


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026094

Date: 31 May 2026 Time: 1427Z Position: 5055N 00312W Location: 4NM NNE Dunkeswell

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	B206	C152
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Listening Out
Provider	Dunkeswell Radio/ Exeter Radar	Dunkeswell Radio
Altitude/FL	2400ft	2578ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Not observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	Black, green	White, blue
Lighting	Nav, strobe	Beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2780ft	2400ft
Altimeter	QNH (1021hPa)	QNH (1020hPa)
Heading	135°	315°
Speed	80kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho ¹	Not fitted
Alert	None ¹	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/50m H	100ft V/200m H
Recorded	~180ft V/~0.1NM H	



THE B206 PILOT reports that they were conducting commercial pleasure flight operations. Prior to lifting, having heard that an aircraft had recently departed [from Dunkeswell], they asked for circuit traffic information. They were informed that a helicopter [an S269] had departed RW35R a short time earlier and had left the zone to the north. [The pilot of the B206] made visual contact with the helicopter which was on a diverging [but similar] heading to the north. The [B206 pilot's] routeing was towards the Wellington Monument as part of a tour route. After a short while, they observed the helicopter change heading and [they both] began converging towards the monument ahead. They contacted Dunkeswell Radio and asked whether the [pilot of the] helicopter north of the field was on frequency. The [pilot of the other helicopter] did not respond, and Dunkeswell Radio advised that there were no other [pilots] on frequency.

On box two, they were monitoring Exeter Radar with whom they had been in frequent contact, and from whom they had been assigned a squawk for the day. They contacted Exeter Radar and asked whether the helicopter was on their frequency. They were advised that no aircraft around them were on frequency. At that point, they noticed another aircraft on their SkyDemon map moving left-to-right at a similar level. Exeter Radar also passed them that Traffic Information. They assessed that the airspace was becoming congested and, as no radio contact had been established with [the pilots of] either aircraft, they decided to turn early before reaching and orbiting the monument and before separation reduced further. They kept the [S269] traffic ahead of them and then to their right side as they turned to the south-east confident that both aircraft were no longer potential threats.

¹ The pilot of the B206 reported that a SkyEcho device had been fitted to their aircraft and that it had alerted to the presence of the C152. However, during analysis by UKAB Secretariat, neither aircraft was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.

Shortly afterwards, they received a 'traffic warning' from Exeter Radar regarding additional traffic at a similar level to the south-east. They visually acquired a fixed-wing aircraft in their forward port quarter at the same level, which appeared to be in a fast tight turn. They observed it turn through at least 720° with a high angle of bank. Their passengers became concerned and verbally worried by the close proximity of the aircraft. Given the manoeuvres being carried out, they were concerned that the pilot had not seen them, or may not have maintained sight of them. [The pilot of the B206] therefore took avoiding action to the right, placing the [other] aircraft in their port-aft quarter. As the aircraft was still manoeuvring unusually, and could have rolled out in any direction, they descended and proceeded towards the [Dunkeswell] ATZ.

They asked Dunkeswell Radio whether [the pilots of] any aircraft manoeuvring north of the field were on frequency. They again advised that no other [pilots] were on frequency. They then asked Exeter Radar whether they had any identifying information for the aircraft, or whether the [pilots] were in contact with them. [The Exeter controller] advised that they did not. They informed Exeter Radar that they would be filing an Airprox. They descended to low level to mitigate the risk of collision from behind and, once inside the ATZ, regained altitude [...].

Later, [...] they asked Dunkeswell Radio whether they could ask if [any pilots] had been carrying out spiralling turns just north of the field a short while earlier. [The pilot of the C152 reportedly] confirmed that they had been conducting 'advanced turns' and that they were visual with [the B206]. [The pilot of the B206] stated that they would be using their registration to file an Airprox.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C152 PILOT reports that the flight was a 1hr training sortie to the north and west of Dunkeswell. The flight was uneventful, and the student was controlling the aircraft at approximately 2400ft, heading 315°. No aircraft were visual before entering the manoeuvre. The student demonstrated a 360° medium-level turn to the left, which was completed to a good standard. After maintaining straight-and-level [flight at] 2400ft on a heading 315°, the student was instructed to repeat the manoeuvre to the right. After looking out, the right turn was carried out maintaining height. As the student was rolling onto heading, they [the instructor] saw a dark helicopter on the nose [reported at a range of 200m, slightly above them] heading right-to-left relatively and was moving away to the south. They took control and carried out a medium turn to the southeast to increase separation.

[UKAB Secretariat note: CPA was assessed to have occurred after the 360° orbit to the left but before the subsequent orbit to the right had commenced].

