
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026122

Date: 20 Jun 2026 Time: 1041Z Position: 5106N 00059W Location: 1NM WSW Bordon

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C525	C206
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ FW
Airspace	Farnborough CTA	Farnborough CTA
Class	E	E
Rules	IFR	VFR
Service	Establishing comms	Basic
Provider	Solent Radar	Farnborough
Altitude/FL	5500ft	4800ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed	Observed
Reported		
Colours	NK	White, Blue
Lighting	NK	Strobes
Conditions	NK	VMC
Visibility	NR	5-10km
Altitude/FL	NK	4500-5000ft
Altimeter	NK	QNH
Heading	NK	340°
Speed	NK	150kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	TCAS I
Alert	RA	None
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	NK	Not Seen
Recorded	500ft V/0.5NM H	



THE SOUTHAMPTON CONTROLLER reports that the C525 [pilot] was [receiving a service from] Farnborough, climbing to 5000ft towards ASLAP on the Farnborough frequency. As the aircraft approached ASLAP, Farnborough called to advise of traffic transiting up the Class E airspace at 5000ft converging with [the C525]. The controller thought that at this point they told Farnborough to transfer the C525 aircraft to [their frequency straight away]. When they did not get the aircraft on frequency, they called back and were told that the Farnborough controller was now descending the transit aircraft. When [the C525 pilot] checked in on frequency, the contacts were merged and they believed that the transit was still at 5000ft, although it may have started a descent. The C525 pilot's initial call was a TCAS RA, which they acknowledged. Once clear of conflict they continued to vector the [C525] with a climb. A subsequent call [was made] to the Farnborough watch manager to inform them of the Airprox, at which point they reported that they were checking whether the [conflicting] aircraft was operating IFR or VFR, therefore this was also a potential loss of separation. The controller opined that there was a serious risk of collision and, as such, had reported this as an Airprox.

THE FARNBOROUGH LARS CONTROLLER reports that they were working busy West and Zone, [the C206 pilot] called on frequency, departed from [redacted], requesting an airways join. They put the aircraft on a 0430 squawk initially and gave the pilot a Basic Service. The aircraft was not validated or verified. They were also vectoring a departure from Fairoaks out to the west that wanted a CPT join, as well as other LARS traffic looking for zone transits. Meanwhile, [the C525] had departed [redacted] climbing to 5000ft towards ASLAP. They then noticed [that the C206 was] indicating 5000ft in the Class E [airspace] and asked the pilot to descend below 5000ft and passed Traffic Information on [the C525]. They continued to pass the traffic and [the C206] passed 200ft below [the C525]. Solent then called to say the [C525 pilot] had received a TCAS RA against [the C206]. They then asked to be let out of position as they were unsure if [the C206] was IFR or VFR in the Class E airspace as the pilot had requested an airways join. If [the C206 pilot] was IFR then [they were] infringing controlled airspace.

THE FARNBOROUGH APPROACH CONTROLLER reports that they were working Approach on RW24 with a coordinator in position. There had been a busy spell of traffic and they were dealing with an IFR arrival that they had descending out of [controlled airspace (CAS)] and had some Traffic Information to pass and monitor. [The C525 pilot] called on frequency and they gave the pilot a climb to 5000ft, to be level by ASLAP as normal. Shortly before transferring the aircraft to Southampton, they asked the coordinator if there was anything to affect transferring the aircraft to Southampton, referring to the overflight procedure. They did not scan the Class E airspace and transferred the aircraft over to Southampton. Shortly afterwards, the LARS N&E controller advised of an aircraft in the Class E airspace. The coordinator called Southampton to advise them and they [the Approach controller] observed the aircraft get very close to a 0430 squawk within the Class E airspace.

THE C525 PILOT did not respond to requests to submit a report.

THE C206 PILOT reports that they were not aware that an Airprox had occurred until informed by the UKAB. Although they have completed the report to the best of their recollection, as they were not aware of any Airprox or risk at the time, they were unable to provide a comprehensive report. They had a TCAS I on a Garmin G1000 in the aircraft and did not see any traffic that posed a threat on the TCAS. Nor did they visually see the other aircraft. They were also uncertain whether they were still working Farnborough at the time of the reported Airprox or whether they had changed to London to join controlled airspace.

Factual Background

The weather at Farnborough was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGLF 201020Z 21010KT 170V240 9999 BKN018 22/17 Q1019=
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Analysis and Investigation

NATS Safety Investigation

Description of the event

The pilot of [the C206 C/S] contacted the Farnborough LARS West frequency at 1032:18 and requested a "*traffic service and clearance to join airways on our filed IFR flightplan*." A Basic Service was advised with 0430 squawk applied.

[The C525] departed Farnborough from RW24 on a HAZEL SID, the pilot contacted the Farnborough Approach frequency at 1037:19 and was issued the standard clearance of "*climb now to altitude five thousand feet to be level by ASLAP*." At 1038:03, the pilot of [the C525] was instructed to expedite their climb through altitude 4000ft, in order to position the aircraft above a Fairoaks IFR departure at 3000ft.

[The C206] climbing into CTA-8, activated the Class E Airspace warning (EAW) alert on the Solent Radar controller's display at 1038:12 (Figure 1), with this being acknowledged at 1038:15.



Figure 1 – Solent Radar

At 1038:42, with [C525 C/S] climbing through altitude 4700ft, the pilot was issued transfer to the Solent Radar frequency, which required repeating to receive a correct readback (Figure 2).




Figure 2 – NODE Radar

As this transfer was occurring, the Farnborough Approach Co-ordinator (LF-APPC) repositioned the [track data block (TDB)] for [the C206] (0430 SSR) which was climbing through 4900ft at the time. The LF-APPC initiated a call to Solent Radar at 1039:04, which was subsequently answered at 1039:18 where they stated, "*apologies for late traffic information. HAZEL, zero four three zero is a Pec… Tecnam, VFR*." Solent Radar replied: "*Which one sorry?*" The LF-APPC re-iterated "*Zero four three zero, HAZEL, is a Tecnam, VFR*." Solent Radar then responded: "*Oh yeah, yeah, can you send him to me right now?*" This was coincident with the LF-APPC verbally requesting the Farnborough LARS West controller (LF-LARSW) seated adjacent: "*Can you descend that one* [the C206] *to four and a half?*"

Coincident with this telephone call, the pilot of [the C525] contacted the Solent Radar frequency at 1039:20 but was initially not responded to, as the Solent Radar controller (HI-RAD) was on the phone to the LF-APPC (Figure 3). At 1039:38 the HI-RAD controller responded, "*sorry station calling, just standby*."




Figure 3 – Solent Radar

During this interaction, Farnborough Radar STCA activated at 1039:26 (Figure 4). Solent Radar STCA activated at 1039:33.



Figure 4 – Farnborough Radar

At 1039:36, the LF-LARSW controller ignored an unrelated aircraft and prioritised contacting the pilot of [the C206]: "[C/S] … *can you descend below five thousand feet due overflying Farnborough departure traffic*?" This was questioned by the pilot with the same request repeated. This was read back correctly with a request for a joining clearance. The controller prioritised passing Traffic Information at 1039:57; "*you've got jet traffic right two o'clock, range of two miles right-to-left indicating five thousand feet*." (Figure 5). The pilot responded, "*roger,* [C/S]*, descending four thousand five hundred feet altitude*."



Figure 5– Farnborough LARSW Radar display.

Further Traffic Information was passed at 1040:20: "[C206 C/S], *that traffic is now coming into your twelve o'clock, quarter of a mile, right-to-left five thousand feet*." This was not responded to by the pilot. During the above LF-LARSW interaction, at 1040:00, the LF-APPC telephoned HI-RAD: "*we're getting the thirty* [0430] *to drop now*", which was acknowledged.

At 1040:23, the pilot of [the C525] broadcast on the Solent Radar frequency; "[C/S] *TCAS RA*" which was acknowledged. This was coincident with [the C206] initiating their descent (Figures 6, 7).




Figure 6 – NODE radar



Figure 7 – Solent radar

NODE Radar displayed [the C525] initiating climb at 1040:27 at an initial 700fpm increasing to 2200fpm. The HI-RAD controller informed the LF-APPC at 1040:29 that the pilot of [the C525] "*just*

called me on frequency having an RA." The LF-APPC responded; "*we gave him three miles ago, wow.*"

The closest point of approach occurred at 1040:31, recorded on NODE Multi-Track Radar as 0.5NM and 400ft (Figure 8).



Figure 8

The pilot of [the C525] informed the HI-RAD controller at 1040:45: "*clear and descending to 5000ft*".

Investigation

Information available to the investigation included:
• CA4114 from the Farnborough Approach Controller (LF-APP)
• CA4114 from the Farnborough LARS W Controller (LF-LARSW)
• CA4114 from the Solent Radar Controller (HI-RAD)
• EGLF NATS4118 Initial Watch Management Investigation Report
• EGHI NATS4118 Initial Watch Management Investigation Report
• [Redacted] Airprox report from the pilot of [the C206] (UKAB Ref No: AC2 2026122)

Farnborough Class E Airspace

Farnborough controlled airspace included CTA-8, Class E airspace positioned between Farnborough and Solent airspace between altitude 4500 and 5500ft which is also a Transponder Mandatory Zone (TMZ) (Figure 9).



Figure 9

CAP493 stipulated Class E airspace required:

> IFR flights to obtain ATC clearance before entry and comply with ATC instructions. VFR flights do not require clearance.'

Controllers were required to

> (a) Separate IFR flights from other IFR flights;
> (b) to IFR flights: wherever practicable, pass Traffic Information and if requested by the pilot or when deemed necessary by the controller, suggest traffic avoidance advice on participating and non-participating VFR flights;
> (c) to VFR flights: provide Traffic Information in accordance with CAP 774 – UK Flight Information Services.

Aircraft outbound from Farnborough on HAZEL departures are required to be climbed to be level 5000ft by ASLAP to ensure they remain within controlled airspace (CAS). EGLF MATS Part 2 APR 3.13 stated:

> To ensure CAS containment, all runway 24 SID Departures shall be instructed, when cleared, to climb to altitude 5000ft, to 'be level by ASLAP' Any aircraft that are taken off the SID track by Farnborough Radar must be returned to own navigation for the next appropriate IFR reporting point on the SID and ensure controlled airspace containment prior to transfer to the next frequency.

[The C525] was then tracking towards KENET, therefore required pre-note and subsequent transfer to Solent Radar prior to transfer to London Control. Dependent on the climb rate of aircraft, this departure track required IFR aircraft to transit through CTA-8 Class E [airspace] between 5000 and 5500ft. Farnborough MATS Part 2 APR 3.13.1 stated:

> To manage traffic interactions within CTA 8, the following list details traffic information requirements in relation to CTA 8 traffic prior to transfer of communications of ATS Route Network traffic to Solent/TC:
> • VFR Traffic in receipt of a service from Farnborough within the HANKY Box portion of CTA 8 (see APR 4.3.1 for definition of the HANKY Box) shall be passed
> • VFR Traffic observed but not in receipt of a service from Farnborough within the HANKY Box portion of CTA 8 between ASLAP and ESULU should be passed.

The transfer of communication was required a minimum of '2NM before ASLAP.' Farnborough MATS Part 2 APR 3.13.7 further advised:

> Farnborough Radar may seek or TC SW may offer higher for Farnborough departures in order to aid deconfliction from VFR traffic within Class E airspace. Where traffic scenarios require a climb above altitude 5000ft whilst still working Farnborough, Farnborough will request climb coordination from TC SW and, for NORRY, KENET / HEKXA and OCK ADRs from Solent Radar prior to climb being issued.

Farnborough MATS Part 2 APR 1.13 Note 1 advised

> Aircraft operating within Class E volumes of airspace with a LARS West SSR code will be assumed to be operating VFR; see APR 2.1 relating to LARS West ATCOs endeavouring to check flight rules of traffic observed to enter Class E airspace. Requests for IFR transit of Class E Airspace will be handled as per GOI 1.3.2, which is IFR Transit of Class E Airspace, utilising an SSR code applicable to IFR operations.

Farnborough MATS Part 2 GOI 5.2 stipulated:

> Outbound IFR ATS Route traffic given to Solent Radar/TC SW/TC WILLO shall be clean of traffic known to Farnborough within Class D, and clean of IFR traffic in Class E.

To summarise the MATS Part 2 requirements, Farnborough Approach was required to pass Traffic Information to IFR pilots entering CTA-8 on VFR traffic within. All aircraft within CTA-8 displaying a Farnborough LARS West SSR code, are considered to be VFR, however there was no requirement for Farnborough Approach controllers to deconflict IFR/VFR traffic within CTA-8 prior to transfer of traffic to Solent Radar or TC SW.

Class E Airspace

The C525 pilot's perception of Class E airspace was not available at time of writing, therefore it could not be ascertained their awareness of the associated rulesets.

Scottish Control airspace contains a small number of areas of Class E airspace. PC MATS Part 2 GEN 2.19.2 stated; '*Controllers should inform IFR and VFR aircraft, under their control, when leaving/entering Class E Airspace*' ensuring pilots were aware separation between IFR/VFR was not applicable. There were no requirements for this within Farnborough or Solent MATS Part 2. The Airprox report from the pilot of [the C206] did not report any awareness of transiting through Class E airspace prior to joining CAS and was therefore inconclusive.

Although the SID for IFR departures at Farnborough ends at 3000ft, there is no information available to pilots of the potential to transit through Class E airspace beyond ASLAP (see Recommendation).

Event

[C206] IFR/VFR?

The EGHI 4118 stated; '*the EGHI MOAT took a call from EGLF to confirm the 0430 [the C206] was IFR. Therefore there was a loss of separation*.' However, the EGLF 4118 clarified: '*The LARS aircraft was VFR in class E and had not been issued an IFR clearance*', suggesting separation minima were not applicable.

This investigation established the pilot flightplan was an IFR plan, not a 'Z' plan which would have suggested the pilot was IFR from departure at [redacted]. However, the aircraft was displaying the VFR conspicuity (7000) from departure, suggesting VFR flight rules were applicable.

The Airprox report from the C206 pilot, however, stipulated their flight rules at the time of the Airprox were IFR, although there was confusion in the report as to whether the confliction occurred whilst IFR in CAS with London Control. As a result of the pilot ambiguity in establishing the flight rules they were operating under on initial contact with the LF-LARSW controller, this was not classified as a controlled airspace infringement, therefore separation minima between IFR/IFR were not applicable. The LF-LARSW controller, at the time of the confliction, had believed [the C206 pilot] to be operating VFR.

Farnborough Approach

The CA4114 from the LF-APP controller stated: '*Shortly before transferring the aircraft to EGHI I asked my co-ordinator if there was anything to affect transferring the aircraft to HI, referring to the overflight procedure. I did not scan the Class E airspace and I transferred the aircraft to EGHI*.' The EGLF NATS4118 provided the perspective from the LF-APPC: *'In the moments prior to transferring* [the C525] *to Solent radar, the Coordinator had scanned and spotted the 0430 squawk on radar indicating below 4500ft outside controlled airspace below CTA 8 and as it was working LARS West, believed the aircraft not to be an issue for the departure.*'

At the time [the C525] was transferred to Solent Radar (1038:42), [the C206] had now climbed into CTA-8 at 4800ft which had not been detected by the LF-APP or LF-APPC controllers at the time. However, the LF-APPC initiated the call to HI-RAD at 1039:04 once cognisant of the potential for confliction.

Farnborough LARS West

The pilot of [the C206] was not required to be receiving a service from LF-LARSW within Class E airspace, however, was receiving an ATS due to the subsequent requested IFR clearance request. Once established on frequency, the LF-LARSW controller informed the pilot they would be receiving a Basic Service outside CAS. The CA4114 from the controller stated '*I was working busy West and*

Zone, [the C206 pilot] *called on frequency departed from […] requesting an airways join. I put the aircraft on a 0430 squawk initially and gave the aircraft a basic service. The aircraft was not validated or verified.*'

CAP774 UK Flight Information Services Chapter 2.1 stated that:

> Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/ FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight.

Workload on the LARS West function was described as busy by the controller, with the NATS 4118 stating: *The LARS West controller was very busy with zone transits and vectoring an IFR aircraft in controlled airspace. They had not spotted the 0430 since issuing the squawk and they were not aware of the climb into Class E* [airspace] *until STCA alarmed*.

Figure 10 displays the RT occupancy from the LARS-W controller position (including Zone controller function combined).




Figure 10 – RT occupancy

The NATS 4118 further stated: 'LARS West and the Coordinator then attempted to resolve the situation by descending [the C206] outside the Class E [airspace] and calling Solent radar to assist.'

The LARS-W controller initially requested the pilot of [the C206] descend below 5000ft to provide some resolution, with awareness [that the C525] would then continue further climb with Solent Radar and that separation minima were not required with VFR traffic. Traffic Information was then prioritised, highlighting the conflicting traffic was at the same altitude, resulting in the pilot of [the C206] reporting descent to 4500ft.

The Airprox report from the pilot of [the C206] stated they were unaware of any conflicting traffic. The report further stated the aircraft was fitted with '*TCAS I on a Garmin G1000 in the aircraft and did not see any traffic that posed a threat on the TCAS. Nor did I visually see the other aircraft*.'

Solent Radar

Solent Radar was operating in low workload with only one aircraft on frequency during the scenario. The Solent Radar function was operating standalone from the Tower function. Prior to the LF-APPC controller highlighting the traffic, it was apparent the HI-RAD controller was not previously cognisant of [the C206] within CTA-8 at 5000ft.

Solent Radar used an EAW alert for traffic within CTA-8. EGHI MATS Part 2 S-6, C-6 stated:

> Class E Airspace Warning (EAW) EAW is set to alert to highlight traffic operating in Class E airspace within LF CTA 8 from 4500-5500 feet by aircraft with operating transponders.

EAW is set to only have a Stage 2 alert. This will alert as the aircraft enters the LF CTA 8 from 4500-5500feet (There is no prior alert to this.) A stage 2 alert is red flashing. Stage 2 alerts must be acknowledged by the ATCO and once acknowledged the alert should stay in an acknowledged state until the aircraft leaves the LF CTA 8.

Figure 11 displayed the EAW alert had activated and acknowledged prior to the time the LF-APPC controller telephoned Solent Radar.



Figure 11 – Solent Radar EAW

However, during the telephone call from LF-APPC, the pilot of [the C525] called onto the Solent Radar frequency with the HI-RAD controller broadcasting "*sorry station calling, just standby*." The HI-RAD controller clarified this scenario, stating in feedback: '*When that aircraft called I did not hear the callsign or information as LF ATCO was talking to me passing traffic information. After the call I told this aircraft to standby. This is because I was put in a very short term conflict that needed resolving. I essentially wanted to sterilise the frequency to allow [the C525 pilot] to check in so I could give climb. There is always a risk of a long winded transmission had I said "station calling say again". It didn't cross my mind that it would be the [C525 pilot] checking in because our procedure with LF states that Traffic Information is to be passed prior to transfer of communication*.'

At the time [the C525] was identified on the frequency, the pilot was already declaring TCAS RA and no further Solent Radar recovery of the scenario was therefore possible.

Actions taken

Two subsequent events [have since] occurred involving CTA-8 and VFR/IFR interaction from a Farnborough/Terminal Control perspective. As a result of these three events, Farnborough USIN006.26 was distributed to the operation highlighting '*the importance of remaining vigilant with VFR/IFR integration in CTA 8*.'

Two Southampton USIN [also] highlighted initial considerations as a result of this event.

Feedback received from the LF-APP controller highlighted, '*IFR departing traffic following a standard instrument departure routing against VFR traffic that can be at the same level without speaking to Farnborough. Due to this being entirely acceptable with the rules of the airspace, there is no audible or visual safety net that currently exists, therefore if the VFR aircraft legitimately climbs in to controlled airspace without informing Farnborough (as happened on this occasion), and this is not observed, there is a risk of such an incident occurring again.*'

Conclusions

The pilot of [the C206] did not provide clarity to the Farnborough LARS West controller on their flight rules when contacting the frequency.

The Farnborough Approach function was operating with a co-ordinator in position due to workload. [The C525 pilot] was issued expedited climb to deconflict against [the C206], and once this confliction was resolved, was transferred to Solent Radar as per the standing agreement.

The Solent Radar controller had been alerted to traffic within CTA-8 by their system EAW alert which was immediately acknowledged.

Prior to transfer to Solent Radar, the Farnborough Approach controller had not recognised Farnborough LARS traffic climbing within CTA-8 in confliction with [the C525].

Coincident with [C525] transfer, the Farnborough Approach Co-ordinator recognised the confliction with [the C206] and immediately telephoned Solent Radar to advise also coincident with requesting the Farnborough LARS West controller to descend [the C206] to deconflict. The pilot of [the C206] was not cognisant of the conflicting traffic on either their TCAS or visual[ly], however reported they would descend to 4500ft on the information provided by the Farnborough LARS West controller.

Coincident with this telephone call, the pilot of [the C525] contacted the Solent Radar frequency, however, the callsign was not recognised and the unknown aircraft was instructed to standby. This resulted in deconfliction actions being unable to be issued to potentially resolve the impending confliction.

The pilot of [the C525] reported a TCAS RA, and initiated a climb to resolve.

Recommendations and Actions

Actions already taken:

Cross unit (Southampton/Farnborough) lesson learning and various USIN to highlight the initial findings of the event.

Review of Class E airspace meeting including representatives from Airport Safety, Southampton, Farnborough, Terminal Control Interface team, TC Unit Competency and NATS Airspace design.

The Farnborough Safety Manager advised: '*Further actions arising from the inter-unit meeting are planned and should continue to improve awareness of the safety considerations associated with Class E airspace for both pilots and ATCOs*.'

Actions underway: As an outcome of the above meeting, the Farnborough Safety Manager produced a Sway package distributed by FAL Safety to Farnborough-based and visiting pilots, to provide clarity to pilots on the Class E airspace parameters, how it interacts with LF airspace, their responsibilities within it, and the information and services they can expect to receive.

UKAB Secretariat

The NATS radar replay was reviewed and both aircraft were identified through Mode S data. Additionally, both aircraft could be observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.

The timings of the NATS radar replay, and therefore the CPA, differed slightly to those used by the NATS safety team who had access to the Farnborough radar. However, the NATS radar replay available to the UKAB Secretariat was used for the diagram at the top of the report.

The C525 and C206 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C206 pilot was required to give way to the C525.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C525 and a C206 flew into proximity 1NM west-southwest of Bordon at 1041Z on Saturday 20th June 2026. The C525 pilot was operating under IFR in unknown

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

meteorological conditions and in the process of establishing communication with Southampton. The C206 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the C206 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

As this Airprox had been controller reported, the Board first discussed the actions of the controllers involved. Prior to this, members were reminded of some of the basic rules applicable for this Airprox for Class E airspace, given that it only existed in a few parts of the UK. They were reminded that IFR traffic was required to be provided with a Radar Control Service from ATC, but that pilots operating VFR were not required to receive an ATS to transit the Class E airspace, however pilots operating under VFR were required to remain VMC in order to be able to give way to IFR traffic.

The Board then discussed the actions of Farnborough ATC as a whole. The Farnborough Approach controller had been providing a Radar Control Service to the C525 pilot, whose routeing had been taking it through Solent Radar's airspace; consequently, a handover had been initiated. The Farnborough Approach controller acknowledged that they had not scanned for any conflicting traffic that might have been intending to climb up into the Class E airspace, and had expected the airspace to have been clear of VFR traffic (**CF7**). They had subsequently sent the C525 pilot across to the Solent Radar frequency without noticing the C206, which had been climbing with Farnborough LARS (**CF6**). Controller members noted that the conditions for a handover were that a controller should resolve any conflictions themselves and not send an aircraft in confliction across to another controller (**CF1**, **CF4**). Turning to the actions of the LARS controller, when the C206 pilot had called them for an ATS, the aircraft had been displaying a 7000 squawk, indicating that they had been operating under VFR. The pilot had requested a Traffic Service, but had been provided with a Basic Service by the LARS controller (**CF5**). Members agreed that, had the LARS controller provided a Traffic Service at this point, they probably would have monitored the C206 more closely and, because Traffic Information was a requirement under a Traffic Service, may have been more likely to have spotted the confliction. In the event, under a Basic Service, the LARS controller had not been required to monitor the C206 (**CF2**) and had not provided any Traffic Information to the pilot on the C525 until prompted to do so by the Farnborough Co-ordinator (**CF3**). However, members acknowledged that the LARS controller had been extremely busy, with almost continuous RT calls on the frequency (**CF8**). When discussing the actions of the Farnborough controllers, members agreed that it had been the Farnborough Co-ordinator that had attempted to resolve the situation, their swift action had alerted the Solent controller and had enabled the LARS controller to pass Traffic Information, albeit late, and to ask the C206 pilot to descend. It had been whilst the Co-ordinator had been attempting to resolve the situation that the STCA at Farnborough had alerted (**CF9**), by which time the controllers had already been taking action.

The Board then discussed the actions of the Solent Radar controller. They had been expecting the C525 pilot to come over to their frequency and, when the Class E Airspace warning (EAW) had alerted, the controller had acknowledged it, as they were required to do. Members thought that it had been unfortunate that, when the Farnborough Co-ordinator had called to provide Traffic Information, the C525 pilot had called up on the frequency at the same time and, not realising that it had been the C525 pilot, the controller had told the pilot calling to stand-by (**CF8**). At around this time, the STCA on the Solent radar had alerted (**CF9**), but the controller had believed that the C525 pilot had not yet called on frequency. Some controller members thought that it had been a missed opportunity for the controller, that they had not issued a 'blind' call on the frequency asking whether the pilot had been on their frequency. In the end, when the C525 pilot had reported responding to the TCAS RA, the controller had believed that this had been the first call from the pilot.

The Board expressed their disappointment that the C525 pilot had not reported their version of the events to the UKAB because, without it, members were unsure whether the pilot had been visual with the C206 or not. However, members agreed that the pilot had not received any Traffic Information from

the controllers and so, in the best case scenario, had received only generic situational awareness from any TCAS indications (**CF10**). Notwithstanding, the C525 pilot had reported to the Solent controller that they had responded to a TCAS RA (**CF11**) and members agreed that this had been the main action that had resolved the confliction.

When discussing the actions of the C206 pilot, members agreed that they had called Farnborough LARS for a Traffic Service and had clearly articulated that they had required a climb on track to Compton, which should have been enough information to cue the controller that the pilot would have climbed into Class E airspace. When flying under VFR, the pilot had not been required to have a clearance to transit through the Class E airspace, but calling Farnborough LARS for a service should have given the controllers enough time and information to have arranged the two flights so that they did not conflict. The C206 pilot had received Traffic Information on the C525 at a late stage (**CF10**), which had been reported as 2NM away at the same level and, when the controller had asked them to descend, the pilot had asked for the request to be repeated; consequently, the C206 pilot had only just begun the descent as the two aircraft had crossed. In their report, the C206 pilot had indicated that they had not received an alert from the EC equipment which, members agreed, would have been expected in the circumstances (**CF12**), particularly given that the TCAS II in the C525 had provided an RA. Although it should have been for the VFR C206 pilot to have given way to the IFR C525, which had also been on their right, the C206 pilot reported that they had not seen the other aircraft (**CF13**).

When determining the risk of the Airprox, members considered the reports from the C206 pilot and the controllers, together with the investigation reports and the radar replay. They quickly agreed that, despite the lack of timely action from the controllers, the C525 pilot had taken swift action in response to the TCAS RA which had increased the separation significantly. Consequently, the Board agreed that whilst there had not been a risk of collision, safety had been degraded; Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026122			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
2	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
3	Human Factors	• ANS Traffic Information Provision	Provision of ANS traffic information	TI not provided, inaccurate, inadequate, or late
4	Human Factors	• ATM Coordination	Coordination related issues (external as well as internal)	
5	Contextual	• ATM Service Effects	An event affecting Air Traffic Management operations.	Controller not able to provide requested ATS
6	Human Factors	• Conflict Detection - Not Detected	An event involving Air Navigation Services conflict not being detected.	
7	Human Factors	• Expectation/ Assumption	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team acting on the basis of expectation or assumptions of a situation that is different from the reality	
8	Human Factors	• Task Monitoring	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team not appropriately monitoring their performance of a task	Controller engaged in other tasks
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
9	Technical	• STCA Warning	An event involving the triggering of a Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) Warning	
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			

10	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
11	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS RA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory warning triggered	
12	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
13	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:


Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Farnborough Approach controller sent the C525 pilot across to Solent Radar without resolving the confliction with the C206.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because Farnborough ATC had not assimilated that the C206 would be a conflict to the C525 and therefore had not resolved that confliction.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because it was thought that the C525 pilot would only have had generic situational awareness from their TCAS, and the C206 pilot had received late situational awareness from late Traffic Information from ATC.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because the C206 pilot had not seen the C525.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.