


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2026054**

Date: 26 Apr 2026 Time: 1635Z Position: 5058N 00002W Location: 3.5NM E Burgess Hill

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

| Recorded          | Aircraft 1       | Aircraft 2          |
|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Aircraft          | PA28(A)          | PA28(B)             |
| Operator          | Civ FW           | Civ FW              |
| Airspace          | London FIR       | London FIR          |
| Class             | G                | G                   |
| Rules             | VFR              | VFR                 |
| Service           | Basic            | Basic               |
| Provider          | F'borough LARS E | F'borough LARS E    |
| Altitude/FL       | 2300ft           | 2300ft              |
| Transponder       | A, C, S          | A, C, S             |
| ADS-B Out         | Not observed     | Not observed        |
| Reported          |                  |                     |
| Colours           | White            | White, blue         |
| Lighting          | Anti-col         | Strobe, nav, l'ding |
| Conditions        | VMC              | VMC                 |
| Visibility        | >10km            | >10km               |
| Altitude/FL       | 2300ft           | 2300ft              |
| Altimeter         | QNH (1023hPa)    | QNH (1023hPa)       |
| Heading           | 067°             | 060°                |
| Speed             | 100kt            | 130kt               |
| ACAS/TAS          | Not fitted       | Not fitted          |
| Separation at CPA |                  |                     |
| Reported          | 0ft V/10m H      | 0ft V/50m H         |
| Recorded          | 0ft V/<<0.1NM H  |                     |



**THE PA28(A) PILOT** reports that they were [en-route to their destination] with two passengers, routing [via] MAY VOR and Tunbridge Wells. After departing from [their takeoff airfield], they requested and obtained a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS East (123.225MHz). They were flying the first leg of the flight to MAY VOR, altitude 2300ft on QNH 1023hPa. They were cruising at 55% power, resulting in approximately 100kt IAS. On the leg to MAY VOR, they heard [the pilot of] another aircraft on frequency requesting a service from Farnborough, also routing via MAY VOR and cruising at 2300ft. They realised that this was another aircraft that had departed [from the same airfield] shortly after they had. Hearing the radio call increased their alertness, given the proximity, same routing and altitude of this other aircraft. They expected the other aircraft to be behind them, but without knowing its speed and [the pilot's] possible intention to overtake. Farnborough Radar then called [the pilots of] both aircraft to alert them of respective traffic. Immediately after that, they saw the other aircraft behind them to their right, at approximately four o'clock. From there, they kept regular visual contact with the traffic and also asked their passengers to do so given the close proximity.

The other aircraft was flying at a greater speed than theirs and kept converging towards them, ultimately overtaking to their right, at the same altitude, with no more than 10m of horizontal separation. This happened near Burgess Hill at approximately 1635. Given the close distance, they could clearly see that the other aircraft's registration was [PA28(B) C/S], which they noted down afterwards. They did not take any diverging action since they were being overtaken from behind, had right of way, and did not know the other pilot's intentions. The narrow distance between the two aircraft as they were being overtaken made them, and their passengers, extremely uncomfortable as they could not identify any reason for [the pilot of PA28(B)] to overtake them so closely (there was no other traffic nearby and no airspace restrictions). [The other PA28] then continued flying at a faster speed ahead of them and they lost sight of it shortly afterwards. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE PA28(B) PILOT** reports that they [departed from their airfield] routeing to Selsey Bill and, on leaving the frequency, they changed to Farnborough Radar. They heard the initial call from the other pilot reporting their position and heading to [a destination]. So, they were aware of them. Both pilots were speaking to Farnborough Radar. Farnborough Radar made [the pilot of PA28(B)] aware of [PA28(A)] and also reported [the position of PA28(B)] to the other pilot. They also informed the other pilot that [PA28(B)] was traveling faster and would likely overtake.

[The pilot of PA28(B)] spotted the aircraft [reported at a range of 15NM in their 10 o'clock] and positioned themselves to the right-hand side to overtake. As soon as the radio was clear, they informed Farnborough that they were visual with the aircraft. They were flying a similar track to [PA28(A)] and were monitoring their position. After overtaking the aircraft, they carried on their navigation towards MAY VOR.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

**THE FARNBOROUGH LARS EAST CONTROLLER** reports that they have no recollection of this event.

## Factual Background

The weather at Shoreham Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGKA 261620Z 15004KT 100V190 CAVOK 14/10 Q1024  
METAR EGKA 261650Z 14004KT 080V180 CAVOK 14/09 Q1023

## Analysis and Investigation

### CAA ATSI

ATSI has nothing to add to the Farnborough Unit Investigation.

### NATS Farnborough Unit Investigation

#### Description of the event

The pilot of [PA28(A)] called on the Farnborough LARS East frequency at 1614:01 (all times UTC) and requested a Basic Service. The pilot reported at 2000ft, from [...] to [...], in the vicinity of Littlehampton and was issued with a Basic Service, QNH 1024hPa and squawk 1740 which was selected by the pilot.

At 1620, the London QNH changed to 1023hPa, and a broadcast was made by the LARS controller at 1620:23 to all stations advising of the change.

The pilot of [PA28(B)] called onto the Farnborough LARS East frequency at 1624:11 requesting a Basic Service. The pilot reported at 2300ft from [...] to [...], QNH 1024hPa, north of Littlehampton. The controller issued squawk 1742 with QNH 1023hPa, and a Basic Service was agreed with the pilot.

The LARS controller called the pilot of [PA28(B)] at 1631:09 and advised, "*Caution, just traffic off to your left-hand side, converging, similar level*". The pilot responded, "*Copy the traffic, we'll keep a good lookout*".




Figure 1 – 1631:09

That was followed, at 1631:20, with a transmission from the LARS controller to the pilot of [PA28(A)] stating, *“Just caution, traffic off to your right, slightly behind, is converging, overtaking on your right-hand side, similar level, and just caution, you’re at two thousand four hundred feet. Base is two thousand five hundred feet. You are outside controlled airspace”*. The pilot responded, *“Roger, we’ll keep a good lookout for traffic and we’ll descend to two thousand three hundred feet just to make sure”*.

At 1634:30, the pilot of [PA28(B)] reported they were visual with the traffic (Figure 2).




Figure 2 – The pilot of PA28(B) reported visual with PA28(A) at 1634:30

The Closest Point of Approach between [PA28(A)] and [PA28(B)] occurred at 1634:40 and was measured on the NODE Multi-Track Radar as 0.0NM and 0ft (Figure 3). The event took place in Class G airspace where there were no separation requirements. There was no report of the conflict on the frequency from either pilot.




Figure 3 – CPA at 1634:40

### Investigation

Information available to the investigation included; CA4114 from the Farnborough LARS North and East controller, NATS4118 Initial Watch Management Investigation Report, Radar and RT recordings, [a redacted copy of the] Airprox report from the pilot of [PA28(A)], and CAP774 UK Flight Information Services.

The Farnborough LARS North and East were operating in a bandboxed configuration. Traffic was light at the time of the event. Both pilots requested a Basic Service, which was agreed with the LARS controller.

CAP774 Ch.2, 2.1 states:

'Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/ FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight.'

CAP774 Ch.2, 2.7 further states:

'A controller with access to surveillance-derived information shall avoid the routine provision of traffic information on specific aircraft but may use that information to provide a more detailed warning to the pilot. If a controller/ FISO considers that a definite risk of collision exists, a warning shall be issued to the pilot ((UK) SERA.9005(b)(2) and GM1 (UK) SERA.9005(b)(2)). Whether traffic information has been provided or not, the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance without assistance from the controller'.

Following the interaction between the two aircraft, there was no notable deviation of track from either pilot.

### UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. Neither aircraft was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources. The pilot of PA28(A) kindly supplied GPS track data for their flight. It was by combining the data sources that the diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined.




Figure 3 – 1635:02 (22sec after CPA)

The PA28(A) and PA28(B) pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the PA28(A) pilot had right of way and the PA28(B) pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering heading to the right. No subsequent change in the relative positions of the two aircraft shall absolve the overtaking aircraft from this obligation until it is entirely past and clear.<sup>2</sup> An aircraft that is obliged by the rules to keep out of the way of another shall avoid passing over, under or in front of the other, unless it passes well clear and takes into account the effect of aircraft wake turbulence.<sup>3</sup>

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when two PA28s flew into proximity 3.5NM east of Burgess Hill at 1635Z on Sunday 26<sup>th</sup> April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS East.

## PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data from the flight of PA28(A), a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of PA28(A), and members noted that they had been passed Traffic Information by the Farnborough controller on the presence of PA28(B). It was noted that PA28(B) had been subsequently sighted at the same altitude in their 4 o'clock, overtaking but converging. Members noted that the pilot of PA28(A) had recognised that they had had the right of way whilst they were being overtaken and recalled the wording of (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (a): 'The aircraft that has the right-of-way shall maintain its heading and speed'. However, members noted that the pilot of PA28(A) had become "*very uncomfortable*" at the decreasing separation and were, therefore, surprised that they had considered that no action had been necessary. Members pointed out that the pilot of PA28(A) had shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and, if they had perceived that the separation had reduced to just 10m, and had assessed that the risk of collision had been "*High*" (as they had described), avoiding action most certainly had been required. Members suggested that a change in altitude (such as a descent by 200-300ft) may have made the encounter far more comfortable or, ultimately, a turn to the left could have been made in order to have avoided a collision. Members agreed that the pilot of PA28(A) had not adapted their dynamic plan to have met the needs of the situation (**CF3**).