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE EXETER RADAR CONTROLLER reports that [the pilot of the] B206 helicopter was operating pleasure flights [...], 10NM northeast of Exeter Airport. The [pilot] was instructed to retain squawk 0413 throughout the day.

At 1424, [the pilot of the B206] stated their position on 128.980MHz [as being] near Wellington Monument and 'were any aircraft in the vicinity on frequency?'. They replied "*negative*" and stated the positions and indicated levels of two aircraft squawking 7000 in the vicinity. [The pilot of the B206] did not request, nor was under, any flight service, but they had the capacity to provide generic Traffic Information to assist their visual lookout.

At 1426, they observed another 7000 squawk to the south-east of [the B206 pilot's] position and provided 'duty of care' to inform them of that aircraft and their indicated altitude. [The pilot of the B206] initially reported this aircraft was "*not sighted*" but was later. At 1429, [the pilot of the B206] asked if they had any details on the last reported aircraft to which they responded "*not officially on frequency*" as the [pilot] was not on any Exeter Radar frequency. They do not have Mode S enabled on their radar displays at Exeter so could not officially provide the other aircraft's details. [The pilot of the B206] reported they would file an Airprox report.

Factual Background

The weather at Exeter Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGTE 311420Z 28011KT 240V320 9999 SCT042 23/10 Q1018

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

No formal ATS had been agreed but, nevertheless, the Exeter controller had passed Traffic Information to the pilot [of the B206] with no requirement to have done so except under the Duty of Care.

Exeter Unit Preliminary Investigation

[The pilot of the B206] was conducting pleasure flights [...]. For ease, the pilot had been allocated the Exeter Squawk of 0413 and was instructed to retain the code throughout the day [...].

At 1421:35, the squawk 0413 could be seen [...] heading north. The pilot did not [request] a service of any kind [for this flight].

At 1424:45, the pilot of [the B206] called Exeter Radar and said that they were “*operating pleasure flights around the Dunkeswell area, currently at the Wellington Monument and was wondering whether you have the other aircraft on frequency operating in the area also?*”.

The controller responded “*negative, there is one on your left-hand-side indicating 2600ft and another one 3 miles northwest of you also indicating 2600ft*” (Figure 1).

The pilot reported that they were “*visual with both aircraft*”.



Figure 1 – Aircraft positions at 1424:45 (Exeter radar)

At 1426:10, the controller informed the pilot that they had “*another aircraft about a mile south-east of you indicating 2400ft*”. The pilot initially responded that the traffic was “*not in sight*”.



Figure 2 – Aircraft positions at 1426:10 (Exeter radar)

Then, at 1426:30, the pilot reported that they had the traffic in sight.



Figure 3 – Aircraft positions at 1426:30 (Exeter radar)

At 1429:19, the pilot asked if the controller had any information on the last aircraft which they had been given Traffic Information on. The controller informed the [pilot of the B206] that the [other pilot] was not on frequency.

Exeter Unit Final Investigation

Conclusion

[The pilot of the B206] had been operating numerous pleasure flights through the day on the 31st May [...]. The local area around Dunkeswell can be extremely busy with light aircraft and gliders. On previous trips, the [B206 pilot] had retained the squawk of 0413 (as they had also done so for this flight).

A Basic Service was the highest rated service that had been provided [to them] during the day but, on this occasion, no service between the pilot and radar controller had been agreed.

Once [the pilot of the B206] had checked in with Exeter Radar on 128.980MHz, the pilot asked the controller if they had any aircraft on frequency operating in the area.

Even though no service had been agreed between the pilot and controller, Traffic Information of *“I’ve got one off your left-hand side indicating 2600ft, another one about 3 northwest of you near*

Wellington also indicating 2600ft” was passed as a duty of care. The controller on duty used the earlier assigned squawk of 0413 as the reference for that Traffic Information.

One minute later, Traffic Information was again passed from the Exeter controller [to the pilot of the B206] on a third aircraft: “*another aircraft about a mile southeast of you indicating 2400ft*”. This is the aircraft believed to be in the subsequent report filled by [the pilot of the B206]. Initially, [the pilot of the B206] did not have this aircraft in sight, but did so 13sec later.

The closest that the three aircraft [had been, as observed on radar,] was within half a mile and 100ft (indicated) of each other. Those altitudes have not been verified.

The conclusion of this report is that, even though no service had been agreed, the controller on duty had, expeditiously, passed Traffic Information as a duty of care to [the pilot of the B206] which gave them the best opportunity to obtain visual contact with all three aircraft. The [classification of the] airspace around Dunkeswell is Class G. It is commonplace to see high levels of light aircraft and gliders operating at similar levels, using the see-and-avoid concept. The ATCO did all they could within the timeframe given to help [the pilot of the B206] with their situational awareness.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken, and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 4). Neither aircraft was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.

The aircraft were depicted on the radar replay flying at Flight Levels. A suitable correction was applied to determine their altitudes. The pilot of the C152 kindly supplied GPS track data for their flight. The diagram was constructed by combining the data sources. The C152 has been shown in the diagram with altitude based on GPS data. The track of the B206 has been shown with a partially dotted line to indicate its probable track due to moments of poor radar performance.



Figure 4 – Aircraft positions at 1424:46 (NATS radar). The white cross represents the location of the Wellington Monument.




Figure 5 – Radar CPA at 1427:06

The B206 and C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.³

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a B206 and a C152 flew into proximity 4NM north-northeast of Dunkeswell at 1427Z on Sunday 31st May 2026. The B206 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, listening out on the frequencies for Dunkeswell Radio and Exeter Radar. The C152 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, listening out on the Dunkeswell Radio frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, GPS track data from the flight of the C152, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the B206. Members noted that their helicopter had been fitted with two radios, one tuned to the Dunkeswell Radio frequency, and the other to the frequency for Exeter Radar. Members noted that the pilot of the B206 had not agreed any service with the Exeter controller and, therefore, would not have expected to have received any Traffic Information during their flight nor expected any assistance with collision avoidance. Notwithstanding, the B206 pilot had received Traffic Information from the Exeter controller on multiple contacts including an *"aircraft about a mile southeast of you indicating 2400ft"*.

Members noted that the B206 had been fitted with an additional EC device and that the pilot had reported that it had alerted to the presence of the C152. However, from the analysis of aircraft emissions, an ADS-B Out signal had not been observed from either aircraft. Consequently, members agreed that the EC device fitted to the B206 would not have been expected to have detected the C152 (**CF3**) and surmised that the alert had, perhaps, pertained to a different aircraft. Members noted that the pilot of the B206 had subsequently visually acquired the C152 and had been concerned by its proximity (**CF5**). The pilot of the B206 had been uncertain whether their helicopter had been sighted,

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

and unsure which way the C152 might turn next. Members noted that they had assessed that positive avoiding action had been required to have increased the separation.

Turning to the actions of the pilot of the C152, members noted that they had been conducting a training flight for 'advanced turns' and had tuned their radio to the Dunkeswell Radio frequency. However, it was noted that the Dunkeswell AGO had believed that 'no other pilots had been on frequency' when the B206 pilot had enquired about the S269 that they had sighted. One member suggested that, as the C152 had been positioned away from Dunkeswell for the purpose of conducting a training flight, the pilot of the C152 may have turned the volume down on their radio to reduce the in-cockpit distraction whilst teaching their student. Whether or not that had been the case, members agreed that the pilot of the C152 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the B206 until it had been visually acquired (**CF2**). It was noted that the C152 had not been fitted with an additional EC device and members wished to emphasise that, had a compatible device been fitted, it may have provided a timely alert to the presence of the B206 and any other aircraft that may have been in the vicinity. Noting that they had been operating well within the Exeter LARS area of coverage, members also suggested that it may have been prudent to have been in receipt of a surveillance-based service (**CF1**).

Analysing the sequence of events, members noted that the pilot of the C152 had recalled that a 360° turn to the left had been completed, followed by a 360° turn to the right, and that it had been at that point that the B206 had been sighted. Members determined that CPA had occurred in the moment between the two orbits and, consequently, agreed that the helicopter had not been sighted until after CPA, effectively making it a non-sighting (**CF4**).

Members next considered the actions of the Exeter controller. Noting that the B206 pilot had been in the general area throughout the day, members agreed that the retention of a transponder squawk code had provided useful situational awareness for the controller. Although no service had been agreed with the B206 pilot, members commended the Exeter controller for having provided Traffic Information on the C152 that had assisted them with their situational awareness and had helped direct their visual scan for the traffic. As the C152 pilot had not been listening out on the Exeter Radar frequency, members agreed that there had been little else that they could have done to have assisted matters.

Concluding their discussion, members turned to the matter of the risk of collision. Some members suggested that the pilot of the B206 had sighted the C152 in time to have taken avoiding action, however, proffered that the rapid change in direction of the C152 had meant that a risk of collision had not been avoided entirely. Other members contended that, ultimately, the B206 pilot's action had increased the separation sufficiently to have resolved the conflict. A vote was conducted and the latter view, that safety margins had been eroded but there had not been a risk of collision, prevailed. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2026094				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
1	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
• See and Avoid				

4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
5	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴


In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because it may have been prudent for the pilot of the C152 to have been in receipt of a surveillance-based service from the Exeter controller.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the C152 had not had situational awareness of the presence of the B206.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the EC device fitted to the B206 would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the C152.



⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).