


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026099

Date: 07 Jun 2026 Time: 1103Z Position: 5121N 00059W Location: Beech Hill

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152	PA28
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	None
Provider	Farnboro' LARS W	N/A
Altitude/FL	1800ft	1700ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	Blue, white	NR
Lighting	Pos'n, anti-coll	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	1800ft	
Altimeter	QNH (1021hPa)	
Heading	020°	
Speed	65kt	
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	SkyEcho
Alert	None ¹	Alert
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/50m H	200ft V/0NM H
Recorded	100ft V/0.1NM H	



THE C152 PILOT reports that, whilst they had been flying a straight-and-level lesson instructing a student, during their lookout scan they had noticed a close PA28 aircraft in their 9 o'clock banking left [they recall] heading towards them on a converging course and appeared to be at the same altitude but descending. The design of the high-wing C152 could have prevented earlier recognition in the lookout scan, and an immediate climb was initiated to ensure the collision risk was mitigated. It had been a very busy day, with lots of aircraft in the area. [The C152 pilot was] not sure if the PA28 had displayed on their SkyDemon using [branded EC equipment] as they had been focussed on instructing at the time. They subsequently realised that the Bluetooth had not been connected, meaning that there would have been no audio alarm if the other aircraft was ADS-B Out equipped.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that at approximately 1103 [...] they had been returning to [...] with the student flying the aircraft and, they believe, having made contact to obtain information to join (or were about to do so) when they became aware that their [branded EC equipment] was showing another aircraft (with a red track) and at the same altitude converging from their right side. At that moment they were unaware of its distance from them so immediately took control and descended to put their aircraft on a path below and behind the converging aircraft. Right after they had commenced this manoeuvre, they observed the other aircraft approaching from their right, above them, and a moment or so later beginning a bank to the right. The PA28 pilot assumed the other pilot had finally noticed them at that point. The PA28 pilot judged that their manoeuvre had put them approximately 200ft below the other

¹ The C152 pilot reported that they had not connected their EC equipment to an audio alert and therefore may have missed an alert relating to the PA28.

aircraft and well behind them and believed that their EC equipment had prevented a close Airprox, so decided there was not a requirement in this instance to file a report.

THE FARNBOBOUGH LARS WEST CONTROLLER reports that they had been working West and Zone in a medium workload/complexity at the time. They had been working 4 Traffic Services and co-ordinating a zone transit with approach in CTA4, when [the C152 C/S] [who was] on a Basic Service called an Airprox on frequency relating to traffic not being worked by them. As they were giving Traffic Services and co-ordinating a zone transit, they hadn't noticed [the C152 C/S] coming into close proximity to another aircraft. The controller asked the C152 pilot to pass details afterwards.

THE BLACKBUSHE AFISO reports that at approximately 1204, Farnborough Radar contacted the Blackbushe ATSU on the tied line. The duty AFISO at the time passed the phone to the tower assistant to deal with. Farnborough reported an Airprox between the PA28 and another aircraft approximately 1 hour earlier in a location 3 miles south of Reading. They noted that the PA28 was on a 7000 squawk and not working them, whilst the other aircraft was on LARS West. They took the details of the report and reviewed the airband recordings of the time, identifying the (C152) and noted that the PA28 was not working Blackbushe at the time, it's first contact for rejoin was 1103. Both aircraft were a few miles outside the Blackbushe ATZ. Accordingly, there was no ATSU unit involvement and so the Airprox will not be investigated by the ANSP.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Odiham and Farnborough airfield was recorded as follows:

METAR EGVO 071050Z AUTO 20012KT 9999 OVC017/// 15/11 Q1020=
METAR EGLF 071050Z 22012KT 9999 SCT022 BKN031 16/11 Q1020=

Analysis and Investigation

NATS Safety Investigation

Description of the event

The pilot of the C152 had requested and was receiving a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS West (LF-LARSW). The pilot had been tracking east at altitude 1900ft, displaying assigned Mode-A 0440. The PA28 was initially displaying the Frequency Monitoring Code (FMC) of 4572 for Farnborough Radar, inbound to [...], maintaining altitude 2000ft on a southeasterly track.

The pilot of [uninvolved aircraft] (0434), receiving a Traffic Service from the LF-LARSW controller, was passed Traffic Information relating to the PA28 at 1100:48 (all times UTC), with subsequent Traffic Information provided on the C152 (0440).

The C152 pilot, maintaining 1800ft, subsequently turned northeast at approximately 1101:43, placing the aircraft into potential conflict with the PA28 still maintaining 2000ft. Both aircraft then displayed 1900ft on their converging tracks.

The PA28 pilot changed Mode-A to 7000 at 1102:07, suggesting they were no longer monitoring the Farnborough frequency and could have potentially been in communication with Blackbushe 'Tower'.

The subsequent closest point of approach occurred at 1102:39 and was recorded on Multi-Track Radar as 0.1NM and 100ft.

Radar displayed the PA28 pilot appeared to perform a lateral and vertical avoidance manoeuvre, descending to 1500ft with a high rate of descent.

At the time the confliction was developing, the LF-LARSW controller was prioritising informing the pilot of [unrelated aircraft] of traffic and ensuring its pilot would remain outside controlled airspace.

At 1103:16, the C152 pilot reported on the frequency “Airprox”. The pilot then detailed; *“about three miles south of Reading, one thousand nine hundred feet, a PA twenty-eight aircraft, approaching us from the west, we were a northeasterly heading, it was a close encounter, about a hundred feet, passed below us, and it looked like it continued routing to the east.”*

Investigation

The LF-LARSW controller was operating combined with the Zone function. The CA4114 from the controller stated that they were operating in ‘medium workload/complexity at the time.’ The C152 had been operating out of, and into [...], VFR. The pilot had requested a Basic Service from Farnborough Radar.

CAP774 Chapter 2, 2.1 stipulates:

‘A Basic Service is an ATS provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. [...]. The avoidance of other traffic is solely the pilot’s responsibility. Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/ FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight.’

The controller report further stated: *‘I was working 4 (separate aircraft on) Traffic Services and co-ordinating a zone transit with approach in CTA-4, when the C152 pilot on a Basic Service called an Airprox on frequency relating to traffic not being worked by me. As I was giving Traffic Services and co-ordinating a zone transit, I didn’t notice the C152 coming into close proximity to another aircraft.’*

The NATS4118 highlighted the LF-LARSW controller ‘focus at that time was on the other Traffic Service aircraft on frequency and on coordinating a VFR transit of controlled airspace with the Farnborough approach controller. The pilot of the VFR transit also called on frequency immediately prior to the Airprox to reassure the controller that they would not infringe and the controller was relaying this message to the approach controller.’

CAP774 Chapter 1, 1.11 highlighted:

There may be circumstances that prevent controllers/FISOs from passing timely Traffic Information and/or deconfliction advice, e.g. high workload, areas of high traffic density, unknown aircraft conducting high energy manoeuvres, or when traffic is not displayed to the controller or is obscured by surveillance clutter. [...]. In high workload situations, which may not always be apparent from RTF loading, controllers/FISOs may not always be able to provide timely Traffic Information and/or deconfliction advice. High workload situations may not necessarily be linked to high traffic density.’

Conclusions

The C152 pilot was receiving a Basic Service from the LF-LARSW controller when they came into conflict with the PA28 displaying a 7000 squawk on a converging track at the same altitude.

The controller was prioritising Traffic Service aircraft and CTR transit requests at the time the conflict was developing and was not aware of the confliction or required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service.

The C152 pilot subsequently informed the controller of the confliction. Radar suggested the PA28 pilot took evasive action to mitigate the confliction.

CAA ATSI

ATSI notes that, as they had already stated in their initial report, the [Farnborough] controller was occupied with other aircraft and did not notice the conflict. The C152 pilot had been on a Basic Service.

