
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026119

Date: 22 Jun 2026 Time: 1423Z Position: 5419N 00133W Location: RAF Leeming

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Tutor	P68
Operator	HQ Air (Trg)	Civ Comm
Airspace	Leeming ATZ	Leeming CMATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	ACS	Traffic
Provider	Leeming Tower	Leeming Zone
Altitude	1300ft	2200ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed	Observed
Reported		
Colours	White/ blue trim	Black & yellow
Lighting	HISL, nav	HISL strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	NR
Altitude/FL	1600ft	2000ft
Altimeter	QNH (1027hPa)	NK
Heading	335°	NR
Speed	90kt	NR
ACAS/TAS	TAS	Unknown ADS-B
Alert	Alert	Unknown
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	400ft V/350m H	Not reported
Recorded	900ft V/0.3NM H	



THE TUTOR PILOT reports that they were in the visual circuit at the end of a familiarisation sortie. They requested and were approved to conduct a glide circuit (1600ft QNH). Whilst completing the pre-landing checks they received an ADS-B alert of traffic. They had heard there was a Tutor joining left base so they assumed the alert was for this traffic. It appeared this was not the case; a MATZ crossing aircraft passed just in front of them 300-400ft above. At this point ATC advised of the MATZ crosser, this call was too late and the traffic was in conflict with them. At this point they turned final in order to descend from the conflict.

They added that traffic should not have been cleared through the airfield overhead at 2000ft with the visual circuit active, without some sort of height deconfliction.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE P68 PILOT reports that they received a clearance from the Leeming controller to transit at the altitude they were at. Leeming advised them of an aircraft in the circuit, which both they and [their colleague] were visual with. The other aircraft seemed significantly lower than them and a lot slower; it seemed as though they would pass behind, which they [believe they] did. An Airprox was filed by the pilot of other aircraft.

They did not believe it to be an Airprox and have filed this MOR and Company Safety Report based purely on the Airprox report filed by the pilot of the other aircraft. They further added that they fly this route on a regular basis with this aircraft as the primary aircraft. The aircraft has been painted into a high conspicuity colour scheme and has two high intensity LED strobe lights. The purpose of the flight is a pipeline inspection [which] is inspected to fulfil UK HSE requirements. They have flown this route (or similar) [for] approximately 30yrs. The aircraft has ADS-B equipment. They notify ATSUs of the intended flight(s). The aircraft is fitted with a moving map GPS with screen, which was being used,

however, the carry on [visual display device] was not being used due to issues with the ambient temperature on the day.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE LEEMING AERODROME CONTROLLER reports that [the Tutor] was operating in the visual circuit at Leeming, with another Tutor warned in for a left-base join. Upon glancing at the ATM, they noticed an aircraft wearing the pipeline squawk approximately 12NM away tracking towards the overhead. It was quite common for pipeline aircraft to transit the Leeming MATZ. They selected the Zone VHF frequency to see if they could glean the intentions of the [pilot of the] aircraft ahead of time. They heard that the [pilot of the] pipeline aircraft was looking for a zone transit on their present track at 2000ft, they heard the Zone controller respond saying the transit should be ok but may require a slight climb, and at this point they deselected the frequency. As [the Tutor] climbed away from a 'touch and go' the pilot requested a glide circuit; despite not having the information on the MATZ crossing aircraft formally passed, they deemed that a glide circuit (climb to 1600ft QNH) and the profile of the two tracks introduced no risk of collision, so they approved it. They then received the formal details of the MATZ crosser via the landline and informed the Zone controller that [the Tutor] was climbing for a glide circuit. The Zone controller elected to give the MATZ crosser a climb to 2500ft. After completing the landline call they broadcast the details of the MATZ crosser on the Tower frequency, to which [the pilot of the Tutor] confirmed they were visual with the aircraft. Upon climbing away from the next approach the [Tutor] pilot informed [the controller] of their intent to file an Airprox. [The controller] took details of the time and informed the ATC Supervisor via the landline.

The controller perceived the severity of the incident as 'Low'.

THE LEEMING ZONE CONTROLLER reports that they received a handover of a [pipeline aircraft] looking to cross the MATZ and ATZ. They received the aircraft just short of the MATZ boundary. [The pilot] explained they wished to route directly through the overhead at 2000ft but were also able to climb if required. They instructed them to continue but warned them they may be issued a climb to avoid circuit traffic and told them the circuit was active. The aircraft tracked on at a faster speed than they had expected, and before long was approaching the ATZ at 2000ft. They had informed [the Radar controller] and were on the line to Tower when they were informed there was a Tutor on a glide circuit at 1600ft. Upon hearing this, [the Zone controller] issued a climb to 2500ft for further separation. They confirmed with the [pilot of the P68] if they were visual with the circuit traffic, which they were, however, on reviewing the scenario the Mode C separation got to roughly 400ft. This scenario could have been avoided by asking the [pilot of the] aircraft to climb earlier and to avoid the ATZ or issue a hold whilst [the Zone controller] ascertained the state of the circuit. In addition, there was wasted time in asking for the crossing with [the Radar controller], when they had no further outbounds. Instead, contacting Tower first would have saved time.

[The two aircraft] were believed to have been within 500ft of each other vertically and the pilot of the Tutor was not informed of the ATZ crossing aircraft until very late. The weather was good and both pilots were VMC and the Zone traffic was visual with the Tutor. The 400ft of vertical separation kept the aircraft apart, however, if the Tutor was climbing to high key, then it could have climbed through the level of the ATZ crossing. In the event of a climb for high key, the Tower controller would have gone onto the radar clearance line, and the approach room would have been made aware. This would have triggered [the Zone controller] into aborting the ATZ crossing.

The controller perceived the severity of the incident as 'Low'.

THE LEEMING SUPERVISOR reports that they had taken over [the Radar position] from being Supervisor only a few minutes prior to the incident, stepping down to ATCO I/C. The Zone controller called them when [P68 C/S], squawking 0036, was at the MATZ boundary, requesting MATZ and ATZ crossing at 2000ft QNH. There were no aircraft due outbound and no aircraft inbound which would be affected. Given the late notice and speed of the aircraft, they approved the transit and asked if the ADC [Aerodrome controller] was aware as the visual circuit was active. The Zone controller then called the ADC to notify of the MATZ/ATZ crosser. Shortly after, they monitored the ADC frequency and heard

that [the Tutor pilot] was filing an Airprox as the climb for a glide circuit resulted in 400ft separation. Shortly after the aircraft cleared the MATZ and went enroute, they band-boxed Zone onto Radar and advised the Zone controller to make notes of the incident as they recalled them. [Safety Management] was advised that the tapes etc were to be impounded and advised the Senior ATCO of what had just occurred [and followed procedures accordingly].

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Leeming was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGXE 221420Z 14010KT CAVOK 23/10 Q1026 RMK BLU
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Analysis and Investigation

Unit Investigation

Summary of the Investigation

The investigator liaised with the two controllers and the [staff member] that handled the subsequent actions following the incident. The pilot of the Tutor had submitted their own [safety report], and the Airprox Board was made aware following the submission of their (the pilot's) report. The tapes of the incident have been pulled/impounded for the investigation, and the tape transcript was written up.

Sequence of Events

[The pilot of the Tutor] was operating in the visual circuit at Leeming, with another Tutor warned in from [the Approach controller] for a left base join. The ADC looked at the ATM and noticed an aircraft [displaying] the pipeline squawk approximately 12NM away, tracking towards the overhead. The pipeline aircraft was handed over to the Zone controller approximately at the MATZ boundary. The ADC selected the Zone VHF frequency to see if they could gather the intentions of the [pilot of the P68] aircraft ahead of time. The ADC heard that the [pilot of the P68] was looking for a zone transit on their present track at 2000ft, and heard the Zone controller respond saying the transit should be ok but they may require a slight climb. The ADC deselected [the frequency] at this point. At this time, the Zone controller elected to contact the Approach controller first to ascertain the MATZ crossing clearance; this process took longer than anticipated, with the pipeline aircraft also tracking faster than anticipated.

[The Tutor pilot] then requested a glide circuit. The ADC had not been formally passed the MATZ crossing information, electing to approve [the Tutor pilot's] glide circuit (climb to 1600ft QNH), deeming that the profile of the two tracks introduced no risk of collision. The ADC then received the formal details of the MATZ crosser via the landline and informed the Zone controller that [the pilot of the Tutor] was climbing for a glide circuit; the Zone controller elected to give the MATZ crosser a climb to 2500ft. After completing the landline call, the ADC broadcast the details of the MATZ crosser on the Tower frequency, to which [the Tutor pilot] confirmed they were visual with the [P68]. The [pilot of the] pipeline aircraft was also asked if they were visual with the Tutor, which they also were. At their closest, the Mode C separation got to roughly 400ft. Upon climbing away from the next approach, the pilot informed the ADC of their intent to file an Airprox. The ADC took details of the time and informed the ATC Supervisor via the landline.

Outcome

(1) Loss of separation - A Tutor aircraft in the visual circuit and a pipeline inspection aircraft got within 400ft of each other while the pipeline aircraft was transiting the Leeming MATZ with the Tutor climbing to conduct a glide circuit at 1600ft QNH.

Causes

(1) Human Factors, Action/Execution - The Zone controller did not instruct the [pilot of the] pipeline aircraft to hold off from entering the MATZ until both clearance from the Approach controller and ADC were [obtained]. They also elected not to issue the [pilot of the] pipeline aircraft a climb to avoid the MATZ [sic], instead choosing to let the aircraft track on (at a faster rate than expected). This resulted in the [P68] entering the MATZ [sic] at 2000ft prior to positive clearance from both the Approach controller and ADC.

Mitigation - [Local action was taken to reduce the likelihood of recurrence].

(1.1) Aggravating Factor - The ADC approved the glide circuit for the [pilot of the] Tutor. This in itself was not incorrect, as they had not been formally passed the intentions of the MATZ crosser and would have done this under normal circumstances. However, they had been listening to the Zone frequency and were aware of the [pilot of the P68] looking to cross the MATZ [sic] at 2000ft. They had deemed the MATZ crosser to not be a factor, but approving the Tutor for a glide circuit would mean putting them within 5NM of each other and within 500ft, eliminating both the lateral and vertical separation required.

Mitigation - The BMUE liaised with [the ADC] regarding the event and went over various [courses of action] available to them for future reference.

(1.2) Contributory Factor - The Zone controller elected to call the Approach controller for the MATZ crossing clearance before calling the ADC. If this were done in the opposite order, there would have been more time for the [pilot of the P68] to climb to 2500ft or higher to avoid the Tutor climbing to 1600ft, as obtaining the clearance from the Approach controller took longer than expected.

Mitigation – as item (1)

Effects

[A reduction of] endorsed controllers from the roster. [Additional] workforce hours were required to [carry out local actions].

BM HQ 2Gp

Occurrence Reports

Leeming Zone controller occurrence report.
Leeming Tower controller occurrence report
Tutor pilot occurrence report

Background

The Tutor [pilot] was operating within the visual circuit and in communication with Leeming Tower. The P68 [pilot] had been transferred from a previous agency under a Traffic Service to Leeming Zone and was requesting an ATZ transit whilst conducting a pipeline survey.

Sequence of Events

At 1419:41, the pilot of the P68 was handed over to Leeming Zone under a Traffic Service.

The P68 [pilot] requested an ATZ transit on their current track at 2000ft, Leeming Zone [controller] informed them they may have to climb as the Leeming circuit was active.

Leeming Zone passed Traffic Information to the P68 regarding the Tutor, *"traffic east 2 miles tracking west indicating 500ft above descending it's a Tutor aircraft inbound for the circuit".*

The P68 [pilot] acknowledged and asked if they were cleared through the ATZ or whether they were required to climb. The Leeming Zone [controller] told them to maintain current track.

At 1420:33, the Tutor [pilot] requested a 'glide' circuit, which was approved.

At 1421:02, the Leeming Zone [controller] informed Leeming Approach of the ATZ transit, to which Leeming Approach approved subject to Leeming Tower being content.

At 1421:26, the Leeming Zone [controller] requested the ATZ transit with Leeming Tower, the Leeming Tower [controller] informed them of the Tutor conducting a downwind glide, so Leeming Zone instructed the P68 [pilot] to climb to 2500ft.

At 1422:20, the Leeming Tower [controller] informed the [pilot of the] Tutor of the P68 conducting an ATZ transit, to which the [pilot of the] Tutor reported visual.

At 1422:26, the Leeming Zone [controller] asked the [pilot of the] P68 if they were visual with the Tutor, they confirmed that they were visual.

Data from the Radar Analysis Cell shows CPA occurring at 1422:51 with a lateral separation of 0.3NM and vertical separation of 1000ft.

Note. ATM radar replay displays the aircraft with approximately 0.5NM and 400ft separation, as shown below in Figure 1.




Figure 1

Local BM Investigation(s)

A local investigation was conducted by Leeming following the event to identify the ATS-related causal/aggravating factors. This investigation resulted in [local action being taken].

HQ 2Gp BM Analysis

The Unit Investigation identified an error in the Zone controller's application of control measures and [made local recommendations]. Whilst the actions of the Zone controller were a significant contributory factor, the investigation appears to have focused predominantly on the individual controller and provides limited consideration of the wider control team dynamics.

Evidence suggests that both the Approach controller (ATCO I/C) and Tower controller were aware of, or had visibility of, the P68 [pilot's] intentions prior to the Airprox. Although neither controller held primary responsibility for the provision of separation at the time, both were potentially positioned to identify the developing conflict and provide timely assistance, challenge, or intervention. The investigation does not sufficiently explore whether opportunities existed for either controller to support the Zone controller's decision-making or whether barriers prevented such intervention.

STCA - Leeming has been asked to confirm whether the radar screen that was quarantined was the display of Leeming Zone, as the P68 was not 'incommed' on ATM as directed for a Traffic Service. Due to this, STCA did not trigger.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay and third-party aircraft tracking sources was undertaken, and both aircraft were identified using Mode S data and were observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.

At 1422:07 it was observed that the P68 had been 300ft above the Tutor, but at a range of 2.2NM. The Tutor was seen in a descent from 1422:27 and the P68 was observed climbing from 1422:31 (4sec later). CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1422:47 with a vertical separation of 900ft and a lateral separation of 0.3NM (Figure 2).




Figure 2 - Time 1422:47 CPA

The Tutor and P68 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2]

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 17.

Comments

HQ Air Command

The Airprox occurred in the RAF Leeming CMATZ as the Tutor was conducting a glide circuit and the P68 was conducting a MATZ transit. The Zone controller received the handover of the P68 at the CMATZ boundary and cleared the P68 through the RAF Leeming overhead at 2000ft with a comment that it may be issued a climb as the circuit was active. The Zone controller then proceeded to coordinate the transit with the Radar controller and the ADC. The ADC informed the Zone controller that the Tutor was conducting a glide circuit, and the Zone controller instructed the P68 pilot to climb to 2500ft. Unfortunately, the instruction to climb was issued late due to the Zone controller coordinating with the Radar controller before the ADC, and the faster than expected groundspeed of the P68. Opportunities to positively deconflict the aircraft were missed, either by holding the P68 outside the CMATZ or by increasing the transit height in the initial clearance. Additionally, while the ADC had not been notified of the P68 by the Zone controller at the point the Tutor [pilot] requested the glide circuit, they were aware of the P68 via the ATM and by monitoring the Zone VHF frequency. Had the ADC made the Tutor pilot aware of the P68 at an earlier stage then the Airprox may have been avoided. Fortunately, the P68 pilot was visual with the Tutor throughout, and the Tutor pilot became visual with the P68 in sufficient time to increase the vertical separation at CPA to 900ft.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Tutor and a P68 flew into proximity at RAF Leeming at 1423Z on Monday 22nd June 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the Tutor pilot in receipt of a military ACS from Leeming Tower and the P68 pilot in receipt of a Traffic Service from Leeming Zone.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the Tutor pilot, and noted that the pilot had been operating in the circuit pattern when the P68 pipeline aircraft had approached the overhead. The Board noted that the Tutor pilot had requested a glide circuit, which had been approved by the Tower controller despite the controller having knowledge that the P68 had been inbound at 2000ft. The Board noted that the Tutor pilot had not been passed Traffic Information on the impending pipeline survey traffic until after the Tower controller had received an official request for the 2000ft ATZ crossing clearance from the Zone controller as the P68 was approaching the ATZ. Members agreed, therefore, that the Tutor pilot had not had situational awareness of the presence of the P68 until a late stage (**CF9**). The Board noted that the Tutor pilot had received an alert on their TAS from the P68 (**CF10**) but had originally thought that alert had been activated by the other Tutor traffic in the vicinity of the aerodrome. Members agreed that the Tutor pilot had, on sighting the P68, been concerned by its altitude relative to their own (**CF11**).

The Board then considered the actions of the P68 pilot, and noted that they had flown the pipeline survey route on a regular basis. The Board noted that the P68 pilot had requested a transit through the Leeming MATZ and ATZ at 2000ft and had also offered a climb if required. The Board also noted that the P68 pilot had asked whether they had been cleared into the ATZ, and the Zone controller had only mentioned that the P68 remain on track, with no further altitude information. The Board felt that the P68 pilot had been led too close to the ATZ by the instructions provided by the Zone controller, and members agreed that the P68 [pilot] had inadvertently 'clipped' the ATZ without clearance (**CF7**). Members further agreed that, although the circumstances had been unfortunate, the pilot of the P68 could have initiated a climb above the ATZ and confirmed their intentions to remain clear of the ATZ, rather than devolve their responsibility to the controller who had issued a late climb instruction (**CF8**).

The Board next considered the actions of the Leeming Tower controller, and noted that, having monitored the Leeming Zone frequency, the controller had already become aware of the P68 pilot's intentions before clearing the Tutor pilot for a glide approach. Members agreed that the controller had done nothing wrong, however, there may have been benefit in passing Traffic Information to the Tutor pilot regarding the approaching P68, delaying the glide approach clearance pending confirmation that no confliction existed, or advising the Zone controller that the Tutor had been cleared for a glide approach, thereby pre-empting the subsequent ATZ clearance (**CF3**). The Board noted that the Tower controller had received the request for the ATZ crossing from the Zone controller as the P68 had been approaching the ATZ at 2000ft, and had only then provided the Zone controller with the Tutor pilot's intentions to execute a glide approach. Members agreed that the Tower controller, having received official notification of the P68 late in the event sequence, had only been able to pass Traffic Information to the Tutor pilot at a correspondingly late stage (**CF2**).

Turning their attention to the actions of the Zone controller, the Board noted that, on receiving the P68 on handover and hearing the P68 pilot's request for a MATZ/ATZ crossing, the controller had been aware of the Tutor in the circuit, but not the intentions for the pilot to execute a glide approach, and had expected that a 2000ft transit by the P68 would not have been in conflict with it (**CF5**). Members agreed that the Zone controller's expectations of the Tutor's flight profile, together with an inaccurate assessment of the P68's speed, had led to the controller allowing insufficient time to obtain the required ATZ crossing clearance (**CF1**), resulting in late coordination requests to both the Approach and Tower controllers (**CF3**). The Board noted that the Zone controller's intervention to resolve a potential conflict between the P68 and the Tutor had been delayed, with the P68 pilot not being instructed to climb until the controller became aware that the Tutor pilot had been positioning for a glide approach (**CF4**). Furthermore, members agreed that the Zone controller had not armed the Short-Term Conflict Alert (STCA) for detection of the PA68 and, therefore, no notification of a potential conflict between the Tutor and the P68 could have been detected by that equipment (**CF6**). Nonetheless, the Board was satisfied that the controller's attention had been focused in the correct area.

In concluding their discussions, the Board noted their disappointment at the apparent lack of coordination between the controllers at Leeming, and wondered whether there was an underlying issue with ATC team coordination and standard operating procedures. Members agreed to issue a recommendation for Leeming ATC procedures to be reviewed and ensure robust controller collaboration. The Board established that, although safety had been degraded, the separation achieved between the Tutor and the P68 at CPA was sufficient for there to have been no risk of collision, and assigned this event a Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026119			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
2	Human Factors	• ANS Traffic Information Provision	Provision of ANS traffic information	TI not provided, inaccurate, inadequate, or late
3	Human Factors	• ATM Coordination	Coordination related issues (external as well as internal)	
4	Human Factors	• Conflict Resolution - Provided Late	An event involving the late provision of conflict resolution	
5	Human Factors	• Expectation/ Assumption	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team acting on the basis of expectation or assumptions of a situation that is different from the reality	
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			

6	Technical	• Conflict Alert System Failure	Conflict Alert System did not function as expected	The Conflict Alert system did not function or was not utilised in this situation
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
7	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
8	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
9	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
10	Contextual	• Other warning system operation	An event involving a genuine warning from an airborne system other than TCAS.	
	• See and Avoid			
11	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Recommendation: HQ 2Gp BM conducts a review of RAF Leeming ATC procedures and orders to ensure robust operational collaboration.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Leeming Zone controller had allowed insufficient time to provide an ATZ crossing clearance to the P68 pilot.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because a late request for ATZ clearance by the Leeming Zone controller had led to the Tutor pilot being passed late Traffic Information on the P68 transiting overhead.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **not used** because the Leeming STCA had not been armed for the P68.

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the P68 had penetrated the Leeming ATZ without positive clearance.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the P68 pilot, without positive clearance to enter, could have initiated an earlier climb to be above the Leeming ATZ.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the Tutor pilot had late situational awareness of the transiting P68.

