Monthly meeting December 2022

1

2022116

Hurricane (HQ Air Ops)

PA28 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2022118

DHC6 (CAT)

Skyranger (Civ FW)

St Mary’s ATZ (G)

C

2022119

SR22 (Civ FW)

PA28 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2022120

C182 (Civ FW)

AA5 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2022121

PA25 (Civ FW)

R44 (Civ Helo)

London FIR (G)

C

2022125

PA28 (Civ FW)

C172 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2022126

ASK13 (Civ Gld)

PA28 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

C

2022127

EV97 (Civ FW)

S76 (Civ Helo)

London FIR (G)

E

2022128

T50 (Foreign Mil)

C208 (Civ FW)

Boscombe RA(T) (G)

D

2022130

Astir (Civ Gld)

Bell 206 (Civ Helo)

London FIR (G)

C

2022131

AW169 (HEMS)

Spitfire (Civ Comm)

London FIR (G)

C

2022133

E190 (CAT)

Unknown (Civ Hang)

London TMA (A)

C

Recommendation: In the near-term, the CAA engages in a robust communication campaign to inform paramotor pilots of where and when they can operate. In the medium-to-long-term, the CAA considers how best to integrate paramotor activity into UK Airspace as part of the Airspace Modernisation Strategy.

2022134

Discus (Civ Gld)

DA42 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

Recommendation: The CAA, in consultation with the MAA through an appropriate forum (such as the JANSC), considers a means by which existing facilities are utilised to provide a LARS in areas that are currently not included in existing UK LARS provision, prior to the implementation of the Airspace Modernisation Strategy.

2022140

PA28 (Civ FW)

Light aircraft (Unknown)

London FIR (G)

C

2022259

3 Nov 22 1523

Paraglider

(Civ Hang)

Drone

5321N 00138W

Stanage Edge

1400ft

London FIR (G)

The PARAGLIDER pilot reports that during a top-to-bottom paraglider flight at Stanage Edge, they were approaching the landing field in a right-hand turn and suddenly heard the noise of a drone nearby. Scanning the sky, they saw it heading away from them under their right-hand wing tip. After landing, the drone pilot was found stood in the car park wearing goggles/head up display. Their friend stood nearby was also wearing similar goggles. [The paraglider pilot reports that the drone pilot said] that they had only just taken off and did not see [the paraglider] approaching the landing area. Several other paraglider pilots had seen the incident. The drone had an estimated combined wing/rotor span of about 500mm and weight of about 1.25Kg.

Reported Separation: 2ft V/20ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 7

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

A

2022261

8 Nov 22 1635

AW109

(HEMS)

Drone

5225N 00038W

Grafton Underwood

2000ft

London FIR

(G)

The AW109 pilot reports that during the cruise at sunset, they saw what they thought was a large bird at 400-500m co-altitude. After 2-3 seconds they realised it was a drone. [Other crew members] saw it too at 3 o'clock around to 5 o'clock as it disappeared behind. They were close enough to identify it as a DJI Phantom type and estimated the distance as 30-80m. No avoiding action was taken due to lack of time. The Airprox was reported to London Info who attempted to get an exact fix via East Midlands Airport radar, but the radar position was unreliable on account that they were on the very limits of their cover. The ACANS (Airborne Command and Navigation System) unit didn't pick up a ground-based operator, suggesting that the drone was not emergency services or a professional operator.

Reported Separation: 0ft V/ 30-80m H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 4, 7

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where safety had been much reduced below the norm to the extent that safety had not been assured.

B

2022263

16 Nov 22

1302

Atlas

(HQ Air (Ops))

Unk Obj

5456N 00151W

Currock Hill

FL75

Newcastle CTA

(D)

The Atlas pilot reports they had just completed instrument approach training at Newcastle and were climbing out to route towards Humberside. After the last approach they had been cleared to climb ahead to FL90. During the climb they received radar vectors from Newcastle ATC before being cleared own navigation to Humberside. During one of the radar vectors, in a left turn passing through about south at FL75, one of the crew on the flight deck alerted the rest of the crew to a drone that was ahead and just to the right of the nose. Other crew members then saw the object as it passed quickly down the right-hand side. There was no time for the crew to react. The drone was assessed to have passed level with the flight deck windows and a few feet outside the wing tip. The drone was circular, had a hollow centre (doughnut shaped), was dark in colour, and approximately 2-3ft in diameter. The incident was reported to Newcastle ATC. It was noted that, had the aircraft not been in a turn at the time, there would have been a very high chance of collision with the drone.

Reported Separation: 0ft V/ 2ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: Very High

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 6

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

A