


AIRPROX REPORT No 2025048

Date: 08 Apr 2025 Time: 1058Z Position: 5143N 00009E Location: North Weald Airfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	P68	AW169
Operator	Civ Comm	HEMS
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	North Weald Radio	North Weald Radio
Altitude/FL	1100ft	900ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White	Red, yellow
Lighting	Anti-coll, navigation	Anti-coll, strobe, landing, position
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1300ft	NR
Altimeter	QNH (1028hPa)	QNH
Heading	020°	020°
Speed	100kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	TCAS II
Alert	None	TA
Separation at CPA		
Reported	300ft V/NK H	Not seen
Recorded	200ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE P68 PILOT reports that, during approach to North Weald, they had joined via left base for RW02. They had contacted North Weald Radio in good time, received airfield information and announced their intentions. Once they had reported left base, they were advised there was nothing to affect, although there had been a helicopter reported to be manoeuvring on the grass. The P68 pilot continued on to final and announced this. A few seconds later, they had heard the AW169 pilot announcing their intention to depart and were then advised by North Weald Radio that the runway was in use. This prompted the P68 pilot to initiate a go-around as the runway was not clear for them to land on. They quickly reached circuit altitude of 1300ft at approximately the runway threshold although, given the nose-up attitude during go around, it is hard to be precise on that. The P68 pilot asked the task specialist in the back to keep an eye on the helicopter below in case it ascended whilst they were on the ground. [The task specialist] then advised that the helicopter had taken off and had been ascending into a position similar to theirs. The P68 pilot decided to turn toward the deadside (right hand) of the circuit as evasive action as they anticipated that the helicopter would enter the left-hand circuit. As they had done so, the helicopter ascended into a similar position to the one the P68 crew had previously occupied. The P68 pilot had then asked if the helicopter would be departing the zone or joining the circuit and were advised it would be entering the circuit. The P68 pilot gave it ample room to complete the circuit and then re-joined the left-hand circuit to land with no other issues.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE AW169 PILOT reports that they were not entirely sure that this event was the Airprox reported as they hadn't been aware that they had been involved until notified by email. The best guess they have of conflicting aircraft at the time given is composed by their assumptions. The AW169 pilot stated that they wouldn't be in a position to classify this as an Airprox themselves as they never had sight of the conflicting aircraft. At the end of an operator proficiency check, they needed to conduct a PC1 profile

for the AW169 which constitutes a near vertical climb to 200ft and then a fly away with a simulated engine failure. They notified North Weald Radio of their intentions and stated that they would want to occupy the in-use runway for approximately 2min for this purpose. Prior to entering the runway a lookout turn was conducted, during which there were no aircraft observed in the final approach arc. The AW169 pilot then commenced the departure. During the departure they don't recall hearing the 'finals' call of any traffic, but that may be because of running through the engine failure actions shortly after TDP. What they did report hearing, though, was the call of an aircraft behind them going around. Not being in a position at this stage to look behind and visually acquire the traffic which was going around, the AW169 pilot continued with the departure. They had expected the traffic behind them to remain a safe distance behind. Subsequently, the TCAS II system declared a Traffic Alert due to the aircraft behind them. This had not warranted any corrective action and, once again, with no option other than to continue the departure, they had continued. The AW169 pilot had conformed with the circuit and believed that the traffic behind had then moved to the deadside of the circuit and any conflict that existed was concluded.

THE NORTH WEALD AGO reports that on Tuesday the 8th April 2025 they had been on duty in the tower at North Weald airfield and had begun their shift at 0700. They [report that] they had been asked to provide details of the events relating to the Airprox report from their position as an Air/Ground Operator. This particular incident had involved a P68 and an AW169.

They note that they had made no notes at the time, nor had they made any notes after the incident, however they did have some recollection of the events in question and in order to refresh their memory and to enable accurate timings to be given, they had referred to the stored data in the tower voice recorder and ADS-B playback.

At 1053 - they received the first call inbound from the P68 pilot and they passed the airfield information. The AW169 at this time had been operating on the helicopter training area adjacent to the main runway.

1055-1056 – calls from uninvolved aircraft.

At 1056 the P68 pilot had called to ask for numbers in the circuit (details were, [one] on final to land, [one] downwind, a Helimed (the Airprox AW169) operating on the HTA, one climbing away, departing the circuit to the east).

1058 uninvolved aircraft called final for a touch and go.

1059 The P68 pilot called approaching left-base.

1059 The AW169 pilot called entering the runway, from helicopter training area and were given the wind for an expected departure.

1059 The AW169 pilot called departing.

1100 The P68 was seen on finals and [they were] advised that the runway had been occupied. The P68 pilot copied and positioned deadside. The AW169 continued along the runway and turned early crosswind. The P68 continued wide deadside and joined further crosswind and into a wide downwind.

Factual Background

The weather at Stansted Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGSS 081050Z AUTO 08007KT 010V130 9999 NCD 13/02 Q1028=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At CPA: 1058:14 200ft V/<0.1NM H (the AW169 squawking 0031 and the P68 squawking 5007.)

The P68 and AW169 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a P68 and an AW169 flew into proximity at North Weald airfield at 1058Z on Tuesday 8th April 2025. Both pilots had been operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of an AGCS from North Weald Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the AGO involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly discussed the actions of the P68 pilot, noting the nature of their flight and their intention to join via left base for RW02, having advised the AGO of this and having received notification of 'nothing to affect', although they had been aware of a helicopter operating on the grass. Board members felt that this call had instilled a degree of inaccurate situational awareness at this stage (**CF3**), with the expectation of the P68 crew that the AW169 operation would have remained clear of the runway. Having continued around the circuit toward finals, the P68 pilot had elected to go around as the AGO had then announced that the runway had been in use. In performing the go-around, members felt that, although a timely move to the deadside had been actioned, this could have been a more positive manoeuvre, increasing lateral separation (**CF2**) and avoiding the cause for concern over their proximity subsequently felt by the AW169 pilot (**CF6**). Members noted positively that the P68 had carried and

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

utilised a commonly used electronic conspicuity unit, expressing some disappointment that it had not registered any emissions from the compatibly-equipped AW169 (CF5).

Members moved on to discuss the actions of the AW169 pilot, noting that the reporting pilot had not seen the P68 ahead of the reported CPA, although their TCAS unit had alerted them (CF4) to its presence, granting them a degree of generic situational awareness (CF3). Members discussed in some depth the nature of the emergency drill that they had aimed to practise and the constraints the pilot would have been under once that manoeuvre had been underway. They felt that a call from the AW169 pilot notifying that they would move to the runway at that stage would have raised greater awareness for any other circuit traffic (CF1). As the AW169 pilot had prepared for their exercise they had performed a clearing turn but had not visually acquired the P68 and, as their procedure had been underway, the approaching P68 had become obscured from their view (CF8) as it had approached from their 6 o'clock and they had gained visual only with the P68 at CPA (CF7).

In considering the contribution from the North Weald AGO, Board members accepted that, as the Airprox had not been called on frequency at the time, they had not logged notes and had subsequently reviewed recordings to determine what had happened. Members noted that the AGO's role is clearly bounded and information calls only can be made, and their involvement is therefore restricted to what they hear or see and there had been nothing untoward on this occasion. Members deemed the AGO's actions and calls had been more than expected.

Concluding their discussion, members noted that although the P68 pilot had initially had inaccurate situational awareness of the presence of the AW169, the onboard task specialist had visually acquired the climbing helicopter and advised the pilot accordingly, enabling them to move towards the deadside and ensure separation between the two aircraft. Members agreed that, although safety had been degraded, there had been no risk of collision. Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025048			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
4	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS TA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system traffic advisory warning triggered	
5	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Lack of Individual Risk Perception	Events involving flight crew not fully appreciating the risk of a particular course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
8	Contextual	• Visual Impairment	Events involving impairment due to an inability to see properly	One or both aircraft were obscured from the other

Degree of Risk: C.


Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the AW169 pilot could have clearly stated their intention to enter the runway to complete their manoeuvre as the P68 had approached to land, and the P68 pilot, on recognising the AW169 occupying the runway, could have moved more positively towards the deadside to increase lateral separation.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the AW169 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the presence of the P68 and the P68 pilot had inaccurate situational awareness of the presence of the AW169.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).