


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026039

Date: 10 Apr 2026 Time: 1225Z Position: 5355N 00105W Location: 1NM NW of Naburn Marina

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Sub-70kg microlight	Aquila A210
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Basic
Provider	Rufforth Traffic ¹	Leeming Zone
Altitude	~2950ft	~2945ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Not observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	Blue/Red roundels	White
Lighting	None	Nav & anti-colls
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/Ht	2500ft AAL	3100ft
Altimeter	QFE	RPS (1017hPa)
Heading	circling	050°
Speed	40kt	110kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation at CPA		
Reported	33ft V/10m H	0ft V/150m H
Recorded	~5ft V/0.1NM H	



THE MICROLIGHT PILOT reports that, whilst on a pleasure flight south of York in a single seat microlight, they used a thermal to gain extra lift with the engine on tick-over. Turning left circles, they had ascended from approximately 1500ft to 2000ft or more. They were concentrating on using the lift, looking at the cloud and altimeter. As their circle brought them to face northeast, they saw a light-aircraft coming directly toward them and continued their turn to move away from the track of the aircraft which appeared to be [flying in] a straight line on an approximate heading of 190°. [They opined that] it was possible that the pilot had seen them and was coming closer for a look, as it's rare to see a microlight thermalling, or the pilot may not have seen them as they came up at approximately 300ft per minute and were still climbing and were able to avoid. Once aware of the aircraft, they were able to deconflict without aggressive manoeuvres.

It was further reported that the pilot was concentrating on centring a thermal at minimum engine revs and made a steep left turn to avoid the other aircraft. The pilot (who holds a FRTOL) remained on the Rufforth Radio [sic] frequency.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE AQUILA A210 STUDENT PILOT reports that this was their second solo navigation flight. The weather on the day was clear and bright with very few clouds. They were flying [to/from departure point] via Naburn Marina. Due to the weather, there were very strong thermals evident and they had been forewarned of heavy glider activity around York. As they approached York from the north on a heading of around 175°, they were aware of several gliders to the south, climbing on thermals. Together with assistance from Leeming Zone, they were maintaining a strong lookout for these as they passed over York at approximately 3100ft. As they passed over the southern edge of York and were approaching

¹ The microlight pilot reported that they were in receipt of an Air Ground Communication Service from Rufforth Radio, however, Rufforth East Ops stated that they are only manned for special events and not at the time of this flight.

their waypoint at Naburn, they performed one more lookout full sweep of the sky and then went into their Pre-HAT [Heading, Altitude, Time] checks. They then did another quick lookout before checking their PLOG [pilot's flight log] for their timings and heading/altitude figures for their next leg etc. As they looked back up from this, they noticed a microlight to their one o'clock position at a similar altitude. They would estimate it was around 400-500m from them. The microlight was moving from left-to-right in their vision and the late spot was likely affected by the bright sunlight almost directly behind it. They banked around 15-20° to their left to increase distance between them and they tracked the microlight visually as it passed to the right of their aircraft, under the tip of their wing and disappeared into their rear starboard quarter. They would estimate that, at the closest point, they were perhaps 100-150m apart. They immediately [transmitted] the details of the incident to Leeming Zone to make them and other pilots in the area aware of the aircraft. They also mentioned the incident to their instructor when they returned to the flight school.

The student pilot further commented that there was very strong thermal activity and that the microlight had the sun directly behind it and appeared to be black with no lighting.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE LEEMING CONTROLLER reports that, from the Leeming ATC perspective, for an Airprox that took place on this date in the location provided, Leeming ATC cannot recall the aircraft in question being on their VHF frequency, neither can a controller recall the event. They had no RT or radar information to share. [UKAB note: Leeming ATC was informed of the Airprox approximately 6 weeks after the event due to difficulties in tracing the correct aircraft.]

Leeming ATC perceived the severity of the incident as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Leeds Bradford Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNM 101220Z 23006KT 140V260 9999 SCT036 08/M01 Q1016

Analysis and Investigation

BMHQ Safety

The investigator liaised with the Flight Safety Officer (BMFSO) regarding this event. Because the submission was made after the 30-day period for which the [recorded media] is saved there were no recordings to pull from. The DASOR was submitted in response to an email from the UK Airprox Board. Nothing further can be added as there was no recollection of the event taking place on Leeming ATC frequencies from any controllers.

Sequence of Events

A microlight [pilot] and light civil aviation aircraft [pilot] reported coming within close proximity of each other in the vicinity Naburn Marina.

Findings

Outcome: Loss of separation and Airprox with a non-transponding aircraft.

Cause: Non service control. The incident did not take place over the Leeming ATC frequencies, as far as they are aware. Nothing was identified as the sole cause.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of third-party aircraft tracking software was undertaken; the Aquila A210 was positively identified on MLAT-derived data sources with track, altitude, aircraft identification and 4010 squawk data, and the sub-70kg microlight was not detected. Neither aircraft was detected using ADS-B data

sources, however, both the pilot of the microlight and the student pilot of the Aquila A210 provided their GPS track and altitude data. CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1224:57 with approximately 5ft vertical and 0.1NM lateral separation.




