

## 2003

009/03 15 Feb 03 involving an SZD Bocian, an Ask21 Glider and an F900 Risk B

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The CAA asks NATS to review the revised MATS Part 2 for Farnborough, to bring it into line with the UK AIP at ENR 5-5-1-4.
2. The CAA asks NATS to introduce, jointly with MOD, written procedures to ensure segregation between Farnborough and Odiham traffic.

### CAA ACTION:

1. The CAA accepts this Recommendation. The Farnborough MATS Part 2 has been revised, to bring it in line with the UK AIP at ENR 5-5-1-4, by the issue of Supplementary Instruction 28/2003 on 12 December 2003.
2. Due to the nature of the airspace involved it is not considered feasible to design procedures that will ensure segregation between Farnborough and Odiham traffic. Nevertheless, an updated Memorandum of Understanding between Farnborough and Odiham was signed on the 1 December 2003 and, in addition, a Letter of Agreement (LoA), between Farnborough and the gliding clubs operating from Odiham at weekends, has been agreed. This LoA has been signed by NATS and is awaiting signature by the appropriate parties at Odiham. Collectively, it is considered that these measures will assist in the segregation of Farnborough and Odiham traffic.

**STATUS – 1. – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**STATUS – 2. – PARTIAL ACCEPTANCE – CLOSED PENDING LoA SIGNATURE**

029/03 27 Mar 03 involving a formation of F3s x 5 and a Tornado GR4 Risk C

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the MoD considers introducing accurate timing information on its ATC voice communication recording equipment.

**MOD ACTION:** New procedures have been introduced to ensure that checks are carried out on timing equipment and that the results are logged; where errors exceeding 2 secs are found, the clock is to be zeroed. Further trials are underway, that also embrace Radar data recording devices, to assess degradation over an extended period. Results will help inform the purchase of future equipment.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

074/03 9 Jun 03 involving a B757 and a Learjet 35 Risk C

**RECOMMENDATIONS:** That the CAA considers:

1. Providing an update on the review into terminology used by civil controllers when effecting avoiding action.

2. Advising if there are other factors, which may inhibit civil controllers from using the terminology 'avoiding action'.

**CAA ACTION:**

1. The CAA accepts this Recommendation. A hazard analysis has been completed by an expert working group conducting an in-depth review on the effectiveness of three avoiding action phraseologies. The working group used a systematic safety assessment methodology to analyse the current UK avoiding action phraseology, introduced in 2001, and two options for change; the previous UK phraseology and that published by ICAO. Due to the complexity of the assessment, the final report of the hazard analysis was presented to the ATS Standards Department of the CAA Safety Regulation Group in June 2004.

Of the three examples, the report concludes that the avoiding action phraseology, used in the UK prior to 2001, is the most effective and recommends that it be reintroduced. Air Traffic Services Information Notice (ATSON) No. 49, issued on 11 August 2004, instructs ATS Units to implement the revised avoiding action phraseology on receipt of the ATSON and the necessary amendments to the Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 1 will be incorporated in Amendment 63 in October 2004.

The CAA accepts this Recommendation. The CAA understands that there are many factors that may inhibit certain controllers from using the terminology 'avoiding action'. The CAA has, for a number of years, actively campaigned to overcome any reluctance and, from the evidence available, this has been successful. However, the phrase 'avoiding action' does continue to be omitted on occasions. Often, this is simply a case of forgetting in the heat of the moment but there are numerous other reasons. The use of the words 'avoiding action' does not dictate whether, or not, an MOR must be filed. This depends on the circumstances surrounding an incident and the cases when an MOR must be filed are described in CAP382. 'The Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme', which also emphasises that the overall objective of occurrence reporting "...is to use the reported information to improve the level of flight safety and not to attribute blame".

**STATUS – 1. ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**STATUS – 2. ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**080/03**

**19 Jun 03 involving a B747- 300 and an A340- 300 Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the CAA considers the introduction of more effective and faster communication between controllers and pilots in the Shanwick Oceanic Area of responsibility.

**CAA ACTION:** The CAA continues to consider and, in conjunction with NATS, will encourage the introduction of a more effective and faster means of communication between controllers and pilots in the Shanwick Oceanic Area of responsibility. However, such steps must take account of our international obligations, which means that, in addition to taking into account technological advances and limitations, it is necessary to consider international agreements covering the whole ICAO North Atlantic Region. Consideration must also be given to existing arrangements between the UK and Republic of Ireland governments, whereby the Shanwick air traffic controllers are stationed in the UK and the communicators in the Republic. Trials using Datalink are being undertaken jointly by NATS and a number of international air carriers, as a necessary first step towards the phased introduction of Controller Pilot Data-Link Communications (CPDLC) into Oceanic airspace. However, even if these trials are

successful, CPDLC is unlikely to completely replace the Shanwick air-ground communication system in the short to medium term.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**081/03 15 Jun 03 involving a YAK52 and an Untraced light aircraft Risk B**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the CAA considers a review of arrangements to ensure that when 'Permission to Display' documentation is issued, this also results in a NOTAM being promulgated, where appropriate.

**CAA ACTION:** The CAA accepts this Recommendation. Procedures were already in place at the time of these incidents to require that a NOTAM be promulgated when the Permission to Display was issued. The CAA has conducted an in-depth investigation into the failure to promulgate a NOTAM in these instances, but has been unable to identify the point of failure.

The CAA has reviewed and strengthened its internal procedures to ensure, as far as is practicable, that when a "Permission to Display" is issued, this will result in a NOTAM being promulgated. A requirement has also been placed upon the pilot/operator to check that a NOTAM has been promulgated prior to commencing the display.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**110/03 17 Jul 03 involving a B757-200 and an F15E Risk B**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That HQ 3AF investigates fully the unsubstantiated reports of the Lakenheath SRE/SSR unreliability, to ensure that the equipment is operating to a satisfactory level for the ATSS provided by Lakenheath RAPCON.

**ACTION:** HQ 3 AF accepts this Recommendation. A Special Maintenance Team examined the Lakenheath ASR thoroughly and concluded that the performance of the radar is fit for purpose.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**145/03 16 Sep 03 involving a Tucano T1 and a Grob Tutor Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That DASC, in conjunction with HQ PTC, considers conducting a widespread publicity campaign on the interaction of instrument traffic within the visual circuit area with particular emphasis at flying training units.

**ACTION:** HQ PTC accepts this Recommendation and has asked FTS Commanders and the Commandant DHFS to reinforce further those rules pertaining to traffic within the visual circuit where it involves the interaction of instrument traffic, in particular when on overshoot or carrying out a missed approach procedure with visual traffic. HQ PTC also asked for the topic to be given stronger emphasis throughout flying training.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**156/03      29 Aug 03 involving an A320 and a SHAR      Risk B**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the CAA and the MOD reviews jointly the safety issues associated with ac that climb or descend in controlled airspace at such high rates that their Mode C indication cannot be interpreted by TCAS or ground based ATC equipment, thereby inhibiting any warning to pilots and/or controllers.

**ACTION:** The CAA and the MOD accept this Recommendation. A review team, comprising members from DAP and SRG, has examined the relevant issues concerning this incident and initiated a study into the effect of high rates of climb/descent on surveillance infrastructure and safety nets, such as TCAS and STCA. This work, conducted in cooperation with the MOD, will aim to quantify the problem and allow policy guidance to be issued to adequately manage the issue. This work is expected to be completed by Summer 2005.

**UPDATE AT DEC 2006:** The CAA and MOD initial review was completed on schedule. The CAA, NATS and MOD are working towards the implementation of a maximum rate of climb and descent restriction in UK Controlled Airspace (Classes A to E) of 8,000fpm. The conditions and areas where this restriction can be lifted to permit essential military training are being finalised, prior to implementation, at a series of planned meetings between the key stakeholders.

**UPDATE AT JUN 2007:** The 8000fpm rate of climb and descent restriction in UK Controlled Airspace within the London and Scottish FIR/UIR will come into effect on 5 July 2007.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**191/03      26 Nov 03 involving an ATR 42 300 and a SHAR      Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** MOD reviews regulations with a view to ensuring that all parties concerned acknowledge safety instructions.

**ACTION:** The MOD accepts this Recommendation. The Defence Aviation Safety Centre (DASC) has reviewed the regulations and states that the extant policy for the acknowledgement of safety instructions is satisfactory. The DASC *Feedback* bulletin issue 14-04 dated 02 September 2004 contained a summary of the subject Airprox, highlighting the importance of acknowledging instructions.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**