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At CPA (1102:42)

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and identified through Mode S data. Neither aircraft had carried an extended squitter capability with their transponders though both pilots had equipped with compatible ADS-B in/out units.²

The C152 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.³ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the C152.⁴

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C152 and a PA28 flew into proximity at Beech Hill at 1103Z on Sunday 7th June 2026. The C152 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS West, and the PA28 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Board members firstly discussed the actions of the C152 pilot, noting that they had been instructing a student during straight-and-level flight and had, during the lookout reinforcement aspect, identified the PA28 closing from their left-hand side. Although the C152 pilot reports having carried a commonly utilised electronic conspicuity (EC) unit, that unit had not been connected to an audio notification system and its contribution to raising the situational awareness of the pilot was therefore greatly reduced. The

² No ADS-B signal was seen from the PA28.

³ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

⁴ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Board noted that the pilot had established themselves with a Basic Service with Farnborough LARS West with the known limitations of such a service (**CF1**, **CF3**) and agreed that, when combined with the unconnected EC unit, the pilot had been left with no situational awareness of the presence of the PA28 (**CF4**). The Board also agreed that the high-wing aspect of the C152 may have potentially obscured the PA28 from its pilot's field of view (**CF9**) and the pilot of the C152 had visually acquired the PA28 only as it had been close to their left-hand side and with that aircraft's pilot already executing an avoidance manoeuvre (**CF8**).

Members then reviewed the role played by the PA28 pilot, noting that they too had been with a student pilot and had been recovering to their home base. The pilot had been 'between frequencies' and, although they had been monitoring the Farnborough LARS frequency for a period (**CF3**), appeared to have been in the process of preparing to switch to another unit at or around CPA. The Board noted that the PA28 pilot had carried the same EC equipment as the C152 and had received an alert signal (**CF6**) indicating the proximity of the C152 and had been sufficiently concerned (**CF5**) to then have initiated an avoidance manoeuvre, visually acquiring the other aircraft during that manoeuvre (**CF7**). Members wished to reinforce through this report the utility of EC equipment when carried and connected in helping to avoid other aircraft in Class G operations.

In considering the role played by the Farnborough West LARS controller, the Board noted that the C152 pilot had been in receipt of a Basic Service with its known limitations (**CF1**), and that the controller had been actively dealing with higher priority traffic, whilst the PA28 had displayed a Farnborough frequency monitoring code (FMC). In this situation, both squawks had lain outside the select frame of the STCA system (**CF2**) and therefore no alert had been activated. Members agreed that the controller had acted accordingly and wished to re-state that this was a prime example of the value to pilots of seeking the highest level of ATS available to enhance their situational awareness.

The Board, in assessing a Risk category for this event, noted that the PA28 pilot had received an EC indication of the presence of the C152 and that this had driven the pilot to initiate avoidance action and had allowed them to gain visual contact with the C152. The Board did agree, however, that safety had not been assured (**CF10**) and, as such, assigned Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026099			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Situational Awareness and Action				
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
2	Technical	• Conflict Alert System Failure	~~Conflict Alert System did not function as expected~~	The Conflict Alert system did not function or was not utilised in this situation
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
3	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
5	Human Factors	• Unnecessary Action	~~Events involving flight crew performing an action that was not required~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				

6	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
• See and Avoid				
7	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
8	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
9	Contextual	• Visual Impairment	Events involving impairment due to an inability to see properly	One or both aircraft were obscured from the other
• Outcome Events				
10	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Farnborough LARS controller was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **not used** because the SSR codes set on both aircraft sat outside the select frame of the controller's STCA system.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because both pilots could have elected to take a surveillance-based service from Farnborough LARS.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the C152 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the PA28.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot had only seen the C152 at a late stage, and the C152 pilot had, potentially due to obscuration, seen the PA28 too late to initiate avoidance action.

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026099		Outside Controlled Airspace				
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness		
				Barrier Weighting		
				0%	5%	10% 15% 20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓			
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓			
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✓	○			
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✓	○			
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓			
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	!			
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓			
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✓	✓			
	See & Avoid	!	!			
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used
Provision		✓	!	✗	●	
Application		✓	!	✗	●	○
Effectiveness						