
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026106

Date: 08 Jun 2026 Time: 1121Z Position: 5403N 00419W Location: 12NM SE Ronaldsway

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	SA102 Cavalier	ATR72
Operator	Civ FW	CAT
Airspace	Isle of Man CTR	Isle of Man CTR
Class	D	D
Rules	VFR	IFR
Service	Radar Control	Radar Control
Provider	Ronaldsway	Ronaldsway
Altitude/FL	FL031	FL037
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed	Observed
Reported		
Colours	NR	Company
Lighting		Strobes, landing lights, beacons
Conditions		VMC
Visibility		NR
Altitude/FL		2000ft
Altimeter		QNH
Heading		300°
Speed		200kt
ACAS/TAS		TCAS II
Alert		RA
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	NR	'Co-alt'
Recorded	600ft V/0.7NM H	



THE RONALDSWAY RADAR CONTROLLER reports that the Cavalier was outbound from Ronaldsway Airport on a VFR flight. The departure clearance was to climb not above 2000ft while maintaining VFR. While on the Radar frequency the Mode C readout indicated 2300ft and, when this was queried, the pilot advised that they were at 1900ft. The controller advised the pilot of the transponder readout anomaly and they stated that they would descend. The controller believed that this indicated a level bust rather than a potential transponder issue. The ATR72 was inbound to Ronaldsway Airport on a scheduled service and, at approximately 25NM southeast of the airfield, the pilot requested a visual approach onto RW26. This was approved. The controller then advised [the Cavalier pilot] that their level restriction of 2000ft was no longer required and they replied "*roger, climbing*". The controller believed the pilot would then initiate a climb to enhance their safety margin for a long water crossing. When [the ATR72] was 18NM south east of the airfield, Traffic Information was passed on the position of the Cavalier and this was acknowledged by the crew. [The Cavalier pilot] was then passed Traffic Information on the ATR72 and the pilot replied that they would now be "*turning right towards Morecambe Bay*". Had this happened, the controller believed that the confliction would have been resolved. The Cavalier pilot did not seem to deviate from their original track and, as yet, had not commenced the climb. As the aircraft were on a converging course the controller updated the Traffic Information to [the ATR72 pilot] and asked if they had the other aircraft in sight. As they did this, the Short Term Conflict Alert alarm on the Radar display activated and went 'yellow'. [The ATR72 pilot] reported that they "*could see the aircraft on the box (TCAS) but not yet out of the window*". At this point the aircraft were on converging tracks approximately 2-3NM apart, with the Cavalier now climbing and the ATR72 descending. The Short Term Conflict Alert alarm then changed to 'red' on the radar display. The ATR72 pilot then reported "*traffic in sight*" while simultaneously a TCAS RA climb alert was heard in the background of the transmission and the pilot reported a "*TCAS RA climbing*". This was acknowledged and a reminder of the QNH was passed. The ATR72 crossed in front of the Cavalier and, at the closest

point of the radar recording, the aircraft were approximately 0.7 miles laterally apart while at the same indicated level. Shortly afterwards the ATR72 pilot reported "*clear of conflict*" and that they wished to continue with the visual approach, which was approved.

The controller assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE CAVALIER PILOT did not respond to requests for a report.

THE ATR72 PILOT reports that they were descending visually towards RW26, heading in a north-westerly direction. Traffic Information was passed about the other aircraft. They began a visual scan for the other traffic, together with TCAS information. A TA advised as the aircraft was acquired visually. The other aircraft was to their left side, similar level, travelling approximately east. Once they had first visually acquired it, it appeared slightly forward of abeam (0930 position), and they assessed that the aircraft was moving out to the left relatively and would pass behind. The distance was assessed to be approximately 2NM. A TCAS RA was received, so they responded to that with a climb of approximately 1000ft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

Factual Background

The weather at Ronaldsway was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNS 081120Z 25016KT 9999 FEW023 14/07 Q1011 NOSIG=
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Analysis and Investigation

Isle of Man CAA

The Ronaldsway Radar function was being undertaken by an ATCO holding a UK CAA issued licence with current unit licence endorsement and medical certificate. The ATCO was working alone in the Approach Control Room without the support of an Air Traffic Services Assistant, although another ATCO and an assistant were working in the Visual Control Room several floors above.

The service was being provided utilising wide area multilateration (MLAT) surveillance equipment. The airport's Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) was unserviceable at the time of the Airprox; however, both aircraft were visible on MLAT throughout.

The Isle of Man Airport ATC radar data processors include STCA functionality which is designed to activate on detecting aircraft encounters which are predicted to result in aircraft proximity of less than 2NM horizontally and/or 700ft vertically. There are two stages of alert:

- Stage 1 activates 45sec before predicted erosion of 2NM laterally and/or 700ft vertically.
- Stage 2 activates 30sec before predicted erosion of 2NM laterally and/or 700ft vertically.

The alerts highlight the affected aircraft on the situation display by adding a flashing STCA flag to the aircraft's label and a circle around its position symbol. These are colour-coded yellow for Stage 1 and red for Stage 2 alerts. Stage 2 alerts also produce an audible alarm.

[The pilot of] one other aircraft was on frequency at the time of the Airprox, being provided with a Basic Service inbound to Isle of Man Airport under VFR from the east.

Description of the event

[The Cavalier pilot] had departed RW26 at Isle of Man maintaining VFR with a level restriction of not above altitude 2000ft. After departure, the pilot made a left turn before settling onto a generally east-north-easterly track, although a slight meandering was observed.

On first contact with Ronaldsway Radar, [the ATR72 pilot] indicated an intent to subsequently request a visual approach. A short while later, after being given initial descent to FL80, the crew requested and were cleared for a visual approach to RW26. [The ATR72 crew] were therefore free to descend and manoeuvre at will. The crew commented that they could see the whole of the Isle of Man.

After clearing [the ATR72 pilot] for the visual approach, the ATCO removed [the Cavalier's] level restriction: "*there's no level restriction now if you wish to climb above two thousand feet maintaining VFR*". The pilot acknowledged the removal of the level restriction and indicated that they would continue climbing: "*maintain VFR and er, continue climbing* [C/S]".

Figure 1 shows [the Cavalier] indicating 2000ft (QNH corrected altitude above mean sea level) and [the ATR72] in descent passing through FL80. The level information of [the Cavalier] is converted to depict with direct reference to the Ronaldsway QNH (which at the time was 1011hPa). The level information of [the ATR72] is depicted in relation to 1013hPa. The lines projecting in front of the aircraft contacts are predict vectors that show the projected position of the aircraft in 1 minute's time (end of first line) and 2 minutes' time (end of second line) based on the aircraft's current track and speed.

It [was noted] that the aircraft labels both display the callsign twice. This is because the left-hand callsign is derived from the aircraft's Mode S downlinked aircraft identification parameter (ARCID), and the right-hand callsign is the Mode A code, converted locally to the callsign.




Figure 1

At 1119:16 (shown in Fig.2) the ATCO provided Traffic Information to [the ATR72 pilot] on [the Cavalier]: *"*[C/S] *Traffic Information, a light aircraft VFR eastbound currently in your eleven o'clock at a range of eight miles, two thousand feet, climbing VFR"*. The ATR72 pilot acknowledged: *"traffic copied thanks, er* [C/S]*"*.




Figure 2 - 1119:16

This was immediately followed at 1119:31 by the ATCO also providing Traffic Information to [the Cavalier pilot] on the ATR72. "[C/S] *er, there is traffic inbound to the airfield on a visual approach an ATR crossing your two o'clock at a range of eight miles just descending through five thousand feet"*. [the Cavalier pilot] responded: *"roger we are going to turn right a little bit now and head towards er…. Morecambe Bay*."

When the aircraft were at a horizontal distance of 4.7NM apart, the STCA generated a Stage 1 alert on the surveillance display.

At 1120:33 the ATCO updated the Traffic Information to [the ATR72 pilot] on [the Cavalier]: "[C/S] *previously mentioned traffic is now in your ten o'clock at four miles do you have him in sight at all, two thousand seven hundred feet"*. At the same time the STCA changed to a Stage 2 alert. The ATR72 pilot responded: *"we can see them on our screen but not out of the window yet, er* [C/S]*"*. The ATR72 pilot continued their descent on the same track.

The ATCO did not provide any updated Traffic Information to [the Cavalier pilot].

At 1121:12 (shown in Fig.3) the [ATR72 pilot] reported responding to a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA): *"TCAS RA* [C/S]*"*.

At this time the aircraft were separated by 1.4NM horizontally and 140ft vertically.[1] This was the closest point of approach (CPA) shown in the recorded data.

The ATCO acknowledged immediately, stating the QNH: "*Roger QNH is one zero one one*".

At 1121:18 the ATR72 pilot stated: *"traffic in sight"*.

In the latter stages of the conflict, the labels on the aircraft labels on the situation display were overlapping, which had the potential to mask the information presented to the ATCO.

[1] The level of [the ATR72] is shown as a flight level on a datum of 1013.2hPa, meaning 60ft must be subtracted to convert to altitude on the Ronaldsway QNH datum (1011hPa) for direct comparison with the altitude shown for [the Cavalier].

The flight crew of [the Cavalier] made no RTF comment on the conflict and did not report if they had the ATR72 in sight or not.




Figure 3

The TCAS RA resulted in [the ATR72 pilot] conducting a climb manoeuvre before subsequently reporting clear of conflict and resuming the visual approach.

There was no further recorded data of relevance to the Airprox.

Regulatory requirements

Whilst UK civil aviation legislation has no direct applicability in the Isle of Man, the Isle of Man's rules of the air and ATC procedures mirror those of the UK:

- Schedule 2 of the Civil Aviation (Rules of the Air) Order 2021 applies EU Regulation 923/2012 to the Isle of Man with amendment to mirror the technical specifications of UK Reg (EU) No. 923/2012 (the Standardised European Rules of the Air, SERA).
- Permissions, authorisations, variations, and exemptions relevant to UK Reg (EU) No. 923/2012 issued by UK CAA under its Official Record Series 4 are replicated for the Isle of Man. A consolidated version is published in Isle of Man CAA publication CP15 Rules of the Air.
- Isle of Man CAA publication CP11 Air Traffic Services adopts the procedures specified by UK CAA publication CAP493 Manual of Air Traffic Services – Part 1 (MATS Pt 1).

The Rules of the Air specify that where two aircraft are converging at approximately the same level, the aircraft that has the other on its right shall give way. However, the rules also specify that 'nothing in this Regulation shall relieve the pilot-in-command of an aircraft from the responsibility of taking such action, including collision avoidance manoeuvres based on resolution advisories provided by ACAS equipment as will best avert collision'.

Within Class D airspace, air traffic control service shall be provided to all IFR flights and VFR flights:

- IFR flights receive traffic information in respect of VFR flights and traffic avoidance advice upon request;
- VFR flights receive traffic information in respect of all other flights and traffic avoidance advice upon request.

The objectives of the air traffic services include:

- preventing collisions between aircraft; and
- providing advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights.

MATS Part 1[2] states:

> Notwithstanding the minimum service requirements associated with each airspace classification, the primary objective of air traffic services is to prevent collisions between aircraft. In support of this objective, on any occasion a controller considers it necessary in the interests of safety, traffic information and, where appropriate traffic avoidance advice, shall be provided. Pilots are responsible for collision avoidance (SERA.3201) and should be aware of the existence of factors that might adversely affect the ability of a controller to detect a collision hazard and provide timely and accurate traffic information, and when surveillance-based ATS is being provided, traffic avoidance advice.

MATS Part 1 also provides guidance on the safe integration of VFR flights with IFR traffic in Class D airspace.[3] This includes:

> Separation standards are not prescribed for application by ATC between VFR flights or between VFR and IFR flights in Class D airspace. However, ATC has a responsibility to prevent collisions between known flights and to maintain a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic. This objective is met by passing sufficient traffic information and instructions to assist pilots to 'see and avoid' each other as specified at Section 3, Chapter 1, paragraph 2A.2.
>
> Instructions issued to VFR flights in Class D airspace are mandatory. These may comprise routeing instructions, visual holding instructions, level restrictions, and information on collision hazards, in order to establish a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic and to provide for the effective management of overall ATC workload.
>
> Routeing instructions may be issued which will reduce or eliminate points of conflict with other flights, such as final approach tracks and circuit areas, with a consequent reduction in the workload associated with passing extensive traffic information.

MATS Part 1 specifies that:

> In the event an STCA is generated in respect of controlled flights, the controller shall without delay assess the situation and, if necessary, take action to ensure that the applicable separation minimum will not be infringed. Specific local STCA procedures shall be detailed in MATS Part 2.[4]

The Isle of Man Airport MATS Part 2 procedures include the following guidance on the handling of STCA alerts:

> In the event of an STCA alert, ATCOs are to assess whether the alert is valid and if necessary initiate any appropriate action.
>
> Appropriate action may include:
>
> - Checking and verifying cleared levels and assigned headings;
> - Verifying pressure settings
> - Re-assigning headings/levels;
> - Avoiding action and essential traffic information.

[2] CAP 493 Section 1 Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.2
[3] CAP 493 Section 1 Chapter 5
[4] Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 2, produced by the ANSP in accordance with UK CAA CAP670 (applicable in the Isle of Man by virtue of Isle of Man CAA publication CP11)

In the event that a pilot reports a TCAS alert coincident with an STCA alert, then the TCAS alert takes priority and no instructions should be passed until such time as the pilot reports 'clear of conflict'.

Analysis

The traffic levels and complexity are considered to have been low and there were no evident distractions. The ATCO reported not being tired or fatigued but noted that it was their last shift of the cycle. The available surveillance equipment and radio communications were performing appropriately. The absence of PSR data is not considered to have contributed in any way to the Airprox event.

The ATCO commented that the destination on [the Cavalier]'s flight progress strip was annotated as 'ZZZZ' (used where an aerodrome does not have an ICAO location indicator), although they understood the destination to be a private landing site in Yorkshire. It has subsequently been confirmed that the destination was [redacted]. However, the ATCO did not obtain clarification from [the Cavalier pilot] as to their exact routeing intentions, which would have potentially given the ATCO more clarity as to the likelihood of the two aircraft conflicting.

The initial level restriction of [the Cavalier] not above altitude 2000ft was imposed by the ATCO as they were aware of the impending arrival of [the ATR72] and felt that there was a high probability of the two aircraft conflicting.

The ATCO removed [the Cavalier]'s level restriction because they felt that [the Cavalier pilot] would wish to climb higher for the oversea transit to give more time to react to an engine failure, should one occur, and would also assist with crossing levels with [the ATR72].

The ATCO had considered issuing a restriction on [the ATR72]'s descent, to ensure deconfliction from [the Cavalier], but elected not to do so. The ATCO explained that this was to expedite the level change, and also expected that an aircraft on a visual approach would normally fly a tighter circuit and therefore expected [the ATR72] to pass behind [the Cavalier].

The ATCO identified the developing conflict between the two aircraft and, in accordance with the airspace classification and the flight rules of each aircraft, provided initial timely and accurate Traffic Information to both pilots when they were 8NM apart. The ATCO also stated that the earlier comment made by [the ATR72 pilot] about being able to see the whole of the island indicated that the in-flight visibility was very good and took this to mean that the crew should be able to visually acquire the traffic with ease.

The ATCO appropriately updated the Traffic Information to [the ATR72 pilot] as the aircraft became more proximate at a range of 4NM. However, the ATCO did not provide any updated Traffic Information to [the Cavalier pilot] on the position of the ATR72. The provision of such updated Traffic Information would have been appropriate given the nature of the developing conflict and the ATC objective to maintain a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic.

At this stage, the ATCO believed that the pilots would soon sight each other. During the interview, the ATCO offered that [the ATR72 pilot] reporting having the traffic on their 'screen' (taken to mean TCAS) gave them a false sense of security that the pilot would be able to visually acquire [the Cavalier].

In the latter stages of the confliction the ATCO should have rotated the aircraft labels on the surveillance display to enhance their ability to discern the Mode S data and the relative aircraft positions. It is further suggested that the unit should review its SOP which result in the callsigns being displayed twice which adds clutter to the surveillance display.

According to the rights of way specified by the rules of the air, [the Cavalier pilot] should have given way to [the ATR72] as it had the ATR72 on its right; however, the RTF recording does not provide any indication as to whether or not [the Cavalier pilot] was visual with the ATR72.

The rules of the air do not relieve the pilot-in-command of an aircraft from the responsibility of taking such action as will best avert collision, regardless of who has the 'right of way'. Despite receiving timely, accurate Traffic Information (including an update as the situation progressed), and their report that they could see the other aircraft on their 'screen', The [ATR72 crew] continued on a converging trajectory until the TCAS RA was triggered at a range of 1.4NM.

Whilst the MATS Part 1 recognises that routeing instructions may be issued which will reduce or eliminate points of conflict with other flights, these are normally applied for phases of flight and areas closer to the final approach and immediate departure tracks and circuit areas. Therefore, the ATCO's actions in not initially deconflicting the aircraft are justified. However, gaining more clarity from [the Cavalier pilot] as to their level and routeing intentions, along with [the ATR72 pilot] positioning for the visual approach, would have assisted in assessing and potentially resolving the confliction. There was an opportunity to accomplish this in the period between provision of initial Traffic Information at a range of 8NM and the provision of updated Traffic Information to [the ATR72 pilot] at a range of 4NM.

Given the predicted proximity of the aircraft as depicted on the surveillance screen, it would not have been unreasonable for the ATCO to have instructed [the ATR72 pilot] to stop descent at a specified altitude to achieve vertical deconfliction from [the Cavalier]. This would have been further facilitated if the ATCO had earlier given [the Cavalier pilot] an explicit level or 'not above' to fly at.

The ATCO stated that they did not elect to provide any traffic avoidance advice as it was not requested by either pilot. It is not appropriate to be prescriptive about the provision of collision avoidance advice; ATCOs must use judgement and discretion according to the circumstances, whilst exercising caution as to the potential for overcontrolling.

Once [the ATR72 pilot] reported the TCAS RA, the ATCO correctly did not provide any contrary control instructions; however, the ATCO's provision of the QNH in response was unnecessary. The ATCO considered that they had erroneously recalled the phraseology used for an EGPWS warning. This had the potential to confuse and distract flight crew at a critical stage of flight. It is therefore important for the ATC response to be as promulgated: *"[callsign] roger"*.

Conclusions

(1) The conflict was resolved by [the ATR72 pilot] manoeuvring in response to a TCAS RA.
(2) At CPA, the two aircraft were separated by 1.4NM horizontally and 140ft vertically.
(3) The ATCO initially fulfilled their primary obligations in accordance with the airspace classification and flight rules of the aircraft in relation to the provision of initial Traffic Information to both aircraft.
(4) Updated Traffic Information should have been passed by the ATCO to the pilot of [the Cavalier] in order for the ATCO to meet their responsibilities to prevent collisions between known flights and to maintain a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic, as set out in the MATS Part 1.6.
(5) The extraneous phraseology in the ATCO's reaction to the TCAS RA had the potential to cause confusion in the flight deck.
(6) The ATC unit should review its SOPs which result in the aircraft callsigns being duplicated on surveillance displays.

UKAB Secretariat

The NATS radar replay was reviewed and both aircraft could be identified through Mode S data. Both aircraft could also be identified using ADS-B data sources. By allowing the radar to continue after the ATR72 pilot had climbed in response to the TCAS RA, CPA on the NATS radar replay differed to that of the IoM radar replay in that the CPA was measured at 600ft vertically and 0.7NM horizontally (Figure 4), this CPA was used in the diagram at the top of the report.




Figure 4 - CPA 1121:27

The Cavalier and ATR72 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[5]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Cavalier and an ATR72 flew into proximity 12NM southeast of Ronaldsway airport at 1121Z on Monday 8th June 2026. The Cavalier pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Ronaldsway, and the ATR72 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC also in receipt of a Radar Control Service from Ronaldsway.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the ATR72 pilot, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board noted that this Airprox had been controller reported and therefore first discussed the actions taken by the Ronaldsway controller. Members noted that the controller had not been overly busy when the Cavalier had departed. They had initially placed a level restriction of 2000ft on the Cavalier, against the inbound ATR72, and had also stopped the descent of the ATR72 at 3000ft. The Class D airspace that they had been operating within dictated that the VFR traffic, the Cavalier pilot, should give way to the IFR traffic, the ATR72, i.e. there had been no separation requirements for the controller to maintain. But whilst the controller had not been required to separate the two aircraft, they had been required to provide adequate Traffic Information to enable the VFR pilot to remain clear of the IFR traffic. Initially, the controller had given both pilots Traffic Information on the other aircraft, at a range of 8NM. Members noted that, once the ATR72 pilot had reported that they would conduct a visual approach, and had indicated that they had already been visual with the airfield, the controller had removed the level restrictions on the two aircraft. Members agreed that, whilst this action had technically not been incorrect, a more defensive controlling technique might have been to keep the height restrictions in

[5] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

place until the Cavalier pilot had reported visual with the ATR72 (**CF3**). As the situation unfolded, the Cavalier pilot did not at any stage inform the controller that they had been visual with the ATR72, and the controller had not been told what routeing the Cavalier pilot had intended to take. Indeed, after the initial Traffic Information, the Cavalier pilot had indicated that they had intended to turn right, but no such right turn had been visible on the radar and members thought that the controller could have questioned the Cavalier pilot at this point. The first stage STCA had alerted when the two aircraft had been 4.7NM apart (**CF5**) and the controller had then provided updated Traffic Information to the ATR72 pilot. However, they had not provided the reciprocal Traffic Information to the Cavalier pilot at the same time (**CF4**), indeed, the controller did not update the Traffic Information to the Cavalier pilot again, which members agreed had been a missed opportunity (**CF1**). The Board noted that the STCA had changed to a stage 2 alert and the ATR72 pilot reported the TCAS RA at a similar time, which members agreed had concerned the controller and had probably been the reason why the controller had reported the Airprox (**CF2**). Nevertheless, members further expressed the opinion that, whilst the controller had been controlling in accordance with the Class D regulations, they had not been busy, and the opportunity had been available to have provided both pilots with more information, and that this action may have prompted the Cavalier pilot to have changed heading which, in turn, may have prevented the TCAS RA.

The Board then discussed the actions of the ATR72 pilot, and noted that they had been flying under IFR but had elected to make a visual approach. They had been given clearance for a visual join by the ATCO and had been cleared to descend. The controller had then provided Traffic Information to the ATR72 pilot on the Cavalier at a range of 8NM and updated that Traffic Information when the aircraft were 4NM apart. At that point, the ATR72 pilot had reported that they had not been visual, but had had the aircraft on their 'screen', which members took to mean that they could see the Cavalier on their TCAS. Members discussed whether the ATR72 pilot should have taken action at that point. Pilot members familiar with commercial operations noted that TCAS procedures generally advise against responding to a TCAS TA while within controlled airspace, although they considered that this guidance may be less applicable when flying a visual approach. The ATR72 pilot reported that, at the point of the TA, they had become visual with the Cavalier and further reported that, whilst it had been closer than desirable, it had been assessed that it would pass behind their own aircraft (**CF8**). Shortly afterwards, the crew had received the TCAS RA (**CF7**), which they had responded to as per regulation.

Turning to the actions of the Cavalier pilot, the Board was disappointed that the pilot had not submitted a report because, without it, the Board was not able to determine whether the pilot had seen the ATR72 and considered the separation adequate, or whether they had not been visual with it at all. Nevertheless, members were able to comment on the responsibilities of the Cavalier pilot operating under VFR in Class D airspace. As they had been operating under VFR, it had been the Cavalier pilot's responsibility to remain clear of any IFR traffic within the Class D airspace and the controller had not been required to provide vectors to keep the aircraft separate, only to provide Traffic Information. When the Cavalier pilot had initially climbed out from Ronaldsway, they had been given a climb restriction by ATC which, members noted, they had initially climbed above, before being prompted by the controller to descend back below 2000ft, leading members to question the pilot's familiarity with operating within controlled airspace. This level restriction had later been removed, once the ATR72 pilot had decided to make a visual approach. The Cavalier pilot had been given Traffic Information on the ATR72 when it had been 8NM away, and the pilot had reported that they intended to '*turn right a little bit*'; it had not been clear on the radar whether that turn had occurred (**CF6**). Although there had not been any level or heading restrictions applicable to the Cavalier pilot, the responsibility to give way to the ATR72 had remained. Whilst the controller had not updated the Traffic Information, the Board felt that the Cavalier pilot should have been able to hear the controller calling their own aircraft to the ATR72 pilot on the frequency. Furthermore, if they had not been visual with the other aircraft, the pilot could have asked for updated information.

When determining the risk of the Airprox, the Board considered the reports from the ATR72 pilot and the Ronaldsway controller, together with radar screenshots from both the NATS radar replay and the Isle of Mann radar. Members noted that the ATR72 pilot had become visual with the Cavalier prior to the TCAS RA, had assessed that it would pass behind their aircraft and had also assessed the risk of

collision as 'low'. Members therefore unanimously agreed that, although safety had been degraded, there had not been a risk of collision; Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026106			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Human Factors	• ANS Traffic Information Provision	Provision of ANS traffic information	TI not provided, inaccurate, inadequate, or late
2	Human Factors	• Expectation/ Assumption	~~Events involving an individual or a crew/ team acting on the basis of expectation or assumptions of a situation that is different from the reality~~	Concerned by the proximity of the aircraft
3	Human Factors	• Inappropriate Clearance	An event involving the provision of an inappropriate clearance that led to an unsafe situation	
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
4	Human Factors	• ATM personnel operation/interpretation of equipment	An event involving the operation or interpretation of ATM equipment by ATM personnel	Controller did not adequately act on the EWS indications
5	Technical	• STCA Warning	An event involving the triggering of a Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) Warning	
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
6	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
7	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS RA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory warning triggered	
	• See and Avoid			
8	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[6]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because updated Traffic Information was not provided to the Cavalier pilot after the initial call at 8NM, and the controller had removed the level restrictions on both aircraft before confirmation that either pilot was visual with the other aircraft.

[6] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because when the STCA triggered, the controller only passed Traffic Information to the ATR72 pilot – updated Traffic Information was not provided to the Cavalier pilot at this point.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the Cavalier pilot did not give way to the ATR72, despite receiving Traffic Information.

