


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026051

Date: 22 Apr 2026 Time: 1405Z Position: 5221N 00010E Location: 4NM SW of Ely

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	KC135	C152
Operator	Foreign Mil	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	IFR	VFR
Service	Traffic	Basic
Provider	Lakenheath App	Cambridge Radar
Altitude	3100ft	2500ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Not observed	Observed
Reported		
Colours	Grey	White with blue
Lighting	Strobe and nav.	Bcn, nav, ldg
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	3000ft	3000ft
Altimeter	QNH	QNH (1027hPa)
Heading	250°	010°
Speed	240kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	Not fitted
Alert	RA	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/<1NM H	0ft V/<3NM H
Recorded	600ft V/0.8NM H	



THE KC135 PILOT reports that they were conducting a pattern-only training sortie. They had flown a mix of IFR/VFR patterns by this point. At 1400, while holding at the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) IRDAB, the Approach controller informed them of unknown traffic, co-altitude, at 3000ft, moving north towards them. At this time, they were in the right turn while in holding, turning southbound, towards the conflict. They became visual with traffic which was in the flightpath. They requested a climb to a higher altitude due to traffic. After a few seconds, after no response, they requested an immediate climb to a higher altitude and rolled wings level in order to avoid the traffic. As they received clearance to climb up to FL060 they also received an RA to climb. There was about 20sec between the time the crew became aware of the traffic and taking avoiding action. They complied with the RA and avoided the traffic visually. The [pilot of the other aircraft] appeared to not see them, never changed course and proceeded northbound at 3000ft. They later landed uneventfully.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C152 PILOT reports that they were conducting a training flight. The flight was a practice skills test for the student. This involved a navigation portion (where the Airprox occurred) followed by general handling/airwork and circuits on return. During the briefing, [the instructor and student] discussed their potential proximity to the Mildenhall MATZ and the student described how they intended to remain clear of it on their navigation leg to Wisbech. The student told them that they would initially route west of Waterbeach, ensure they crossed a notable bend in the Great Ouse, track overhead Haddenham and the road leading north from it. The student flew accurately as they had briefed the [instructor, who] also used [a GPS device] as a backup to check their navigation accuracy. On their departure, they were transferred to Cambridge Radar, requested and were given a Basic Service and squawked 6160. Approaching Haddenham, tracking approximately due north (heading approximately 010°) at about 3000ft, QNH 1027hPa, they saw a KC135 directly north of their position at approximately 5NM distance

and pointed it out to their student who acknowledged they were visual with it. Due to the [area of operation] it was a relatively common occurrence to see large and/or high-performance military aircraft. It was a little more unusual to see a KC135 manoeuvring at relatively low-level outside controlled airspace. At this point, it was tracking left-to-right (east) and they initially deemed it to be no factor. It then began a right turn which, as it continued, caused their flightpaths to begin to converge. Both they and their student noted this and briefed that if the other aircraft continued in the turn, the student would enter a descent. Shortly after this, the KC135 was seen to enter a climb and appeared to adjust its turn to pass behind them. As a result, they felt no avoiding action was necessary. Shortly after this, the other aircraft passed out of view above their right wing. The flight was continued normally.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE LAKENHEATH CONTROLLER reports that [the KC135 pilot] was holding south of the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) IRDAB on the ILS final approach course for RW10 at RAF Mildenhall at 3000ft AMSL, under a Traffic Service, and noticed that a light fixed-wing aircraft was flying northbound from Cambridge at 3000ft AMSL (unverified), not on frequency. The controller issued Traffic Information to [the KC135 pilot] on [the C152] 5NM south of the holding fix IRDAB prior to [the KC135's] outbound holding turn. The controller then attempted to raise [the C152] on the MATZ frequency two times without success. As [the KC135 pilot] started turning south, the controller asked if they could accept a climb. [The KC135 pilot] responded a few moments later they could. The controller re-issued Traffic Information to [the pilot] stating that traffic would soon be in their 12 o'clock at 4 NM and gave a heading of 180° to avoid. The heading was not read back by [the KC135 pilot]. [The pilot] then requested a climb after already being issued a climb, and the controller reissued a climb to FL060. [The pilot] continued their turn and climb, later reporting the traffic in sight.

THE CAMBRIDGE CONTROLLER reports that they had just taken over as the APS ATCO. The weather was CAVOK and there was some traffic on frequency. They were unaware of an Airprox until they received an e-mail.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Lakenheath and Cambridge Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGUL 221355Z AUTO 05019G23KT 9999 CLR 16/M04 A3034 RMK A02 SLP278 T01641037
METAR EGSC 221350Z 08011KT 040/140 CAVOK 16/01 Q1027

Analysis and Investigation

USAFE RAF Lakenheath

An investigation was completed by the RAF Lakenheath Radar Chief Controller (CCTLR) on an incident that occurred involving a KC135 and a general aviation Cessna. The CCTLR interviewed the Watch Supervisor and line controllers that were working during the times noted on the daily events log.

The controller's report and METAR were included (see above).

In reviewing the radar playback, the controller's workload was light with light complexity. The Approach controller provided two traffic calls to [KC135 C/S] under a Traffic Service and tried to establish positive communications with [the pilot of the C152]. [The pilot of the KC135] later confirmed that they had the issued traffic in sight. The controller also issued Traffic [Information] and control instructions to another aircraft inbound to RAF Mildenhall reference [the C152]. At no time was communication established with [the pilot of the C152]. The weather was not deemed a factor.

The Chief Controller's investigation was closed with a determination that while the controller did issue Traffic [Information] to [the KC135 pilot] twice, more proactive actions should have occurred to ensure targets that are likely to converge are prevented. No separation standards were broken,

and the [pilot of the] aircraft filed a report due to responding to a Resolution Advisory (RA) on traffic that was issued. This scenario will be debriefed as a lesson learned and to ensure the Radar Approach Controller (RAPCON) is providing a safe and expeditious service.

On request, it was further noted that the STCA had alerted at 1404:29 and continued for a few seconds until the aircraft had passed. This was shortly after climb was given. Ground radar data recorded the transponder on the KC135 logged and RA at 1404:18.

Cambridge Airport

Documentation provided was as follows:

Recorder transcript, Cambridge ATCO and Mildenhall ATC Liaison Officer reports, the unit SOP between Cambridge and Lakenheath, and the Cambridge METAR.

Sequence of Events

1402:06 The Cambridge Approach Control Surveillance (APS) handover was completed. The ATCO had 4 aircraft on frequency – 3 under a Basic Service, which included [the C152], and one under a Traffic Service (with an additional aircraft on Cambridge Tower frequency, [the pilot of which] was under a Traffic Service prior to being transferred to TWR).



Figure 1- Time 1402:06

On completion of the ATCO handover, the two aircraft were approximately 8NM horizontally and 100ft vertically apart.

At this time, the heavy [KC135], #0424, was crossing left-right ahead of [the C152] on present tracks.



Figure 2 – Time 1403:34

At 1403:34 the heavy KC135 appeared to start commencing the right turn at the Initial Approach Fix (IAF) IRDAB for RW10 at Mildenhall.

Before commencing the turn, as the KC135 passed over the IAF, the Lakenheath ATCO provided Traffic Information to the KC135 [pilot] on the C152. They asked the pilot if they would take a climb above and this is where the Lakenheath [controller] believed that the KC135 pilot had accepted a climb to avoid, yet their response was unclear from their recordings. No climb was issued by the ATCO at this point. Further Traffic Information was provided once 4NM apart.



Figure 3 – Time 1404:00

At 1404:00 the Lakenheath ATCO offered a heading of 180° to avoid. This was not read back, but a few seconds later the KC135 pilot requested a climb. The [pilot of the] aircraft was given a climb to altitude 6000ft and was readback.



Figure 4 – Time 1404:30

The KC135 [pilot] reported traffic in sight. They did not appear to take the heading previously offered and instead appeared to self-deviate from the holding pattern whilst continuing to climb (Figure 4).

Standard Operating Procedures between Cambridge ATC and Royal Air Force Lakenheath Radar Approach Control – Annex A Procedures – A.2

A.2 Procedures

A.2.1 RAPCON shall notify Cambridge ATC of the following:

Aircraft inbound to Cambridge International Airport requesting an instrument approach. Cambridge ATC shall issue an appropriate altitude and applicable restrictions. RAF Lakenheath shall then transfer communications and control as soon as traffic conditions permit.

Aircraft executing Radar patterns/finals to RAF Lakenheath Runway 06.

On agreement of Military Air Traffic Zone (MATZ) penetration, any traffic information on aircraft arriving or departing RAF Mildenhall or operating within the RAF Mildenhall circuit which may affect traffic conducting instrument approaches at Cambridge International Airport.

Any known traffic which will cross Cambridge International Airport Runway 23 final approach course between Cambridge Airport and the RAF Lakenheath/RAF Mildenhall Combined Military Air Traffic Zone (CMATZ) below 3000ft above mean sea level (AMSL).

Requests may be made for co-ordination regarding Cambridge International Airport traffic to provide appropriate deconfliction minima in accordance with the service provided.

Note: For the purposes of traffic information, RAF Lakenheath ATCOs should note that when Cambridge ATC are using the callsign "Cambridge Approach" that they are operating non-Radar.

A.2.2 Cambridge ATC shall notify RAPCON of the following:

Aircraft requesting an instrument departure from Runway 05 turning north or aircraft conducting a missed approach from Runway 05 at Cambridge International Airport and climbing above 2000 AMSL.

Aircraft executing instrument approaches to Runway 23.

On receipt of information regarding aircraft executing radar patterns/finals to RAF Lakenheath Runway 06, Cambridge ATC shall advise RAPCON of any traffic which may affect RAF Lakenheath operations.

Requests may be made for co-ordination regarding RAF Lakenheath traffic to provide appropriate deconfliction minima in accordance with the service provided.

Analysis of event evidence.

Initiating event. The KC135 made a turn at IAF IRDAB towards [the C152] and, despite calling Traffic Information to the aircraft, no calls were made to Cambridge Radar [by the Lakenheath controller via landline].

Examination of the initiating event factors. Traffic information was passed but avoidance advice offered by the controller and requested by the pilot was missed with some radio limitations/issues, possibly caused by transmissions stepping over each other.

Identification of recovery factors. The ATCO attempted two transmissions to [the pilot of the C152].

Failure of recovery factors. [The pilot of the C152] was being provided a service from Cambridge Radar and therefore not on frequency.

Contributory Factors.

The Cambridge ATCO shift began at 1000. They had completed two hours operationally earlier in the shift, however, was just returning from an hour break prior to taking the position.

There was moderate traffic with 4 aircraft on frequency and another conducting a training approach on the Tower frequency.

Conclusion.

The Cambridge Radar controller had no awareness that the KC135, inbound to RAF Mildenhall, had manoeuvred towards [the C152] or that a confliction had developed. [The C152 pilot] was operating under a Basic Service from Cambridge Radar and, as per CAA CAP 774¹, there was no requirement for the controller to continuously monitor the flight or provide Traffic Information. However, despite having access to surveillance-derived information, the Cambridge controller did not identify the developing confliction or associated risk of collision and consequently, no Traffic Information or warning was passed to [the pilot of the C152] about the KC135.

The primary causal factor was the failure of effective and timely co-ordination between Lakenheath and Cambridge Radar [controllers]. Although the Lakenheath controller made two blind transmissions to [the pilot of the C152] using the Mode S callsign, no direct telephone call was made to pass Traffic Information or request co-ordination to Cambridge Radar, despite [the C152 pilot] operating on a Cambridge allocated discrete SSR code. As a result, the Cambridge controller remained unaware of the developing confliction.

Given that the KC135 was receiving a Traffic Service from Lakenheath, the failure to pass Traffic Information or request tactical co-ordination with Cambridge Radar is considered a causal and contributory factor to the subsequent Airprox. This appeared inconsistent with the Standard Operating Procedures between Cambridge ATC and Lakenheath RAPCON which state that,

“RAPCON shall notify Cambridge ATC of the following: Requests may be made for co-ordination regarding Cambridge International Airport traffic to provide appropriate deconfliction minima in accordance with the service provided” [Appendix 2].

¹ UK CAA CAP 774 – UK Flight Information Services, Chapter 2, Basic Service

However, equally, the Cambridge [controller] made no blind transmissions or telephone calls to the Lakenheath controller to ascertain the intentions of the KC135 [pilot] as they remained unaware of the KC135 [pilot's] intentions.

The workload of the Cambridge controller was deemed as moderate with 4 aircraft on frequency and another aircraft [pilot] working Cambridge Tower shortly to come back on the Radar frequency after completing an approach to RW05 at Cambridge. However, the investigation was unable to determine why the surveillance information available did not lead to the conflict being identified. Whilst this did not alter the controller's obligations under the provision of a Basic Service, the failure to recognise the developing situation is considered an additional factor.

Furthermore, because of the KC135 crew's decision to file the Airprox after landing, both ATSU's were unaware of the TCAS RA and Airprox until some time after the event, so neither controller was withdrawn from position. Subsequently, Cambridge was unable to establish details of the TCAS RA; such as when it was triggered, the instructed corrective action given, or when the aircraft was clear of conflict.

Recommendations.

Team discussion - email to all ATC team highlighting best practices for passing Traffic Information to [pilots], even those under a Basic Service, and email to all ATC highlighting the importance of coordinating between Cambridge and other units, particularly those [with which] there are LOA/MOU/SOP agreements.

Documentation - Review refresher training to ensure it includes the application of surveillance-derived information for all types of Flight Information Services, as well as the use of tactical coordination.

