


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2026090**

Date: 29 May 2026 Time: 1307Z Position: 5146N 00115W Location: Oxford

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

| Recorded                 | Aircraft 1      | Aircraft 2    |
|--------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Aircraft                 | DA42            | AW169         |
| Operator                 | Civ FW          | Civ Comm      |
| Airspace                 | London FIR      | London FIR    |
| Class                    | G               | G             |
| Rules                    | VFR             | VFR           |
| Service                  | Basic           | Basic         |
| Provider                 | Oxford Radar    | Oxford Radar  |
| Altitude                 | 1800ft          | 2400ft        |
| Transponder              | A, C, S         | A, C, S+      |
| ADS-B Out                | Not observed    | Observed      |
| Reported                 |                 |               |
| Colours                  | White           | Silver/grey   |
| Lighting                 | Nav, strobes.   | NR            |
| Conditions               | VMC             | VMC           |
| Visibility               | >10km           | NR            |
| Altitude                 | 2000ft          | 2400ft        |
| Altimeter                | QNH (1023hPa)   | QNH           |
| Heading                  | 135°            | 327°          |
| Speed                    | 120kt           | 140kt         |
| ACAS/TAS                 | Not fitted      | TCAS II       |
| Alert                    | N/A             | RA            |
| <b>Separation at CPA</b> |                 |               |
| Reported                 | 200ft V/0.5NM H | 300ft V/0NM H |
| Recorded                 | 600ft V/0.1NM H |               |



**THE DA42 PILOT** reports that, whilst departing from Oxford to [destination] routing east-southeast, Oxford ATC advised that there were no level restrictions applicable and passed Traffic Information regarding a helicopter southeast of their position tracking northwest at approximately 2400ft. They elected to remain at 2000ft initially whilst actively searching for the reported traffic. Their aircraft was operating under a Basic Service. During this period, the student may have allowed the aircraft to enter a slight climb whilst maintaining a steady heading. Visual contact was subsequently established with the helicopter at less than 1NM range. It appeared the helicopter was operating under a Traffic Service. Upon becoming visual and assessing the relative positions of both aircraft, a precautionary descent of approximately 300-400ft was carried out to increase vertical spacing prior to passing.

The helicopter [pilot] later advised ATC that they had received an RA. In [the DA42 instructor's] assessment as PIC, at no stage did the situation present a significant collision risk. The helicopter had already been identified from the earlier Traffic Information, visual contact was established in sufficient time, and prompt proactive action was taken to further increase separation prior to passing. The flight was operating VFR in Class G airspace with no deconfliction or separation service being provided to their aircraft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

**THE AW169 PILOT** reports that, while in cruise transit approaching the overhead of Oxford enroute to [destination], with a Basic Service from Oxford Approach, they heard [the DA42 pilot] warned of [the AW169's] presence and flightpath converging with [the DA42]. They held [the DA42] on TCAS and monitored their continued converging heading and climb. They saw and reacted to a head on, very similar altitude at the same time as the TCAS instructed an RA. A collision was avoided and the flight continued. ATC was notified and a report filed.

**THE OXFORD RADAR CONTROLLER (R-B)** reports that they had just taken the Oxford Radar position and were made aware of an AW169 helicopter transiting southeast-northwest via the overhead on a Basic Service and VFR. The previous controller, who had just handed over to them, had passed generic Traffic Information to [the pilot of the AW169] on a DA42 that had just departed Oxford to the southeast VFR [they thought]. In the first few minutes of them taking over there were lots of cross transmissions and therefore they may have missed whether [the DA42 pilot] had checked in with them or not and there were a few aircraft on a Traffic Service that drew their initial attention. [The pilot of the AW169] asked for an update on the position of the traffic. They assumed the pilot meant [the DA42] so they passed this Traffic to them in the clock code format. After a slight delay, [the AW169 pilot] said they were visual with the DA42.

There was no time to pass Traffic [Information] to [the pilot of the DA42] (if they were on frequency). [The pilot of the AW169] then called a TCAS RA. [A Unit Assessor] was sat next to them whilst the event happened and confirmed that [their] opinion was that there was no controller fault. Both aircraft were under a Basic Service and Traffic Information was passed at least to [the pilot of the AW169]. The time of the event was approximately 1305.

The controller (at interview) assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

## **Factual Background**

The weather at Oxford was recorded as follows:

METAR EGTK 291250Z 22008KT 9999 FEW040 20/11 Q1023

METAR EGTK 291320Z 25007KT 200V290 9999 FEW040 20/10 Q1023

## **Analysis and Investigation**

### **Oxford Airport**

Details of Investigation.

The following were reviewed: R/T and data records, including screen recordings and raw radar data, the radar watch log, the booking system log (for the date), movement logs for the period 1230-1330. Both radar controllers were interviewed, and the controller who was plugged-in during the Airprox also reviewed the R/T and data recording.

Findings and observations.

All times stated are Zulu. Oxford's ATC was fully staffed. Five controllers had arrived on watch by the time of the Airprox, with a sixth on administrative duties. The Rad 2 (Director) was available but was not in use. An ATCA was present in the ACR, assisting the Radar controller.

Two controllers operated Oxford Radar during the time period that concluded with the Airprox: R-A, then R-B. R-A had been on shift since 0900, and on operational duty since 1235, following a break which had lasted 33 minutes. When R-A handed over to R-B, the former had been on operational duty for 30 minutes. R-B had been on shift since 1300 and took over the Radar position from R-A at 1305. This was their first operational duty of the day.

Oxford recorded 19 movements during the period 1230-1330, predominantly light aircraft and helicopters. The Radar watch log was reviewed and was annotated at 1305 "TCAS RA [AW169 DA42 R-A initials] reviewed, no issues."

At 1300, the radar recording indicates that 8 aircraft were being provided with a service by Oxford Radar; 5 aircraft were receiving a Basic Service, and 3 aircraft were receiving a Traffic Service.

At 1257:24 [the pilot of the AW169] checked in with Oxford Radar (R-A), requesting a Basic Service, approaching Oxford from southeast of RAF Benson, reporting their altitude as 2400ft. The controller provided a Basic Service.

At 1304:52 the Oxford Tower controller telephoned the Oxford Radar controller to report that [the DA42] was airborne.

At 1305:22 [the pilot of the DA42] checked in with Oxford Radar, requesting a Basic Service, which the controller (R-A) provided. In the same transmission, R-A provided a generic warning of *“opposite direction helicopter traffic approaching from the southeast, northwest bound, 2400ft,”* matching [the AW169’s] previously reported altitude, and the aircraft’s (unverified) Mode C indication.

At 1306:22 [the pilot of the AW169] stated *“I’m not visual with the traffic on the nose, it’s at one and a half miles?”* The Oxford Radar controller (now R-B) initially responded querying the transmission’s source, which was repeated by the pilot of [the AW169].

At 1306:33 the Oxford Radar controller stated, *“It’s now in your 12 o’clock, half a mile, opposite direction, 2200ft”*.

At 1306:38 the pilot of [the AW169] responded that they were visual with the other aircraft.

At 1306:44 the CPA occurred, calculated by the Oxford RDP as 0.07 NM/625ft, a slant distance of 755.99ft (Figure 1).



Figure 1 – Time 1306:44 screenshot.

At 1307:14 the pilot of [the AW169] stated *“TCAS RA”* The Oxford Radar controller responded, *“Roger.”*

At 1307:27, the pilot of [the AW169] stated, *“Now reselecting 2200ft, conflict resolved.”*

#### Radar controller interview (R-A)

R-A provided a ‘live’ review, in their capacity as Unit Assessor, of R-B’s actions during the TCAS RA (then not known to be an Airprox), as they had remained in the [control room] after handing over the position and had witnessed the event. R-A did not submit a companion report or review the recording, so their statements were based on their recollections 13 days post-event.

R-A stated that they had told the Tower controller about [the AW169] transiting and then given [the pilot of the AW169] Traffic Information on [the DA42] as it departed. They then handed over the position to R-B.

R-A stated that R-B passed Traffic Information [to the pilot of the AW169] regarding [the DA42], they then recalled some crossed transmissions which hindered their recollection. R-A stated that they expected that the Tower controller would have passed Traffic Information to [the pilot of the DA42] regarding [the AW169] before transferring them to the Radar frequency.

With regard to the event itself, R-A considered that R-B had discharged their responsibilities appropriately, since both aircraft were operating on a Basic Service on their own navigation, with no requirement to monitor, but that R-B had nonetheless passed appropriate Traffic Information to [the AW169 pilot] in response to a perceived risk of collision.

#### Radar controller interview (R-B)

R-B was invited to review the R/T and radar recording and given the opportunity to record any further observations. This was considered relevant because an Airprox was not reported by either pilot over the R/T, and therefore the controller's report pertained only to the TCAS RA and did not include an assessment of the risk of collision.

R-B did not report any external factors which may have influenced the provision of service, such as workload or equipment serviceability. They also noted that R-A, who is a Unit Assessor, had remained nearby after handover, had observed the TCAS RA, and had assured them that they had responded appropriately.

R-B stated that once the pilot of [the AW169] reported visual with [the DA42], they considered their responsibility discharged in terms of mitigating a perceived risk of collision and did not continue to monitor the two aircraft closely. However, based on the traffic presentation they observed during their review of the radar recording, R-B considered the risk of collision to be 'Medium'.

#### Analysis

The [pilots of the] aircraft involved in the Airprox both requested and were provided with a Basic Service by Oxford Radar. Per CAP 774 2.5,

"the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight, [and] pilots should not expect any form of traffic information from a controller/FISO".

Paragraph 2.7 also cautions against "routine provision of traffic information on specific aircraft" to pilots in receipt of a Basic Service. However, Paragraph 2.8 states:

"If a controller/ FISO considers that a definite risk of collision exists, a warning shall be issued to the pilot (SERA.9005(b)(2) and GM1 SERA.9005(b)(2))".

R-A passed [the pilot of the DA42] generic Traffic Information about [the AW169] shortly after the former checked in with Oxford Radar, which is considered appropriate since they were departing in the same approximate direction as [the AW169] was approaching Oxford from. R-A, when applying the Basic Service to [the pilot of the DA42], stated '*no level restriction*': Oxford's usual VFR departure includes an initial climb to not above altitude 2000ft, and it is routine for the Approach/Radar controller to remove this restriction on first contact, if there is not a traffic reason to retain it. However, the pilot of [the DA42], when they checked in, stated, "*levelling off at 1800*".

R-A's statements, and R-B's report, contained some inaccuracies, in the former case presumably due to the elapsed time post-event. R-A recalled that they passed Traffic Information to the Tower controller regarding [the AW169] and stated that they believed the Tower controller would have relayed this to [the pilot of the DA42] prior to their departure. R-B incorrectly stated that R-A had passed generic Traffic Information to [the pilot of the AW169] on [the DA42], when R-A had actually passed Traffic Information to [the pilot of the DA42], when they checked in, on [the AW169].

Unit procedure, with regard to transit aircraft, states:

"Aircraft transiting Oxford above 2500ft (QNH) will normally be retained by APP/APS, and at or below 2500ft (QNH) will be pre-noted to the Aerodrome controller (ADC), who will decide whether or not to work the aircraft."

At a reported altitude of 2400ft, [the AW169] was within these criteria. R-A did not pass Traffic Information on [the AW169] to the Tower controller, which did not comply with unit procedure. However, they did subsequently pass Traffic Information directly to [the pilot of] the DA42 on “*opposite direction helicopter traffic*” in response to their check-in transmission. These actions are considered equivalent as it pertains to these aircraft, and the pilot of [the DA42] acknowledged the Traffic Information, concluding in their response, “*copy traffic, looking*”.

The statement by the pilot of [the DA42] that they were “*levelling off at 1800*”, (albeit made before handover was complete) may have influenced R-B to not provide further Traffic Information on [the AW169], since the respective reported levels were not in confliction.

During the Radar position handover, R-A indicated that they intended to climb [the AW169] by 100ft (to 2500ft) for their transit of Oxford. This was based on the incorrect belief that the AW169 was in the ‘small’ wake turbulence category aircraft, implying protection was needed for aircraft in the ‘light’ wake turbulence category in the visual circuit. R-B corrected this during the handover, and therefore [the AW169 pilot] was not asked to climb further.

It is acknowledged that CAP 774 2.12 states, under a Basic Service,

“Unless the pilot has entered into an agreement with a controller to maintain a specific course of action, a pilot may change heading or routeing without advising the controller.”

Additionally, as stated, controllers are not required to monitor flights in receipt of a Basic Service. The potential prompts that remained for the controller to identify the developing confliction, considering that their attention was occupied in part by providing three other aircraft with a Traffic Service, were therefore limited.

R-B later passed specific Traffic Information to [the pilot of the AW169] on [the DA42], when the pilot of the former stated they were not yet visual with the latter. At the time of this statement, the two aircraft were approximately 2NM apart on reciprocal tracks. R-B initially mis-identified [the AW169 pilot’s] transmission as coming from [another aircraft] which, based upon the time stamps, delayed their response to [the pilot of the AW169] by approximately 5sec.

R-B utilised the Mode S Flight ID for both aircraft during this transmission to establish surveillance identification, and to underpin the provision of specific clock-based Traffic Information to [the pilot of the AW169]. This Traffic Information was accurate and sufficient for the pilot of [the AW169] to become visual with [the DA42] within 5sec. At this time the two aircraft were approximately 0.5NM apart on reciprocal tracks, with the [DA42’s] unverified Mode C indicating 2200ft and climbing, and [the AW169’s] unverified Mode C indicating 2400ft.

R-B acknowledged the TCAS RA reported by [the pilot of the AW169] and did not attempt to intervene. No TCAS RA was reported by [the pilot of the DA42]. Neither pilot reported an Airprox over the RTF.

The controllers are considered to have acted appropriately, with a proactive and generic warning to [the pilot of the DA42] regarding [the AW169], and subsequent specific Traffic Information to [the pilot of the AW169] after they stated they were not visual with [the DA42]. With both aircraft operating on their own navigation and under a Basic Service, the controllers are considered to have provided appropriate information to pilots to assist them in the safe conduct of their flights and responded appropriately to collision risk highlighted by the pilot of [the AW169]. R-B’s belief that they considered this risk to be mitigated once the pilot of [the AW169] reported visual with [the DA42], is also considered reasonable.

Problem statement.

Two aircraft operated in such proximity that a TCAS RA was triggered, and one or both pilots considered safety was or may have been compromised. Such events may result in collision, with associated damage to aircraft, property on the ground, and injury or loss of life.

## Direct Cause

The two aircraft operated in the same airspace segment on reciprocal tracks, at converging altitudes.

## Causal Factors.

- Apparent late sighting, by one or both pilots, of the other aircraft.
- [The DA42 pilot] continued to climb beyond the altitude at which they stated they were levelling off.

## Contributory Factors.

- Initial misidentification of the transmission source when [the pilot of the AW169] stated they were not yet visual with the traffic ahead, delaying the provision of specific Traffic Information.

## CAA ATSI

Having reviewed the reports, ATSI has nothing further to add.

## UKAB Secretariat

The NATS radar replay and independent third-party aircraft tracking software were reviewed and both the DA42 and AW169 were identified through Mode S data. The AW169, but not the DA42, was also observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.

At 1306:38 the AW169 climbed from 2100ft and at 1306:42 was passing 2200ft. At that time the DA42 had reached 2000ft and then descended. The aircraft were 200ft apart vertically and 0.4NM laterally (slant range 2440ft).

CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1306:46 with 0.1NM lateral and 600ft vertical separation with a slant range of 855ft (Figure 2).




Figure 2 – CPA

The DA42 and AW169 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.<sup>2</sup>

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DA42 and an AW169 flew into proximity at Oxford at 1307Z on Friday 29<sup>th</sup> May 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of a Basic Service from Oxford Radar.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first reviewed the actions of the Oxford Radar controllers (R-A and R-B) and noted that there had initially been some confusion as to which pilot had been passed Traffic Information on which aircraft first. Nonetheless, despite the confusion, members agreed that both the pilot of the DA42 and the pilot of the AW169 had received Traffic Information on the other aircraft, albeit later than anticipated for the AW169, and that there had been little else that the on-duty controllers could have done to have assisted matters. The Board also wished to congratulate the controllers on their proactive approach to the passing of Traffic Information, even though the pilots of both aircraft had requested a Basic Service (where Traffic Information is not routinely passed).

