
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026110

Date: 16 Jun 2026 Time: 1152Z Position: 5156N 00127W Location: ivo Enstone Airfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Light Aircraft	PA28
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Basic
Provider	Enstone Traffic	Oxford Radar
Altitude/FL	1100ft	1300ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed	Not observed
Reported		
Colours	Cream/Red	White/blue
Lighting	Lower strobe	Beacon & strobe
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	5-10km
Altitude/FL	700ft AGL	1500ft AMSL
Altimeter	QFE (994hPa)	QNH
Heading	350°	230°
Speed	75kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	TAS
Alert	N/A	None
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	100ft V/150m H	Not seen
Recorded	200ft V/0.3NM H	



THE LIGHT AIRCRAFT PILOT reports that they were in the circuit at Enstone doing touch-and-goes on RW26 Hard (right-hand circuit). They had been on frequency for 5min and had heard [the pilot of] another local aircraft land and clear the runway, so they were sure that they were the only aircraft on frequency. (NB the pilot of that local aircraft later told them that they had seen them on their alerting system.) Climbing crosswind on the go-around, they were almost at circuit height when they saw the PA28 just to the right of the aircraft nose. It was at circuit height (800ft QFE) and just at the point of where they would turn right onto downwind. It was heading roughly 130°, and so was moving diagonally across the circuit (and away from them). It left the circuit to the south-southeast and so they turned to follow it. It flew towards Blenheim Palace, losing altitude, and [the Light Aircraft pilot] thought it was going to crash land as the wings wobbled and it was very low. Then it turned east towards Oxford Airport and climbed a bit so they changed frequency to 125.090MHz to see if they could hear the aircraft callsign. The reception was poor but they thought that they heard Oxford tell [the other aircraft pilot] to turn right and head south to avoid their approach; then (they think it was to the subject aircraft) they said to call the Tower but [the Light Aircraft pilot] did not have the Tower frequency to hand so they gave up and returned to Enstone to land. They did not see it earlier as they were climbing and so it was in their blind spot. They considered that, had they been on the go-around 10 or 20sec earlier, the other aircraft and [their own] would have been at the same position at the same time. There was a real risk of collision due to the other aircraft flying through the Enstone circuit in an unusual direction at circuit height without being on the local frequency.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that they were revalidating their SEP land rating and joining the visual circuit at Oxford. They did not see the aircraft and the aircraft was not displayed on the TAS equipment.

THE OXFORD CONTROLLER reports they had no recollection of the traffic, or any Airprox being reported to them.

Factual Background

The weather at Oxford Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGTK 161150Z 21010KT 9999 FEW032 21/14 Q1014
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Analysis and Investigation

Oxford Airport

Review

The ATCO was focussed, quite rightly, on the traffic they were vectoring and other traffic also under a Traffic Service. [The pilot of the PA28] was in receipt of a Basic Service and flew towards [Oxford] aerodrome after passing Enstone. An aircraft was seen climbing out from Enstone on the southwesterly runway, passing ahead and below [the PA28].

Findings and Observations

[A local Airport] agreement states that:

> 'Arriving aircraft intending to re-join Oxford shall state their intention and request join before reaching 10NM so that the arrival can be co-ordinated'.

Even if [the pilot of the PA28] had called at 10NM versus 5NM, this would not have altered the outcome. The controller would have scanned it then, when [the pilot] called, versus scanning it when they called after the event. When the aircraft was at 10NM, the departure from Enstone was not airborne, so not showing on radar.

Local operators know how busy Enstone is, albeit it has no ATZ, and usually remain well clear of the area.

Conclusion


There were no ATC aspects [to this Airprox].

CAA ATSI

ATSI has reviewed the Oxford report and has nothing further to add.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken, and both aircraft were identified using Mode S data. Further analysis of third-party aircraft tracking software was undertaken, and only the Light Aircraft was seen using ADS-B data sources.



CPA 1152:27

CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1152:27 with 200ft vertical and 0.3NM lateral separation.

The Light Aircraft and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Light Aircraft and a PA28 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Enstone Airfield at 1152Z on Tuesday 16th June 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the Light Aircraft pilot listening out to Enstone Traffic and the PA28 pilot in receipt of a Basic Service from Oxford Radar.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, and reports from the Oxford air traffic controller and ANSP. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the Light Aircraft pilot, and noted that they had been flying circuits at Enstone while monitoring the Enstone Traffic frequency. The Board noted that, during a go-around, the pilot of the Light Aircraft had been confronted with a PA28 flying south-southeast across the circuit area ahead of them, without any notification on the Enstone Traffic frequency. Members agreed that the Light Aircraft pilot had had no situational awareness of the presence of the PA28 (**CF5**) and that the pilot's shock of having seen the aircraft on the crosswind section of their climbout, at CPA, had been indicative of an effective non-sighting of the PA28 by the Light Aircraft pilot (**CF7**). The Board noted that the Light Aircraft pilot had elected to follow the PA28 back towards Oxford. Members considered this decision ill-advised, given the pilot's apparent level of stress, and could identify no operational or safety benefit in continuing to follow the aircraft.

The Board then considered the actions of the pilot of the PA28, and noted that the pilot was undergoing a Single Engine Piston (SEP) licence renewal. Members expressed surprise that the examiner would have allowed the pilot to have flown through the Enstone circuit area, at circuit height, without contacting Enstone traffic (**CF3**), and members agreed that the pilot of the PA28 had not avoided the pattern of

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

traffic already formed at Enstone (**CF2**, **CF4**). The pilot made no mention of Enstone in the narrative that they provided to the UK Airprox Board, however, the Oxford controller stated in their report that *'Local operators know how busy Enstone is, albeit it has no ATZ, and usually remain well clear of the area.'* Members agreed that, regardless of whether the pilot of the PA28 regularly operated in the area, they should have had generic situational awareness of the possibility of traffic operating in the area of the Enstone circuit as it is marked on aviation charts (**CF5**). The Board agreed that the PA28's TAS had been compatible with the equipment carried by the Light Aircraft, but that no alert to the presence of the Light Aircraft had been reported by the pilot of the PA28 (**CF6**), which may have much improved the PA28 pilot's situational awareness of the Light Aircraft and assisted them in visually acquiring it. Members agreed that, under the circumstances, the PA28 pilot had not seen the Light Aircraft (**CF7**).

The Board then considered the actions of the Oxford controller, and noted that the controller had not been required to monitor the PA28 under the terms of the Basic Service (**CF1**). The Board noted the Oxford investigation's conclusion that there were no ATC aspects to the Airprox. Whilst members did not dispute that the controller had acted appropriately, they considered that further exploration of the wider circumstances and associated human factors might have added value to the investigation.

Drawing their discussions to a close, the Board agreed that safety had been degraded when the PA28 had come into close proximity with the Light Aircraft in the circuit at Enstone. Members agreed that, fortuitously, the PA28 pilot had flown past the Light Aircraft and had increased their initial separation sufficiently for there to have been no risk of collision. As such, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026110			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
2	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
3	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
5	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
6	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Oxford controller was not required to monitor the flight of the PA28 under the terms of a Basic Service.

Flight Elements:


Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28 pilot did avoid or conform with the circuit traffic at Enstone.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the PA28 had neither communicated their intentions to Enstone Traffic, nor avoided the pattern of traffic at the aerodrome.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28 pilot only had generic situational awareness of the possibility of traffic in the Enstone circuit, and the Light Aircraft pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the PA28 until they had sight of it.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28's electronic conspicuity equipment had not provided the pilot with an alert to the presence of the Light Aircraft.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of the PA28 had not seen the Light Aircraft and the pilot of the Light Aircraft had not seen the PA28 until at or after CPA.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.