


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026095

Date: 02 Jun 2026 Time: 1652Z Position: 5346N 00104W Location: Selby

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C206	PA28
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Listening Out
Provider	Brighton Radio	Sherburn Radio
Altitude/FL	3500ft	3400ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Not observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	White, blue	White, yellow, blue
Lighting	Bcn, nav, strobes	Strobes, nav, ldg
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	3500ft	4000ft
Altimeter	QNH (1000hPa)	NR
Heading	338°	270°
Speed	114kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	TAS	Not fitted
Alert	TA	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	150ft V/50ft H	200ft V/1NM H
Recorded	100ft V/0.1NM H	



THE C206 PILOT reports that their TCAS [sic] alerted them to an approaching and climbing aircraft to their port [sic]. The visual TCAS indicator turned from a white diamond to yellow circle, with numerals indicating that it was climbing. From the first audible and visual alert, the C206 pilot was looking out for the aircraft which they now believe was in their blind spot, perhaps obscured by the engine cowling or below the right window. Unable to spot the aircraft, which continued to close on TCAS, they took evasive action with a climbing turn to port. During their steep bank, they then saw a low-wing Piper below them and to their left in a dive, before it turned and levelled off heading in the direction of Sherburn-in-Elmet. Met conditions were [reported by the C206 pilot as] good and visibility 20 miles or more. The C206 pilot noted that they had been flying straight-and-level at a constant speed and height. They had changed to Brighton's frequency to monitor for traffic.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that they had been on an instructional sortie, returning to [...] conducting climbing with a student pilot at the controls. The student was tasked to climb to, and level off at, 4000ft. Passing approximately 3700ft an aircraft was spotted slightly above in their 10 o'clock position. The instructor took control and reversed the climb into a descent. The aircraft was observed passing behind and above until it was out of sight behind them, it then reappeared on their right-hand side.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE SHERBURN-IN-ELMET AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that they confirm that, whilst both aircraft may have been monitoring or in contact with Sherburn Radio (122.610MHz) at the time of the reported Airprox, Sherburn Radio (AGCS) had no involvement in the incident. Nothing was observed by the AGCS operator to indicate that an Airprox or other occurrence had taken place.

As there was no observed involvement by the AGCS unit, they have no relevant recordings or staff accounts to provide in relation to this occurrence.

Factual Background

The weather at Leeds/Bradford Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNM 021650Z 27016KT 9999 SCT027 16/10 Q1001=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At CPA minus 8sec as the PA28 passed through the C206's 12 o'clock co-alt at 0.3NM.




Figure 2: At CPA (1652:06) 100ft V/0.1NM H

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and identified through Mode S data. The C206 had maintained a steady altitude of 3500ft in the minute leading up to CPA and the left turn-and-climb described by the pilot was initiated around the time of CPA. The PA28 can be seen to have been in a steady climb, peaking at 3600ft approximately 4sec ahead of CPA and had then initiated a sharp descent to be at 3400ft by CPA in a right-hand turn before then reversing left in the general direction of Sherburn-In-Elmet. Neither aircraft was seen to be emitting an ADS-B signal.

The C206 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C206 pilot was required to give way to the PA28.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C206 and a PA28 flew into proximity at Selby at 1652Z on Tuesday 2nd June 2026. The C206 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been monitoring the Brighton Radio frequency, and the PA28 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been monitoring the Sherburn-in-Elmet Radio frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly considered the actions of the C206 pilot, noting that they had been equipped with a Traffic Alerting System (TAS) and that this had been instrumental in building their situational awareness and initiating their avoidance action. Members did discuss the process followed by the C206 pilot on receiving that alert (**CF4**), noting that it had focussed their attention and that that alert had subsequently upgraded to signify the PA28 to have become a greater threat. The Board discussed this action and recognised that with such equipment, the azimuth indication can be vague but that there had been a more accurate relative altitude readout that perhaps could have suggested a more immediate response to initiate avoidance action (**CF1**). The Board agreed that, ultimately, the pilot had flown close enough to the PA28 to cause its pilot concern (**CF2**). The Board recognised that, after having initiated their avoidance manoeuvre, the pilot had gained visual contact (**CF5**) with the PA28 and that proximity concern had been reinforced (**CF6**).

Members then discussed the role played by the PA28 pilot, noting that they had been instructing a student and, during that exercise, the crew had spotted the C206 slightly above and to their left, 10 o'clock, and their concern as to its proximity (**CF6**) had led the instructor to immediately take control and reverse the climbing attitude into an avoidance diving manoeuvre. Members were in agreement that this action had averted a greater issue. The Board noted that the PA28 had carried no electronic conspicuity equipment and this, combined with a lack of an active Air Traffic Service had denied the pilot any situational awareness of the presence of C206 (**CF3**). Members wished to re-state the importance of the carriage and use of such equipment, particularly on training flights, as both an active guard and as an educational tool for trainee pilots.

The Board, in assessing a Risk category for this event, noted that the C206 pilot had received TAS indications of the presence of the PA28 and this had driven the pilot to focus their attention and subsequently initiate an avoidance manoeuvre, whilst the PA28 pilot had gained visual contact and had themselves manoeuvred to avoid the C206. The Board felt that it had been fortunate that both pilots had reacted and that this had likely led to the event being an Airprox and no more. The Board agreed that safety had not been assured (**CF7**) and, as such, assigned Risk Category B to this event.

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**Contributory Factors:**

	2026095			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Events involving flight crew not taking any action at all when they should have done so	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern despite Situational Awareness
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
4	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
	• See and Avoid			
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
6	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
	• Outcome Events			
7	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.**Safety Barrier Assessment³**

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the C206 pilot, having gained situational awareness of the proximity of the PA28, could have manoeuvred earlier to increase separation.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28 pilot had no situational awareness of the C206, and the C206 pilot, having gained SA on the PA28, had delayed their avoidance manoeuvre.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the C206 pilot, having received a Traffic Alert for the crossing PA28, had not adjusted any of their flight parameters.

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026095			Outside Controlled Airspace							
		Barrier	Provision	Application	Effectiveness					
					Barrier Weighting					
					0%	5%	10%	15%	20%	
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	●	●							
	Manning & Equipment	●	●							
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	●	●							
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●							
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✔	✔							
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✔	⚠							
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✖	✔							
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	⚠	⚠							
	See & Avoid	✔	✔							
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable		Not Used			
Provision		✔	⚠	✖	●					
Application		✔	⚠	✖	●					
Effectiveness		■	■	■	■		□			