


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026091

Date: 31 May 2026 Time: 1102Z Position: 5202N 00119W Location: 2NM SSE Banbury

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Ventus	Global 6000
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ Comm
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	IFR
Service	Listening Out	Traffic
Provider	Oxford Radar	Oxford Radar
Altitude/FL	3712ft	3700ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Not observed	Observed
Reported		
Colours	White, orange	NR
Lighting	Nil	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	3100ft	
Altimeter	QFE (998hPa)	
Heading	"Thermalling"	
Speed	60kt	
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	
Alert	None	
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/500ft H	NR
Recorded	~0ft V/~0.4NM H	



THE VENTUS PILOT reports that, whilst in a thermalling turn between the village of Adderbury and the southern edge of Banbury, they became visual with a Gulfstream-type large business jet head on at the same height and closing rapidly [initially reported at a range of 2NM at 090°]. They were aware that this area is near the extended centreline of RW19 at Oxford, and they were looking for traffic to the west, which is the normal pattern, but this jet came through the overhead of Hinton (active gliding) which is maybe why they were late to see it. They took avoiding action to the north, descended and increased speed, then conducted a slight right turn to maintain visual separation. The [pilot of the] jet made no alterations and, they assume, had not seen them. They judge the distance was 500ft laterally and at the same height. They were close enough to experience light wake-turbulence, though they did not struggle to maintain control.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE GLOBAL 6000 PILOT did not respond to requests to submit a report.

THE OXFORD CONTROLLER reports that they were working as the Radar controller when [the glider pilot] called up on the frequency (125.090MHz) to inform them that they intended to file an Airprox on the business jet that had "*just nearly wiped me out*". [The controller] had previously been vectoring [the pilot of the Global 6000] onto the ILS, passing Traffic Information on numerous contacts, both transponding and non-transponding. At one point, the pilot of the jet reported seeing a glider ahead at a similar level (3000ft QNH 1016hPa) but nothing had shown on the radar screen. The weather at the time was 9999, BKN048.

THE OXFORD UNIT ASSESOR reports that the Radar controller was vectoring the [Global 6000] in, which was tricky. The Radar controller had to re-climb it up to 4000ft and bring it to the west after downwind left-hand did not work. The Radar controller called all gliders that were painting, and the [pilot

of the Global 6000] acquired them all visually. Then, as the Radar controller turned [the Global 6000] back eastbound onto base, the [pilot of the Global 6000] stated: *“for your information, probably a couple of miles off the nose just then, there was one, a similar height, glider”*. The position was 12 miles NW, tracking westbound on a heading of 270°. The Radar controller apologised and said that that one was not showing. It did not paint at any point prior to that. [The UA] watched the tapes again just to confirm that. It painted for the first time when the [pilot of the Global 6000] was turned onto the localiser well south of it, thermalling about 11 miles NW.

At 1106, [pilot of the Ventus] called up to report an Airprox, against ‘a bizjet that almost wiped [them] out’. At that point, the glider pilot had reported one mile north of Deddington and was thermalling just off a ten mile final.

[There was] no fault by the controller, the Radar controller could not have done anything as the glider did not paint until well afterwards. [The UA] was opening DIR and the Radar controller had refused a Deconfliction Service on a second inbound, so the Radar controller was doing well to manage the workload.

Just to add to that, the glider was giving the Radar controller a ‘little bit of attitude’ and the Radar controller did well to respond professionally. [The pilot of the Ventus] stated that they would like to file an Airprox on *“one of your bizjets that just almost wiped me out”*, and told them that *“Hinton is active”*. The Radar controller responded that they did not have Hinton [-in-the-Hedges] as active that day, and [the pilot of the Ventus] replied *“It’s not active with paradropping, but it is active with gliding seven days a week”* and *“maybe you should avoid that area”*. The Radar controller calmly responded that: *“Unfortunately so are we, and we don’t have that information”*.

The [pilot of the Global 6000] was kept at 4000ft in the vicinity of Hinton, and was only descended to 3000ft when west of the final approach track (FAT). When the Airprox took place, the glider was thermalling in the base leg area for RW19.

Factual Background

The weather at Oxford Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGTK 311050Z 26011KT 230V290 9999 BKN048 19/10 Q1016
METAR EGTK 311120Z 26011KT 9999 FEW038 BKN049 19/10 Q1016

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

ATSI does not have anything to add to the Oxford Unit investigation.