Figure 1 CPA 1224:57

The sub-70kg microlight and Aquila A210 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.³ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the sub 70kg microlight pilot was required to give way to the Aquila A210.⁴

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a sub-70kg microlight and an Aquila A210 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Naburn Marina at 1225Z on Friday 10th April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the sub-70kg microlight pilot listening out to Rufforth Traffic and the Aquila A210 pilot in receipt of a Basic Service from Leeming Zone.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, GPS track data for the microlight and Aquila A210 aircraft, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the microlight pilot and noted that they had been listening out on the Rufforth frequency to Rufforth Traffic. Members agreed that it may have been prudent for the pilot to have planned to have been in receipt of a surveillance-based service with Leeming Zone during their pre-flight preparation (**CF2**) and to have then communicated their position and intentions to the Leeming controller during the flight (**CF1**). The Board felt that, although the microlight may not have been visible on radar, any information provided by the pilot to the controller would have proven useful to both the controller and other pilots on frequency. Members agreed that the latter would have been in addition to increasing the microlight pilot's own situational awareness of other traffic operating in their vicinity

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

⁴ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

and that, in the event, the pilot had not had any situational awareness of the presence of the Aquila A210 (CF3). The Board further noted that pilot had been concentrating on increasing their altitude and members commented that this would likely have taken considerable concentration on behalf of the pilot, thereby significantly affecting their ability to have maintained a continuous lookout (CF4). One member, familiar with such situations, strongly recommended that the pilot invest in a variometer with audio, explaining that an 'audio vario' would have provided the pilot with continuous audible feedback on the microlight's rate of climb or descent and could have reduced the amount of time spent looking at other instruments instead of monitoring the surrounding environment. Members agreed that the combined factors of no situational awareness and task distraction had led to a late sighting of the Aquila A210 by the microlight pilot (CF5).

The Board then considered the actions of the Aquila A210 student pilot, noting that the pilot had reported being aware of multiple glider traffic in the vicinity of York, as notified by the Leeming controller. Members noted that, on having seen the microlight pass in front of them, the pilot had immediately transmitted the details of the event to the Leeming controller. The Board considered that it had been unfortunate that the student had either not known, or not remembered, to use the term 'Airprox' in their communication to Leeming, as this would have resulted in the controller following procedures to note the occurrence and maintain the ATC recordings, and that this had not happened. Members noted that the student had also reported this event to their instructor and that no further action had been taken by the flight school either. The Board felt that, generally, not enough emphasis is made regarding the reporting of an Airprox during flight training or related ground-school courses and wanted to take this opportunity to remind both instructors and students to refer to the relevant section in CAP413⁵ for the correct phraseology and procedure. Continuing their discussion on the use of RT and the appropriateness of the service requested by the student pilot, members agreed that it may have been more prudent for the pilot to have been in receipt of a Traffic Service which may have led to a safer transit in the vicinity of the primary contacts (CF1). However, members agreed that the pilot had been informed that there had been primary tracks in the vicinity and that they would have had generic awareness of the presence of other aircraft in the vicinity, if not specifically the microlight (CF3), and that this had led to the late sighting of the thermalling microlight silhouetted in the sun (CF5).

The Board was unable to consider the actions of the Leeming controller as there was no information available from them due to the time passed after initial difficulties in tracing the second aircraft involved. The Board, therefore, concluded their discussions by reviewing the overall event between the pilots of both aircraft. The Board noted that both the pilot of the microlight and the pilot of the Aquila A210 could have improved communications and members were concerned that neither aircraft had been equipped with additional electronic conspicuity equipment that may have enabled each pilot to have known about the presence of the other, emphasising that both aircraft would need to have been equipped for the devices to have worked effectively. Members agreed that the pilots had either had little or no situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft, and both pilots had seen the other aircraft at a late stage. The Board noted that both pilots had taken avoiding action at the last minute albeit that, for the microlight pilot, this had been a continuation of their left turn away from the Aquila A210 (CF6). Members agreed that safety had been reduced much below the norm and, as such, the Board assigned Risk category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026039			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider

⁵ [CAP 413](#) Chapter 9, 'Miscellaneous Phraseology', Airprox Reporting 9.12 – 9.15 (p6-7) Ed 24 (01 July 2026)

2	Human Factors	• Pre-flight briefing and flight preparation	An event involving incorrect, poor or insufficient pre-flight briefing	
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Distraction - Job Related	Events where flight crew are distracted for job related reasons	
5	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
	• Outcome Events			
6	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁶

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the microlight pilot had neither planned to nor called Leeming Zone for a service to inform them of their position and intentions, and the Aquila A210 pilot could have requested a Traffic Service from Leeming Zone.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the microlight pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the Aquila A210, and the Aquila A210 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the presence of gliders thermalling enroute.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because both the microlight and the Aquila A210 pilots had seen the other aircraft at a late stage.

⁶ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026039		Outside Controlled Airspace				
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness		
				Barrier Weighting		
				0%	5%	10% 15% 20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance					
	Manning & Equipment					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance					
	Tactical Planning and Execution					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance					
	See & Avoid					
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used
Provision						
Application						
Effectiveness						