

2009 RECOMMENDATION TRACKER

2009-59 ASK21 GLIDER v SUPERMARINE SPITFIRE – 21 JUN 2009 - RISK: B

RECOMMENDATIONS

- (i) That the MoD reviews the glider site symbology and the representation of ATZs on military LFCs and within associated Mission Planning Aids with the aim of improving their conspicuity and clarity.
- (ii) That the MoD reviews the co-ordination arrangements for UAA involving military ac, such as occurred here in regulated airspace, to ensure the safe de-confliction of UAA from other established but incompatible air activities.

ACTION: - DAATM

UPDATE

- (i) The glider site and ATZ symbology has been reviewed and is considered adequate. AMPA uses the UK LFC as its base map. This Airprox was due to a lack of detailed planning by the Spitfire pilot who also displayed a lack of knowledge of military airfields. It would be incorrect to say that such an AIRPROX will not occur again but the UK LFC is in daily use by many aircrews and there does not appear to be reoccurrences. The symbology will be kept under review.
- (ii) AUS has reviewed, and is content with, the co-ordination arrangements for UAA involving military aircraft.

STATUS – Closed

2009-74 F3 FORMATION v GROB 115 – 16 JUL 2009 RISK B

RECOMMENDATIONS

- (i) The MoD should review the performance of the Watchman primary ASR and associated SSR system at RAF Leuchars to ensure that it provides appropriate solid radar coverage in the lower airspace commensurate with its rôle.
- (ii) RAF Leuchars, together with ATC and aircraft operators at Dundee airport, should review the Dundee General Handling Areas and Air Traffic procedures to improve the mutual deconfliction of military fast jets and civilian light aircraft operating in this vicinity.

ACTION:

- (i) MoD – DAATM COS
- (ii) Tayside Aviation Ltd – Chief pilot
ATC Dundee Airport - SATCO

MoD – DAATM (Chief of Staff)

UPDATE:

The Watchman was flight checked on 19 Feb 10 and passed. The SSR was flight checked on 12 Apr 10 and passed. There are no other reviews of PSR and SRR systems' performance at Leuchars that can be undertaken; that said, there were no problems found with the PSR or SSR.

There is a close relationship between the two ATSU's at Dundee and RAF Leuchars. A User's Forum has been established, hosted by Dundee and with RAF Leuchars and Tayside Aviation as members, to provide the following:

a means of encouraging communication between a group representing the interests of Dundee Airport and its main users as well as outside agencies and organisations whose services and/or activities may directly impact on the airport and/or its users. Fostering a better understanding between members of the group and thereby improving safety by communication and understanding.

Tayside Aviation is a member of the Forum where it was agreed that:

- (i) Dundee ATC would examine the feasibility of obtaining a conspicuity squawk for ac operating with Dundee outside of Dundee's visual circuit; Leuchars controllers would then be able to pass appropriate Traffic Information to Dundee for onward transmission. SATCO Dundee has applied to DAP for a conspicuity squawk and awaits the outcome.
- (ii) Tayside Aviation would provide Dundee ATC with maps showing their training areas to the Northwest and east of Dundee. These maps have been copied to RAF Leuchars in order to brief aircrew and controllers.
- (iii) It would not be practical for all (18) Tayside ac to use Leuchars Radar 126.50. As a general rule, aircraft operating North of the river Tay receive a more useful and safer Basic service from Dundee. All aircraft therefore operating north of the Tay have the benefit of listening out to build a traffic picture. Aircraft operating south of the Tay do use 126.50 and this does work well particularly for Fife based aircraft. However, as Leuchars are also operating UHF it is clear this receives a priority service and aircraft on VHF do not get the benefit of listening out to build up a mental traffic picture. Consideration is being given to use of VHF only at the weekends.

Tayside Aviation has fitted additional markings to the fins of their Tutor aircraft to improve their conspicuity,

STATUS – Closed

2009-76 PA28 v ASK21 GLIDER – 5 JUL 2009 – RISK: B

RECOMMENDATIONS

- (i) Dunkeswell Aerodrome and the Operator of North Hill Gliding Site should jointly develop a LoA and promulgate agreed procedures that will ensure the safe integration of air traffic at these closely located airfields.

