
AIRPROX REPORT No 2026103

Date: 27 May 2026 Time: 1409Z Position: 5119N 00052W Location: Blackbushe Airport

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C172	PA34
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Blackbushe ATZ	Blackbushe ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	IFR
Service	AFIS	AFIS
Provider	Blackbushe Info	Blackbushe Info
Altitude	700ft	700ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
ADS-B Out	Observed[1]	Not Observed
Reported		
Colours	White -blue detail	White - blue/red
Lighting	Strobes, nav, ldg, taxy	Strobes, ldg
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	200ft AGL	500ft
Altimeter	QFE	QNH
Heading	070°	070°
Speed	70kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	300ft V/50m H	0ft V/500m H
Recorded	0ft V/0.4NM H	



THE C172 PILOT reports that they were turning base to final for RW07(right-hand) at Blackbushe. They were then notified of IFR traffic on a 2NM final by the AFISO. There had been no prior notification by the AFISO of inbound IFR traffic and no prior radio calls on [the] Blackbushe frequency (122.305MHz) by the [pilot of the] IFR traffic. The traffic was visually identified as high to their left at less than 1NM. To move deadside would have necessitated climbing away in front of the converging, faster moving, aircraft and losing visual, due to the high wing of the C172. The IFR traffic subsequently went around. [The C172 pilot] had transponder code 7010 set, and working [electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment]. They did not recall [the EC] identifying the traffic, however, they were in a critical phase of flight with higher workload and focussing on lookout and maintaining speeds and flying the published circuit. The C172 pilot phoned Blackbushe Tower afterwards. They acknowledged the traffic was not notified on frequency prior, citing issues with their landline as well as workload. The pattern was very busy, and they were on frequency with Blackbushe from overhead Reading and were deconflicted with 2 departing aircraft within the ATZ, one outside, a survey helicopter over Hawley Lake and 2 in the circuit in addition to multiple ground movement requests. The IFR traffic was not heard to make any calls on frequency prior to *'2 mile final'*.

The C172 pilot reflected on the following,

1. This was a stressful occurrence during a critical high workload phase of flight.
2. Converging traffic on landing created a MAC risk. IFR traffic flew a long final vs circuit traffic established in and conforming to the circuit pattern. Usually this is notified and the circuit is cleared.
3. They were below and ahead of IFR traffic and turning final in an established circuit when the [pilot of the] IFR traffic first notified and was visually identified.

[1] The ADS-B Out signal was intermittent and displaying an incorrect aircraft registration.

4. They did not judge it safe to climb in front of the faster converging traffic to move deadside at that point. Airspace limitations at Blackbushe preclude departing the ATZ in other directions.
5. They determined the safest course of action was to continue the descent and land.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE PA34 PILOT reports that they were on [a standard IFR arrival route for Farnborough] when [the London controller] released them to Farnborough Radar at 4000ft near [waypoint]. Farnborough instructed [the pilot of the PA34] to expect RW07 at Blackbushe and radar vectors to a 3NM final for RW07. Subsequently, they were re-cleared 3000/2000/1500ft in a further descent. Radar vectors from Farnborough guided them in a turn to the 3NM final point. At this point, Farnborough advised them to switch to Blackbushe 'Tower'. After immediate contact, [the Blackbushe AFISO] advised them about traffic in the pattern and to call 2NM final. At the same time [the Blackbushe AFISO] informed the traffic about the *"IFR twin engine inbound on final".* At this time, they observed one aircraft opposite, to the right, extending the downwind leg behind [the PA34] and at 2NM another high wing aircraft turning behind [the PA34]. [The pilot of the PA34] reported at two miles. Their approach speed was 90kt (= blue line speed).

At about 1NM to the RW07 an aircraft was observed, which cut in from the right into the flightpath of [the PA34] (at the same altitude of approximately 500ft) at a distance of approximately 500 yards. This high wing aircraft was in a permanent curve from downwind to base to final. As it appeared much slower [the pilot of the PA34] decided to go-around. They switched back to Farnborough and got vectored around again for a successful landing.

THE BLACKBUSHE AFISO reports that the circuit was very busy with traffic; they had a rotary aircraft operating in the southeastern corner of the ATZ over Hawley Lake filming for TV news at short notice. [The PA34] joined from an IFR flight plan onto a long final. They did not get passed the 10-mile call from Farnborough until the aircraft was approximately 4NM out. As soon as they learnt of the IFR PA34, they gave Traffic Information on the departing C152 traffic, which was departing the downwind leg to the west, and they gave the [pilot of the] C152 reciprocal Traffic Information. There was C172 traffic late downwind turning base. They gave Traffic Information on both the PA34 and the C172. They asked the [pilot of the] C172 if they were able to reposition to the deadside, which they said they were unable. [The AFISO] advised the [pilot of the] PA34 of this, and [the pilot] said they might go around. They then asked [the pilot of the PA34] to confirm if they were going around to which they confirmed *"yes".* They then asked [the PA34 pilot] if they were IFR or VFR, to which they responded IFR. [The pilot of the PA34] suddenly turned right towards the Farnborough CTR where there was DA40 traffic late downwind turning base. [The AFISO's first instinct was to give reciprocal Traffic Information. Then they asked if [the pilot] could climb straight ahead over the runway and then told [the PA34 pilot] to contact Farnborough Radar on 134.355MHz (in accordance with the standard missed approach profile). They witnessed the aircraft turning right and heading south - they immediately told them to turn left immediately with the aim of following the standard go around profile – they were off frequency at this time. The [pilot of the] DA40 was visual with [the PA34] and moved to the deadside to give way. [The pilot of the PA34] was vectored back round to final approach by [the Farnborough Radar controller] and landed safely. An MOR has subsequently been submitted after Blackbushe was notified of the Airprox.

THE BLACKBUSHE AFISO ASSISTANT reports that the [PA34 pilot] had joined IFR on final. They had received a late 10-mile call from [the Farnborough controller] but phones and internet were down due to an issue at the local telephone exchange. The call was received on the priority tied line. The circuit was extremely busy, so the 10-mile call was not passed to the AFISO straight away due to workload –they were not able to 'cut in' as the AFISO was talking on the radio. [The pilot of the PA34] joined straight in. Another aircraft turned base and was committed to landing ahead of the PA34. Subsequent calls post event with the pilot [of the C172] highlighted that they had not heard an IFR traffic imminent call made by the AFISO and the first they had heard of the traffic was when the [pilot of the] PA34 called 3 mile final while their aircraft, [the C172], was mid base leg. [The pilot of the PA34] went around and made a right-hand turn (following a non-standard go-around profile). The AFISO asked them to climb straight ahead before changing to Farnborough. [The PA34] made a right turn heading south towards the Farnborough zone.

Factual Background

The weather at Farnborough Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGLF 271420Z AUTO 06010KT 020V090 9999 NCD 29/15 Q1023
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Blackbushe General Procedures UK AIP (IFR traffic):

EGLK AD 2.22 FLIGHT PROCEDURES

1 GENERAL

(p). IFR jet & turbo-prop traffic will operate straight-in "long final" approaches to Blackbushe. This is to facilitate the integration with Farnborough airspace, and to avoid faster types using the visual circuit with much slower aircraft.

i. When an IFR fast aircraft is expected, Blackbushe ATSU may inform VFR aircraft that "jet / turbo-prop aircraft expected imminently". When this information is provided, VFR pilots are expected to either vacate the ATZ to the northwest, or land on their next approach.

ii. Aircraft waiting to join or re-join the visual circuit may only do so once the fast IFR aircraft is established on final and must ensure they fly their circuit to remain behind the jet or turboprop, taking into consideration wake turbulence.

iii. Jet & turbo-prop traffic must not attempt to enter the ATZ VFR without first establishing that the visual circuit is empty.

2 JOINING [--] PROCEDURES

a. There are two standard VFR / SVFR joins:

i. From outside CAS (north and west). Joins from the north and west shall descend to circuit height on the "deadside" (to the north of the Aerodrome). Care must be taken not to overfly Yateley or Eversley to the north, and aircraft arriving from the north east should ensure they are positioned sufficiently west to avoid them.

ii. From within CAS (south and east). Aircraft coming from within the Farnborough CTR shall join overhead at 1,600 FT AAL to ensure they are within the LFA. They shall descend on the deadside and integrate with the visual circuit. Care should be exercised not to overfly the noise abatement area of Yateley except in an emergency.

iii. See diagrams on aerodrome website: www.blackbushe.com/vfr.

b. Downwind, base leg, and long final joins may be possible depending on circuit traffic, but pilots are advised to plan for a standard join to avoid circuit conflicts if the circuit is busy.

Analysis and Investigation

Blackbushe Airport

On 27th May 2026 at 1409 UTC, Blackbushe ATSU was notified of an [Airprox between a] visiting [PA34 and a C172]. The [pilot of the PA34] had intended to join from an IFR flight onto long final for RW07 and subsequently an Airprox was reported by [the pilot of the C172] operating in the circuit at the time of join.

Blackbushe ATSU has conducted a unit investigation, including reviewing recordings of the Blackbushe frequency 122.305MHz at the time. [The pilot of the PA34] (joining onto final IFR) is a regular visitor and [the pilot of the C172] (operating in the circuit) [regularly operates from] Blackbushe.

The review of the occurrence report included reports from the AFISO, the AFISO's assistant, and the redacted report from the pilot of the C172.

Timeline,

1403:34 C172 – *'*[C/S] *is overhead Wellington Park, I've just flown under a low wing, Is that coming to join the circuit, I am a high wing and can't see them anymore'.*

1403:43 AFISO – *'*[C172 C/S] *I don't appear to have anyone else on frequency inbound from the northwest or Wellington Park at the moment'.*

1403:51 C172 – *'Roger* [C/S]*'.*

[1403:55 – 1404:34 Other departing traffic and circuit calls.]

1404:37 AFISO – *'*[C172 C/S] *Blackbushe'*.

1404:39 C172 – '[C/S]'.

1404:41 AFISO – *'*[C172 C/S] *that traffic you mentioned, did you actually see it or was it on your screen?'.*

1404:54 C172 – '*I saw the traffic visual and kept separation,* [C/S]'.

1404:58 AFISO – *'I don't appear to have a low wing on frequency at the moment'.*

1405:01 C172 – *'Roger, entering the ATZ from the northwest,* [C/S]'.

1405:04 AFISO – *'*[C172 C/S] *Squawk 7010 and report downwind, traffic is a DA40 late downwind turning base, PA28 base leg, I've got an outbound PA28 routeing northwest via the overhead and a C152 on the climb-out to depart local.'.*

1405:10 C172 - '[C/S] *visual one on the climb-out 7010, wilco'.*

[1405:15 – 1406:59 Multiple circuit calls and Traffic Information passed to each aircraft. Two incidences of 'multiple stations at once' at 1506:56 and 1506:59.]

1407:06 PA34 – *'Blackbushe good afternoon* [C/S] *for RW07 and we are 4NM out for direct'.*

1407:16 – 1407:23 The AFISO acknowledged the pilot of an unrelated aircraft, changing to enroute frequency.

1407:45 PA34 – '[C/S] *affirm roger, in sight, we will proceed.'.*

1407:49 AFISO - '[unrelated C152 C/S] *I have inbound IFR PA34 traffic I believe setting up for a final approach from the west are you visual with that one?'.*

1407:55 AFISO - '[PA34 C/S] *report your position. Are you visual with outbound C152 traffic?'.*

1408:00 PA34 – '[C/S] *we are 3NM south of RW07 and traffic in sight, just passing ahead'.*

1408:06 AFISO - '[PA34 C/S] *roger, thanks'.*

1408:08 AFISO - '[unrelated C152 C/S] *that PA34 traffic reported visual with yourself, reported 3NM final RW07'*.

1408:13 unrelated C152 - '[C/S] v*isual with it and I'll be changing to Farnborough 125.250'.*

1408:18 AFISO - '[C172 C/S] *Blackbushe'.*

1408:20 C172 - '[C/S]*'.*

1408:21 AFISO - '[C172 C/S] - *I have IFR PA34 traffic probably on your left-hand side now to land, are you happy to reposition to the deadside for spacing?'.*

1408:29 C172 - '[C/S] *I'll have to cross the final path I'm just turning final now'.*

1408:35 AFISO - '[C172 C/S] *are you visual with the PA34 on your left-hand side?'.*

1408:38 C172 - *'Err, yes* [C/S]*'.*

1408:41 AFISO - '[C172 C/S] *roger, break break* [PA34 C/S] *are you visual with C172 straight ahead?'.*

1408:50 PA34 – '[inaudible] - *we need to go around'.*

1408:52 AFISO – '[PA34 C/S] *are you going around?*'.

1408:54 PA34 – *'Yes* [C/S] *is going around we are going around to the right'.*

1408:59 AFISO - '[PA34 C/S] *roger I have DA40 traffic is late downwind now are you IFR or VFR?'.*

1409:04 PA34 – *'We are IFR sir, we are going around now'.*

1409:12 AFISO - '[PA34 C/S] *can you climb ahead straight ahead until 1500ft QNH, are you visual with the DA40?'.*

1409:17 PA34 – *'Negative'.*

1409:19 AFISO – '[unrelated DA40 C/S] *there is PA34 traffic doing a right hand orbit on final are you visual with that one?'.*

1409:24 unrelated DA40 – '[C/S] *affirm we will go deadside now, one ahead in sight late downwind'.*

1409:26 AFISO – '[unrelated DA40 C/S] *roger'.*

1409:30 C172 - '[C/S] *late final RW07'* (2 stations at once).

1409:32 AFISO – '*Station calling for join standby'.*

1409:33 C172 - '[C/S] *late final RW07'.*

1409:36 AFISO - '[C172 C/S] *instant wind 070/5 land at your discretion'.*

[1409:44 onwards, the AFISO requested that the pilot of the PA34 contact Farnborough and turns left. The pilot of the PA34 had already changed frequency to Farnborough and was redirected by the Farnborough controller on to the final approach to RW07 to land at Blackbushe.]

Review of Procedures, Legislation, Regulation and Guidance.

[The UK AIP General procedures were referred to with regards to their relevance to the Airprox].

Aerodrome Rules and Procedures,

As referenced above all the procedures are also referenced in the airport rules and procedures document listed on the website.

Annex 1 – RULES OF THE AIR, Section 3, Chapter 2

SERA.3201 General

Nothing in this regulation shall relieve the pilot in-command of an aircraft from the responsibility of taking such action, including collision avoidance manoeuvres based on resolution advisories provided by ACAS equipment, as well best avert collision.

SERA.3225 Operation on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome.

An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall:

(a) observe other aerodrome traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision;

(b) conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation;

Review of immediate corrective action

In the moment, the FISO ensured all aircraft had reciprocal information, at which point pilots are required to see and avoid. On reviewing the recordings, we can see it was a period of high workload, and the FISO did everything within their privileges to deliver appropriate information to aircraft, to encourage the pilot of [the C172] to position to the deadside (which they did not do), and to encourage the pilot of [the PA34] to either switch to VFR and integrate into the visual circuit, or follow the published IFR go-around procedure, [the latter of which referred to after the Airprox event].

Root cause analysis

Whilst investigations by the Airprox Board will consider any causal factors relating to pilot action and the operation of aircraft, this unit investigation is focussed on any causal factors within the control of Blackbushe ATSU.

Blackbushe ATSU received a late call from Farnborough referencing the distance to run for the IFR inbound aircraft, which acts as a prompt to issue an IFR traffic imminent call to established circuit traffic. The Blackbushe ATSU conversations with Farnborough controllers are usually recorded but, due to internet technical issues, the priority tied line was in use which did not have a recording facility, so they were unable to verify how ‘late’ this call was. This information was not instantly passed to the FISO by the assistant due to FISO workload. Ordinarily, the FISO would answer the phone to Farnborough themselves. However, due to workload, the assistant had stepped in to take the call. As a result in the delay of this information, subsequently an IFR traffic imminent call was not broadcast. This did not allow time for the circuit traffic to reposition or land as required as per usual procedures and likely was a contributing factor in [the pilot of the C172] not making the early decision to reposition to the deadside in line with airport procedures. A contributory root cause that is within the scope of Blackbushe ATSU is therefore the provision of timely information to the FISO by the assistant.

Root cause (new procedures)

Whilst it is [usual] for the FISO to answer the tied line to Farnborough, it is not uncommon during higher workload periods for the assistant to do so. This occurrence has highlighted the importance of timely information. Accordingly, a non-verbal means of notification will be explored, likely using a coloured flight progress strip which can be placed in front of the duty FISO and assimilated into their information without interrupting their speech on the radio. Blackbushe Airport will undertake to provide a copy of this Airprox to FISOs and Air Ground Operators to increase awareness of potential Airprox risks in joining from the south and inside the Blackbushe ATZ. The Blackbushe Safety Action Group (Sept/Dec 2026) provides an opportunity to disseminate safety information to resident flying schools and operators. An ATSU notice has been published to FISO staff to ensure that when the 10NM (IFR/Jet traffic imminent) call is received that it is passed to the FISO without delay as it is critical safety information.

Conclusion

Blackbushe Airport Flying Procedures,

On reviewing the flying procedures, the Blackbushe Aerodrome published procedures should have worked as intended but were not followed. [The pilot of the C172] could have positioned deadside, though it is recognised the late information meant the pilot felt they had insufficient time to reposition to accommodate the arriving IFR traffic.

Blackbushe ANSP Procedures

The IFR traffic imminent call was not issued as promptly as it should have been to established circuit traffic. The ATSU is considering non-verbal means of communicating this call between FISO and assistant. Workload was high due to traffic volume, and the distraction of a news helicopter operating within the ATZ. Internet technical issues were another contributing factor in the procedures not working as intended.

NATS Farnborough

Summary

Safety Investigations was notified by the UK Airprox Board that an Airprox had been reported between [a PA34] and [a C172] during the visual approach to Blackbushe with neither pilot on frequency with Farnborough Radar at the time of the event.

Description

A Piper PA34 operating IFR was inbound to Blackbushe from the south via EVATA. At 1400:11 (all times UTC) the pilot of [the PA34] reported onto the Farnborough Radar frequency in the descent to 4000ft to be level by EVATA. The Approach controller (LF-APP) instructed the pilot to expect vectors for a visual approach to RW07 at Blackbushe and issued QNH 1034hPa. The LF-APP subsequently issued the pilot of [the PA34] with several heading instructions and stepped descent to 2000ft to position the aircraft on a northerly track within CTA-2.

At 1406:12 the LF-APP instructed the pilot of [the PA34] *"Blackbushe in your right two o'clock range of five miles, report visual"*, the pilot replied, *"visual with Blackbushe"*. The LF-APP responded *"roger, circuit is very busy, keep a good lookout as you approach. Cleared visual approach runway zero seven at Blackbushe".*

The pilot of [the PA34] asked the LF-APP if they should change frequency at 1406:29, the LF-APP replied *"affirm, before you go, there is traffic in your right two o'clock range of err four miles. Currently err just downwind for their runway zero seven at one thousand feet"*, the pilot replied, "[C/S]". This aircraft was identified on NODE radar as [an uninvolved aircraft] on Blackbushe circuit Mode-A 7010.

The LF-APP instructed the pilot of [the PA34] at 1406:48 *"Farnborough radar service will terminate as you route north of the M-Three. Remain north of the M-Three at all times, contact Blackbushe now, one two two decimal three zero five"*, the pilot replied, *"one two two three zero five wilco bye".* At this point a controller handover of the Farnborough Approach Radar function took place.

The Closest Point of Approach between [the PA34] and [the C172] (Mode-A 7010 operating within the circuit at Blackbushe) occurred at 1409:15 and was measured on the Multi-Track radar as 0.3NM and 0ft (Figure 1).




Figure – 1

The CPA occurred whilst both aircraft were within the Blackbushe ATZ. Neither pilot reported the proximity as an Airprox on the frequency to Farnborough at the time of the event.

Investigation

Information available to the investigation included:

- CA4114 from the Farnborough Approach Radar controller
- NATS4118 Initial Watch Management Investigation Report
- UKAB Airprox redacted report from the pilot of [the PA34]

The runway in use at Farnborough was RW06 and RW07 was in use at Blackbushe. The Farnborough Approach function was being operated by the LF-APP and was separated from the Farnborough LARS West and Zone functions, which were being operated in a band-boxed configuration by another controller.

Safety Investigations was notified by the UK Airprox Board (UKAB) on 11th June that the pilot of [the C172] had submitted an Airprox report in relation to the event.

Farnborough MATS Part 2 APR 3.5.1 Blackbushe stated,

> '*Farnborough Radar shall vector traffic for a visual approach to Blackbushe, leaving controlled airspace at a suitable time, with an appropriate UK FIS being provided until transfer of frequency to Blackbushe Information.'*

After the pilot of [the PA34] had reported visual with Blackbushe, the LF-APP cautioned the pilot at 1406:12 that the Blackbushe *"circuit is very busy, keep a good lookout as you approach".*

The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) reported that the Airprox occurred at 1409 while [the PA34] was on final approach to Blackbushe RW07. By this time, the pilot of [the PA34] was no longer in contact with Farnborough Radar, having previously had their Radar Control Service terminated and been transferred to the Blackbushe Tower frequency at 1406:48.

[The Farnborough investigation then refers to events after the Airprox citing the PA34 pilot's redacted Airprox report, stating that] no Airprox report was available to Safety Investigators from the pilot of the [PA34].

Conclusions

Causal factors

The UK Airprox Board notified NATS Safety Investigations that the pilot of [the C172] had submitted an Airprox report regarding a confliction with [the PA34] whilst both aircraft were operating inside the Blackbushe ATZ with neither pilot receiving a service from Farnborough Radar.

After the reported Airprox occurred, Farnborough Radar was notified by Blackbushe Tower that [the PA34] was going around.

CAA ATSI

The pilot of the C172 had called for rejoin from the north at 1400:05 and was advised by the Blackbushe AFISO that RW07 was in use with a right-hand circuit. They were requested to next report entering the ATZ.

At 1403:24 the Farnborough controller rang Blackbushe to pass a *"10NM check"* on the inbound PA34 (Figure 2).




Figure 2 – 1403:24

At that time the Blackbushe AFISO had a helicopter operating to the east-southeast of the airfield in close proximity to the circuit which was occupied by a PA28 and a DA40.

At **1406:16** the Farnborough controller pointed out the position of Blackbushe to the PA34 pilot who reported visual. The Farnborough controller then advised the pilot that the circuit there was very busy and to keep a good lookout before clearing them for the visual approach at Blackbushe at **1406:24** (Figure 3).




Figure 3 – 1406:24

At **1406:33** the Farnborough controller passed specific Traffic Information to the PA34 pilot on traffic downwind (a departing C152) at Blackbushe which was acknowledged by the pilot (Figure 4).




Figure 4 – 1406:33

The Farnborough controller then instructed the PA34 pilot to contact Blackbushe which the pilot acknowledged at 1406:54 (Figure 5).




Figure 5- 1406:54

At **1407:06** the [pilot of the] PA34 made their initial call to the Blackbushe AFISO*: "Blackbushe good afternoon* [C/S] *for runway 07 and we are 4 miles out for direct".* The AFISO did not immediately answer that call and instead dealt with another aircraft leaving the frequency (Figure 6).




Figure 6 – 1407:06

The AFISO then returned to the PA34 pilot at 1407:25, advising them that it was RW07 with a right-hand circuit and *"C152 base leg and C172 downwind - the one on base is departing local area and DA40 traffic just turning crosswind"* (Figure 7).




Figure 7 – 1407:25

The PA34 pilot replied: *"affirm, roger, in sight we will proceed".*

The AFISO then passed Traffic Information to the [pilot of the] C152 leaving to the west: *"I have inbound IFR PA34 traffic I believe setting up for a final approach from the west are you visual with that one?"*

Before the C152 pilot replied the AFISO requested the PA34 pilot's position and asked if they were visual with the C152. The PA34 pilot advised that they were 3NM south and were visual with the traffic *"just passing ahead".* The C152 pilot then confirmed that they were visual with the PA34 (Figure 8).




Figure 8 1407:55

At **1408:21** the AFISO asked the C172 pilot: *"I have IFR PA34 traffic probably on your left-hand side now to land, are you happy to reposition to the deadside for spacing?"* The C172 pilot replied: *"I'll have to cross the final path I'm just turning final now".* The AFISO continued: "*are*

you visual with the PA34 on your left-hand side" which the pilot confirmed they were (Figures 9 and 10).




Figure 9 – 1408:21




Figure 10 – 1408:25

The AFISO then asked the PA34 pilot at **1408:41**: *"are you visual with the C172 straight ahead".* The PA34 pilot's answer was not discernible, but they were heard to state *"we need to go around"* (Figure 11).




Figure 11 - 1408:41

Both the PA34 and the C172 continued down final approach with CPA occurring at **1409:15** and with the PA34 then seen to break off the approach at **1409:24** (Figures 12-15).




Figure 12 – 1408:58




Figure 13 – 1409:03




Figure 14 – 1409:15




Figure 15 – 1409:24

A Letter of Agreement (LoA) exists between Blackbushe and Farnborough ATSUs. With respect to IFR arrivals, the following has been agreed:

> Arriving flights are required, by means of the Blackbushe UK AIP flight procedures section, to expect to arrive on a suitable Farnborough STAR, and will be positioned either within or outside controlled airspace to obtain visual reference to the ground to complete a visual approach into Blackbushe.
>
> For all IFR flights leaving the ATS Route Structure, and IFR high-performance aircraft (i.e. BE20, C550 etc.) routeing outside controlled airspace, Farnborough ATC will endeavour to provide Blackbushe with a 10NM check (see Note). This check will include the position of the traffic relative to Blackbushe and whether it is expected the aircraft will make an approach from immediately downwind within the ATZ or be positioned further out on final approach by Farnborough. Other than for ATS route arrivals, this 10NM check may not always be possible due to workload on Farnborough LARS West/Approach Radar/Zone.
>
> Note: Whilst referred to as a '10NM check' this should ideally be completed no sooner than 15 track miles and no less than 5 track miles from Blackbushe.
>
> Any information on circuit activity advised to Farnborough by Blackbushe as a result of the 10NM call above shall be advised to the inbound traffic prior to frequency transfer to Blackbushe.
>
> Where possible, Farnborough ATC should transfer aircraft to Blackbushe in sufficient time for the Blackbushe FISO to pass further traffic information to the pilot. Where this is not possible the Farnborough controller shall reach an accord with Blackbushe to allow entry to the Blackbushe ATZ if it is believed the traffic will enter the Blackbushe ATZ prior to transfer of communication.

The "10NM check" for the PA34 passed by the Farnborough controller to Blackbushe met the terms of the LoA with the PA34 10.8NM south of the airfield, and with more than 12 track miles remaining. It could not be considered to be *"late"* as suggested in the Blackbushe investigation report.

According to the Blackbushe investigation report, the call from Farnborough was taken by the Blackbushe assistant, not the AFISO. It is not clear from the Blackbushe investigation report

when or if that information was ever passed to the AFISO, but no Traffic Information was passed by the AFISO to aircraft on their frequency until after the [pilot of the] PA34 had called them.

[The Blackbushe investigation report included an extract from the Blackbushe Aerodrome Manual with regards to procedures for IFR arrivals see 'Factual Information' above].

Whilst the PA34 may have been a turbo-charged aircraft, it is not a turbo prop (nor jet) and does not meet the criteria [referred to in the IFR arrival procedures].

Once the AFISO was aware of the presence of the PA34 they worked hard to pass reciprocal Traffic Information to and obtain visual calls on the PA34 from the C152 and the C172 pilots.

When the AFISO requested an updated position report from the PA34 pilot, the pilot gave an inaccurate position of 3NM south, whereas they were turning onto final approach.

CAP797 Flight Information Service Officer Manual details the responsibilities and restrictions applicable to the role, specifically:

> *FISOs shall issue information to aircraft in their area of responsibility useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. They are not permitted to issue instructions, except for those circumstances in paragraph 1.2, or when relaying a clearance from an air traffic control unit. Pilots therefore are wholly responsible for collision avoidance in conformity with the Rules of the Air.*

(Note: Paragraph 1.2 does not apply in these circumstances).

Had the AFISO been aware of the presence of the PA34 earlier, then Traffic Information could have been passed in sufficient time for the other pilots to position themselves more appropriately in relation to the inbound PA34.

It has been noted that Blackbushe [ATSU] has issued a notice to all staff to remind them that when a 10NM call is received it should be passed to the AFISO without delay.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken, and both aircraft were detected and identified using Mode S data sources. Further analysis of aircraft tracking software was undertaken and the C172 was detected using ADS-B data sources but transmitting an incorrect aircraft registration, and the PA34 was not detected. The GPS navigation data for the C172 was provided and was coincident with the radar track.




Figure 16 CPA 1409:15

The results provided from the NATS Multi-Node radar by the Farnborough investigation could not be reproduced. CPA was assessed by the UKAB Secretariat to have occurred at 1409:14 with 0.4NM lateral and 0ft vertical separation.

The C172 and PA34 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2] An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.[3]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C172 and a PA34 flew into proximity at Blackbushe Airfield at 1409Z on Wednesday 27th May 2026. The C172 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, and the PA34 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC. Both pilots were in receipt of an AFIS from Blackbushe Information.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data for the flight of the C172, a report from the Blackbushe AFISO and Farnborough air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the C172, noting that they had been established in the circuit for RW07 when the PA34 had been positioning for an approach to RW07. The Board noted that the C172 pilot had reflected on several items after the flight and had stated they '*were below and ahead of IFR traffic and turning final in an established circuit when the [pilot of the] IFR traffic first notified and was visually identified.'* Members referred to the recorded RT and agreed that the pilot of the PA34 had called Blackbushe at 1407:06 at a range of 4NM, which had coincided with the C172 pilot joining the circuit via the overhead (Figure 6). The Board noted, from the Blackbushe investigation report, that the pilot of the C172 had thought that the PA34 pilot's first call had been at 1408:00 when the C172 pilot appeared to have been initiating the base leg turn (see Figures 8 and 9 for relative positions). The Board also noted that the pilot of the C172 had been on base leg when asked if they were *'happy to reposition to the deadside for spacing?'* to which the pilot had replied, '*I'll have to cross the final path I'm just turning final now'.* Some members felt that the C172 pilot may have taken advantage of their perceived lower position at that time, and used a converging heading from base to final to achieve a position ahead of the PA34 on the final approach. The Board noted that SERA.3210 Right of Way states:

> (4) Landing. An aircraft in flight, or operating on the ground or water, shall give way to aircraft landing or in the final stages of an approach to land.
>
> (i) When two or more heavier-than-air aircraft are approaching an aerodrome or an operating site for the purpose of landing, aircraft at the higher level shall give way to aircraft at the lower level, but the latter shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is in the final stages of an approach to land, or to overtake that aircraft. Nevertheless, power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft shall give way to sailplanes.

Some members felt that the pilot of the C172 could have, potentially, positioned themselves behind the PA34, while other members felt that the C172 pilot, established in the circuit, had right of way and that it had been for the pilot of the PA34 to have integrated with them. The Board agreed that a more defensive approach to circuit positioning by the C172 pilot may have provided greater opportunity to maintain appropriate separation and sequencing with the IFR traffic on final (**CF6**). The Board noted that the C172 pilot had been aware of the position of the PA34 from the RT calls, but that their onboard electronic conspicuity device had not been able to detect it (**CF8**). Members agreed that the pilot of the

[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[3] (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

C172 had been concerned by the proximity of the PA34 (**CF9**) and had rationalised their actions, for which members also acknowledged the C172 pilot's constructive reflections following the event.

The Board then considered the actions of the PA34 pilot, and noted that the pilot had been handed over to Blackbushe when the Farnborough controller stated '*circuit is very busy, keep a good lookout as you approach. Cleared visual approach runway zero seven at Blackbushe".* The Board noted that the clearance issued by Farnborough, together with the established Blackbushe procedure for handling IFR traffic, may reasonably have led the pilot to anticipate priority in the circuit. As a regular visitor to the aerodrome, the pilot may also have become accustomed to this operating environment and the associated traffic sequencing. The Board noted, however, that as the pattern of traffic had not been cleared, the PA34 pilot may have been encountering a scenario that had been unfamiliar to them and members agreed that the pilot's mental model had been such that that pilot of the PA34 had neither integrated with nor avoided the pattern of traffic already established in the circuit (**CF5**, **CF7**). Members further agreed that the pilot of the PA34 could have flown their approach with greater preparedness to have reverted to VFR and joined the visual circuit as encouraged by the Blackbushe AFISO (**CF6**).

Turning their attention to the actions of the Blackbushe AFISO, the Board noted that they had been unable to respond to a telephone call from the Farnborough controller, who had transferred the PA34 to the Blackbushe frequency, and that the call had been taken by the assistant. Members agreed that the assistant had been unable to alert the AFISO to the call in a timely manner (**CF1**) and that there had been inadequate coordination between the assistant and AFISO as to how this could have been achieved (**CF2**). The Board considered that these difficulties had stemmed from the AFISO's workload while they had been managing a congested frequency (**CF3**) and members agreed that the Blackbushe AFISO had had late situational awareness of the PA34 on a final approach to RW07 (**CF4**). The Board noted that the Blackbushe procedures for IFR traffic, as published in the UK AIP (see Factual Background p3), concentrated specifically on jet and turboprop traffic, with very little reference to how other IFR traffic should integrate, and members felt that it was unclear whether other IFR traffic was expected to revert to VFR procedures. Members acknowledged that the Blackbushe dedicated IFR Procedures website page also referred to jets and turboprop traffic, however, at the time of the Board discussion, the following information appeared at the beginning of the Blackbushe IFR Flying Procedures webpage[4] (date unknown).

> This page contains practical information for pilots of IFR jets or turboprops. Operators of Single or Twin-Engine Piston aircraft are requested to switch from IFR to VFR prior to arrival and join the visual circuit in the normal way. Do not expect to join on a long final and for established circuit traffic to give way.

Members felt that this had been less obvious in the Blackbushe procedures V8b 2024.11.06, also published on the Blackbushe website which states,

> 10.8 IFR ATS Route Structure Arrivals
>
> 10.8.1. IFR ATS Route Structure aircraft will typically arrive on a suitable Farnborough STAR and will be positioned either within or outside controlled airspace to obtain visual reference to the ground to complete a visual approach into Blackbushe.
>
> 10.8.2. Farnborough ATC will endeavour to notify Blackbushe of the inbound estimate for all IFR arriving flights filed within the National Airspace System (NAS). Typically, this will be at 10NM but may be earlier or later as workload permits.
>
> 10.8.3. Any aircraft operating SVFR in the LFA will be required to comply with Rule 12.2 in this document to facilitate IFR traffic.

Where Rule 12.2 would have all local traffic vacating the area for the IFR traffic under SVFR conditions, should it apply, which it had not at the time of the Airprox. Similarly, the Blackbushe website 'practical information for pilots of IFR jets or turboprops' stated that,

[4] Blackbushe IFR Flying Procedures

VFR aircraft operating in the circuit will be warned of the *"imminent"* arrival and should vacate the ATZ or give way to IFR traffic.

The implication is that, under different circumstances, IFR traffic has 'right of way', which opposes the statement preceding the IFR procedures on Blackbushe's dedicated webpage. The Board wondered, therefore, whether the AFISO had been following procedures that applied to all IFR traffic or whether the procedures had usually been reserved for the jets and turboprops or SVFR. Members agreed that the procedures published at the time of the event lacked clarity and that refinement of the wording could reduce the potential for differing interpretations. Nonetheless, the Board was heartened to see that a clarifying statement was published at the beginning of the Blackbushe IFR Flying Procedures webpage, but encouraged the aerodrome operator to ensure that this was clearly articulated in the published arrival procedures (website and UK AIP).

In concluding their discussion, the Board agreed that the AFISO gained situational awareness of the PA34 at a late stage and had made reasonable efforts to provide Traffic Information to aircraft in the vicinity and manage the developing situation accordingly. However, the AFISO had been unable to resolve the emerging conflict because the C172 pilot had reported as unable to manoeuvre to the deadside and the PA34 pilot had declined to revert to VFR flight and integrate with the visual circuit. Members considered that both the C172 and PA34 pilots could have adopted a more defensive approach within the Blackbushe circuit area, and to have both been prepared to have given way to the other aircraft if necessary. In the event, members agreed that both pilots had been aware of the other aircraft and that the pilot of the PA34 had taken timely and effective avoiding action to prevent the aircraft from coming into close proximity. Accordingly, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event – no risk of collision but safety degraded.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026103			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
2	Human Factors	• ATM Coordination	Coordination related issues (external as well as internal)	
3	Contextual	• Frequency Congestion	An event involving frequency congestion that reduces the effectiveness of communications	
4	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
5	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
6	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
8	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			

9	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[5]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Blackbushe AFISO had not received timely information on an IFR inbound.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the Blackbushe AFISO had late situational awareness of the PA34's position during a period of high workload.


Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the PA34 did not integrate with or avoid the pattern of traffic already formed in the Blackbushe circuit.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because neither the pilot of the PA34 nor the pilot of the C172 adapted their plans to accommodate the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the electronic conspicuity equipment in the C172 could not detect the PA34.

[5] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026103
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness