# AIRPROX REPORT No 2025044

Date: 05 Apr 2025 Time: 1507Z Position: 5158N 00312W Location: Talgarth

## PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

| Recorded | Aircraft 1 | Aircraft 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Aircraft | ASK13 | P68 |
| Operator | Civ Gld | Civ Comm |
| Airspace | London FIR | London FIR |
| Class | G | G |
| Rules | VFR | VFR |
| Service | Listening Out | None |
| Provider | BMGC | Establishing contact |
| Altitude/FL | ~3990ft | 4140ft |
| Transponder | Not fitted | A, C, S |
| **Reported** | | |
| Colours | Red | White |
| Lighting | Nil | Anti-coll, nav |
| Conditions | VMC | VMC |
| Visibility | >10km | >10km |
| Altitude/FL | 3800ft | 5000ft |
| Altimeter | QNH | QNH |
| Heading | 110° | 020° |
| Speed | 45kt | 150kt |
| ACAS/TAS | FLARM | SkyEcho |
| Alert | None | None |
| **Separation at CPA** | | |
| Reported | 200ft V/875m H | 500ft V/NK H |
| Recorded | ~150ft V/~0.2NM H | |




**THE ASK13 PILOT** reports that the other aircraft's details were established by looking at FlightRadar24 immediately after the incident. They were […] flying from [… to …]. The image of the aircraft on FlightRadar24 exactly matches what they had seen from the glider. The [other] aircraft's altitude and position were also taken from FlightRadar24.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

**THE P68 PILOT** reports that, whilst transiting back from […] to […] over Wales, they had been receiving a Basic Service from London Information. To the best of their knowledge they had been at 5000ft. At approximately 1500, whilst looking out for traffic, they noticed what they believed to be a red glider in their 9/10 o'clock below them crossing from left-to-right. They estimate that it was between 500ft-1000ft below and 1-2NM away. The pilot immediately announced "traffic" to their task specialist in the back who had spotted it at the same time. Whilst [the pilot reports that] they didn't have too much time to react, both [crew members] agreed that they felt the traffic, whilst fairly close, posed no imminent threat. They continued to observe the traffic and continued on their track. The glider passed below and behind them. As the P68 pilot had continued, they observed a further glider behind the first observed glider at a similar level. This one had been further away and again posed no imminent threat. They report that they had received no warning of the traffic from London Information.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

**THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO** reports that they had been notified by NATS Safety Investigations of a pilot-reported Airprox regarding the P68 that had been in receipt of a Basic Service on the London Information frequency at the time of the event. This Airprox was not reported on the frequency, and [the FISO] had no recollection of the flight.

## Factual Background

The weather at Cardiff Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGFF 051450Z AUTO 06019KT 9999 NCD 17/04 Q1018=
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## Analysis and Investigation

### NATS Safety Investigation

At 1507:08 the P68 pilot called the London Flight Information Service Officer (FISO) and requested a Basic Service. The pilot was displaying Mode-A code 7000 at that time and had been approximately 2.1NM north of the Black Mountains Gliding Club, Talgarth, Wales (and around 3.1NM north of the village of Pengenfford). The FISO had asked the pilot to pass further details, and in response the pilot reported their [point of] departure, destination, persons on board and explained that they were VFR, at 4000ft on QNH 1018hPa and "*30NM north of Cardiff*". The FISO issued the London FIS SSR code of 1177 and agreed a Basic Service, as requested, at 1507:42. No other traffic was visible in the vicinity of the P68 at that time. [UKAB Secretariat note: the Airprox occurred at 1506:32 – 36sec ahead of the initial call from the P68 pilot].

> CAP774 prescribes, 'Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers / FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight'.

After the flight, the P68 pilot submitted an Airprox report stating that the Airprox had occurred at Pengenfford, Wales. Radar data showed that the P68 had directly overflown Pengenfford at 1506:32, prior to the aircraft contacting the FISO and agreeing a Service. During their time on the FIS frequency, the pilot did not report an encounter with another aircraft. The UK Airprox Board reported this Airprox to NATS on 28th May 2025.

Conclusions

The Airprox occurred when the pilot of the P68 came into reported close proximity to the ASK13 glider whilst south of the Black Mountains Gliding club, Wales. It is not possible to provide a definitive point of approach as the ASK13 was not visible on radar at any time.

### UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: Image taken from the CAA's Airspace Analyser Tool – The P68 had passed across the front of the ASK13 at a distance of ~0.177NM at 1506:32. Note that, due to the P68 showing on the system only at 1506:13 then 1506:49, interpolation puts the CPA at that time and distance.




Figure 2: At 1506:32 The white cross is at the reported CPA. The ASK13 did not show on radar.




Figure 3: Taken from the CAA's Airspace Analyser Tool showing the south-to-north path of the P68

The ASK13 was tracked using GPS data and the P68 was tracked by radar and identified through Mode S data. The diagram at page 1 was constructed and the separation at CPA determined by combining these two sources.

The ASK13 and P68 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the P68 pilot was required to give way to the ASK13.[2]

## Comments

### AOPA

Whilst not required, but when flying close to a gliding site, everyone's situational awareness is improved if the site is given a radio call (known frequencies are in the AIP). It must also be remembered that London Information does not have a radar so is unable to offer any form of surveillance service. In this case, the pilot saw the glider and considered there to be no risk, it is worth noting if an Airprox does occur to report it on frequency.

### BGA

Talgarth is one of approximately 80 permanent glider launch sites in the United Kingdom listed in UK AIP ENR 5.5 and labelled on the CAA 1:500,000 and 1:250,000 charts with a "G" symbol, as shown on the chart segment in Part A. Under the right conditions, neighbouring hills generate mountain lee wave, which gliders can use to fly in this area at all altitudes up to the base of the overlying controlled airspace (FL145 overhead Talgarth and to the north, FL105 to the south of the site). The EC equipment fitted to the ASK13 (and in fact, to almost all gliders) warns of impending conflicts with other similarly-equipped aircraft. This mitigates the risk of Airprox with other gliders, but basic installations do not detect aircraft equipped only with a transponder or a CAP 1391 ADS-B-out device, as the P68 was in this case. However, recent versions of this EC equipment can optionally include a 1090MHz receiver, and thereby warn of conflicts with transponder and ADS-B-out-equipped aircraft. Updating glider EC hardware to add such a 1090MHz receiver would provide a useful additional safety barrier in airspace with a high density of transponder or ADS-B-out equipped aircraft.

The carry-on CAP1391 ADSB-based TAS on board the P68 can also be configured to receive transmissions from the EC equipment carried by almost all gliders (including this ASK13) and display nearby glider traffic via participating EFB applications. Using this option would provide a useful additional safety barrier in airspace where gliders operate.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when an ASK13 and a P68 flew into proximity at Talgarth at 1507Z on Saturday 5th April 2025. The ASK13 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and Listening Out on the BMGC frequency, and the P68 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and not in receipt of a Flight Information Service.

## PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, ADS-B-derived track data and a report from the London FISO. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Board members firstly discussed the actions of the ASK13 pilot. They noted that neither the pilot nor the student had seen the P68 before it had crossed their path (**CF3**) and had crafted their report utilising

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

an open-source software tracking system. Members noted that the pilot had been monitoring the Gliding Club frequency and had carried an electronic conspicuity unit common amongst the gliding fleet. Unfortunately, no RT call had been heard from the P68 pilot or EC alert received due to equipment incompatibility (**CF2**) leaving the ASK13 pilot with no situational awareness of the presence of the P68 (**CF1**) and the ASK13 pilot having been concerned by its proximity (**CF4**).

Members secondly considered the actions of the P68 pilot, noting the nature of their flight. Members discussed the reported use of a Flight Information Service, concluding that that service had not been established until after the event and that, tied to the carriage and use of electronic conspicuity equipment commonly used by general aviation pilots, which had unfortunately been incompatible with that carried by the ASK13 (**CF2**), had left the P68 pilot with only generic situational awareness of the presence of gliding activity in the area (**CF1**). Members discussed the chosen flightpath and altitude for the P68 and felt that, although a wider or higher passage had been possible, there had been little to have been gained by doing so due to the terrain and other local area flight activity.

The Board briefly discussed the contribution made by the London FISO, and agreed that the P68 pilot's request for a Basic Service had been made after the Airprox had occurred and so there had been nothing that the London FISO could have done to have assisted matters. Nonetheless, the Board wished to express its gratitude to NATS Safety Investigations for its contribution and investigation into the event.

Concluding their discussion, members noted that although the ASK13 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the P68 and had achieved visual contact only as it had passed through their 12 o'clock, the P68 pilot had seen the ASK13 and had judged their paths to have not been in conflict and members agreed that, although safety had been degraded, there had been no risk of collision. Risk Category C.

## PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

| | **2025044** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CF | **Factor** | **Description** | **ECCAIRS Amplification** | **UKAB Amplification** |
| | **Flight Elements** | | | |
| | **• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** | | | |
| 1 | Contextual | • Situational Awareness and Sensory Events | Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations | Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness |
| | **• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** | | | |
| 2 | Technical | • ACAS/TCAS System Failure | An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations | Incompatible CWS equipment |
| | **• See and Avoid** | | | |
| 3 | Human Factors | • Monitoring of Other Aircraft | Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft | Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots |
| 4 | Human Factors | • Perception of Visual Information | Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement | Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft |

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Flight Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because the ASK13 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the P68 and the P68 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the presence of gliders in the area.

**Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by both aircraft had been incapable of receiving electronic emissions from the other.