Monthly meeting July 2025

2025026

PA28 (Civ FW)

AW109 (Civ Comm)

London FIR (G)

C

2025030

C172 (Civ FW)

C152 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2025033

ASK13 (Civ Gld)

AS365 (Civ Helo)

London FIR (G)

B

2025034

Robin R100 (Civ FW)

RV9 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

A

2025036

C42 (Civ FW)

C152 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

C

2025037

P68 (Civ Comm)

EC120 (Civ Comm)

Liverpool CTR (D)

E

2025039

DJI M30T (Civ UAS)

R44 (Civ Comm)

EG R432 (G)

E

2025040

H145 (HEMS)

Sprite (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

A

2025041

Tutor (HQ Air Trg)

Hawk (HQ Air Trg)

Leeming ATZ (G)

C

2025043

PA28 (Civ FW)

Sport Cruiser (Civ FW)

Elstree ATZ (G)

C

2025044

ASK13 (Civ Gld)

P68 (Civ Comm)

London FIR (G)

C

2025047

DA40(A) (Civ FW)

DA40(B) (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

C

2025048

P68 (Civ Comm)

AW169 (HEMS)

London FIR (G)

C

2025049

DeltaJet 500 (Civ FW)

Sport Cruiser (Civ FW)

Kemble ATZ (G)

C

2025050

C152 (Civ FW)

C172 (Civ FW)

Blackpool ATZ (G)

C

2025052

PA28(A) (Civ FW)

PA28(B) (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2025054

PiK20D (Civ Gld)

PA28 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2025056

KC135 (Foreign Mil)

JS1 (Civ Gld)

London FIR (G)

A

Recommendation: The CAA considers implementing a discrete conspicuity SSR code for gliders.

2025057

Stearman (Civ FW)

SR22 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2025058

DJI M350 (Civ UAS)

Paraglider (Civ Hang)

Bournemouth CTR (D)

C

2025060

C140 (Civ FW)

Beagle Pup (Civ FW)

Duxford ATZ (G)

A

2025062

Yak 52 (Civ FW)

DA40 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

A

2025063

DA42 (Civ FW)

AS355 (Civ Comm)

Gamston ATZ (G)

C

2025065

DJI M350 (Civ UAS)

PA28 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

C

Recommendation: The CAA considers publishing a list of established drone training locations in the UK AIP.

2025038

26 Mar 25

2147

(night)

Bell 429

(HEMS)

Drone

5111N 00154W

Shrewton

~900ft Alt

Terrain in that area is roughly 122m (400ft). Aircraft and Drone height was therefore approximately 500ft AGL

D125

(Danger Area)

THE BELL 429 PILOT reports that the crew were tasked at night with a HEMS mission in Salisbury on the opposite side of Salisbury Plain Training Area (SPTA) to their base in […]. As there was an active exercise taking place with a Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC) controlling aircraft, the pilot rang the JTAC directly and discussed their need to cross the plain via the Lavington to Shrewton low level route. The JTAC indicated that they would get all aircraft and drones in the danger area a minimum of 1km away from the route and would confirm by radio this had occurred before their helicopter entered the danger area. The Bell 429 pilot reports that they departed […] using [the Night Vision Imaging System] (NVIS) with conditions being clear skies but no moon. They received the all clear from the JTAC on Salisbury Ops 122.755MHz and proceeded along the standard route. As they approached Shrewton at 550ft AGL to exit the SPTA, the Technical Crew Member (TCM) in the LHS saw an unusual light in the vicinity of Shrewton. They tried to determine the source of the light as they had approached Shrewton, lifting their head to see what the natural colour of the lights were off-NVIS. The TCM began to see some parallax with the lights not moving while the background did and immediately brought the attention of the rest of the crew to the light and identified it as a [small multi-copter] drone. They quickly assessed there had been an increasing rate of change in aspect on the drone lights so did not call for a break manoeuvre (a good call given the low altitude they had been at). The drone lights continued to change in aspect and the drone passed level with the cockpit around 200m to the left of the aircraft's path a few seconds later. The approximate location of the drone was SU06724384. They immediately reported the drone via VHF to the JTAC. The Bell 429 pilot notes that they subsequently aborted the mission over Salisbury due to a reduction in visibility on the ground and elected not to transit back along the low-level route and instead went via Warminster. They reported the drone on landing to the JTAC for further reporting via SPTA as civilian drones are not permitted within the SPTA danger area. They had received the call that all the drones in the SPTA were clear so it was natural to second guess what they initially saw and this may have delayed their reaction to the threat.

Reported Separation: 0ft V/200m H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

THE SALISBURY PLAIN TRAINING AREA JOINT TERMINAL ATTACK CONTROLLER (JTAC) reports that [the Bell 429 pilot] called prior to take-off to say they wanted to fly down the A360 and to which [the JTAC] said “YES”. [The JTAC then noted that] it did not take long to [ensure military] drones were [landed] and that [one drone] had been kept 2km to the west of the flying route but when the Bell 429 pilot left the SPTA to the south they reported one small UAV at the same height as themselves (500ft AGL) about 200-300m away (over Shrewton]. Luckily the Bell 429 was tracking to the side of the town. This had happened in the vicinity of SU 0700 4364 (Shrewton).

THE SPTA TSO (AT HQ SPTA) reports that SPTA Air Ops had no involvement in the incident as they had been closed. The Drone involved in the incident was reported to the CRTC JTAC-I on the ground on 122.755MHz (Salisbury Information Secondary Freq) by the Bell 429 pilot. The location of the Drone sighting was outside the Salisbury Plain Training Area.

The SPTA TSO adds that SPTA airspace also includes civilian areas outside SPTA in which ‘Salisbury Information’ has very little control. SPTA Air Ops does try to enforce with the local population that drone users are to request drone flights following normal SPTA Air Ops booking procedures. If the drone user in this event had requested to operate through SPTA Air Ops, and followed correct booking procedures, the details of the drone would have been on SPTA Air Ops out-of-hours brief and the Bell 429 pilot would have been made aware of the location of the drone.

All Military RPAS flying takes place inside the Ground Training Area boundary which was what the JTAC had been referring to when they had passed that ’the route was clear of all other aircraft’ to the Bell 429 crew.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

2025084

28 Apr 25

1936

B787

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5137N 00034W

3NM NW Denham

FL70

London TMA

(A)

The B787 pilot reports that a drone was spotted passing down the left side of the aircraft at 7000ft, downwind for RW09L.

Reported Separation: NR

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

The Heathrow INT North controller reports that they have no recollection of the event.

NATS Safety Investigations report that the pilot of [the B787] reported to the LL INT North controller, “there’s a drone, just passed in our ten o’clock position. We think it was a drone down our left side just about seven thousand”.

Analysis of the radar replay indicated that there were no primary or secondary contacts associated with the drone report visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that there was insufficient information to make a sound judgement of risk.

2025088

15 May 25

1720

Dauphin

(JAC)

Model aircraft

5134N 00018W

Northwick Park

1700ft

London CTR

(D)

The Dauphin pilot reports that during the top of climb cruise (1700ft AMSL) routing out of the London TMA (approx 2NM northwest of Wembley Stadium

VRP) a potential conflict was identified and raised to the crew, initially as a bird. Once the object got closer, it was evident this was a winged UAV, approximately 1.5m in length. The UAV passed approximately 100ft below and 300m from the aircraft (1600ft AMSL ivo Northwick Park Station). The location and altitude of the UAV were passed to Heathrow Radar. The sortie was continued without further incident.

Reported Separation: 100ft V/ 300m H

Reported Risk of Collision: Low

The Special VFR Controller reports that [the Dauphin pilot] reported a possible drone in the vicinity of Greenhill, near to Northwick station at around 1720 UTC. [The controller] asked [another pilot] if they could see anything when they flew past the area, and they didn't see anything.

A NATS Investigation reports the Dauphin pilot submitted an Airprox report in response to the sighting of drone whilst approximately 2NM North-West of Wembley VRP, in the vicinity of Northwick Park station. The pilot reported that the drone was white and approximately 1.5m in length.

It has been estimated that the UAS was at 1600ft. Safety Investigations reviewed the radar at the time the pilot reported the sighting, however, no radar contacts associated with the drone were visible.

A JAC Investigation reports that no NOTAMs or any other source of information were available during planning to inform [the crew] of the presence of any UAV activity in this area. Also no aids alerted them of it approaching at the time. It was purely their visual lookout which drew their attention to its presence. ATC was not aware of it either when they raised it on the radio.

The crew felt no need to take any evasive action as they were comfortable that they had seen it and could ascertain that it would pass safely down their side, however, they also felt that there were no other barriers that would have guaranteed this had they not seen it.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a model aircraft.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1 ,2, 3, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

2025106

04 Jun 25

1401

ATR72

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5330N 00210W

12NM NNE Manchester Airport

5000ft

Manchester CTR

(D)

The ATR72 pilot reports that they had been downwind right for VOR DME RW23R at 5000ft QNH1003 Hdg 150°. Both pilots spotted an object in-front of the aircraft at exactly the same level. It passed very close down the left hand side within a few metres (5-10) of the port wingtip. It appeared to be a rectangular box shape with legs/skids beneath and a small balloon on-top. The whole structure was approximately 1m tall. On checking the internet it looked like a "helium assist" type drone. They think the balloon was black with gold stripes and the rest of the structure was black. ATC informed and phone call report made on ground. It would have caused significant damage if it had hit the aircraft. Looking at the wingtip from the FD, it straddled the top and bottom surface of the wing exactly as it passed.

Reported Separation: 0ft V/5-10m H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

The Manchester Controller reports that the ATR72 was established for an ILS approach for RW23R. Passing 7.5NM from touchdown, the pilot reported passing in close proximity to an unknown object that may have been a drone. Upon receipt of this information, all following arrivals were warned by A/R or Manchester approach. No further sightings were reported.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 6

Risk: The Board considered that providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

2025107

19 May 25

1809

A320

(CAT)

Unk Obj

N5132 00004W

E Central London

FL90

London TMA

(A)

The A320 pilot reports that the flight departed from LHR RW09R, on the BPK6J SID initially and then an eastbound heading over London. Whilst over central London at FL90 in clear skies at a speed of 250kt IAS, both the Captain and First Officer saw a bright white object pass overhead from the opposite direction. The object appeared to be approximately 2-3m in size at the very least, it may have been larger as it filled a good proportion of the windshield. There was no appreciable separation vertical or horizontal. The First Officer observed that it was triangular in shape. The Captain only saw the object for a second or two in peripheral vision so could not reliably comment on the shape. No markings were identified. The object did not appear on TCAS. The encounter was immediately reported to London control

Reported Separation: 10m V (above)

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

The Swanwick TC Radar controller (NE departures) reports that at 1810 [the A320 pilot] reported a drone sighting at FL90, 10NM west of [London City Airport], it was grey. This information was passed on to Heathrow Approach also.

The NATS Safety Investigation reports that the pilot of [the A320] reported that an object passed within about 10m of the aircraft as they were passing 9000ft, approximately 5NM west-northwest of London City Airport. Safety Investigations was subsequently informed by the UK Airprox Board that the event had been submitted as a drone Airprox.

The pilot stated that the object “went over us, probably within about 10 metres”. The NE DEPS controller informed the Heathrow Intermediate Director, the Heathrow Tower Supervisor was also informed.

Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts, associated with the drone report, visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

They concluded that the pilot of [the A320] submitted an Airprox report in response to the sighting of a drone whilst approximately 5NM west-northwest of London City airport.

It has been estimated that the UAS was at 9000ft.

Safety Investigations reviewed the radar at the time the pilot of [the A320] reported the sighting, however, no radar contacts associated with the drone were visible.

UKAB Secretariat reports that an analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and a single primary return was seen at 0.2NM ahead of the A320 to the east of Central London at 1808:50 when the A320 had been at 9200ft. There were no further similar returns detected on radar.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 6

Risk: The Board considered that providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

2025110

10 Jun 25

0956

EMB190

(CAT)

Drone

5130N 00017E

Thurrock

3000ft

London TMA

(A)

The ERJ190 pilot reports that during the approach, at 3000ft and approx 7.5 DME, a yellow and black quadcopter drone was spotted below and in front of the aircraft. They estimated that it passed 20ft below the nose, travelling from ahead to slightly right, passing between the aircraft and engine 2. An ATC report was made and police report filed.

Reported Separation: 20ft V/0m H

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7

Risk: The Board considered that providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

2025111

08 Jun 25

0803

B787

(CAT)

Drone

5128N 00009W

11NM final RW27R

Heathrow

3400ft

London TMA

(A)

The B787 pilot reports that a drone was sighted as it passed within approximately 100ft laterally from the left-hand side of the aircraft and at a similar altitude to the aircraft on the final approach to RW27R at Heathrow

Reported Separation: 0ft V/<100ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

The Swanwick TC Radar controller reports that [the B787] was making an approach for RW27R into [Heathrow]. They had just instructed the pilot to transfer to the Tower frequency when they reported seeing a drone off the left-hand-side close to the aircraft. At the time no returns were visible on radar. They asked for a description of the drone and informed subsequent aircraft. Details were passed on to the GS Airports for further dissemination.

The B787’s position was noted at 10NM final for 27R at Heathrow at an altitude of 3900ft

The NATS Safety Investigation reports the sector was Heathrow Final Director (LL FIN) with the flight conducted in the London TMA Class A airspace.

At the time of the pilot’s report [the B787] was passing 3400ft. The pilot stated that the drone passed very close to the aircraft, “less than one hundred feet away”.

The controller passed details of the report to following arrival [aircraft] and made an ‘all stations’ broadcast with information on the position of the reported drone. The controller also informed the GS Airports for further dissemination.

Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts associated with the drone report, visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

Their conclusion and assessment were that the pilot of [the B787] submitted an Airprox report in response to the sighting of a drone whilst at approximately 11NM on final approach for RW27R at Heathrow. It has been estimated that the UAS was at 3400ft. Safety Investigations reviewed the radar at the time the pilot of [the B787] reported the sighting, however, no radar contacts associated with the drone were visible.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7

Risk: The Board considered that providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

2025113

15 Jun 25

0901

DR400

(Civ FW)

Drone

5150N 00038E

2NM N Witham

2100ft

London FIR

(G)

The DR400 pilot reports that upon reaching cruise altitude of circa 2100ft QNH 1021hPa , a red drone passed them (at same altitude) to their port side at a an approximate distance of 100ft. They reported the incident to Southend Radar.

Reported Separation: 0ft V/100ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

A Southend Investigation reports that at the time of the reported Airprox (0901), [the DR400 pilot] was not in communication with Southend Radar and was squawking 7000 (VFR conspicuity). There was no other radar contact that could have been a drone IVO of the DR400 displayed on the radar.

[The DR400 pilot] did however call Southend at 0902:05 and requested a Basic Service. They reported [their routeing and that they were] 5NM east of Rivenhall, level at altitude 2100ft. There was a short delay to agree the service due to controller workload.

At time 0903:37 a Basic Service was agreed, and the aircraft changed their squawk to 4575 (Southend conspicuity), they then reported that they had sighted a drone when they had passed Rivenhall, this was acknowledged by the controller, however, the pilot did not report the sighting as an Airprox on the Southend frequency. Having analysed the surveillance recordings, there was no other radar contact displayed that could have been a drone, in that area, at that time and at the DR400’s level and range from Southend. It is highly unlikely that the radar would detect a drone.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

2025119

18 Jun 25

1940

A320

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5127N 00009W

11.8NM final LHR 27L

3800ft

London TMA

(A)

The A320 pilot reports that a drone was observed passing close under the nose of the aircraft at approximately 11.8NM final approach for LHR ILS27L, altitude around 3800ft. The estimated separation was 100-200ft below their altitude, exactly on the runway centreline. The drone was round, shiny and black. The pilot reports that they had only seen it for a few seconds and were unable to recall more detail.

Reported Separation: 100-200ft V / 0ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

The Swanwick TC Radar Controller reports that they had been in position as LL FIN.The landing runway was 27L. The A320 was established on the localiser and descending on the glidepath when the pilot reported a drone sighting - at around 11NM and 3A for RW27L, colour black. This information was passed on to the supervisor and subsequent arrivals.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

Risk: The Board considered that although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.