

**2007**

**081/07      06 Jul 07 involving an Ask 13 and a Slingsby T67M      Risk B**

**RECOMMENDATION:** The CAA should review the depiction of glider launch sites on VFR charts with a view to making them more conspicuous.

**UPDATE AT DEC 2007:** The CAA's Directorate of Airspace Policy has reviewed the symbology on CAA VFR charts for the depiction of glider sites and agrees that at the location in question, around the Bicester area, the glider symbol is hard to detect in the busy airspace. In an effort to improve the depiction, not only at this location but nationally, a decision has been taken to increase the line weight on all gliding circles - both at primary locations and also where gliding is a secondary activity. As this is such a minor change - and is being carried out to enhance aviation safety - there is not considered to be a requirement for further consultation. Consequently, Ordnance Survey will make these amendments to the specification and have confirmed that they will be included for the first chart of the 2008 flying season - the 1:250,000 Sheet 8 England South.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**082/07      26 Jun 07 involving a Tornado F3 and a Dominie      Risk A**

**RECOMMENDATION:** The MoD should direct a review of the ATC procedures for the entry/exit into/from Radar Corridors.

**ACTION:** The MoD partially accepts this Recommendation. It was concluded that there is no systemic problem with Radar Corridor (RC) operations. However, some areas were identified where administrative processes could be improved.

Following a very close review of the incident on 26 Jun 07, the MoD was entirely satisfied that the RC was simply a catalyst for a series of poor judgments by the controller concerned rather than the root cause of the Airprox. The Unit took immediate action following this Airprox: a valuable lesson was learnt by the controller and the wider lessons have been well-publicised within the Unit through the 'standards bulletin'.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**122/07      25 Aug 07 involving an EMB195 and an R44      Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** The CAA should initiate a review of the Exeter SRE display system to ascertain why neither primary nor secondary radar data from the R44 helicopter was displayed to the controllers at the Approach Radar and Tower positions.

**ACTION:** The CAA accepts this Safety Recommendation. The Air Navigation Services Provider (ANSP) at Exeter is certified under the Single European Sky Common Requirements Regulation, the scope of which includes surveillance equipment. Therefore, the CAA has required Exeter to undertake a review of its radar's performance in compliance with the Exeter Airport Safety Management System to ascertain why neither primary nor secondary radar data from the R44 helicopter was displayed to the controllers at the Approach Radar and Tower positions.

**UPDATE DEC 2008:** Exeter Airport commissioned Selex to undertake a full technical evaluation of the radar, which revealed that some minor radar set-up parameters required adjustment. With these adjustments completed, a flight check was undertaken using a small helicopter. The flight check concluded that radar coverage was consistent with that expected and that all the technical anomalies had been addressed.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**