

## 2002

### 002/02 9 Jan 02 involving a B737 and a Microlight Rick C

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the CAA considers a review of the provision of Radar Control Service in class E airspace.

**CAA ACTION:** The CAA accepts this Recommendation. After reviewing the provision of Radar Control Service in Class E airspace, the CAA concluded that the rules governing the provision of a Radar Control Service in Class E airspace are clear and unambiguous and conform to ICAO requirements.

However, whilst accepting that no rules were broken during the events leading to the filing of this Airprox report, the CAA does recognise that a Radar Control Service is better suited to a totally known environment. With this in mind, the Director of Airspace Policy has invited NATS to consider whether it wishes to review the airspace arrangements in question and propose a change in accordance with the nationally agreed airspace change process laid down in the Airspace Charter. The UKAB will be advised of the outcome of this invitation.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

### 003/02 11 Jan 02 involving a Grob Tutor and a Tucano Risk C

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the MOD, through CFS, reviews priorities and/or policy for situations where IFR and VFR traffic mix in the visual circuit.

**MOD ACTION:** Central Flying School (CFS) perceived no requirement to change established procedures. However, at the suggestion of CFS, the Defence Aviation Safety Centre has agreed to initiate a campaign to remind aircrew of priorities in the visual circuit area. Furthermore, HQ STC ATC undertook a safety audit on extant Radar PFL/Visual PFL procedures and produced subsequently 'best practice guidelines'. These have been sent to all SATCOs.

**STATUS – PARTIAL ACCEPTANCE – CLOSED**

### 015/02 26 Feb 02 involving a Sea King and a Harrier Risk C

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the MoD considers conducting a review on the use of GUARD, instead of the LFS frequency (300.8 MHz), for warning broadcasts by SAR helicopter crews penetrating the FW Region of the UKNLFS on operational sorties.

**MOD ACTION:** The MoD accepts this Recommendation. A new instruction in the MIL AIP (effective 3 Oct 02) details that aircrew on operational and SAR night flights below 2,000ft, that have not been the subject of a NOTAM, are to ensure warning of their activity is broadcast on 243.0 MHz as appropriate. Additionally, procedures between ARCC~LFBC ensure that SAR units are made aware of night and out of hours LF activity.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**030/02 01 Apr 02 involving an A320 and a PA34 Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the CAA asks NATS to review the efficacy of the London FIS as currently provided.

**CAA/NATS ACTION:** The CAA accepts this Recommendation. NATS has carried out a review into the efficacy of the London FIS as currently provided. A copy of the report, which contained 10 recommendations, was submitted to the CAA for consideration. The recommendations, together with a number of additional actions called for by the CAA, have now been addressed to the satisfaction of the CAA.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**047/02-1 22 Apr 02 involving a DHC8 and a SHAR Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** The MOD considers a review of the rules for Visual identification by military air defence ac in UK airspace.

**ACTION:** The MOD accepts this Recommendation. HQ 1Gp issued written guidance on 15 May 03 to all Air Defence aircraft crews on Targets of Opportunity (TOO) that states 'if the target cannot be identified by 5nms, crews are to ensure that a minimum of 3000ft vertical separation is maintained. Wherever possible, crews conducting TOO intercepts are to be in receipt of a radar service and are to avoid traffic that is not in Class G airspace'.

The above guidance was issued in advance of a planned re-write of Training Instruction 4 of 1984 (TI4/84), an updated version of which was released on 28 February 2005. The relevant parts of TI4/84 pertaining to TOO are firstly that only military fast-jet (FJ) aircraft, excepting Hawk, flying day VMC in Class G airspace may act as, and be intercepted as, TOO. Secondly, TOO is not to be conducted in Advisory Air Routes and thirdly if the TOO target cannot be positively identified as a military FJ aircraft by 3nm it should be presumed that it is a civil ac. In this event crews are to break off the interception and ensure that a minimum of 1000 ft vertical and 2nm horizontal separation is maintained.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**047/02-2 22 Apr 02 involving a DHC8 and a SHAR Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** The RN considers the feasibility of including an independent Air Safety Cell ashore for each RN AD exercise at sea, within UK airspace.

**ACTION:** The RN accepts this Recommendation. The feasibility of including an independent Air Safety Cell ashore for each RN AD exercise at sea was investigated. It was concluded that, with the exception of Plymouth Military (who have a 'sea watch' facility to their radar), the radar coverage of shore-side ATSU was not suitable to control aircraft at low level where a high proportion of exercise deconfliction is required. Although this Airprox did not happen at low level, the embarked Air Safety Cell, with help from the raid aircraft and other shore-side agencies, would 'normally' be able to deconflict such incidents.

