
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026116

Date: 21 Jun 2026 Time: 1135Z Position: 5130N 00000W Location: Approach to LCY RW09

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	EMB190	AS355
Operator	CAT	Civ Comm
Airspace	London/City CTR	London/City CTR
Class	D	D
Rules	IFR	VFR
Service	Radar Control	Radar Control
Provider	Thames Radar	Heathrow SVFR
Altitude	1800ft	1100ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	White, blue	Black
Lighting	Bcn, stb, ldg, taxi	Nav & landing
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude	2000ft	NK
Altimeter	QNH (1025hPa)	NK
Heading	090°	NK
Speed	140kt	NK
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	TAS
Alert	TA	None
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	300ft V/1NM H	Not seen
Recorded	700ft V/1.1NM H	



THE EMB190 PILOT reports that they had proximate traffic noted on their TCAS display, indicating 600ft below their 2000ft platform altitude when established on localiser RW09 for [London City Airport] at 6NM. They had been cleared for [the] approach prior to this, so their aircraft captured the glideslope at 3.4DME and began to descend, just as ATC told them about the traffic and instructed them to maintain runway heading and climb to 2500ft. The TCAS TA was not aurally heard, but the pilot monitoring noted the amber indication on the TCAS display with a 200/300ft vertical separation below.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE AS355 PILOT reports that they were conducting a pleasure flight from Battersea along H4 to the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge and back to Battersea. From their understanding, they were cleared to route along the river beyond the Isle of Dogs to the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge. However, they thought that the Heathrow controller thought that they were going to route direct and, in the process of following the river, they were told to take avoiding action. A jet did a precautionary go-around at London City. They then routed back to Battersea via Vauxhall Bridge and landed, and immediately contacted the Heathrow controller.

THE THAMES RADAR CONTROLLER report information is contained within the NATS investigation below.

THE HEATHROW SVFR CONTROLLER reports that they took over position on SVFR at the start of their shift, at 1103. Traffic on frequency on handover was [AS355 C/S], a VFR helicopter that was at the [Isle of Dogs] reporting point and, according to the handover, cleared to leave the zone routeing direct to VRP QEII "QE2 Bridge". They asked the outgoing controller if both [London City] Tower and Thames controllers had been told about the traffic; it was confirmed they had been.

Shortly afterwards, the Thames Radar controller asked what the 7042 [squawk] was doing. They saw that the [AS355] had followed the River Thames and was facing north at [1300ft altitude] against London City inbound traffic on the ILS for RW09, about to reach the descent point from [2000ft altitude]. They immediately issued avoiding action to the pilot of the helicopter to turn them south, away from the London City approach, and passed Traffic Information. The Thames Radar controller discontinued the approach of the London City inbound [EMB190 C/S]. When asked what their intentions were, the [AS355] pilot said they were routeing to *"Quay"* (phonetically 'kway') bridge. After/during some confused communications about their routeing, the controller routed the [helicopter pilot] back to [their departure point] as soon as they [the controller] could. They believed that the [pilot] was referring to VRP "QEII" as *"kway",* it is generally known as "Q E 2" or "Q E 2 Bridge".

Factual Background

The weather at London City Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGLC 211120Z AUTO VRB05KT 9999 NCD 28/17 Q1025
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Analysis and Investigation

NATS Safety Investigations

Executive Summary

The pilot of [the AS355] misperceived routeing instructions issued by the [Heathrow Special VFR controller (LL SVFR)] and made a northerly turn towards [the EMB190] under the control of Thames Radar on final approach to RW09 at London City Airport. The scenario was resolved by the controllers, with avoiding action issued to the pilot of [the AS355] and [the EMB190 pilot] was broken off the approach and instructed to climb straight ahead. The pilot of [the EMB190] subsequently filed an Airprox report regarding the event.

Description of the event

The LL SVFR controller received a telephone call from Battersea [Tower] at 1123:36 (all times UTC) to request release for [AS355 C/S], an AS355 (twin engine) helicopter departing London Heliport (Battersea) VFR, routeing H4, Queen Elizabeth II Bridge and returning to Battersea. The LL SVFR controller provided a squawk of 7042 and approved an 'H4' clearance for the flight in accordance with the abbreviated procedure detailed in TC MATS Part 2 SVFR 8.7.1. Under this procedure, the Battersea [Tower controller] was to instruct the pilot to route via helicopter route H4 with a clearance limit of London Bridge, operating not above an altitude of 1300ft. H4 follows the course of the River Thames, ending at the Isle of Dogs, a point depicted on the London Helichart map as a 'Compulsory Reporting Point'. The Queen Elizabeth II Bridge is a defined Visual Reference Point (VRP) on an easterly track from the Isle of Dogs and is denoted on VFR charts as 'QEII'. The expected route of [the AS355] is shown in red on the NODE radar map in Figure 1.




Figure 1

The pilot of [the AS355] departed Battersea and reported on the LL SVFR frequency at 1128:17, correctly stating that they were "cleared to London Bridge". The LL SVFR controller instructed them to remain not above 1300ft VFR on the QNH 1025hPa and validated and verified the transponder information. They informed the pilot that RW09 was in use at London City and provided Traffic Information on an (unrelated) inbound aircraft turning for a base leg. After this was acknowledged by the pilot of [the AS355], the controller continued *"and requested route, just confirm H4 to Isle of Dogs and then to the Q E Two Bridge?"* to which the pilot responded, *"Affirm, back to Battersea".*

The LL SVFR controller informed both the Thames Radar (TMS) and London City Tower controllers of the position and expected routeing of [AS355 C/S]. They gained confirmation from the pilot of [the AS355] that they were visual with the previously mentioned inbound traffic, which was now ahead of them and establishing on the ILS for RW09.

At 1130:44 the LL SVFR [controller] instructed the [AS355] pilot *"still not above one thousand three hundred feet, you're cleared to the Isle of Dogs and then to the Q E Two Bridge".* The pilot of [the AS355] responded *"Hold over London Bridge cancelled, cleared to the Isle of Dogs,* [AS355 C/S]*".* The controller confirmed *"and you can continue thereafter to the Q E Two Bridge"* to which the pilot replied, *"we'll continue on,* [AS355 C/S]*".*

A handover of the LL SVFR position took place after this exchange. The incoming controller described that [the AS355 C/S] was specifically discussed during the handover, reporting that they were informed that clearance had been issued to the *'QE2 Bridge'*. They stated, *'I asked the outgoing controller if both LC Tower and Thames had been told about the traffic, it was confirmed they had been.'*

As [the AS355] approached the Isle of Dogs, the LL SVFR controller answered a telephone call from another sector which required their attention to be focussed on identifying traffic operating in proximity to their airspace boundary. Whilst this took place, [the AS355] passed the Isle of Dogs but did not continue on the expected easterly track, instead making a northerly turn to continue along the course of the River Thames and toward the final approach track to RW09 at London City where [EMB190 C/S], an EMB190, was cleared to establish on the approach maintaining an altitude of 2000ft.

The pilot of [the EMB190] reported localiser established at 1134:04 as they approached a 4.5NM final (Figure 2).




Figure 2 - EMB190 localiser established RW09

As the report was made, the TMS controller recognised that [the AS355] was turning towards the final approach track and immediately alerted the LL SVFR controller before instructing at 1134:19 *"*[C/S]*, roger, just continue straight ahead, in fact climb to two thousand five hundred feet, I'm going to break you off the approach, there's traffic in your twelve o'clock range of two miles at one*

thousand three hundred feet routeing northbound at the moment, so just continue runway heading, two thousand five hundred feet." The instruction was read back by the pilot, however, the aircraft had commenced descent on the glideslope, resulting in them requiring to reverse the vertical profile.

Meanwhile, after being alerted to the situation by the TMS controller, the LL SVFR controller reported *'I saw the* [AS355 C/S] *had followed the River Thames and was facing north at* [1300ft altitude] *against LC inbound traffic on the ILS for* [RW]*09, about to reach descent point from* [2000ft altitude]*'*. At 1134:13 they instructed *"*[AS355 C/S]*, avoiding action, make a right turn now, turn south please, avoiding action, turn south immediately".* The pilot promptly read *back "immediate right turn south,* [AS355 C/S]*"*.

The LL SVFR controller continued, *"traffic on a three mile final for London City Runway tw- er, zero nine, just in your left 9 o'clock".* A red (high level) Short Term Conflict Alert became displayed at 1134:25 as Traffic Information was passed (Figure 3) and [AS355 C/S] was observed to commence a sharp right turn on the following radar update.




Figure 3 – Time of STCA

A minimum vertical distance of 300ft between [the AS355] and [the EMB190] was recorded at 1134:39 (Figure 4) as [the AS355] turned south at a lateral distance of 1.3NM. The minimum lateral distance of 1.1NM was recorded at 1134:52 with increasing vertical separation after [the EMB190] commenced climb (Figure 5).




Figure 4




Figure 5

Note: As this scenario occurred within Class D airspace between a VFR and IFR aircraft, there are no applicable separation standards. The scenario resolved as [the AS355 pilot] continued on a southerly track, and [the EMB190 pilot] climbed to 2500ft. Following the event, the pilot of [the AS355] elected to return to Battersea, and coordination and clearance was arranged by the LL SVFR controller accordingly.

Investigation

Information available to the investigation included:

- CA4114 from the LL SVFR controller
- Airline Safety Report (ASR) from the pilot of [the EMB190]
- Report from the pilot of [the AS355]
- Feedback from the operator of [the AS355]

The pilot of [AS355] explained in their pilot report *'From my understanding, I was cleared to route along the river beyond the Isle of Dogs to the Queen Elizabeth Bridge. However, I think that Heathrow thought I was going to route direct, and in the process of following the river, I was told to take avoiding action.'*

The expectation of the LL SVFR controller was that [the AS355 pilot] would follow H4 to where the heli-route ended at the Isle of Dogs, then proceed directly to the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge in accordance with SERA (UK Regulation (EU) 923/2012), which required VFR flights in Class D airspace to comply with Annex I Rules of the Air Section 8.

SERA.8020 (a) (1) detailed:

> (1) Unless otherwise authorised by the competent authority, or directed by the appropriate air traffic control unit, controlled flights shall, in so far as practicable,
>
> (i) when on an established ATS route, operate along the defined centre line of that route, or
>
> (ii) when on any other route, operate directly between the navigation facilities and/or points defining that route.

Had the pilot of [the AS355] complied with the issued clearance "Isle of Dogs and then to the QE Two Bridge", the profile would not have interacted with the approach profile of [the EMB190].

The Battersea [Tower controller] reviewed recordings of their communications with the pilot of [the AS355] and reported*, 'the pilot requested H4 to "Qway" Bridge which was then interpreted by the duty ATCO as QE2 Bridge. The delivery and readback of the H4 clearance was standard with our standard hold at London Bridge. There was no mention from the pilot or ATCO of any routeing beyond H4'.*

After the conflict against [the EMB190] was resolved, the LL SVFR controller advised the pilot of [the AS355] of their expectation that the clearance was to route from the Isle of Dogs to the QE2 Bridge. The pilot apologised and responded that they had thought they were cleared to continue past the Isle of Dogs.

It was during this exchange that confusion regarding the VRP name was first apparent to the LL SVFR controller.

The pilot of [the AS355] stated that they were planning to go to *"Qway Bridge",* and, after the controller enquired where this was, responded *"It's just down the Thames, south of the City zone"*. Note that this was the first occasion in which the pilot of [AS335] had referred to *"Qway bridge"* on the LL SVFR frequency.

The pilot of [AS355] reported *'On* [their navigation display], *the Queen Elizabeth bridge is put down as* QEII. *This confused the controllers when I requested it as "QEII". I was not aware that it was abbreviated'.*

VFR charts depicted the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge VRP as QEII, as shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6 – Queen Elizabeth II Bridge VRP

At the time, the LL SVFR controller did not recognise the pilot's pronunciation as reference to the VRP. They did, however, establish that the pilot had intended to continue following the course of the River Thames. They offered the pilot clearance to route direct to the "QE2" Bridge, however the pilot elected at this point to return to Battersea.

Note: When first reporting on the LL SVFR frequency, the pilot of [the AS355] had affirmed their intention to the controller's query*, "and requested route, just confirm H4 to Isle of Dogs and then to the Q E Two Bridge?"* and had not indicated any uncertainty of the reporting point 'QE Two' or request any alternative route.

Further, the pilot of [the AS355] also did not query two additional references to "Q E Two Bridge" when cleared by the LL SVFR controller [SERA.8015 (b) (2)[1]], nor did they read back the clearance in full as required [CAP413[2]] which was not challenged by the LL SVFR controller. However, whilst this element demonstrated incomplete practice by both parties, it was not fundamental to the pilot error that resulted in the event i.e. the Airprox occurred not because of confusion over where [the AS355 pilot] was going, ('QE2' and 'QEII' ultimately being the same place), but pilot perception of how they were permitted to get there.

The pilot of [the AS355] did not report passing the Isle of Dogs, defined on the Helichart as a 'Compulsory Reporting Point,' which may have provided an earlier opportunity for the LL SVFR controller to identify the pilot's error. Anecdotal evidence from LL SVFR controllers indicated that it was common occurrence for helicopter pilots to not make this position report on H4.

Safety Investigations noted that the pilot perception contributory to this event displayed similarity with those identified in Airprox 2026041.[3] UKAB analysis of this event considered the potential existence of a systemic issue around pilot RT standards, with a recommendation proposed for the CAA to further review the RT standards within UK airspace.

[1] SERA.8015 Air Traffic Control Clearances (b) (2) The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall inform ATC if an air traffic control clearance is not satisfactory. In such cases, ATC will issue an amended clearance, if practicable.

[2] CAP 413 Chapter 2, Clearance Issue and Read-back Requirements, 2.69

[3] Airprox Report 2026041.pdf

Pilot/Operator reports

The pilot of [the AS355] reported that they had undertaken a busy schedule of flying in the days prior, albeit within flight time limitations, and considered potential for fatigue to have been a factor in the event.

The operator of [the AS355] identified future preventative actions stating*: 'Crews to be reminded that route H4 stops at the Isle of Dogs and a clearance beyond that eastbound is not necessarily one that follows the river. If there is any doubt in a pilot's mind as to the exact nature of the clearance they must clarify with the ATSU before proceeding'.*

The pilot of [the EMB190] reported that their aircraft had just captured the glideslope when they were informed of the traffic and issued a heading and climb instruction. They noted a 'small delay' in achieving upwards vertical speed due to a combination of startle effect and managing speed and flap configurations, noting the narrow window of reversing vertical profile from just below 2000ft to 2500ft. They reported *'The Captain noted the* [TCAS Traffic Advisory] *closest contact of 300ft below to the right of the approach track. Neither crew recall an audio call-out for the TA, but it was amber on the MFD.'* They further noted that they were filing an Airprox report *'due to the location of the traffic and the threat it presented'.*

Conclusions,

The LL SVFR controller issued [a] clearance to the pilot of VFR helicopter [AS355 C/S] to route from the Isle of Dogs to the Queen Elizabeth II Bridge, which would remain sufficiently clear of [EMB190 C/S] established on final approach to RW09 at London City. The LL SVFR controller informed both the TMS and London City Tower controllers of the clearance issued to [the pilot of the AS355].

The pilot of [the AS355] did not query the LL SVFR controller's references to *"QE2 Bridge"* despite it later becoming apparent that they believed the point to which they were intending to route was called *"QEII".*

The pilot did not fully read back the route clearance issued by the LL SVFR controller, and the controller did not challenge the omission. However, neither error was causal to the event.

The pilot of [the AS355] misperceived that the clearance permitted them to follow the course of the River Thames and did not require a direct track between the points. They did not request to undertake an indirect route, nor did they report over the Isle of Dogs Compulsory Reporting Point.

The TMS controller, who was in communication with the pilot of [the EMB190], subsequently recognised that [the AS355] had commenced an unexpected northerly turn, resulting in a conflict developing against [the EMB190]. They alerted the LL SVFR controller, then issued missed approach instructions and Traffic Information to the pilot of [the EMB190]. The LL SVFR controller issued an avoiding action turn and Traffic Information to the pilot of [the AS355].

[The EMB190 pilot] had commenced descent prior to receiving the instruction to climb, which resulted in the vertical geometry initially worsening before the pilot was able to reverse the profile. The pilot of [the AS355] promptly made the instructed avoidance turn, and the combined recovery actions were effective in resolving the scenario.

[Root causes (abbreviated) were identified as follows:]

(1) IFR/VFR mix – situational – pilots
(2) Incomplete pilot readback – situational – pilot
(3) Forgot to check or monitor – situational – ATCO
(4) Mis-perceived auditory information – causal – pilot
(5) Failure to follow ATC procedure – causal – pilot
(6) Resolution action – mitigating – ATCOs

Recommendations and Actions

Actions already taken: There were no immediate actions recorded as a result of this Investigation.

Actions underway: Following similar recent events involving IFR/VFR interactions, including the referenced [Airprox 2026041], further work is being undertaken by the CSIT [Centre Safety Improvement Team] and TC UCM [Terminal Control Unit Competence Manager] regarding interactions between IFR and VFR traffic in Class D Airspace to identify ATC lesson learning points and mitigations. The investigation of this event will be utilised to support this work. There are no Safety Investigations recommendations as a result of this Investigation.

Unit Management Commentary

This event highlighted the difference in perspectives for airspace users within Class D airspace. [The pilot of] a VFR aircraft was issued a routeing clearance that would have not interacted with an IFR aircraft inbound to London City, however, [the pilot of] the VFR aircraft deviated from the clearance issued, due to the pilot fundamentally misunderstanding the instruction.

ATC fully complied with the ruleset and expectations around VFR/IFR interactions within Class D airspace and, upon recognising the developing scenario, the controllers issued effective instructions that resolved any risk of collision. The investigation noted the recommendation from the UK Airprox Board around R/T standards within the UK, which will support the ongoing successful integration of aerial users within Class D airspace. As such, there are no safety recommendations as a result of this investigation.

CAA ATSI

ATSI wondered if use of the phrase *"avoiding action*" by the Thames Radar controller might have been appropriate (as used by the Heathrow SVFR controller). The unit recommendations made no mention of suggestions to prevent future occurrences such as emphasising the routeing to the QEII Bridge after the Isle of Dogs by use of the word *"direct".*

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken, and both aircraft were detected using Mode S data sources. Further analysis of third-party aircraft tracking software was undertaken and the EMB190 was detected using ADS-B data sources, although the AS355 was only seen on MLAT-derived sources. CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1134:50 with 700ft vertical and 1.1NM lateral separation and a slant range of 6720ft.




Figure 7 – CPA

The EMB190 and AS355 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[4]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an EMB190, on the approach to RW09 at London City Airport, and an AS355 flew into proximity at 1135Z on Sunday 21st June 2026. The EMB190 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Thames Radar, and the AS355 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Heathrow Special VFR.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from one of the air traffic controllers involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the EMB190 pilot, and noted that the pilot had already begun their descent profile for RW09 at London City Airport before the Thames Radar controller had requested them to climb to 2500ft on runway heading. Members agreed that, as there had been a profile change for the EMB190, it had inevitably descended slightly before the climb had commenced, during which time the pilot monitoring had seen a TCAS Traffic Advisory generated by the proximity of the AS355 (**CF13**).

The Board then considered the actions of the AS355 pilot, and noted that the pilot had been following helicopter route 4 (H4) along the River Thames with an initial clearance to London Bridge. The Board noted that the pilot had requested a routeing to 'Kway' bridge, which had been correctly interpreted by the controller as the Queen Elizabeth 2nd (QEII) Bridge, the hold at London Bridge had been cancelled and the new routeing had been confirmed to the end of H4 and then to the QEII Bridge. Members agreed that the pilot had not read back the clearance correctly, despite having been encouraged by the controller to repeat the latter part of the clearance *"and you can continue thereafter to the Q E Two Bridge"*, to which they had replied, *"we'll continue on,* [AS355 C/S]*"* (**CF11**). The Board was surprised that the pilot had then continued to follow the River Thames after reaching the end of the H4 route at the Isle of Dogs, and wondered about the pilot's familiarity with the routeing, given that the pilot had seemingly misinterpreted the clearance (**CF10**). Members agreed that the pilot of the AS355 had neither reported their position at the Isle of Dogs (**CF8**), which is a compulsory reporting point, nor routed direct to their next waypoint, QEII Bridge, but had instead deviated from their cleared routeing by incorrectly continuing to follow the River Thames (**CF7**, **CF9**). The Board further noted that, prior to the pilot having been told to make a turn to the south by the Heathrow SVFR controller, the pilot of the AS355 had had no situational awareness of the presence of the EMB190 (**CF12**). Furthermore, members agreed that the AS355's TAS had not improved the pilot's situational awareness because, although an alert would have been expected as the EMB190 had become proximate, none had been reported by the pilot of the AS355 (**CF14**).

The Board next considered the actions of the Thames Radar controller, and noted that the controller had seen the developing conflict as the AS355 had been tracking north, towards the London City approach path for RW09, and members agreed that the controller's immediate action of instructing the pilot of the EMB190 to climb had provided the first course of action towards the prevention of a potential MAC.

Finally, the Board considered the actions of the Heathrow SVFR controller, and noted that, when the AS355 pilot had not read back the entirety of the delivered clearance, the controller had encouraged the pilot to repeat the final part of that clearance by saying *"and you can continue thereafter to the Q E Two Bridge"*, and that this had not been correctly read back either. Members agreed that the controller had not then asserted that the pilot read back the final part of the clearance as required (**CF1**) and could not, therefore, have been certain that the route would have been followed as cleared (**CF2**). The Board

[4] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

noted that the Heathrow SVFR controller had then concentrated on identifying another aircraft, when they had subsequently been alerted by the Thames Radar controller to the fact that the AS355 pilot had turned north towards the London City approach path (**CF5**). Members agreed that the Heathrow SVFR controller had been distracted with other valid tasks when the AS355 had turned north, and that the distraction had led to the late detection of the conflict between the AS355 and the EMB190 (**CF3**). The Board noted that the Heathrow SVFR controller had expected the AS355 pilot to have flown from the Isle of Dogs direct to the QEII Bridge, but this had not occurred (**CF4**). Members mostly agreed that the controller's expectations had been justifiable, as a clearance from point A to point B is a straight line clearance unless informed otherwise, while some members also felt that, in this scenario, with the AS355 tracking the Thames, the controller could have used the word 'direct' to clarify that they had meant a straight line route and not to continue following the river. The Board further noted that the Heathrow SVFR controller had directed the pilot of the AS355 to make an immediate turn to the south and away from the London City approach area, at which time they had also received a short-term conflict alert (STCA) on their radar monitor, generated by the proximity between the AS355 and the EMB190 (**CF6**).

In concluding their discussion, the Board agreed that the controllers had successfully prevented the possibility of a MAC event while both aircraft were under the control of ATC in Class D airspace. Neither the pilot of the EMB190 nor the pilot of the AS355 had sighted the other aircraft, and the pilot of the AS355 had had no situational awareness of the presence of the EMB190. Only the EMB190 pilot had received any alert of proximate traffic, which had been purely through a visual presentation with no aural alert due to the approach configuration at the time. Members agreed that safety had been degraded and that, by having followed their respective controller's instructions, both pilots achieved a timely and effective separation from each other and removed any risk of collision. As such, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026116			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
2	Human Factors	• ATM Personnel Hear back	An event involving the hearback (listening) of ATM personnel to communications	
3	Human Factors	• Conflict Detection - Detected Late	An event involving the late detection of a conflict between aircraft	
4	Human Factors	• Expectation/ Assumption	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team acting on the basis of expectation or assumptions of a situation that is different from the reality	
5	Human Factors	• Task Monitoring	Events involving an individual or a crew/ team not appropriately monitoring their performance of a task	Controller engaged in other tasks
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
6	Technical	• STCA Warning	An event involving the triggering of a Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) Warning	
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
7	Human Factors	• Flight Crew ATC Clearance Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an air traffic control clearance.	
8	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			

9	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
10	Human Factors	• Flight crew response to communications	An event related to the flight crew taking the incorrect action following communication	
11	Human Factors	• Readback Incorrect	An event involving incorrect readback	
12	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
13	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS TA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system traffic advisory warning triggered	
14	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[5]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Heathrow SVFR controller did not challenge the incomplete readback from the AS355 pilot for their clearance to the QEII Bridge.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the Heathrow SVFR controller had detected the conflict between the AS355 and EMB190 at a late stage, having reasonably assumed that the AS355 pilot would route direct to QEII Bridge as cleared.

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the AS355 did not report at the 'Isle of Dogs' compulsory reporting point, and had then deviated from their clearance by not routeing direct to the QEII Bridge.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the AS355 pilot had continued following the Thames beyond the end of the H4 route instead of following the cleared (direct) routeing.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the AS355 pilot had no situational awareness of the EMB190 on the approach to RW09 at London City Airport.

See & Avoid were assessed as **not used** because both pilots were responding to ATC instructions in Class D Airspace and neither pilot was manoeuvring as a result of sighting the other aircraft.

[5] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026116 Outside Controlled Airspace