(ii) The CAA should review the disparate operations within the ATZ at Dunkeswell aerodrome and at North Hill Glider Site, to ensure their continued operation is in accord with the requirements of Rule 45 of the Rules of the Air Regulations.

UPDATE

The CAA agreed with recommendation (i) and has provided advice on the content of the Letter of Agreement.

The CAA accepted recommendation (ii), and has reviewed operations within the ATZ at Dunkeswell to ensure compliance with Rule 45.

STATUS – Closed

2009-117 BE200 V PA28 – 23 SEP 09 - RISK C

RECOMMENDATION

The MoD is recommended to direct that, whenever it is possible to do so, aircraft in the visual circuit operate on the same frequency.

ACTION: DAATM

UPDATE:

RAF ATSUs have been advised of the requirement for having aircraft in the visual circuit operating on the same frequency; where same frequency or cross linked frequencies can not be achieved, controllers are to ensure that sufficient Traffic Information is passed to enable all pilots in the visual circuit to have appropriate SA to maintain safety.

STATUS - Closed

2009-119 DG500 V HAWK PAIR – 25 SEP 09 – RISK A

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(i) That the MoD and BGA jointly consider the promulgation of more information about gliding operations from sites that conduct ridge or mountain wave soaring, for the information of military crews.

(ii) That the MoD and the BGA should consider formulating notifying arrangements with the aim of forewarning military crews when gliding clubs are conducting ridge or mountain wave soaring.

UPDATE:

The MOD has introduced the Gliding Wave NOTAM system in conjunction with the British Gliding Association (BGA) for pre warning, when practicable, larger glider wave soaring and

gliding competition events. The system also has the capacity to publish additional information as provided by BGA. It must be appreciated that a large amount of smaller local wave and ridge soaring activities take place in UK 7 days a week and potentially at short notice which this system will not be able to cover. Glider pilots are encouraged strongly to make their aircraft as conspicuous as practicable and pass as much information as possible regarding gliding activity by radio or telephone to ATC units that may be affected.

STATUS - Closed

2009-127–SEA KING V HAWK – 14 SEP 09 – RISK C

RECOMMENDATION:

RAF Valley procedures for the notification of the RIFA status should be reviewed.

ACTION: MAA

UPDATE:

Procedures have been reviewed. Ac operating in the RIFA wear a designated squawk that is Code Callsign Converted to 'RIFA'. All ac departing RAF Valley and RAF Mona, operating in the vicinity or likely to operate in the vicinity of the RIFA are told of the RIFA status and the activation height. Traffic operating within the RIFA is also provided with a Traffic Service. These RIFA notification and operating procedures are stipulated within the RAF Valley Flying Order Book.

STATUS - Closed

2009-130–B206 v VANS RV8 – 8 OCT 09 – RISK C

RECOMMENDATION:

The Aerodrome Operator should ensure that the Shoreham Aerodrome AIP entry regarding helicopter operations is reviewed.

ACTION: The Aerodrome Manager, Shoreham Airport

STATUS - Closed

2009-151–TRISTAR v B767– 1 DEC 09 – RISK C

RECOMMENDATION:

That the MoD requests a review of the CAP413 instructions about the passing of climb-out restrictions.

ACTION: MAA

UPDATE:

A review of CAP413 was undertaken and additional guidance concerning climb-out restrictions has been incorporated.

STATUS - Closed

2009-157-A340 v B747- 11 DEC 09 – RISK D

RECOMMENDATION:

The CAA requests further information from the aircraft operator.

ACTION: CAA

UPDATE: The CAA accepted the recommendation and contacted the ac operator. The operator responded but was unable to explain fully the sequence of TCAS RA commands generated in the A340. Given the time that has elapsed since the incident and the data already provided by the operator, it is judged that it will not be possible to resolve the issue without disproportionate effort and expense.

STATUS - Closed