Oxford Unit Investigation

Factual background

At the time of this Airprox, the Oxford Radar controller was operating the Radar position with an adjacent controller preparing to take over the position. [The pilot of the Global 6000] was in receipt of a Traffic Service from Oxford Radar and being vectored for an ILS approach to Oxford RW19.

During vectoring, at time 1054, the Oxford Radar controller advised, “[Global 6000 C/S], *I think I’m going to sneak you downwind left-hand actually, there’s quite a lot of unknown traffic out to the west side, turn right heading zero-four-zero degrees, descend now to altitude five thousand feet*” which was acknowledged by the crew of [the Global 6000].

The Oxford Radar controller, at 1057, later advised, “[Global 6000 C/S], *I’m going to have to climb you back up to four thousand feet, I’ve got a lot of unknown stuff, so climb to altitude four-thousand feet*”. And, at 1058, further specified, “[Global 6000 C/S], *turn left heading three-four-zero degrees,*

this going to be quite a convoluted route I've got a lot of unknown traffic on about an eight mile final", all of which was acknowledged by the crew of [the Global 6000].

The Oxford Radar controller went on to explain that they intended to route the aircraft to the west of the FAT as there appeared to be less conflicting traffic in that area. At time 1102, the following exchanges occurred between [the pilot of the Global 6000] and the Oxford Radar controller:

1102: OXF RAD: "[Global 6000 C/S], *turn left heading zero-nine-zero degrees*".

1102: [Global 6000 C/S]: "*Left turn heading zero-nine-zero, [Global 6000 C/S], for your information, probably a couple miles off the nose just then, there's one similar height, glider*".

1103: OXF RAD: "*Oh, that one's not showing, sorry*".

1103: [Global 6000 C/S]: "*It's not your fault, we're keeping good eyes out, don't worry*".

[The pilot of the Global 6000] then continued to be vectored onto the [localiser] for an ILS approach into Oxford and transferred onto the Oxford Tower frequency for landing. At time 1106, the following interactions occurred between the Oxford Radar controller and the [pilot of the] conflicting glider:

1106: [The pilot of the Ventus]: "*Oxford, Glider [Ventus C/S]*".

1106: OXF RAD: "*Glider [Ventus C/S], I think that was?*".

1106: [Ventus C/S]: "*Just on this frequency, approximately one mile north of Deddington, three-thousand feet, want to file an Airprox against the biz jet that just woke me up, for your information Hinton is active gliding so it might be worth not routeing people through that*".

1106: OXF RAD: "*Glider [Ventus C/S], Roger we don't have Hinton as being active?*".

1107: [Ventus C/S]: "*It's not active parachuting, it's active gliding seven days a week*".

1107: OXF RAD: "*Yeah, unfortunately we don't get that information*".

1107: [Ventus C/S]: "*I'll remain on frequency whilst in this area*".

Throughout the vectoring sequence, it is evident that the Oxford Radar controller endeavoured to pass Traffic Information on all observed primary (inferred to be glider) contacts displayed on the situation display. A review of the radar replay confirmed that no radar return corresponding to the reported glider was visible immediately prior to the [Global 6000 pilot's] visual report.

Analysis

Traffic loading at the time of the occurrence was assessed as light-to-moderate but with added complexity owing to the density of unknown traffic operating in the vicinity of the RW19 FAT. The Oxford Radar controller was managing a complex traffic situation involving IFR arrivals/departures, alongside VFR aircraft and suspected gliding activity.

A review of the radar controller's situation display recording confirmed that the glider involved in the Airprox was seemingly not displayed immediately prior to the pilot of [the Global 6000] reporting the traffic visually. The contact (which is inferred to have been the aircraft involved in this Airprox) potentially appeared on the display only after the reported encounter had occurred and after [the pilot of the Global 6000] had turned onto the localiser. Consequently, the controller had no surveillance information available from which Traffic Information could have been derived or passed.

As per CAP 774, under the provision of a Traffic Service, Traffic Information was passed, and:

'...is normally considered to be relevant when, in the judgement of the controller, the conflicting aircraft's observed flight profile indicates that it will pass within 3NM and, where level information is available, 3000ft of the aircraft in receipt of the Traffic Service or its level-band if manoeuvring within a level block'

and that:

'Controllers shall aim to pass information on relevant traffic before the conflicting aircraft is within 5 NM, in order to give the pilot sufficient time to meet their collision avoidance responsibilities and to allow for an update in traffic information if considered necessary'.

However, the provision of Traffic Information is dependent upon aircraft being observed on the controller's situation display. In this case, the aircraft concerned was not visible and, therefore, Traffic Information could not be passed by the controller.

On reviewing the recordings leading up to this event, it is evident that the Oxford Radar controller had been actively monitoring and passing Traffic Information on observable contacts within the area, leaving little doubt that the controller was aware of their responsibilities in accordance with CAP 774 in regards to application of a Traffic Service.

The first time the Oxford Radar controller would have become aware of a glider operating within the position was when the pilot of [the Global 6000] passed a visual sighting report on the aircraft. No avoiding action was reported by the pilot and no Airprox was declared by [the pilot of the Global 6000]. The Airprox report originated from the glider pilot several minutes after the event.

The conflicting glider pilot first made contact with Oxford Radar at 1106, reporting their position as *"approximately one mile north of Deddington, three-thousand feet"* with an intention to file an Airprox. As the glider was not displayed on radar until after the event, the investigation has been unable to determine an exact CPA or independently verify the separation that existed between the aircraft at the point of closest proximity.

No evidence was identified that the Oxford Radar controller could reasonably have taken any action to prevent the occurrence. The conflicting glider concerned was not displayed on the surveillance system and, therefore, no Traffic Information, vectoring action or other mitigating measure was available to the controller.

The glider pilot was heard in RTF exchanges to advise *"Hinton is active gliding so it might be worth not routing people through that"*, to which the Oxford Radar controller reported, *"Roger, we don't have Hinton as being active"*, with the glider pilot then stating *"It's not active parachuting, it's active gliding seven days a week"*.

It is correct and noteworthy that, as per a Letter of Agreement (LoA) between London Oxford Airport/Hinton Skydiving Centre/NERL/Birmingham Airport, that Oxford will be made aware when Hinton Skydiving Centre is active and, during this period, procedures exist to aid in the avoidance of the drop area for safety reasons. Outside of that, Oxford would not usually receive any form of call notifying of any specific activity at Hinton and, as such, should assume it to be active in line with their usual aerial activity. Overflying active gliding sites comes with its own risks and pilots are discouraged from doing so in line with CAA guidance on this topic:

<https://www.caa.co.uk/general-aviation/safety-topics/flying-over-gliding-sites/>.

That said, this Airprox seemingly occurred in the vicinity of Deddington and, as such, was some way clear of the Hinton overhead.

Post event, subsequent enquiries were conducted by Oxford Head of Air Traffic Services with the crews of both aircraft involved. The crew of [the Global 6000] was complimentary of the service provided by the Oxford Radar controller and specifically referenced the Traffic Information passed throughout the approach. The crew further noted that arrivals into Oxford are amongst the more complex operations that they routinely conduct due to the surrounding airspace structure and known gliding activity in the local area. Whilst the crew reported observing the glider at the same altitude, they described the lateral separation as approximately 200-300ft and indicated that they were reassured when the glider was seen to turn away from their flightpath.

The glider pilot advised that they had not established two-way communication with Oxford Radar as they did not hold a radio licence. They confirmed, however, that they were monitoring the Oxford

Radar frequency (125.090MHz) and were aware of the potential conflict posed by IFR traffic operating into and out of Oxford. The pilot also advised that they were not transmitting ADS-B on the day of the occurrence. This reduced the likelihood of the aircraft being detected by either air traffic surveillance systems or compatible airborne traffic awareness equipment.

This occurrence further highlights the challenges associated with mixed-mode operations within Class G airspace, particularly where IFR traffic is routinely vectored through areas also utilised by gliders operating without electronic conspicuity [that is compatible with assured ATC systems]. The absence of a detectable surveillance return significantly limits the controller's ability to provide timely Traffic Information and increases reliance upon the visual lookout responsibilities of pilots. The Unit is currently actively engaging with local gliding and General Aviation communities and continues to promote awareness of Oxford's IFR traffic patterns and ways in which to mitigate collision risk within these areas.




Figure 1 – 1100:11 (Oxford Radar)

Conclusion

At approximately 1102 on 31st May 2026, an Airprox occurred between [the Global 6000] and a glider operating in the vicinity of Oxford Airport.

The glider involved was not visible on the controller's situation display prior to the reported encounter and therefore could not be identified nor could Traffic Information be notified to the crew of [the Global 6000]. The occurrence developed as a result of two aircraft operating in close proximity within Class G airspace, where both pilots shared responsibility for collision avoidance.

