AIRPROX REPORT No 2022140

Date: 14 Jul 2022 Time: 1706Z Position: 5214N 00050E Location: Rougham

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2	3
Aircraft	PA28	Unknown	Diagram based on radar data and pilot reports
Operator	Civ FW	Unknown	and phot reports
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR	Stowland
Class	G	G	PA28
Rules	VFR	NK	
Service	Listening Out	Unknown	3
Provider	Rougham	NK	Great
Altitude/FL	700ft	NK	Barton\\ Pakenha
Transponder	A, C, S	NK	CPA ~1706:38
Reported			2
Colours	White	NK	A008
Lighting	Landing	NK	0
Conditions	VMC	NK	NM NM ZUUS P
Visibility	>10km	NR	122 ACE Tostock
Altitude/FL	800ft	NK	23.105
Altimeter	QFE (1015hPa)	NK	
Heading	270°	NK	
Speed	080kt	NK	Kingshall Beyton
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Unknown	Unknown
Separation at CPA			light aircraft
Reported	0ft V/200m H	NK	Polyale and essell
Recorded NK		ık	// Rougnam // //

THE PA28 PILOT reports that they were on base-leg at 1000ft descending, with one stage of flap set. They turned right on to final for RW27; at 800ft they set the second stage of flap, trimming for descent. An aircraft appeared ahead travelling from left-to-right, they manoeuvred left to avoid, and saw the other aircraft passing on their right. It was level with them at 800ft and was a single-engine, high-wing, white aircraft with red markings. They resumed finals and landed.

THE UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT could not be traced.

THE ROUGHAM AGO reports that as an Air/Ground Operator there were no recordings and no instructions given out to aircraft. They had no information regarding the other aircraft and could add nothing further.

Factual Background

The weather at Wattisham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGUW 141650Z 01011KT CAVOK 20/10 Q1023 NOSIG RMK BLU BLU=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken. Whilst the PA28 could be seen on the radar on final at Rougham, as described by the pilot, unfortunately, the unknown light-aircraft could not be seen (Figure 1). However, at 1710:51 a primary-only contact appeared approximately 4NM southeast of Honington/4.5NM northeast of Rougham, and it is possible that this was the light-aircraft that was seen by the PA28 pilot 3min earlier. Unfortunately this primary-only contact faded from radar shortly afterwards and so could not be identified. Further analysis of GPS data was

undertaken to see whether the unknown aircraft could be identified, but again, it could not be seen. Therefore the unknown light-aircraft pilot could not be traced.



Figure 1-1706:38 PA28 turning final at Rougham.




Figure 2-1710:51 Unknown aircraft 3.9NM from Honington

The PA28 and unknown light-aircraft pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and an unknown light-aircraft flew into proximity at Rougham at 1706Z on Thursday 14th July 2022. The PA28 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and listening out on the Rougham A/G frequency. The light-aircraft pilot could not be traced.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the PA28 pilot and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first discussed the actions of the PA28 pilot. They had turned onto final for Rougham and would not have expected to see another aircraft crossing in front of them at that stage. The PA28 had not been fitted with a CWS and so the pilot had had no prior warning that the light-aircraft had been in the vicinity (CF3). Once they had become visual, the pilot had been able to take action to increase the separation, but they had been concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft (CF4). Members agreed that this Airprox demonstrated how important it was to maintain a good lookout, even when on final approach to an airfield, and they commended the PA28 pilot for their actions.

Turning to the untraced light-aircraft pilot, the Board was disappointed that the pilot could not be traced because without their report it was not known whether the pilot had been aware of Rougham and visual with the PA28 or not. The Board advised that pilots transiting so close to an airfield should call on the RT to provide situational awareness for those in the area, but also noted that it was possible that the light-aircraft had not been fitted with a radio. Nevertheless, they thought that by routing at the same altitude as the Rougham circuit traffic and through the final approach lane, the light-aircraft pilot had demonstrated poor airmanship in not conforming with, or avoiding, the pattern of traffic formed by the PA28 (CF1, CF2).

When determining the risk of the Airprox, the Board discussed that, without the radar replay showing the Airprox, they had very little information to assess. However, they took into consideration the report from the PA28 pilot and agreed that the action that the pilot had taken to turn away from the light-

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

aircraft, together with their assessment of the separation, described a situation whereby safety had been degraded, but there had been no risk of collision. Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2022140					
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification		
	Flight Elements					
	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance					
1	Human Factors	Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with		
	Tactical Planning and Execution					
2	Human Factors	Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed		
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action					
3	Contextual	Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness		
	• See and Avoid					
4	Human Factors	Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft		

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the unknown light-aircraft pilot did not avoid the pattern of traffic formed by the PA28 on final at Rougham.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the unknown light-aircraft pilot did not conform with, or avoid, the pattern of traffic at Rougham.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as ineffective because the PA28 pilot had no situational awareness that the unknown light-aircraft was in the vicinity until they became visual with it.

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³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

