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Assessment Summary Sheet

Contributory factor assessment for each assessed Airprox can be downloaded 

Number of Airprox reports assessed, and their ICAO Risk rating
Total Risk A Risk B Risk C Risk D Risk E
17 0 4 7 2 4
Assessed Airprox reports

Airprox

Aircraft 1 (Type)

Aircraft 2 (Type)

Airspace (Class)

ICAO

Risk

2023131

C152 (Civ FW)

AW109 (Civ Comm)

London FIR (G)

C

2023139

ASK21 (Civ Gld)

RV8 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2023141

A320 (CAT)

A319 (CAT)

London TMA (A)

C

2023146

EMB190 (CAT)

SR20 (Civ FW)

London TMA (A)

E

2023148

Pioneer 300 (Civ FW)

DH Vampire (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

C

2023150

Model Aircraft (Civ UAS)

Chinook (HQ JHC)

London FIR (G)

E

2023153

Bristell NG5 (Civ FW)

C172 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

E

2023154

A320 (CAT)

Unk Microlight (Unknown)

London FIR (G)

C

2023156

B737 (Civ Comm)

LAK17 (Civ Gld)

London FIR (G)

C

2023157

DA42 (Civ FW)

Nimbus (Civ Gld)

London FIR (G)

B

2023158

 

PA28 (Civ FW)

C172 (Civ FW)

Thruxton ATZ (G)

C

Recommendation: The Thruxton airfield operator reviews their website and UK AIP entries to ensure coherence.

2023159

LS7 (Civ Gld)

Texan (HQ Air (Trg)

London FIR (G)

D

2023160

Pioneer 300 (Civ FW)

Jabiru (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

B

2023161

DG100 (Civ Gld)

GA8 Airvan (Civ Comm)

London FIR (G)

D

2023165

AW109 (Civ Comm)

C182 (Civ FW)

London FIR (G)

C

2023169

Juno (HQ Air (Trg))

Typhoon (HQ Air (Ops)

London FIR (G)

B

2023178

Eurofox (Civ FW)

Ikarus (Civ FW)

Scottish FIR (G)

E

 

Consolidated Drone/Balloon/Model/Unknown Object Summary Sheet

Contributory factor assessment for each Drone/Balloon/Model/Unknown Object Airprox can be downloaded 

Number of Drone/Balloon/Model/Unknown Object reports, and their ICAO Risk rating
Total Risk A Risk B Risk C Risk D Risk E
7 2 2 1 1 1

Airprox

Number

Date

Time (UTC)

Aircraft

(Operator)

Object

Location[1]

Description

Altitude

Airspace

(Class)

Pilot/Controller Report

Reported Separation

Reported Risk

Comments/Risk Statement

ICAO

Risk

2023269

11 Dec 23

1035

S76

(Civ Helo)

Drone

5257N 00151W

Rocester

10ft

London FIR

(G)

The S76 pilot reports that, during the lookout prior to a vertical departure profile, the non-handling pilot noticed a small quadcopter in close proximity. They chose to abort their takeoff and land. The drone held position, airborne, and continued to face [the S76]. After about 3min, the quadcopter was seen to descend towards the ground in proximity to a car park. Having waited a few minutes, [the pilot of the S76] conducted a vertical profile departure with an increased lookout toward the area where the drone had been. Local security were informed over the radio who subsequently attempted to trace the drone pilot.

 

Reported Separation: 0ft V/50m H

Reported Risk of Collision: Medium

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

 

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

 

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where although safety had been reduced, there had been no risk of collision.

C

2023270

20 Nov 23

1830

Wildcat

(RN)

Unk Obj

 

5021N 00409W

IVO Cremyll, Plymouth

600ft

London FIR (G)

The Wildcat pilot reports that after lifting from [departure site] at night, transiting out to sea into the SCXA at 400FT AMSL, at approximately Cremyll the pilot had seen a light through NVD at approximately 600ft and 3 rotor spans from the aircraft with the bearing drawing left to right. The pilot informed the crew of the light, it was discussed, and they assumed it had likely been a drone due to no anti-col lights. No deviation from the aircraft's current flying condition had been needed to avoid, and the light had passed down the stbd side of the aircraft at a safe distance. The aircraft commander called an Airprox to Plymouth Mil by radio of the potential drone and position. The aircraft continued with tasking and recovered to RNAS Yeovilton without further incident.

 

Reported Separation: 200ft V/~70ft H

Reported Risk of Collision: Low

 

The Plymouth controller reports that during a nighttime SURFEX involving a number of fixed wing and rotary wing assets one of the participating Wildcats landed at [HLS] to conduct a rotors running refuel. The aircraft remained at [HLS] to resolve another issue with frequencies being used for the SURFEX.

The Wildcat eventually departed [HLS] heading south along the River Tamar to re-join the exercise and called on West UHF. The aircraft had been identified and given a Traffic Service before the controller’s attention went back to the two Falcons positioning for a run in to the ships. The Wildcat pilot then made a transmission which had largely been obscured by a simultaneous transmission made by a Falcon on a separate JSATO frequency.

The controller had then gone back to the Wildcat pilot and asked them to repeat their transmission. They stated that they had an Airprox with what they believed to have been a drone at about 600 to 700ft (at this time the Wildcat Mode C showed 400ft). They reported the potential drone could only be seen with NVD/IR aids and not visually with the naked eye.

The reported position of the drone had been overhead the River Tamar, just north of Southdown and the controller had no radar contact with any object in that area at any time. No drone activity in the area had been approved by Plymouth Mil for this evening. The Wildcat pilot continued with the exercise without further incident.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

 

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

 

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where normal procedures and/or safety standards had applied.

E

2023271

31 Dec 23

1723

B737

(CAT)

Drone

5554N 00333W

Livingston

2500ft

Edinburgh CTR

(D)

The B737 Captain reports that the First Officer (FO) was PF and the Captain (CP) was PM. At 6.3NM on final to RW06 a large drone appeared on the FO's side of the aircraft and moved to the CP's side of the aircraft. It went out of pilots’ vision as it passed the left side of the aircraft. The drone's direction of travel was from south to north. Exact size of the drone was not known, but it appeared to be a large industrial size as it had 10-12 high brightness lights on it and was travelling quite fast. Speed of the B737 was ~165kts (until 4NM DME by ATC request). CP advised ATC immediately of the drone and they continued to a normal landing. ATC asked the aircraft behind if they had any drone sightings, but they didn't. On landing, the FO rang engineers and asked them to carry out a drone strike inspection. A tech log entry was completed by the CP. Preliminary drone strike inspection carried out by FO but no damage/evidence noted. After passengers had disembarked and aircraft was closed, the police took a statement from the FO regarding the matter.

 

Reported Separation: NK

Reported Risk of Collision: High

 

The Edinburgh controller reports that [B737 C/S] reported sighting a drone at 6.4NM final to RW06. After landing [B737 C/S] reported that the drone had passed right-to-left in close proximity necessitating an aircraft inspection.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

 

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7

 

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

A

2024001

6 Jan 24

1241

EMB190

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5539N 00353W

4NM SW Lanark

FL060

Scottish TMA

(D)

The EMB190 pilot reports that when descending through 6500ft and on radar vectors on a NNE heading, the FO spotted a shiny object ahead and pointed it out to the Captain. The closure rate of the object was fast and it passed just to the right and slightly below their aircraft. The weather was clear and good and they both saw the similarities with a drone as it passed quickly beside them. They reported the sighting to ATC.

 

Reported Separation: 50ft V/ 30-50m H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

 

The Glasgow Radar controller reports that the EMB190 was at 6000ft and approximately 3NM south-east of Lanark, when the pilot reported that they had spotted a drone passing around 100ft below them. They described a sliver dome shaped object that looked like a drone.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

 

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 6

 

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where safety had been much reduced below the norm to the extent that safety had not been assured.

B

2024003

5 Jan 24

0859

A320

(CAT)

Unk Obj

5055N 00026W

Storrington

FL100

London TMA

(A)

The A320 pilot reports that when passing overhead the village of Storrington, a drone was observed passing under the aircraft. This was reported to ATC. The distance below was difficult to ascertain due to the perspective, but unless it was a very large drone the fact that it could be seen indicates that it was fairly close.

 

Reported Separation: NR

Reported Risk of Collision: NR

 

The TC South controller reports that the pilot of the A320 reported a drone when approximately 10NM ENE of Goodwood. The pilot reported seeing the drone about 30sec before they reported it to ATC, the aircraft was at approximately FL080 (they recalled) at the time of reporting and the pilot reported that the drone was below the aircraft but couldn’t tell how far. They reported that the drone was light in colour, but nothing further could be determined.

 

A NATS Safety Investigation reports that the pilot of the A320 reported to the TC South Controller, who was controlling the TC WILLO sector, that they had observed a possible light coloured done, as the aircraft passed FL100, 12NM northeast of Goodwood. The Controller acknowledged the report of the drone and passed Traffic Information to subsequent aircraft on a similar track. Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no associated primary or secondary contacts associated with the drone report, visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were such that they were unable to determine the nature of the unknown object.

 

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 5

 

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where there was insufficient information to make a sound judgement of risk.

D

2024004

3 Jan 24

1624

A321

(CAT)

Drone

5112N 00011E

5NM S Sevenoaks

9600ft

London TMA

(A)

The A321 pilot reports that, whilst approaching BIG VOR to hold at FL90, they became aware of an object slightly to the right of the nose at same level on a constant bearing with closing distance. It was small but had the distinctive shape of a drone. The object passed down the right-hand side of the aircraft and over their right wing. Details were passed immediately to London ATC who informed the pilot of the aircraft behind them.

 

Reported Separation: 5ft V/~10m H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

 

NATS Safety Investigations report that no description of the UAS was given over the RT. The pilot stated that the UAS “shot down our right hand side” and described it as “extremely close”.

 

The pilot of [the A321] submitted an Airprox report in response to the sighting of a drone whilst approximately 4.3NM south-southwest of BIG. It has been estimated that the UAS was at FL90.

 

The controller passed details of the reported UAS to the following arrival. Analysis of the radar by Safety Investigations indicated that there were no primary or secondary contacts associated with the drone report visible on radar at the approximate time of the event.

 

UKAB Secretariat notes that a primary-only contact was observed on the NATS radar replay for one sweep at the time and location reported by the pilot of the A321, approximately 10NM SSE of BIG.

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and/or description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

 

Applicable Contributory Factors: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7

 

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where providence had played a major part in the incident and/or a definite risk of collision had existed.

A

2024014

24 Jan 24

1618

Bell 429

(HEMS)

Drone

5123N 00221W

Parade Gardens Bath

250ft

London FIR

(G)

The Bell 429 pilot reports that they departed a HEMS site at the Recreation Ground in the centre of Bath. At 250ft AGL and approximately 50kt, the Technical Crew Member (TCM) in the left seat spotted a drone directly in the 12 o'clock, at the same level, less than 20m away. The pilot spotted the drone immediately following the TCM's target identification and took evasive action with an avoiding right turn. The drone passed down the left side of the aircraft, within 15 to 20m, and was observed to be white in colour, with lighting. Following the near-miss they returned to base without further incident. The incident was reported via the HEMS desk in flight, who passed the information to the Police.

 

Reported Separation: 0ft V/15m H

Reported Risk of Collision: High

In the Board’s opinion the reported altitude and description of the object were sufficient to indicate that it could have been a drone.

 

Applicable Contributory Factors: 4, 7

 

Risk: The Board considered that the pilot’s overall account of the incident portrayed a situation where safety had been much reduced below the norm to the extent that safety had not been assured.

B

 

[1] Latitude and Longitude are usually only estimates that are based on the reported time of occurrence mapped against any available radar data for the aircraft’s position at that time. Because such reported times may be inaccurate, the associated latitudes and longitudes should therefore not be relied upon as precise locations of the event.

 

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