


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026081

Date: 25 May 2026 Time: 0912Z Position: 5203N 00113W Location: Farthinghoe

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PAC750	TB10
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	AGCS
Provider	Hinton Traffic	Turweston Radio
Altitude/FL	2100ft	~2135ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, S ¹
ADS-B Out	Not observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	White	White, blue
Lighting	Nav, stbs, ldg, bcn	Strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2000ft descending	1800ft
Altimeter	QFE (1017hPa)	QNH (1032hPa)
Heading	090°	280°
Speed	160kt	85kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/50m H	0ft V/10m H
Recorded	~35ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE PAC750 PILOT reports that they had just completed a parachute drop at Hinton airfield and were on descent. They switched from London Control (121.030MHz) and went to Hinton [Traffic] on 119.455MHz. They made a traffic call at approximately 3NM west at 6000ft saying their position, height and how they were joining which was right base for RW24 grass. They then turned right base and were looking at the runway and the parachutes that were in the overhead when they then looked forwards and saw a TB10 come flying past their left-hand side so close they could see the pilots face. [The PAC750 pilot notes that] if they had been 50m more to their left it would have easily been a head-on collision. They then landed and contacted the airfield it came from and asked who it was and got the details needed to make this report. [...]. The TB10 was not on frequency and, if so, no calls were made. They would also like to highlight the fact the pilot flew through the parachute zone [they believed] with canopies in the air.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE TB10 PILOT reports that following departure from [...] enroute to [...], they had been climbing at approximately 85kt after completion of normal departure actions when a white low-wing aircraft passed close down their left-hand side on an approximately reciprocal track. The aircraft passed with such a high relative closing speed that they did not have time to take effective avoiding action. Prior to the encounter, they had been maintaining a lookout during the climb. Review of their SkyDemon log following notification of the Airprox shows that their aircraft tracked slightly left of the planned departure track and entered the Hinton-in-the-Hedges area by approximately 90m. At 2min 55sec after take-off they had been passing approximately 1775ft on Turweston QNH at approximately 85kt. They remained

¹ No altitude readout was seen on radar replays

within the area for approximately 25sec, exiting at approximately 1950ft QNH. [The TB10 pilot believes that] the Airprox occurred during that period.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE HINTON AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that they are a small unlicensed airfield and did not have an ATS or AGCS in operation at the time of the incident. Traffic calls only.

THE TURWESTON AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that the TB10 pilot was given standard information for a departure to the west routing to [...]. Their departure was standard and they reported leaving the frequency on enroute roughly 3min after departure. [The AGO] reports that their first awareness of the Airprox was a phone call received by the assistant in the 'tower' which was from the Turweston Flying Club owner [...]. No further discussion was had between the AGO and either pilot regarding the incident.

Factual Background

The weather at Luton Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGGW 250850Z AUTO 16005KT 9999 NCD 26/15 Q1032=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At CPA minus 3sec (0911:42)




Figure 2: At CPA + 1sec (0911:46) the TB10 is 0.9NM north of the Turweston centreline.

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and identified through Mode S data. Unfortunately, the TB10 gave no Mode C readout and therefore altitude references were taken from a pilot-provided GPS file. Both pilots report passing head-to-head co-altitude and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the separation at CPA when calculated as ~35ft V and <0.1NM horizontally is accurate. Neither aircraft were seen to have been emitting an ADS-B signal.

The circle around parachuting sites on CAA 1:500,000 scale VFR charts depicts the 'lateral limits' of a parachute jumping site. Despite common use of the term 'Drop Zone' or 'D/Z', there is no zone or controlled or regulated airspace associated with a civilian parachute jumping site, other than airspace that may already exist in the vicinity of the site and with which its notified lateral or vertical limits overlap.

The PAC750 and TB10 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.³ An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.⁴

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PAC750 and a TB10 flew into proximity at Farthinghoe at 0912Z on Monday 25th May 2026. The PAC750 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been Listening Out on the Hinton Traffic frequency, and the TB10 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been in receipt of an AGCS from Turweston Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data and a report from the Turweston Air Ground Operator. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

⁴ (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

Board members firstly discussed the actions of the PAC750 pilot, noting that they were familiar with the area and had been engaged in a task that had required focus toward the immediate airfield area from surface to parachute release altitude. In recovering to the airfield between drops, the pilot had been making blind calls on the Hinton Radio frequency to alert others to their position and had carried an electronic conspicuity (EC) unit common to gliders, but which had unfortunately, in this case, been unable to register any emissions from the TB10 (CF4). As the TB10 pilot had not been utilising the same radio frequency as the PAC750, this had combined with the incompatible EC fit to ensure the PAC750 pilot had not had any situational awareness of the presence of the TB10 (CF3). The PAC750 pilot noted that their attention had been drawn to the airfield at this time and that in their routine lookout scan had seen the TB10 as it had passed sufficiently close to their left-hand side that they had seen the other pilot's face. Members agreed that this had allowed no time to perform an avoidance manoeuvre and deemed it to have been effectively a non-sighting (CF5).

In reviewing the role played by the TB10 pilot, members noted that they had departed their nearby airfield and had completed post-departure checks whilst monitoring the Turweston Radio frequency. Members noted the flightpath taken by the TB10 pilot and opined that it had been to the left of that normally taken by aircraft departing to the west from that area, and a wider berth may have helped to have avoided the situation (CF2). They added that it may have been prudent for the TB10 pilot to have monitored the Hinton frequency or made an information call as they had passed the airfield (CF1). As the TB10 had not been equipped with an EC unit, the Board agreed that this, together with the lack of mutual radio monitoring, had left the pilot with no situational awareness of the presence of the PAC750 (CF3). The pilot reports that they had visually acquired the PAC750 only as it had passed to their left-hand side (CF5) and had left them with no time to initiate an avoidance manoeuvre. Members agreed that the high rate of descent and manoeuvre by the PAC750 had likely made visual acquisition by the TB10 pilot more difficult.

Board members agreed that neither Hinton nor Turweston Radio operators had been involved in this event and had not influenced its outcome. They noted, however, that the agreement between the two airfields enabled the passage of activity information to be passed between them and subsequently broadcast to traffic when the relevant ATS personnel were in place.

The Board, in assessing a Risk category for this event, noted that the PAC750 pilot had been recovering from a live parachute drop and was focussed on their approach and the parachutists they had previously delivered. The TB10 pilot had departed their nearby airfield and had strayed left from their planned departure track. They noted that the TB10 pilot recalls that they had been maintaining a good lookout and members opined that the pilot may have been surprised by the rate of descent used by the recovering parachute-drop aircraft. The Board felt that it had been fortunate that the aircraft were laterally spaced, albeit marginally, and that this had likely led to the event being an Airprox and no more. The Board agreed that safety had not been assured (CF6) and, as such, assigned Risk Category A to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026081			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
2	Human Factors	• Pre-flight briefing and flight preparation	An event involving incorrect, poor or insufficient pre-flight briefing	
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			

4	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
• See and Avoid				
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
• Outcome Events				
6	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: A.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Turweston AGO's actions did not affect the Airprox.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the TB10 pilot could have made an information call as they had aimed to pass Hinton airfield.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any situational awareness of the proximity of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by the PAC750 had been unable to register any electronic emissions from the TB10.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because both pilots had gained only very late sightings of the other aircraft and had been unable to initiate any avoidance action.

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

