AIRPROX REPORT No 2025033

Date: 15 Mar 2025 Time: 1355Z Position: 5318N 00143W Location: ivo Camphill

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	ASK13	AS365
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ Helo
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Listening Out
Provider	Camphill Base	Manchester Radar
Altitude/FL	~1982ft	1900ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White/Red	Blue
Lighting	Nil	Landing, taxi, HISL and strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	800ft	1500ft
Altimeter	QFE	QNH
Heading	190°	345°
Speed	40kt	145kt
ACAS/TAS	PowerFLARM	TAS
Alert	Information	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/90m H	Not seen
Recorded	~82ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE ASK13 PILOT reports that they were P1, on a coaching flight with a student instructor. They sat in the front seat and had been roleplaying a student attempting turns. They had been circling to the right and decided to hand back control to P2 to join a downwind leg for landing. The P2 straightened onto a northerly heading before starting a 180° turn to the left to join the downwind leg. As they turned left they saw the helicopter pass by in front of and below them. It appeared to be flying straight and level. They looked to see if they could see any crew in the right-hand seat of the helicopter and waved their hand but couldn't see any response. They continued their turn to the left before straightening onto the downwind leg. They had the impression that their track on the downwind leg would have been the reciprocal track of the helicopter.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE AS365 PILOT reports they were flying from [departure point] to a private site. It was a CAVOK day and they believed they were cruising at around 1500ft doing 150kt.

They routed their flight as direct as possible which took them close to the vicinity of Camphill. They had spoken to East Midlands for a Zone transit and there was a short portion of the flight where it was a bit early to speak to Leeds. They thought that they had put in the listening squawk for Manchester for a few miles before going over to Leeds Radar.

They dropped their passengers at the private site, then proceeded to a Heliport for fuel, then back down to [their destination]. They noted that they had ACAS [sic] on the whole flight and never received a traffic warning. They did not see the glider in question.

Factual Background

The weather at Manchester Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGCC 151350Z AUTO 01009KT 9999 BKN044 08/M02 Q1025 NOSIG
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the AS365 was positively identified using Mode S data. A primary contact was also seen on radar in the vicinity of the reported Airprox as the AS365 passed to the east of Camphill, but this did not match the GPS track supplied by the ASK13 pilot.

Further analysis of ADS-B tracking sources positively identified the ASK13 and the CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1355:22 with less than 0.1NM lateral and approximately 82ft vertical separation based on combined radar and GPS data. At this time, the ASK13 pilot was in a clockwise manoeuvre, after which it was seen to turn onto approximately north prior to making a left turn onto downwind as described by the ASK13 pilot in their report. The ASK13 pilot did not report sighting the AS365 until after CPA. The AS365 was following a similar track to the ASK13 and was seen to pass ahead of the ASK13 to the north, after which time their tracks were diverging.

The ASK13 and AS365 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the AS365 pilot was required to give way to the ASK13.[2]

Comments

BGA

Camphill is one of approximately 80 permanent glider launch sites in the United Kingdom listed in UK AIP ENR 5.5 and labelled on the CAA 1:500,000 and 1:250,000 charts with a "G" symbol, as shown on the chart segment in Part A. A greater density of gliders may be expected nearby at any time during daylight hours at all altitudes up to the base of the overlying controlled airspace (FL65 with a minimum altitude 5500ft overhead the site), accompanied by high-tensile-strength winch-launch cables up to 2000ft above the site (3350ft AMSL). The downwind leg of a glider circuit at Camphill is typically flown at 1950-2150ft AMSL (600-800ft AAL), 0.4-0.8NM from the site.

Between 1352:26 and 1355:46 the glider descended from 2335 to 1974ft AMSL while executing five 360° turns to the right; an average of one complete turn every 40sec (during which interval an aircraft approaching at 145kt would cover 1.6NM). The pilot of a circling glider must look for aircraft approaching from every direction, and although continuous turning facilitates 360° lookout, it also leaves the pilot unsighted in any specific direction for about half the time. After rolling out of the final right-hand turn on a northerly heading, at 1355:54 the student instructor then initiated a 180° turn to the left to join the downwind leg. The glider's crew first sighted the helicopter half way through this turn, at about 1356:02, as it passed left-to-right in front of and below them, at what they believe was its closest point of approach to the glider.

Like many gliding sites, Camphill has a dedicated VHF radio channel, notified on VFR charts and in AIP ENR 5.5 and monitored by gliders flying in the area. If transiting nearby, a brief broadcast call on this channel using "Unattended Aerodrome" phraseology (CAP 413 Ed 23 §4.162 et seq) could help avoid conflicts and increase everyone’s situational awareness.

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an ASK13 and an AS365 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Camphill at 1355Z on Saturday 15th March 2025. The ASK13 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC not in receipt of a FIS, and the AS365 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC listening out on the Manchester Radar frequency, also not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, and GPS navigation data from the ASK13. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first looked at the actions of the ASK13 pilot and noted that they had been operating on a short flight to the east of the airfield, due to northerly winds on the day. The Board agreed that, during the flight, the electronic conspicuity equipment fitted in the ASK13 had provided non-directional information of an aircraft in the vicinity (**CF6**), and members agreed that this had provided a degree of situational awareness to the ASK13 pilot of the helicopter, albeit late (**CF4**). The Board further noted that, after CPA, the pilot turned left and then sighted the AS365 on a reciprocal track and members agreed that this had been an effective non-sighting of the AS365 by the ASK13 pilot (**CF7**).

Turning their attention to the actions of the AS365 pilot, the Board noted that the AS365 had routed close to Camphill gliding site and, although it had appeared that the pilot had initially tracked slightly right on becoming proximate to the site, members agreed that they could have adapted their route away from the glider site more effectively (**CF2**). Members discussed the potential scenario for the AS365 pilot further and wondered if the high ground had been a distraction, given the transit altitude being flown and some members felt that the pilot could have gained more altitude for mitigation rather than to have been at a relatively low level over the high ground. As such, the Board noted that the AS365 had been proximate to the ASK13 as it had been joining the Camphill circuit and members agreed that the pilot had not avoided the circuit pattern formed by the ASK13 (**CF3**). Members wondered if the pilot had considered the potential level of glider activity in the vicinity, and agreed that they had had only generic situational awareness of glider activity (**CF4**) provided by the chart symbology. Members thought that it was unfortunate, in this case, that the pilot's situational awareness had not been enhanced by the capabilities of the TAS fitted to the AS365 because it had not been able to detect the ASK13 (**CF5**) and that, in not knowing about the traffic, the pilot had had no further cues to their lookout and had not seen the ASK13 (**CF7**). Members further agreed that the AS365 pilot could have improved the situational awareness of other aircraft operators in the area by calling Camphill and communicating their intentions as they passed by the glider site (**CF1**).

Concluding their discussion, members were in agreement that the ASK13 pilot had had no situational awareness of the presence of the AS365 nor had they seen it until after CPA, and that the AS365 pilot may have had generic situational awareness that gliders could have been operating in the area but had not seen the ASK13 above them. Members agreed that the proximity of the aircraft resulted in safety margins being reduced much below the norm and were in agreement that there had been a risk of collision (**CF8**). Accordingly, the Board assigned a Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2025033			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			

1	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
6	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
	• See and Avoid			
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
	• Outcome Events			
8	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the AS365 pilot had not given sufficient consideration to the potential gliding activity at Camphill.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the ASK13 pilot had only gained non-directional situational awareness from their electronic conspicuity equipment, and the ASW365 pilot had only generic situational awareness of potential glider activity in the vicinity of the Camphill glider site.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because, although the ASK13 pilot had received information from their electronic conspicuity equipment, it was non-directional.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because the ASK13 pilot did not see the AS365 until after CPA and the AS365 pilot remained unsighted on the ASK13.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2025033
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness