
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026113

Date: 14 Jun 2026 Time: 1215Z Position: 5204N 00104W Location: 2NM NE Turweston

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	Cavalon
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Helo
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	None
Provider	Turweston Radio	N/A
Altitude/FL	2400ft	2200ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed	Not Observed
Reported		
Colours	Blue, white	White
Lighting	Nav, anti-col, strobes	Strobe, position
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2398ft	2500ft
Altimeter	QFE (1007hPa)	QNH
Heading	240°	270°
Speed	88kt	70kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	150ft V/50m H	NR
Recorded	200ft V/<50m H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that, one mile northwest of Silverstone circuit, they changed frequencies from Cranfield Approach to Turweston Radio. They made a call to Turweston Radio that they were overhead Silverstone for a standard overhead rejoin. About 1-2 miles from Turweston, they spotted that they were very close to a gyrocopter passing by, seen just underneath to the left-hand side of their external view. That was the first time that they had seen that aircraft. As it was beneath them, they increased their rate of climb as soon as possible. After passing it, they made a radio call stating that they were visual with the traffic. Approximately 15sec later, Turweston Radio asked if they had seen the gyrocopter nearby as it had looked as if it had been close. [The PA28 pilot] replied stating that they had been visual with it.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE CAVALON PILOT reports that they were aware that a low wing aircraft passed by their aircraft. They have no reliable recollection of the incident.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE TURWESTON AGO reports that they received no information regarding this incident, either by VHF or by other means.

Factual Background

The weather at Cranfield aerodrome was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGTC 141220Z VRB02KT 9999 SCT035 17/09 Q1020
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 1). The aircraft were depicted on the radar replay at Flight Levels. A suitable correction was applied to determine their altitudes. The PA28, but not the Cavalon, was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources. The diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined by combining the data sources.




Figure 1 – Radar CPA at 1214:30 (NATS radar data)




Figure 2 – Aircraft tracks (MLAT and ADS-B data)

The PA28 and Cavalon pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Cavalon pilot was required to give way to the PA28.[2] If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the Cavalon pilot had right of way and the PA28 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering heading to the right. No subsequent change in the relative positions of the two aircraft shall absolve the overtaking aircraft from this obligation until it is entirely past and clear.[3]

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.
[3] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a Cavalon flew into proximity 2NM northeast of Turweston at 1215Z on Sunday 14th June 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the PA28 pilot in receipt of an AGCS from Turweston Radio and the Cavalon pilot not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, a report from the AGO involved and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the PA28. Members noted that the PA28 had been fitted with an additional EC device, but agreed that it would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the Cavalon (**CF3**). It was also noted by members that there had not been a common frequency in use between the pilots and, consequently, agreed that the pilot of the PA28 had not had situational awareness of the Cavalon until it had been sighted (**CF2**). Members pondered the timing of the encounter and noted that the PA28 pilot recalled that the Cavalon had been 'very close' and that it had been first seen 'just underneath to the left-hand side'. It was agreed by members that the Cavalon had not been sighted until the moment of CPA which, effectively, meant that it had been a non-sighting (**CF4**). It was noted that the pilot of the PA28 had initiated urgent avoiding action that had increased separation after CPA.

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the Cavalon, and it was noted that they had been in possession of a FRTOL (Flight Radio Telephony Operator's Licence) but had not been in receipt of a service. Given that the encounter had occurred approximately 2NM northeast of Turweston aerodrome, it was agreed by members that it may have been prudent for the pilot of the Cavalon to have announced their intentions on the Turweston frequency (**CF1**) for the benefit of other pilots in the area, as well as for the Turweston AGO. It was noted that the Cavalon had not been fitted with an additional EC device, and members were keen to point out that, had a compatible device been fitted, it may have provided a timely alert to the presence of the PA28 and other traffic along their route. Members agreed that the pilot of the Cavalon had not had situational awareness of the presence of the PA28 until it had been sighted (**CF2**). Although not specifically mentioned in the Cavalon pilot's narrative report, members surmised that they had not sighted the PA28 in time to have taken any action to have resolved the close proximity. Members agreed that that effectively constituted a non-sighting (**CF4**).

Members wished to emphasise the imperative of maintaining a thorough and effective visual scan, particularly when operating within congested airspace, even more so when in the vicinity of a busy aerodrome such as Turweston. Tangentially, members noted that Turweston aerodrome does not benefit from the additional protection that an ATZ may have provided.

Turning their attention to the role of the Turweston AGO, members noted that they had reported that they 'had received no information regarding this incident'. However, members noted that the PA28 pilot recalled that the AGO had asked them if they had sighted 'the gyrocopter' as it had 'looked as if it had been close'. Therefore, members inferred that the Airprox encounter had been witnessed by the Turweston AGO.

Concluding their discussion, members considered the matter of the risk of collision. It was agreed that neither pilot had sighted the other aircraft until the moment of CPA. Acknowledging that the pilot of the PA28 had taken positive avoiding action as soon as they had sighted the Cavalon, members were in agreement that that action had not materially affected the outcome. Notwithstanding, members noted that there had been 200ft separation vertically between the aircraft as the encounter had unfolded. Members agreed, unanimously, that safety margins had been much reduced below the norm and that there had been a risk of collision (**CF5**). The Board assigned Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026113			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
	• Outcome Events			
5	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Turweston AGO had not been required to have monitored the flight of the PA28.

Flight Elements:


Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because, due to their proximity to Turweston aerodrome, it may have been prudent for the pilot of the Cavalon to have transmitted their intentions on the Turweston Radio frequency.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft until visually acquired.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the EC device fitted to the PA28 would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the Cavalon.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had sighted the other aircraft before the moment of CPA.

[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026113
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness