



AIRPROX *Insight*

DIRECTOR UKAB'S MONTHLY UPDATE

April 2018



AIRPROX OF THE MONTH

Do something **positive**

A 'close' fly-by might be okay with you, but what about the other pilot?



Usually, this month's Airprox of the Month features two incidents, both involving a degree of inaction when sighting, or becoming aware of, another aircraft.

In the first ([Airprox 2017269](#)) a PA-28 had left Shoreham 'to the north' (but actually to the north-west) and was caught up by an SR22 which also departed to the north-west a few minutes later.

The SR22 pilot received TCAS indications and then saw the PA-28 about 1.5nm ahead as he overtook; although closer than desirable, he judged he had enough separation to pass above the PA-28 by about 100ft. However, the Airprox Board thought this was too close and it would have been better for the SR22 to have had greater lateral separation to the right as he passed by.

In the second case ([Airprox 2017266](#)) an Agusta Westland AW139 and CAP10 met head-on at Beachy Head.

This was slightly less clear-cut than the first incident. The CAP10 pilot had the sun behind him and saw the AW139 early enough to judge that there was enough separation. The AW139 pilot, meanwhile, was looking into sun and received TCAS indications on the CAP10 head-on just



below and focused his lookout ahead, but only saw the CAP10 at the last moment too close for his comfort.

The Board thought that it would have been better for the AW139 pilot to have immediately increased his height when receiving TCAS indications of the CAP10 ahead rather than just focusing his lookout.

This incident also raised the issue of the 'right-hand-rule' on line-features (the coast). Although now not formally part of SERA, the right-hand-rule is still recommended by the CAA, and the Board thought that the AW139 pilot could usefully have anticipated that other pilots might be using the rule as they routed along the coast in the other direction.

Both cases demonstrate that positive action should be taken when detecting an unfolding conflict, and pilots shouldn't assume that others will be as comfortable with the separation as they might be.

The other pilot might not be aware of your aircraft until the last moment (especially when being overtaken) and so the onus is on everyone to avoid others by a margin of separation that they themselves would wish if the roles were reversed.

Full details of both incidents can be

found at airproxboard.org.uk in the 'Airprox Reports and Analysis' section within the appropriate year and then in the 'Individual Airprox reports' tab.

UKAB MONTHLY ROUND-UP

The Airprox Board assessed 19 incidents during its March 2018 meeting of which 13 were aircraft-to-aircraft, with three assessed as having a definite risk of collision; there was one Category A where providence played a major part, and two Category B where safety was much reduced due to serendipity, misjudgement, inaction, or late sighting.

The main themes were five examples of poor tactical planning (both pre-flight and/or not updating the plan in flight when circumstances changed); four incidents of inaction or flying too close to another aircraft that had otherwise been seen in good time; four incidents where lack of communications between pilots, or a failure to assimilate traffic information, meant that the pilots flew into conflict; four examples of poor controllership decisions; four incidents where pilots were simply concerned by the presence of other aircraft that were subsequently assessed as probably being within normal

safety standards, and three involving late sightings by the pilots involved.

The Board made three recommendations during the meeting: one that 'The British Gliding Association considers recommending fitting transponders to tug aircraft' following a Typhoon and tug/glider incident where the Typhoon pilot and ATC were not aware of the tug/glider combo's presence because they did not appear on radar.

Secondly, 'USAFE-UK (United States Air Forces in Europe, UK) consider promulgation of North Sea helicopter activity to F15 crews' following an incident where a helicopter crew were concerned by an F15 at low-level over the North Sea.

Thirdly, 'USAFE-UK review rate of climb standard operating procedures once above safety altitude after a low-level abort' as a result of an F15 and Tucano that came into conflict when a pair of F15s had to abort from low-level through cloud near Linton-on-Ouse and their rapid rate of climb meant that their SSR transmissions were hidden from ATC's view as they exceeded 10,000fpm climb rate. ■

Download the **new Airprox app**

