
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026124

Date: 24 Jun 2026 Time: 1426Z Position: 5428N 00301W Location: Grasmere

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Paraglider	Typhoon
Operator	Civ Hang	HQ Air (Ops)
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Listening Out
Provider	N/A	Low Level Common
Altitude/FL	~790ft	A012
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Not observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	Orange, green	Grey
Lighting	None	NR
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	500ft	400ft
Altimeter	QFE	NR
Heading	260°	
Speed	25kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	0ft V/300m H	NR
Recorded	~400ft V/~0.5NM H	



THE PARAGLIDER PILOT reports that, following submission of a CANP for Heron Pike, they proceeded to take-off from Heron Pike summit at 1406. Their flight was, principally, along the east side of the Grasmere Valley between Alcock Tarn and Stone Arthur. After approximately 15min, they had reached a height where it was appropriate to plan to land. They turned to the west to move into the valley passing over the A591. As they lined up with the landing field on Grasmere sportsground, they were at an altitude of approximately 500ft when they saw the Typhoon aircraft rounding the south of Nab Scar in a banked position turning towards Dunmail Raise. They adjusted their course, turning to the left out of the path of the aircraft which passed at a distance estimated at 300m. Aware of the risk of wake turbulence adversely affecting their flight at low altitude, they sought to land promptly and, as a result, had to land in an alternative field to the designated landing spot. As they landed, the wake turbulence did affect their wing, but [it was] when they were at a low enough height (approximately 1m) to avoid adverse consequences.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE TYPHOON PILOT reports that the sortie was progressing as planned, in the low level portion of a passenger sortie [in the two-seat variant of the Typhoon]. The weather and visibility was excellent. The aircraft reached the top of Lake Windemere and was climbed early to cross the high ground of Loughrigg Fell [to facilitate a] look into the valley beyond Grasmere. The paraglider stood out immediately with its brightly coloured canopy, [and was] located close to the ridge, east of the town of Grasmere from the perspective of the pilot. The pilot [of the Typhoon] highlighted the paraglider to their passenger, 'talking their eyes' onto it whilst manoeuvring the aircraft to the west side of the lake and up the western edge of the valley to give the paraglider a wide berth, before continuing on the planned route.

This was a case of the see-and-avoid principle being exercised in plenty of time without any need for urgent evasive action and, at no point, did the pilot [of the Typhoon] consider that there may be a risk of collision or danger to either the aircraft or the paraglider.

[The pilot of the Typhoon commented that] the paraglider was located in a valley system that tapers towards the top and funnels aircraft towards the centre of the valley as they progress beyond the town of Grasmere. It highlights the continued need for a disciplined lookout scan for pilots to ensure conflictions are spotted early, to give them the time needed to plan their avoidance action to continue safely in confined flying conditions.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

A NOTAM for paragliders in the vicinity of Heron Pike on the 24th June 2026:

H3523/26 NOTAMN
Q) EGTT/QWGLW/IV/M /W /000/050/5430N00301W003
A) EGTT B) 2606241200 C) 2606241900
E) CIVIL AIRCRAFT NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE - MULTIPLE PARAGLIDERS OPR WI 2NM RADIUS OF PSN 542931N 0030108W (HERON PIKE, CUMBRIA). LOW FLYING AREA 17 2000FT AGL. CTC 07769 675535. 26/06/175/LFC
F) SFC G) 5000FT AMSL

The weather at Blackpool Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNH 241420Z 35011KT CAVOK 22/16 Q1020
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the Typhoon could be positively identified from Mode S data. The Typhoon appeared sporadically from 1424:07 (when it had been approximately 13NM south of the Airprox location) and appeared for two sweeps just before CPA (Figure 1). The Typhoon was depicted at a Flight Level and a suitable correction was applied to determine its altitude. The paraglider was not observed on the radar replay. Neither aircraft was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.




Figure 1 – The position of the Typhoon at CPA (1426:03)




Figure 2 – The planned route of the Typhoon (from CADS[1]).

The pilot of the paraglider kindly supplied GPS track data for their flight. It was by combining the data sources that the diagram was constructed and the CPA determined. The track of the Typhoon has been shown with a partially dotted line to indicate its probable track.

The paraglider and Typhoon pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2]

Comments

HQ Air Command

This Airprox occurred in Class G airspace in an area where both Fast Jet Low Flying Operations and paragliding frequently take place. A CANP submitted for the paragliding activity on the day in question had generated a NOTAM Warning which had been received by RAF Coningsby Ops staff. A Local Investigation at RAF Coningsby has revealed that the NOTAM information was likely entered incorrectly into the Typhoon mission planning system by the Ops Staff and this resulted in the pilot being presented with incorrect information during their sortie planning. They had planned to avoid the area as displayed and flew their route as planned which, unfortunately, meant they flew through the paragliding Warning. Nevertheless, they visually acquired the paraglider in sufficient time to ensure there was no need for significant manoeuvring to 'give the paraglider a wide berth'. At no time did the Typhoon pilot assess there was a risk of collision. RAF Coningsby Ops personnel have since implemented a robust system for checking information input into mission planning systems which should reduce the likelihood of further occurrences.

BHPA

The BHPA commends the paraglider pilot for submitting a CANP in good time, detailing their paragliding activity together with a contact number. However, we remind all pilots that a NOTAM is not an 'Avoid' and, therefore, due diligence in the form of a thorough lookout must always be maintained, especially in areas renowned for low-level military flying activity. The BHPA also

[1] CADS (Centralised Aviation Data Service) is a web-based flight planning service where pilots flying in uncontrolled airspace can share information about hazards and flightpaths.
[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.

commends the Typhoon pilot and co-pilot [sic] on their situational awareness whilst flying in that area and their disciplined lookout scan which had a positive result.

We note that the Typhoon pilot seemed quite familiar with the area as they commented in their report on how the Grasmere valley tapered and funnelled aircraft into the valley's centre as it progressed northwards. The Typhoon pilot also commented that the need for a disciplined lookout scan was very important in this area. As neither aircraft had a compatible EC capability, and that most paraglider/hang glider pilots are neither aware of the Low Level [Common] frequency nor carry an airband radio, it might have been prudent for the Typhoon pilot to have contacted the paraglider pilot and given an estimate of when they would be transiting the Grasmere valley. If that had been the case, we feel sure that the paraglider pilots would have remained on the ground until the Typhoon had passed. However, it is understood that, in this particular case, the Typhoon pilot had intended to avoid the NOTAM'd area but, due to the NOTAM information being entered incorrectly into the Typhoon mission planning system, the Typhoon pilot had inadvertently flown through the NOTAM'd area.

As the main purpose of investigating an Airprox is to try and identify what happened and whether there is anything that can be done to avoid a future occurrence, perhaps the military flying authorities might consider contacting NOTAM originators in order to promote good flight safety and collision avoidance in known free-flying and gliding 'hot spots'.

As it happens, both pilots saw each other in good time, avoiding action was taken and the incident was described by both reporters as low risk.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a paraglider and a Typhoon flew into proximity at Grasmere at 1426Z on Wednesday 24th June 2026. The paraglider pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, not in receipt of a FIS. The Typhoon pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, listening out on the Low Level Common frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, GPS track data from the flight of the paraglider, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the paraglider, and members noted that, subsequent to their decision to plan their landing, they had sighted the Typhoon at a reported distance of 500m. Members acknowledged the limited manoeuvrability of the paraglider and the high groundspeed of the Typhoon. Nevertheless, members noted that the pilot of the paraglider had had time to have altered course away from the projected track of the Typhoon and had steered towards an alternate landing area.

Focussing their attention on the actions of the pilot of the Typhoon, members pondered the flight planning sources that had been at their disposal. A member with particular knowledge of military pre-flight planning explained that, at their base of operations, it had been the responsibility of Operations Support personnel to have been aware of any notices or restrictions (such as NOTAMs) and to have entered them into a flight planning system that the pilots would then use for their pre-flight preparation. On this occasion, the NOTAM pertaining to paragliding at Heron Pike had been entered into the system with an incorrect location. It was acknowledged that, ultimately, it had been the responsibility of the Typhoon pilot to have ensured that they had had the correct information with which to attend to their flight-planning and to conduct their sortie. However, members agreed that it had been reasonable for the Typhoon pilot to have relied upon the planning system available to them. Members noted that the pilot of the Typhoon had been aware of the NOTAM in question, although had not been aware of the error regarding its location. Therefore, members felt that it was somewhat ironic that the pilot of the

Typhoon had planned their route to have avoided the NOTAM'd area and had inadvertently chosen a route that had passed directly through it. Members agreed that the incorrect planning source had been a contributory factor in this Airprox (**CF1**).

Whilst it was not clear whether there had been multiple paragliders in the air at the time of the Airprox (as the wording of the NOTAM had suggested), members were satisfied that the location of the paraglider that the Typhoon pilot had observed correlated accurately with the location of the paraglider pilot in question. It was therefore agreed that the pilot of the Typhoon had sighted the paraglider in time to have considered the safest course of action and had altered their heading to increase the separation.

Concluding their discussion, members noted that the pilot of the Typhoon had been unaware that their planned route would pass through an area notified as having 'multiple paragliders' operating. Consequently, members agreed that there had been a reduction in safety margins. It was also agreed that neither pilot had had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft until visually acquired (**CF2**). Nevertheless, members noted that both pilots had sighted the other aircraft in time to have taken action which had materially increased the separation. Members appreciated that the pilot of the paraglider had been concerned by their proximity to the Typhoon (**CF3**), but were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026124			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Organisational	• Flight Planning Information Sources	An event involving incorrect flight planning sources during the preparation for a flight.	
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• See and Avoid			
3	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]


In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the mission planning system used by the Typhoon pilot had not provided the correct details of the applicable NOTAM.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft until visually acquired.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026124
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness