffic Information relating to the reported drone to other airspace users. Information regarding the sighting was, however, passed to the Coastguard, the Cygnus Platform, and a large wind farm construction vessel operating in the area. The actions taken by ATC in response to the report were considered appropriate. [S92 C/S] (S92) was enroute from Aberdeen to the Cygnus Field in the southern North Sea and was descending to land on the Cygnus Bravo platform. Anglia Radar (ANG) had been providing the aircraft with a Basic Service prior to them leaving the frequency to transfer flight watch to the platform. There were no other aircraft on the Anglia Radar frequency or operating in the vicinity at the time of the event.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 2, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

C

2026123

21 Jun 26

1934

A320

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5132N 00013W

Kensal Town

5300ft

London TMA

(A)

The A320 pilot reports on [a] BPK6J departure from RW09R at Heathrow. ATC put them on an easterly heading, just to the north of central London. They were climbing to approximately FL80 when a large object was spotted by the FO on the right side of the aircraft, flying a few hundred feet below them and on a westerly track. It looked like a potential large drone and was reported to ATC.

Reported Separation: NR

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

The Swanwick controller reports [A320C/S] departed Heathrow airport on a BPK SID and called onto the frequency. The aircraft was vectored off the

SID track; placed on a heading of 090° and climbed to FL110. At abeam FINCH the pilot called to report a drone sighting. The controller reported the incident to the North coordinator and the Group Supervisor who informed them that there had been many drone sightings in the area, that this information had been incorporated into the ATIS and Heathrow Tower controllers were passing this information on to departing [crews]. The crew did not pass on any significant details.

NATS Investigation reports that the pilot reported a “potential drone flew past our right-hand wing about point two of a mile ago.”. The NE Deps Co-ordinator highlighted the pilot report to Heathrow Tower, suggesting further BPK departures were advised by the Tower. There were three other reported Drone sightings within 30min of this report.

Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts associated with the drone report, visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that there was insufficient information to make a sound judgement of risk.

D

2026125

26 Jun 26

0738

C172

(Civ FW)

Drone

5136N 00002W

Banbury Reservoir

1900ft

London FIR

(G)

The C172 pilot reports that they were flying eastbound when they saw what they initially thought was a metallic helium balloon but as they got closer it became clear that it was a drone. It was travelling in the opposite direction and, as they tipped forward in motion, they could clearly see the rotors and lights. On landing they checked their track and noted that they had clipped the southern section of an area NOTAM. However, they strongly believed this Airprox was roughly 4 miles east of the NOTAM location.

Reported Separation: 100ft V /0.5NM H

Reported Risk of Collision: Low

The Farnborough LARS North controller reports that were providing a Basic Service to the C172 pilot, when the pilot reported passing a drone within 1NM of Lippett's Hill. [The controller] asked them to describe the drone. They passed this description on to other pilots who were flying in the vicinity, however no other pilots reported any sightings of this drone.

A NATS Investigation reports that the pilot of [the C172], in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS North, reported observing a 3-metre-wide drone at 1900ft in the vicinity of Lee Valley Reservoir whilst operating outside controlled airspace. When asked for a description the pilot reported that the drone “had lights on it, it was probably about three metres across I would estimate”. The LARS North controller acknowledged the report of the drone and passed Traffic Information to the pilot of another aircraft in receipt of a Traffic Service that was routing close to Lee Valley Reservoir. Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts associated with the drone report, visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

C

2026127

24 Jun 26

1208

B777

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5117N 00029W

4NM NE Guildford

5800ft

London TMA

(A)

The B777 pilot reports that they were climbing to altitude 6000ft on departure from LHR. Passing 5800ft, a shiny silver object (likely a mid-size drone)

passed in the opposite direction, very fast and very close to the right wing of the aircraft at no more than 50ft above aircraft altitude. It was too close for comfort.

Reported Separation: 50ft V/NR H

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

The LTCC controller reports that [the pilot of the B777] reported that a drone had just flown over their right wing. They said it was moving very fast, was probably of silver colour, metallic and reflective. After an enquiry as to its size, the [pilot] reported to them that it was about the “size of four toasters”.

NATS Safety Investigations reviewed the radar at the time that the pilot of [the B777] reported the sighting, however, no radar contacts associated with the drone were visible.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 6

Risk: The Board considered that providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

A

2026129

28 Jun 26

2047

B787

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5336N 00205W

Rochdale

FL140

Manchester TMA

(A)

The B737 pilot reports that during the climb, an object was sighted passing by the aircraft, estimated less than 1000ft below. The object looked to be the

size of a UAV/drone/balloon. The sighting was immediately notified to Scottish Control. No avoiding action was necessary due to the vertical separation, and indeed not possible due to the speed of the aircraft relative to the object and time from when the object was first sighted. The object may have been illuminated but may also have been reflecting the setting sun. They cannot be certain that the object wasn’t a metallicized balloon.

Reported Separation: 1000ft V/100m H

Reported Risk of Collision: Low

The PC North controller reports that they acknowledged the report of the drone and passed Traffic Information to subsequent aircraft on a similar track. Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts associated with the drone report, visible on radar at the approximate time of the

event.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

C

2026130

26 Jun 26

0611

A320

(CAT)

Drone

5110N 00006W

~3NM E of Gatwick

~1200ft

Gatwick CTR

(D)

[outside FRZ]

The A320 pilot reports that a drone was observed between [4NM and 3NM] on the ILS approach [for RW26L] into Gatwick, directly below the aircraft, approximately 300ft

Reported Separation: 300ft V/ 0ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

The NATS investigation report states that, after landing at Gatwick, the pilot of [the A320] reported on the GMC frequency that they had sighted a drone on final approach to RW26L.

Description of the UAS:

The pilot reported the encounter on the Gatwick GMC frequency after landing, describing that it occurred at approximately 3NM, 300ft below on a reciprocal track. No further description of the drone’s appearance was given.

Other pertinent information:

The Ground Movement controller (GMC) was aware of a ‘known drone’ which had permission to operate in the vicinity of Gatwick and informed the pilot, believing that this was the reported sighting.

Post event investigation established that the position of the approved drone did not correlate with the position in which the Airprox occurred.

Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts, associated with the Airprox drone report, visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

Conclusion:

The pilot of [the A320] submitted an Airprox report in response to the sighting of a drone between 3 and

4NM from landing on RW26L.

It has been estimated that the UAS was at 800ft.

Safety Investigations reviewed the radar at the time the pilot of [the A320] reported the sighting, however,

no radar contacts associated with the drone were visible.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

C

2026140

3 Jul 26

1654

A319

(CAT)

Drone

5128N 00005W

14NM E Heathrow

3750ft

London TMA

(A)

The A319 pilot reports that the Heathrow Director [passed an instruction] to turn right heading 240° at 4000ft 180kt and descend on the glideslope. Approximately 14NM on the extended centreline, and 1NM north of track, a large drone came into sight directly ahead and it passed slightly to the left and approximately 150-200ft above the aircraft. The crew confirmed a large 1m plus, four-rotor dark grey [drone] with black rotors. They informed ATC. They continued their approach to a successful landing. The Police and Airfield Ops Manager attended the aircraft.

Reported Separation: 150ft V/NR H

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

The LTCC controller reports that they have no recollection of the event.

NATS Safety Investigations reviewed the radar at the time that the pilot of [the A319] reported the sighting, however, no radar contacts associated with the drone were visible.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

C

2026153

11 Jul 26

0523

A320

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5320N 00256W

2.4NM Liverpool

~1000ft

Liverpool CTR

(D)

The A320 pilot reports that a drone was spotted by the FO over the right wing, on the Liverpool ILS for RW09. The FO may have seen a red light on the device which made them believe that it was a drone instead of a bird. After the sighting, the crew told ATC of the incident. It did not impact the aircraft.

No evasive action was taken. It was described as a medium/standard sized drone, the size of a normal backpack (less than 1.2kg).

Reported Separation: NR

Reported Risk of Collision: Low

The Liverpool controller reports that [the pilot of the A320] reported a possible drone on the RW09 final approach at about 2.3/2.4NM from touchdown at a height of 1000ft approximately, passing on their right-hand side wing, with a possible red light on it, but not confirmed by both pilots. APS [the Approach controller] was informed, and the area was isolated for 30min (the only traffic affected, was a [B737] which had to hold over KEGUN to [ensure] the full 30min were completed before the approach).

The Liverpool ATC investigation reports that RW09 was in use, with Manchester operating RW05. The weather was CAVOK, daylight, and the traffic levels [were light to medium].

[The A320] was vectored correctly from the northwest of Liverpool onto the ILS RW09. The aircraft was in class D airspace, Liverpool CTR, on a Radar Control Service.

The flight crew were given landing clearance from the ADC at 5.3NM with nothing observed on the radar display ahead of the aircraft. The radar replay was reviewed by the investigator from 05:30 UTC until the time of the incident and no contacts were observed in the vicinity of the incident during this time.

There were no SUA bookings on record via the Air Portal for this time and date. The investigator reviewed all telephone lines into ATC from 05:00 UTC and no phone calls had been received with any SUA requests.

[The pilot of the A320] reported sighting a possible SUA (drone) at 2.3/2.4NM at approximately 1000ft.The ADC controller acknowledged this and correctly obtained more information from the crew after landing due to their workload on a 2NM final. There was no traffic behind the [A320] to affect.

The aircraft was at 900ft according to Mode C readout from radar display. One flight crew member stated that the object sighted had a red light on it and it was on the right wing at about 1000ft. Subsequently, when on the ground, the other crew member reported that they did not see a red light however the object flew over the aircraft onto the right-hand side, but they had avoided it. This crew member suggested that it may have been a drone.

The narrative from the report filed by the flight crew states that they may have seen a red light on the object which led them to believe it was a drone and not a bird.

After the report was received, the Approach controller sterilised the arrival route for RW09 for 30min as per operational instructions.

Departures from RW09 were still permitted according to published procedures. Merseyside Police were informed of the Drone siting by the ADC ATCA.

One inbound [aircraft] was held at KEGUN for a few minutes until the 30min period had elapsed.

After this time had expired, normal arrival operations resumed. The inbound [aircraft] landed without incident.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that there was insufficient information to make a sound judgement of risk.

D

2026155

9 Jul 26

1826

B787

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5230N 00152W

Aston

3000ft

Birmingham CTA

(D)

The B787 pilot reports that during climb-out on a BRUMI 1M departure, on track 252° inbound BBW02, a metallic object was identified passing down the left side, continuing under [the] wing area. The Captain was PF and hand flying the departure on a nice calm clear day. The sunlight caught the object making it difficult to identify and it all happened very quickly. Nothing was noticed by the PM but ATC was informed. They mentioned a low-level helicopter passing in a southeasterly direction so they could only assume that is what it was, although they were sure it looked more like a much closer metallic object.

Reported Separation: NR

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

The Birmingham controller reports [B787 C/S] reported a large metal object or a ‘bird like thing’ over the city centre, passing down the left-hand side of the aircraft, continuing to the wing area, on the left turn-out following the BRUMI 1M SID.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that there was insufficient information to make a sound judgement of risk.

D