Contributory factors

- Gliding activity was taking place within an area routinely utilised by IFR traffic being vectored for instrument approaches.
- The glider involved was not transponder-equipped, or otherwise did not generate a radar return, reducing the controller's ability to provide surveillance-based Traffic Information.
- A complex traffic environment required management of IFR arrivals alongside significant gliding activity.
- Both aircraft were operated within Class G airspace, where responsibility for collision avoidance remained with the respective pilots.

- The glider pilot was not in two-way communication with Oxford ATC, despite monitoring the Oxford Radar frequency.

Root cause correction

Oxford Airport will continue proactive engagement with local gliding and General Aviation communities to promote awareness of IFR arrival and departure routes, encourage the use of electronic conspicuity devices wherever practicable, and reinforce the safety benefits of establishing communication with Oxford ATC when operating in areas routinely utilised by instrument traffic.

Recommendations

- Engage with local gliding clubs to encourage the routine carriage and operation of electronic conspicuity equipment, particularly when operating within the vicinity of known IFR arrival and departure routes.
- Review opportunities to further publicise Oxford's instrument arrival and vectoring areas through local airspace user forums, safety evenings and community engagement events.
- Continue monitoring Airprox reports and occurrences involving glider activity to identify recurring trends, hotspots or opportunities for collaborative risk reduction with neighbouring stakeholders.
- Further consider use of FID within the ACR to aid controller SA.
- Reminder to staff (via safety newsletter) of the CAA guidance on avoiding active gliding sites.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the Global 6000 was positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 2). The Global 6000 was depicted on the radar replay at Flight Levels and a suitable conversion was applied to determine its altitude.

The Global 6000, but not the Ventus, was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources. The pilot of the Ventus kindly supplied GPS track data for their flight. The diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined by combining the data sources.




Figure 2 – CPA at 1102:14 (NATS radar)

The Ventus and Global 6000 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.² All users of RT in the United Kingdom are expected to comply with the phraseology described in CAP 413, and SERA.14001 requires that standardised phraseology shall be used in all situations for which it has been specified. However, the phraseology examples contained within CAP 413 are not intended to be exhaustive and, when circumstances differ, pilots, ATS personnel and other ground personnel will be expected to use plain language, which should be as clear and concise as possible.³

Comments

BGA

While strict conformance to CAP 413 is desirable, some variation while conveying the desired message is not the worst sin. The Ventus pilot was stressed initially by the startle encounter with the Global 6000 and subsequently by the controller's apparent indifference to the activity status of gliding at Hinton-in-the-Hedges. We note that "*sneak you downwind*" does not appear in CAP 413 either.

The Ventus pilot was surprised to discover the Oxford controller was not aware of gliding activity at Hinton-in-the-Hedges. Such activity is promulgated by the listing of the airfield in AIP ENR 5.5 and although the entry refers directly to circuit traffic, concentrated glider activity may be expected in the vicinity of such an airfield up to cloudbase.

That parachuting is notified specifically under the Letter of Agreement while gliding activity is implicit in the AIP entry (alongside parachuting), meant that the controller gave the unfortunate impression that Oxford was entirely unaware of gliding operations. This did little to cool annoyance.

The Ventus was transmitting its location using technology that has been implemented for many years and is fitted to almost all gliders. Neither the Global 6000 nor the controller at Oxford were equipped to receive it. Access to a Flight Information Display receiving information from various electronic conspicuity systems would have allowed the Oxford controller to see the traffic for which they had only intermittent primary returns.

Although the Oxford Unit investigation correctly notes that the incident occurred near Deddington rather than Hinton-in-the-Hedges, the Global 6000 was routed close to the Hinton overhead and this practice might usefully be reviewed in light of the cited CAA guidance. That said, the controller seems otherwise to have done a good job with the workload and imperfect information available to them.

Safety would have been enhanced if the Ventus pilot had called Oxford for a service but they properly declined to do so, not holding the appropriate (FRTOL) licence. BGA and its members clubs have (with some success) been encouraging pilots to obtain this qualification (and importantly to use it) but cost barriers, together with study and practice time, are preventing full adoption. Steps to encourage action in this area would be welcome.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Ventus and a Global 6000 flew into proximity 2NM south-southeast of Banbury at 1102Z on Sunday 31st May 2026. The Ventus pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, not in receipt of a FIS. The Global 6000 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC, in receipt of a Traffic Service from Oxford Radar.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

³ CAP 413 Radiotelephony Manual, CAP 413 Status (14).

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the pilot of the Ventus, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data from the flight of the Ventus, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the Ventus. Members agreed that the EC device fitted to their glider would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the Global 6000 (**CF3**). Members were also in agreement that they had not had situational awareness of the Global 6000 until it had been sighted at a reported range of 2NM (**CF2**). Members noted that they had had sufficient time to have assessed the situation and had considered that the safest option had been to have taken avoiding action by turning to the north. Members noted that the pilot of the Ventus had not been in possession of a FRTOL and, consequently, had not been permitted to have transmitted on the Oxford Radar frequency. Nevertheless, it was noted that they had made a transmission to the Oxford controller to express their disapproval of the vectoring of the Global 6000 overhead Hinton-in-the-Hedges.

A member with particular experience of gliding operations explained that, if not partaking in a cross-country flight (such as a competition, for example) it is likely that a glider pilot might try to remain within reasonable gliding distance from a gliding site. In this particular instance, the location of the Airprox had been approximately 4NM west of Hinton-in-the-Hedges. Members noted that that location had broadly coincided with a 10NM long final to RW19 at Oxford Airport. Members remarked that the Airprox had occurred in Class G airspace, available to be shared by a variety of airspace users.

The Board next considered the actions of the pilot of the Global 6000 and, although they had not supplied a narrative report for the encounter, members referred to their interactions with the Oxford controller. Members noted that the Oxford controller had provided vectors for their approach and had explained that there had been "*a lot of unknown traffic*". Members noted that the pilot of the Global 6000 had sighted the Ventus, subsequently described as "*off the nose*" and at "*a similar height*". It was noted that they had not been provided Traffic Information on that particular contact. However, they had also transmitted: "*It's not your fault, we're keeping good eyes out, don't worry*", which indicated to members that the pilot had appreciated the best efforts of the controller. Although not explicitly reported, members presumed that the Global 6000 had been fitted with TCAS and, as such, agreed that it would not have been expected to have detected the Ventus (**CF3**). Consequently, members agreed that the pilot of the Global 6000 had not had situational awareness of the Ventus until it had been visually acquired (**CF2**).

The actions of the Oxford controller were next considered, and members noted that they had provided vectors for the Global 6000 pilot's approach to the ILS for RW19. Referring to the screenshot of the controller's radar display (as shown in Figure 1), members appreciated that the controller had attempted to vector the Global 6000 through the least congested part of the airspace in the most expeditious way. An air traffic controller member explained that the Global 6000 had been 'kept high' (at 4000ft) to the north of Oxford (and over Hinton-in-the-Hedges) but, naturally, had been required to have initiated a descent at some point for the pilot to have been able to intercept the glideslope for their approach to Oxford Airport. Members noted that the Ventus had not appeared on the controller's radar display and, consequently, agreed that they had not had situational awareness of the presence of the Ventus near Banbury (**CF1**).

Members pondered the subsequent interaction between the pilot of the Ventus and the Oxford controller, and noted the glider pilot's retort that "*Hinton is active seven days a week*" and that the controller "[did] *not have that information*". Members felt that the co-ordination between the relevant organisations warranted further investigation and the Board resolved to make a Recommendation:

Banbury Gliding Club and Oxford ANSP to agree a means by which commencement and cessation of gliding activity can be notified.

Members also commended the recommendations drawn out from the Oxford Unit investigation. The discussion was concluded and members turned their attention to the matter of the risk of collision. It

was agreed that, although neither pilot had had situational awareness of the other aircraft, both pilots had sighted the other aircraft in time to have considered the safest course of action. Members agreed that the pilot of the Ventus had been concerned by the proximity of the Global 6000 (**CF4**) and noted that they had taken avoiding action to increase the separation. Given that the separation had been 0.4NM, members agreed that safety margins had been reduced but were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026091			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Recommendation: Banbury Gliding Club and Oxford ANSP to agree a means by which commencement and cessation of gliding activity can be notified.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Oxford Radar controller had not had situational awareness of the presence of the Ventus.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the EC device fitted to the Ventus would not have been expected to have detected the Global 6000. The TCAS fitted to the Global 6000 would not have been expected to have detected the Ventus.

⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