Unless all RN AD and similar Ship/Air exercises are conducted off the Plymouth area, the RN will be reliant upon its embarked Eagle Safety Teams.

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**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**067/02 28 May 02 involving an Embraer 145 and an Islander Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the CAA considers publishing clarification on the meaning of "Radar Control" within Class D airspace for ac operating to different flight rules.

**CAA ACTION:** The CAA accepts this Recommendation. In view of the misunderstandings that have become apparent as a result of this Airprox, the CAA will reiterate, through various publications such as FODCOM (Flight Operations Department Communication), ATSIN (Air Traffic Services Information Notice) and GASIL (General Aviation Safety Information Leaflet), details of the various airspace types in use in the United Kingdom and the air traffic services that are provided in them. The meaning of "Radar Control" as it applies to IFR and VFR traffic will be included.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**097/02 22 Jun 02 involving a B737 and a Balloon Risk D**

**RECOMMENDATION:** In light of 3 incidents during the months May - July 2002, involving encounters with untraced balloons, the UKAB recommends that CAA and the MoD should consider conducting a review of arrangements on:

- a. The notification and permission procedures for the release of balloons in UK airspace, particularly those with suspended payloads.
- b. Risk analysis for other airspace users.

## **MOD ACTION:**

a. The MOD believes that the risk to the aviation community is minimal and sees no need to review their procedures. Balloons are released by 2 sources: responsible operators such as the Met office, who release balloons only from sites notified in the AIP; and the General Public. The majority of Airprox involving balloons fall into the latter category. The MOD has no control over when and where these balloons are released and attempts to trace the perpetrators more often than not prove fruitless.

b. In addressing the risks associated with meteorological balloons, the suspended payload never exceeds 300 grams and the electronic components are packed in a frangible 'styrofoam' casing. Accordingly, any damage caused by the payload striking an aircraft is likely to be minimal and is considered to be less than that associated with a bird strike. Attempts to make balloons more visible to radar would likely entail adding a radar reflector which, in itself, might present a hazard. The "suspension cable" to which you refer is made of thin cord and is unlikely to present a hazard to aircraft.

## **CAA ACTION:**

a. The CAA accepts this Recommendation.

Balloons are launched by the Met Office, other MoD organisations and members of the public. Meteorological balloons flown by the Met Office and MoD organisations are classed as military aircraft and are therefore exempt from the requirements of the Air Navigation Order (ANO). However, location details and launch timings by these organisations are listed in the UK AIP ENR section.

All other organisations and members of the public require permission in accordance with the ANO before releasing meteorological balloons into notified airspace. ANO Article 86 specifies the requirements for notification and permission for the launch of balloons, and is subject to CAA written permission and any attached conditions. This permission is arranged through DAP's Airspace Utilisation Section, who agree the proposed flight and arrange NOTAM action. However, in view of the difficulty in monitoring the activities of members of the public releasing meteorological balloons, DAP considers it timely to remind them of the current requirements, and will:

Liaise with the Royal Meteorological Society to determine a suitable manner of reminding amateur meteorologists of the requirements of the ANO.

Amend the en-route section (1.1.5) of the AIP to emphasise the requirement to obtain permission from the CAA for the flight of uncontrollable balloons in notified airspace.

Write to other organisations (e.g. universities) and remind them of existing requirements.

b. Turning to the risk of collision between balloons and other airspace users, it is noted that ICAO classifies meteorological balloons in the "light" category, which ICAO perceives as posing little risk to aircraft. All of the current meteorological balloon flight equipment is frangible, and total weight of balloon and suspended payload is normally just over 0.5 kg. Any additional equipment, such as a radar reflector, would increase the weight and potentially increase the risk of significant damage to aircraft if a collision should occur. Given the weight and frangibility of the equipment, the risk of aircraft damage in the event of a collision with a meteorological balloon is considered less than that associated with a typical bird strike.

## **STATUS**

**a MOD – NOT ACCEPTED – CLOSED**  
**CAA – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**b MOD – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**  
**CAA – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**102/02      2 Jul 02 involving an RJ85 and a Jaguar    Risk A**

**RECOMMENDATION:** The MOD should convey STC's advice to all military pilots operating in UK airspace and publicise the incident as widely as possible.

**MOD ACTION:** MoD accepts this Recommendation. Details of the incident have been passed to the DASC who will feature the lessons to be learned from it in an article in the Tri-Service magazine 'Aviate'.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**104/02      3 Jul 02 involving Jaguars x 2 and an AS332L2    Risk B**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the MOD considers, through HQ STC Flight Safety and Ops Spt ATC, a review of the guidance promulgated to military controllers in JSP 318A, about expressing the vertical position of ac by reference to the appropriate height/altitude/flight level datum when included within traffic information.

**MOD ACTION:** The MoD considers that the training received by military controllers should leave them in no doubt as to the dangers of mixing height, altitude and flight level information. Likewise the need for caution is emphasised in JSP 318A. However, several areas within JSP 318A have been identified where improvements could be made and these are being implemented in due course in the new JSP 552. Meanwhile, these changes and lessons learned will be highlighted to military ATC controllers, the Central ATC School, the ATC Examining Board and the ASACS community.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**105/02      03 Jul 02 involving an EMB145 and a DHC8    Risk B**

**RECOMMENDATION:** The CAA gives wide publicity to this incident and the lessons to be learned.

**CAA ACTION:** The CAA accepts this Recommendation. The CAA will give wide publicity to this incident by way of the issuance of a Flight Operations Department Communication (FODCOM) and in the General Aviation Safety Information Leaflet (GASIL). The subject documents are planned to be published by the end of August 2003.

Regarding publicity in respect of the lessons to be learned, the CAA considers that FODCOM 19/2002 "ACAS – Action to be taken following a Resolution Advisory (RA) Warning" contains up-to-date advice. The CAA will therefore make reference to this FODCOM in the publicity described above.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**113/02      14 Jul 02 involving EMB 145 and a Paraglider      Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** In light of this incident, the CAA should consider looking at arrangements surrounding unregulated flying activities in UK airspace.

**CAA ACTION:** The CAA accepts this Recommendation and has reviewed arrangements surrounding unregulated flying activities in UK airspace. At present there is no compelling case for changing the arrangements for unregulated flying. However, the CAA will continue to monitor these arrangements and to provide support to the national airports associations and governing bodies with a view to ensuring best practice in the future.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**117/02      15 Jul 02 involving a Robin DR36 and a Hercules      Risk B**

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. That the MOD reviews the existing regulations within JSP 318 Joint Regulations Section 3 - 05111 (and its subsequent replacement) to ensure they are in accord with that promulgated within the ANO and UK AIP.
2. That the MOD defines more clearly within RAF FLIPs, the R/T frequencies used at UK civil and military airfields by participants of activities which occur outside of the applicable ATSU's hours of watch.

**MOD ACTION:**

1. The MOD accepts this Recommendation. Woodvale ATC will follow the procedures set out in JSP552 paragraph 801.105 if closure is initiated during published opening hours. The Woodvale BINA entry has been updated and now states the out-of-hours frequency to be used; the corresponding UK AIP entry has also been updated.
2. The MOD accepts this Recommendation. Under certain conditions there is a requirement to remain clear of ATZs. The guidelines presented in military documentation are specific, compliment with civilian documentation and remove any uncertainty that may have previously existed.

**STATUS 1. – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

**STATUS 2. – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

222/02

**15 Nov 02 involving a B747 and a B767 Risk B**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the CAA asks NATS to review and amend the way in which Track Data Blocks and aircraft symbols are displayed, to remove the scope for future confusion.

**NATS ACTION:** NATS has conducted a review and the action already taken, together with that proposed, is described below.

Shortly after the Airprox occurred, as an interim measure, the London Area Control Centre (LACC) issued a Supplementary Instruction (SI 102/02, effective 16 December 2002) requiring Tactical Controllers, when moving individual labels from the globally set position, to ensure that the Track Data Block (TDB) is displayed on a strut to the aircraft target symbol.

In addition, LACC staff have been working on software modifications to improve the manner in which TDBs are displayed. In changes (Workstation Situation Display Improvements) scheduled for introduction in April 2004, there are a number of enhancements. These are designed to improve the clarity of TDBs and to help overcome problems associated with overlapping TDBs. In the context of this Airprox, when an individual TDB is moved, a strut will be forced onto the display. TDB struts will be attached as closely as possible to the relevant TDB text by changing both the strut and strut attachment points.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**

225/02

**28 Oct 02 involving a SF34, a Ka13 Glider and an ASW19 Glider Risk C**

**RECOMMENDATION:** That the City of Derry and the Ulster Flying Club review jointly their operating procedures.

**ACTION:** Agreement regarding the co-ordination of instrument approach traffic and gliding traffic in the vicinity of the ILS approach area has been reached with the Ulster Gliding Club. A Letter of Agreement detailing this co-ordination has been signed by City of Derry Airport/ Ulster Gliding Club.

**STATUS – ACCEPTED – CLOSED**