Secondly, the Board considered the actions of the DA42 pilot, and noted that the pilot had been provided with Traffic Information regarding an approaching AW169 on a reciprocal heading. The Board noted that the pilot had elected to maintain 1800ft, but their student had inadvertently climbed above the planned altitude (**CF1**) and had triggered the AW169's TCAS. The Board recognised that the pilot had seen the AW169 at approximately 1NM and had executed a precautionary descent to avoid it, having reached 2000ft just 4sec before CPA.

Moving their attention to the actions of the AW169 pilot, the Board noted that the pilot had received situational awareness on the presence of the DA42 from having heard Traffic Information passed to the DA42 pilot on their own aircraft and had monitored the DA42 on their TCAS. The Board further noted that, after the pilot had stated they were not visual with the DA42, they had then been updated on the position of the DA42 from the second Oxford controller (R-B). Members noted that the pilot had initiated a climb once sighting the DA42 at a late stage (**CF3**) and had also received an RA from their onboard TCAS (**CF2**) upon initiation of that climb.

In concluding their discussions, the Board reflected that the DA42 pilot had inadvertently triggered an RA by not maintaining their planned level and that the AW169 pilot had followed the RA by climbing while the DA42 pilot had established a precautionary descent. The Board noted that both the pilot of the DA42 and the pilot of the AW169 had seen the other aircraft, albeit a late sighting for the AW169 pilot. Members agreed that the situation met the criteria for reporting, but that normal procedures, safety standards and parameters were considered to have pertained. As such, the Board assigned Risk Category E to this event.

**CF1:** The pilot of the DA42 had not maintained their planned altitude.

**CF2:** The AW169's TCAS alerted the pilot with an RA.

**CF3:** The pilot of the AW169 had not seen the DA42 until a late stage.

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<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK****Contributory Factors:**

|    | 2026090                                                     |                                |                                                                                                                                                     |                                     |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| CF | Factor                                                      | Description                    | ECCAIRS Amplification                                                                                                                               | UKAB Amplification                  |
|    | <b>Flight Elements</b>                                      |                                |                                                                                                                                                     |                                     |
|    | <b>• Tactical Planning and Execution</b>                    |                                |                                                                                                                                                     |                                     |
| 1  | Human Factors                                               | • Action Performed Incorrectly | Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly                                                                             | Incorrect or ineffective execution  |
|    | <b>• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance</b> |                                |                                                                                                                                                     |                                     |
| 2  | Contextual                                                  | • ACAS/TCAS RA                 | An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory warning triggered |                                     |
|    | <b>• See and Avoid</b>                                      |                                |                                                                                                                                                     |                                     |
| 3  | Human Factors                                               | • Identification/Recognition   | Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation                                                        | Late sighting by one or both pilots |

**Degree of Risk:** E.

**Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>3</sup>**

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Flight Elements:**

**Tactical Planning and Execution** was assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the DA42 had not successfully maintained their planned altitude.

| Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026090 |                                                            |         |           | Outside Controlled Airspace |                            |    |          |     |     |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|----|----------|-----|-----|
|                                     |                                                            | Barrier | Provision | Application                 | Effectiveness              |    |          |     |     |
|                                     |                                                            |         |           |                             | Barrier Weighting          |    |          |     |     |
|                                     |                                                            |         |           |                             | 0%                         | 5% | 10%      | 15% | 20% |
| Ground Element                      | Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance          | ✓       | ✓         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
|                                     | Manning & Equipment                                        | ✓       | ✓         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
|                                     | Situational Awareness of the Conflication & Action         | ✓       | ✓         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
|                                     | Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance         | ●       | ●         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
| Flight Element                      | Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance          | ✓       | ✓         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
|                                     | Tactical Planning and Execution                            | ✓       | !         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
|                                     | Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action | ✓       | ✓         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
|                                     | Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance         | !       | ✓         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
|                                     | See & Avoid                                                | ✓       | ✓         |                             |                            |    |          |     |     |
| Key:                                |                                                            | Full    | Partial   | None                        | Not Present/Not Assessable |    | Not Used |     |     |
| Provision                           |                                                            | ✓       | !         | ✗                           | ●                          |    |          |     |     |
| Application                         |                                                            | ✓       | !         | ✗                           | ●                          |    | ○        |     |     |
| Effectiveness                       |                                                            | ■       | ■         | ■                           | ■                          |    | ■        |     |     |

<sup>3</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).