Discussions between ATC Team to reinforce the importance of shared situational awareness and effective monitoring between both ATCOs and ATSA's.

CAA ATSI

ATSI has reviewed the Cambridge investigation and had nothing further to add.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both the KC135 and C152 were identified using Mode S data (Figure 1).




Figure 1 – CPA 1404:38

Further analysis of aircraft tracking software was undertaken and only the C152 was detected using ADS-B data sources.

The KC135 and C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C152 pilot was required to give way to the KC135.³

Comments

USAFE

This Airprox is very similar to Airprox 2025056⁴, occurring in the same location along the Mildenhall RW10 approach. Once again, it highlights the risks when mixing large military aircraft on published instrument procedures with light GA traffic in Class G airspace.

The light aircraft was routeing straight through the IRDAB holding fix whilst on a Basic Service with Cambridge. Under a Basic Service, ATC is not required to monitor an aircraft's flight, meaning the pilot is relying purely on see-and-avoid in an area where heavy aircraft are manoeuvring. Although the traffic was shown on Lakenheath radar and called to the KC135 crew on multiple occasions, a breakdown in communications developed along multiple lines: the Lakenheath controller offered advice to the KC135 crew that appears not to have been heard (likely due to radio limitations); Lakenheath and Cambridge did not coordinate by landline, which would have improved the situational awareness of both controllers; and [the Lakenheath controller's] calls to the [pilot of the] C152 on the MATZ frequency could not be heard because the [pilot] was on Cambridge's frequency.

The major difference from Airprox 2025056 and the barrier that enabled the KC135 crew to gain situational awareness was that the C152 was squawking Mode S. That allowed the KC135's TCAS to identify the conflict and issue an RA climb, which the crew flew promptly. Lakenheath controllers have been briefed on this incident and how a direct call to adjacent units like Cambridge, rather than making unmonitored blind calls, may have offered a better resolution.

Pilots operating in Class G airspace should carefully consider their selection of service and service provider for the relevant portion of flight. Had the [pilot of] the C152 requested a Traffic Service from Cambridge, asked Cambridge about the KC135 that they had sighted, or requested a service from Lakenheath, the crew would have been assisted further during their transit.

Operators of light GA aircraft should also be mindful that crews of large, commercial-sized aircraft may be more sensitive to proximity of other aircraft than another light GA aircraft would be, given their limitations in cockpit visibility, manoeuvrability, and performance.

Lakenheath Radar is always ready to provide a Flight Information Service (FIS) to any aircraft transiting in the vicinity of RAF Mildenhall and RAF Lakenheath. Consideration should be given along extended runway centrelines (out to 15–20NM) and south of the MATZ, where large aircraft routinely manoeuvre under IFR to approach and depart the airfield.

AOPA

AOPA is heartened and in agreement with the frustration held by the Lakenheath authorities, in that this is another example of an Airprox in Class G [airspace] which involves aircraft flying IFR over points not published for the VFR world to see. Whilst the outcome may have been different had the VFR aircraft been on a Traffic Service, a similar result could have been achieved if the VFR aircraft had a form of electronic conspicuity equipment fitted. Whilst this Airprox may have been resolved by these two items, the root cause of the Airprox is the IFR unpublished holding points in the VFR

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 12.

⁴ UKAB [Airprox Report 2025056](#)

Class G airspace. AOPA hopes that this issue will be resolved by the CAA before a mid-air collision occurs.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a KC135 and a C152 flew into proximity southwest of Ely at 1405Z on Wednesday 22nd April 2026. The KC135 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Traffic Service from Lakenheath Approach, and the C152 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Cambridge Approach.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the KC135 pilot, noting that the pilot had first become aware of the presence of the C152 from the Lakenheath controller's provision of Traffic Information. The Board noted that the pilot had been holding at the Initial Approach Fix at this time and members agreed that this was the first point at which the pilot had become concerned by the proximity of the C152 (**CF9**). The Board noted that the pilot had sighted the C152 as they had turned southbound in the hold and, on seeing it, had become further concerned by the C152's proximity (**CF11**) and had requested a climb to a higher altitude. The Board also noted that the Lakenheath controller had issued a heading and climb for the KC135 which had neither been heard nor acknowledged by the KC135 pilot (**CF7**), and members agreed that it was possible that they had both transmitted at the same time, and that the pilot had then made a more urgent request for an immediate climb to avoid traffic after, seemingly, having had no response from their previous call. The Board further noted that the KC135 pilot received an RA from their TCAS (**CF10**) as they received an ATC climb clearance to FL060. On the subject of EC, a question was raised by members regarding the use of additional EC and specifically the lack of ADS-B output from the KC135 on this occasion, and it was confirmed that USAFE will be utilising the ADS-B out function during training flights in future, but that GA pilots should be mindful that this may not always be the case in other scenarios.

The Board then considered the actions of the C152 pilot, noting that the pilot had been in receipt of a Basic Service from Cambridge Approach, and members agreed that the pilot could have likely improved their situational awareness by having either requested a Traffic Service from Cambridge, or by speaking with Lakenheath (**CF6**), particularly after they had become aware of the KC135's presence and not knowing the other pilot's intentions. As it was, members agreed that the pilot of the C152 had had no situational awareness of the presence of the KC135 (**CF8**) until they had sighted it.

Moving their attention to the actions of the Lakenheath controller, the Board noted that they had attempted to call the pilot of the C152 on frequency on a couple of occasions to provide them with information on the KC135. The Board wondered why the controller had not realised that the C152 pilot had been in communication with Cambridge, based on the squawk displayed on their radar screen, and had not contacted Cambridge directly with any pertinent information. Members agreed that, by not co-ordinating with the Cambridge controller (**CF3**), the Lakenheath controller had not complied with the Cambridge and RAF Lakenheath Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) (**CF1**), and that such coordination is an important part of safety operations, as highlighted in the Cambridge investigation report. The Board further noted that there had been some initial communication difficulties between the Lakenheath controller and the KC135 pilot. Members agreed that the controller had not queried an unclear transmission and had instead assumed it to have been the KC135 pilot's acceptance of their initial climb and heading to avoid the nearby traffic (**CF4**). The Board considered it fortunate that the confusion had finally been resolved by the Lakenheath controller's reissuance of a climb instruction, noting that this had been coincident with an RA from the KC135's TCAS and immediately followed by an STCA on the controller's radar display (**CF5**). Reflecting on the flight track of the KC135 some members voiced their general concerns regarding large military IFR traffic performing holds and approaches in Class G airspace without those hold positions being on the GA VFR chart, however, they

were pleased to note that the approach charts have been made available in the Aerodrome section of the UK Military AIP⁵ at least.

Finally, the Board considered the actions of the Cambridge Approach controller, noting that they had been providing the pilot of the C152 with a Basic Service. The Board also noted that the controller had been busy with other traffic on a Traffic Service and had not noticed a developing conflict between the C152 and the KC135. Members agreed that the controller had not been required to monitor the C152 under the terms of a Basic Service (**CF2**) but had thought it had been a shame that the controller had not seen the conflict and had therefore not reacted to it.

In concluding their discussion, the Board noted that the confusion on frequency between the Lakenheath controller and the KC135 pilot had likely delayed the pilot's climb. Members agreed that both had attempted to call the other to initiate avoidance action at the same time and that the subsequent brief delay may have been enough to have allowed the proximity to be sufficiently close for the TCAS RA to have activated. In considering the Risk Category of this Airprox some members had felt that normal parameters were considered to have pertained (Risk E) but the majority had felt that, as some of the safety barriers had not been fully effective, safety margins had been reduced below the norm and, as such, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026051			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
2	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
3	Human Factors	• ATM Coordination	Coordination related issues (external as well as internal)	
4	Human Factors	• ATM Personnel Hear back	An event involving the hearback (listening) of ATM personnel to communications	
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Technical	• STCA Warning	An event involving the triggering of a Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA) Warning	
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
6	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
7	Human Factors	• Flight crew response to communications	An event related to the flight crew taking the incorrect action following communication	
8	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
9	Human Factors	• Unnecessary Action	~~Events involving flight crew performing an action that was not required~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
10	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS RA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert	

⁵ [UK Mil AIP | AIP](#)

			and collision avoidance system resolution advisory warning triggered	
	• See and Avoid			
11	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁶

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Lakenheath controller had not complied with Cambridge and RAF Lakenheath's Standard Operating Procedures.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the Lakenheath controller had not heard the KC135 pilot's response to their instructions.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the C152 pilot could have either requested a Traffic Service from Cambridge or contacted Lakenheath.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the C152 plot had no situational awareness of the presence of the KC135.

⁶ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026051		Outside Controlled Airspace				
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness		
				0%	5%	Barrier Weighting
						10% 15% 20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	!	5%		
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓	2.5%		
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✓	!	15%		
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✓	✓	2.5%		
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓	10%		
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	!	10%		
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓	20%		
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	!	✓	15%		
	See & Avoid	✓	✓	20%		
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used
Provision		✓	!	✗	●	
Application		✓	!	✗	●	○
Effectiveness		■	■	■	■	□