<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

<sup>3</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c).

Members next considered the actions of the pilot of PA28(B) and noted that they had been aware of the presence of PA28(A) having heard the pilot's transmissions on frequency, and that they had been given specific Traffic Information on its relative position to them. It was also noted that the pilot of PA28(B) had subsequently confirmed to the Farnborough controller that PA28(A) had been sighted. Members were satisfied that the pilot of PA28(B) had had sufficient awareness of PA28(A) to have been able to have conducted an appropriate overtake manoeuvre. Nevertheless, it was noted that their separation from PA28(A) had reduced to such an extent that the radar replay indicated that the returns had merged. Paraphrasing the applicable (UK) SERA regulations, members emphasised that the pilot of PA28(B) had been required to have kept 'out of the way' of PA28(A) whilst overtaking and had been required to have avoided passing in front of it until 'well clear'. Members agreed that that had not been the case and that wholly insufficient separation had been provided. Members agreed that the overtake manoeuvre had not been executed correctly (**CF2**) and, further, agreed that the pilot of PA28(B) had operated in such a way as to have created a collision hazard (**CF1**).

Members noted that both pilots had been in receipt of a Basic Service, and agreed that, as such, they would not have expected to have received any form of Traffic Information from the controller, and that they had remained responsible for collision avoidance without assistance. Members also noted that neither aircraft had been fitted with an additional EC device. Although both pilots had gained situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft in this case, members wished to highlight that if compatible devices had been fitted, there may have been a benefit to their general situational awareness of other aircraft in the vicinity and, crucially, may have provided an alert to the very close proximity of the other aircraft in this particular instance.

Turning their attention to the actions of the Farnborough controller, members noted that they had not been required to have monitored the flights of either pilot or to have passed routine Traffic Information. Nevertheless, members noted that both pilots had received very useful Traffic Information which had assisted with their situational awareness and lookouts. Commending the controller for their actions, members agreed that there had been little else that they could have done to have assisted matters.

Members concluded their discussion and summarised their thoughts. It was agreed that both pilots had visually acquired the other aircraft in time to have taken action to have avoided the close proximity. However, members agreed that the pilot of PA28(B) had flown into conflict with PA28(A) (**CF5**) and that the pilot of PA28(A) had not reacted to have resolved the situation (**CF4**). Members agreed that safety margins had reduced to such an extent that there had been a risk of collision (**CF6**) and assigned Risk Category B to this event.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**

### **Contributory Factors:**

| Factor                                                     | Description                    | ECCAIRS Amplification                                                                                               | UKAB Amplification                              |
|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Flight Elements</b>                                     |                                |                                                                                                                     |                                                 |
| <b>• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance</b> |                                |                                                                                                                     |                                                 |
| Human Factors                                              | • Use of policy/Procedures     | Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew                                        | Regulations and/or procedures not complied with |
| <b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>                   |                                |                                                                                                                     |                                                 |
| Human Factors                                              | • Action Performed Incorrectly | Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly                                             | Incorrect or ineffective execution              |
| Human Factors                                              | • Insufficient Decision/Plan   | Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation | Inadequate plan adaption                        |
| <b>• See and Avoid</b>                                     |                                |                                                                                                                     |                                                 |
| Human Factors                                              | • Incorrect Action Selection   | Events involving flight crew performing or choosing the wrong course of action                                      |                                                 |
| Contextual                                                 | • Loss of Separation           | An event involving a loss of separation between aircraft                                                            | Pilot flew into conflict                        |
| <b>• Outcome Events</b>                                    |                                |                                                                                                                     |                                                 |

|            |                                         |                                                                                                                       |  |
|------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|
| Contextual | • Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft | An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles |  |
|------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|

Degree of Risk: B.

#### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>4</sup>


In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

#### Flight Elements:

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of PA28(B) had operated in such a way as to have created a collision hazard.

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of PA28(B) had not executed their overtaking manoeuvre correctly. Upon becoming concerned at the proximity of PA28(B), the pilot of PA28(A) had not adapted their dynamic plan to have resolved the situation.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of PA28(B) had not provided adequate separation from PA28(A) during their overtake manoeuvre.



<sup>4</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).