
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026131

Date: 29 Jun 2026 Time: 1146Z Position: 5351N 00037W Location: 7NM W Beverley

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C172	Nimbus
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Gld
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	None
Provider	Humberside Appr.	N/A
Altitude/FL	~2575ft	2932ft
Transponder	A, C, S	Not fitted
ADS-B Out	Observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	Nav, strobes, bcn	None
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	3000ft	3350ft
Altimeter	QNH (1025hPa)	QFE
Heading	272°	"*Thermalling*"
Speed	100kt	64kt
ACAS/TAS	TAS	FLARM
Alert	None	None
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	50ft V/1NM H	NK
Recorded	~350ft V/~0.25NM H	



THE C172 PILOT reports that [a glider had been] first sighted at 1NM, 12 o'clock, 50ft above. [They made an] immediate right turn and a descent was initiated to increase separation from the conflicting aircraft. Once safely deconflicted, [they advised] Humberside Radar that a glider had been observed operating aerobatically overhead Market Weighton. The aircraft was not visible on Humberside Radar [they believe] and was not detected on TAS.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE NIMBUS PILOT reports that they were heading north and entered a thermal at 3133ft (GPS altitude) at 1145 and climbed to near cloudbase at 4482ft at 1151. Neither [they nor their passenger] can recall any incident where they felt a risk of collision. Either because they never saw the aircraft or, more likely, they had seen it and had assessed [that there] was no risk - especially as, when thermalling, both pilots are keeping a high level of lookout due to the increased risk of other gliders joining the thermal.

They note that, if they had seen the Cessna, they would have tolerated the close proximity due to the nature of gliding. They would also expect [the pilot of a] powered aircraft to try and avoid flying underneath cloud in the normal soaring range of 'half the cloudbase and above'. Also, as [they had been turning, they would] expect the oncoming traffic to take safe avoidance [action].

THE HUMBERSIDE CONTROLLER reports that they were the APS ATCO on duty at the time but have no recollection of an Airprox occurrence.

Factual Background

The weather at Humberside Airport was recorded as follows:

```
METAR EGNJ 291150Z 23012KT 9999 SCT049 23/09 Q1024
```

Analysis and Investigation

Humberside Unit Investigation

The overall workload was low, reducing from 2xTraffic Service and 7xBasic Service to approximately 2xBasic Service at the time of the Airprox.

Summary

An APS ATCA was on duty in support. Claxby SSR is currently out of service. The Great Dun Fell (GDF) SSR is in use with patchy and limited coverage at low levels.

[The pilot of the C172] initially called Humberside LARS […] following an anticlockwise cross country route past Hull towards the coast and Market Weighton. Humberside Radar allocated a squawk of 4270 and placed [the C172 pilot] under a Basic Service.

When [the pilot of the C172] was approaching Market Weighton from the southeast, a generic warning of glider activity in the vicinity of Pocklington was passed with specific mention of a primary contact manoeuvring approximately 2NM southeast of Market Weighton. [The pilot of the C172] acknowledged this information and reported 'not visual', but fairly quickly followed that by reporting 'visual'.

[The pilot of the C172] continued to track towards the glider contact. With approximately 0.25NM or less to run to the glider return, [the pilot of the C172] entered a right-hand turn, the returns briefly merged and, subsequently, [the pilot of the C172] established on track towards Goole clear of the glider.

Once steady on their new track, [the pilot of the C172] advised APS of a close encounter with a glider at a similar altitude near Market Weighton but did not advise they were filing it as an Airprox.

Details

1121:47 [The C172], squawking 0401 (Leeming), changed to 7000.

1123:01 [C172 C/S]: "*Humberside Radar* [C172 C/S] *request Basic Service*".

1123:05 ATCO: "[C172 C/S], *Humberside Radar, pass your message*".

1123:09 [C172 C/S]: "[C172 C/S], *a C172 from* […] *to* […] *currently tracking to the Humberside bridge,* […] [C172 C/S]"

1123:23 ATCO: "[C172 C/S], *Basic Service, report your level Humberside QNH 1024*".

1123:30 [C172 C/S]: "*Currently at 3100ft QNH 1024,* [C172 C/S]".

1123:33 ATCO: "[C172 C/S], *Squawk 4270*"

1123:35 Squawk was acknowledged and applied.

Various non-relevant LARS Transmissions.

1132:30 [The C172] turned east of Hull towards the coast.

1137:00 [The C172] turned and tracked towards Beverley town.

1141:00 [The C172] passed just north of Beverley town at 3000ft.

At that point, a primary contact was orbiting approximately 3NM SSE of Market Weighton.

1143:57 ATCO: "[C172 C/S], *keep a good lookout for gliders after Pocklington, there is a primary contact west of you by 3NM, no height information*".




Figure 1 – 1143:57

1144:05 [C172 C/S]: "*Looking for traffic* [C172 C/S]".

1144:12 [C172 C/S]: "*And we are visual with that glider* [C172 C/S]".

1144:15 ATCO: "*Roger*".

1146:00 [The C172] continued towards Market Weighton and closed on the primary contact before turning away to the right. The returns briefly merged. [The C172] continued the right turn and steadied on track for Goole.




Figure 2 – 1146:00

1147:16 Transmission not relevant.

1147:32 [The pilot of the C172] reported coming close to a glider at 3000ft near Market Weighton and confirmed their new routeing to Goole.

1147:49 APS acknowledged and passed a generic warning of glider activity to the SW down the Trent Valley as far as Gamston.

1148:02 [The pilot of the C172] acknowledged that information and continued en-route.

Investigation

The Investigator reviewed the incident via Veristore recording. As part of the investigation, a review of SARMS, ECCAIRS, FPS and the APS logbook was undertaken. The ATCO had no recollection of events due to the gap between the event and reporting action.

Conclusion

Background traffic levels and controller workload were low. Traffic in receipt of a radar service was manageable with no complicating factors.

A generic Pocklington glider-activity warning was passed to [the pilot of the C172] followed by specific Traffic Information on a primary contact (the glider in question) manoeuvring approximately 2NM SE of Market Weighton. No height information was available and [the pilot of the C172] continued to close with that contact.

A proactive early call of traffic was made by the ATCO in order to aid the pilot's situational awareness, at that point there was no immediate risk of collision. The generic warning of glider activity alerted the pilot of the need to keep a lookout. The specific Traffic Information passed by the Humberside ATCO allowed the pilot to focus on, and acquire, the conflicting traffic visually in plenty of time to give it a wider berth.

Note: Gliders will manoeuvre quickly and unpredictably when seeking thermal activity and powered aircraft are required to give way to gliders under UK Air Navigation Order Regulation [sic].

This Airprox occurred as a result of the [pilot of the C172] continuing to track directly towards the glider despite being advised of its presence by Humberside ATC and reporting visual with it.

'Under a Basic Service, the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance without assistance from the controller and the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight. However, if a controller considers that a definite risk of collision exists, a warning shall be issued to the pilot'.

The experienced Humberside ATCO made an early assessment that there was a potential for confliction and passed pertinent, generic and specific Traffic Information in a timely manner. This information aided [the C172 pilot's] situational awareness under a Basic Service and allowed the pilot to become visual in good time.

Responsibility

The Pilot in Command is solely responsible for traffic avoidance under a Basic Service. However, the experience of the APS ATCO ensured that a timely generic and specific warning was passed to the pilot reinforcing the need to keep a good lookout and helping them become visual with the traffic that they subsequently flew into close proximity with.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the C172 could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 3). The Nimbus was not observed on the replay.




Figure 3 – 1146:26 (24sec after CPA) (NATS radar data)

The C172, but not the Nimbus, was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources (Figure 4).




Figure 4 - 1146:26 (24sec after CPA) (ADS-B data)

The pilot of the Nimbus kindly supplied GPS track data for their flight. It was by combining the data sources that the diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined. The aircraft have been shown in the diagram with altitudes based on SPS.

The C172 and Nimbus pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.[2]

Comments

BGA

The glider in this incident was a two seat glider with long wings (over 25m) for high performance (though ponderous roll rate) and a self-sustaining engine. It was part way through a very long cross country flight (9hr 26min) when it encountered the C172. The C172 pilot initially seems to have turned towards the glider's circling path, though prediction of the future track of a potentially conflicting aircraft is the speciality of glider EC equipment and hard to assess for a human.

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

The glider pilot suggests that the Cessna should have avoided flying directly underneath cumulus clouds because that is where thermalling gliders are likely to be encountered. That is arguably too much to ask, but the Nimbus was climbing at around 300ft/min, circling under a thermal topped by a cumulus cloud. Aeronautical Information Circular Y 027/2023[3] does note this concentration of glider traffic and, clearly, hyper-vigilance is appropriate. There were over one hundred serious cross-country flights airborne that day. The glider pilot's expectation that powered traffic will give way to gliders is accurate from an air law perspective, but certainly not a means to enhance overall flight safety.

The pilot of a thermalling glider must look for aircraft approaching from every direction; although continuously turning facilitates 360° lookout, it also leaves the pilot unsighted in any specific direction for about half the time. The difficulties of sighting another aircraft approaching head-on with little relative motion are well known. Further, the glider would have been difficult to see when head-on or tail-on (with minimal profile) twice per turn though much more visible when (twice per turn) seen in planform. The Nimbus does seem to have been sighted in planform at about 0.8NM range (1145:43).

The glider does not appear to have been equipped with ADS-B In which would have detected position information from the Cessna, and its owners should consider such fitment in a dedicated cross-country glider.

AOPA

Whilst the Nimbus pilot would expect powered aircraft to try and avoid flying underneath cloud, this is rather impractical and the BGA agrees. What could be an effective barrier is the compatibility of Electronic Conspicuity systems, but this will have to wait until the Department for Transport directs the CAA as to their preferred system. Until then, the barriers to mid-air collision are (if appropriate) to fit a transponder, to talk to an Air Traffic Service Unit and, most significantly, to execute an effective lookout - which in this case was effective.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C172 and a Nimbus flew into proximity 7NM west of Beverley at 1146Z on Monday 29th June 2026. The C172 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, in receipt of a Basic Service from Humberside Approach. The Nimbus pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, GPS track data from the flight of the Nimbus, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the C172. Members noted that, under the terms of a Basic Service, they had been responsible for collision avoidance without the assistance of the controller and would not have expected to have received any Traffic Information along their route. However, it was noted that they had been passed a generic caution by the Humberside controller, advising of gliding activity near Pocklington. Members also noted that Traffic Information had been passed to them regarding "*a primary contact west of you by 3NM, no height information*".

Members agreed that the EC device fitted to the C172 would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the Nimbus, however, also agreed that the pilot of the C172 had gleaned generic situational awareness of it from the controller's information. Members acknowledged that gliders may

[3] https://nats-uk.ead-it.com/cms-nats/export/sites/default/en/Publications/Aeronautical-Information-Circulars-AICs/yellow-aics/EG_Circ_2023_Y_027_en.pdf

be hard to spot in certain orientations (perhaps twice per thermalling turn, for example) and that this may have hindered visual acquisition at an earlier point. Nevertheless, it was noted that the C172 pilot had subsequently sighted a glider at a reported range of 1NM. Members considered that the suggestion that the glider had been 'operating aerobatically' would not apply to the Nimbus and was either associated with another aircraft or had been a misinterpretation of the normal thermalling manoeuvres.

Whilst it was appreciated that the proximity of the Nimbus had caused the C172 pilot concern, members agreed that they had had sufficient time to have considered the safest course of action and had manoeuvred to increase the separation. Notwithstanding, some members noted that the C172 pilot had remained on track, towards the thermalling glider after having visually acquired it, and suggested that it may have been prudent to have initiated an earlier avoiding turn.

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the Nimbus. It was agreed that the EC device fitted to the Nimbus would not have been expected to have detected the emissions from the C172. The Nimbus pilot's narrative report was pondered, and members noted that they had suggested that "*if they had seen the Cessna, they would have tolerated the close proximity due to the nature of gliding*". Whilst it was not clear to members that the C172 had been positively identified, on the balance of probability, a majority of the members surmised that it had been sighted, and that the Nimbus pilot had not been concerned by its proximity. It was also agreed that the Nimbus pilot had not had situational awareness of the presence of the C172 until it had been visually acquired. Members suggested that it may have been prudent for the pilot of the Nimbus to have initiated contact with the Humberside controller which may have improved the situational awareness of all parties. The Board noted the efforts being made by BGA to increase the proportion of glider pilots with a FRTOL. In consideration of the Nimbus pilot's comment that they would expect oncoming traffic to take safe avoidance action, members were keen to point out that, in accordance with (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity, both pilots had been equally responsible for collision avoidance.

The Board turned their attention to the actions of the Humberside controller, and members agreed that, under the terms of a Basic Service, they had not been required to have monitored the flight of the C172. However, members agreed that the Humberside controller had had generic situational awareness of the Nimbus insofar as a primary-only contact had been visible on their radar display. Members commended the useful, and timely, passage of a caution and Traffic Information to the C172 pilot. It was noted that the C172 pilot had subsequently reported that they had "*come close to*" the Nimbus but had not declared an Airprox on frequency. Members indicated that there had been little else that the controller could have done to have assisted matters.

Concluding the discussion, members considered the risk of collision. It was agreed that the pilot of the Nimbus had not had situational awareness of the presence of the C172 but had not been concerned by its proximity once sighted. It was also agreed that, although the C172 pilot had visually acquired the Nimbus in time to have taken early avoiding action, the separation had reduced further before a turn to increase the separation had been initiated. Notwithstanding, members were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision and agreed that normal safety parameters had pertained. The Board assigned Risk Category E to this event and agreed on the following contributory factors:

CF1. The Humberside controller had generic situational awareness of the Nimbus.

CF2. The pilot of the C172 had generic situational awareness of the Nimbus. The pilot of the Nimbus had not had situational awareness of the C172.

CF3. The EC devices fitted to each aircraft had not been mutually compatible and would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the other aircraft.

CF4. The pilot of the C172 had been concerned by the proximity of the Nimbus.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026131			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]


In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the Nimbus had not had situational awareness of the C172. The pilot of the C172 had generic situational awareness of the Nimbus.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the EC device fitted to the C172 would not have been expected to have detected the Nimbus. The EC device fitted to the Nimbus would not have been expected to have detected the C172.

[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026131
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness