
# AIRPROX REPORT No 2026082

Date: 22 May 2026 Time: 1411Z Position: 5209N 00019E Location: Six Mile Bottom

## PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

| Recorded | Aircraft 1 | Aircraft 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Aircraft | PA28(A) | PA28(B) |
| Operator | Civ FW | Civ FW |
| Airspace | London FIR | London FIR |
| Class | G | G |
| Rules | VFR | VFR |
| Service | AFIS | AFIS |
| Provider | Duxford | Duxford |
| Altitude/FL | 2105ft | 2250ft |
| Transponder | A, C, S | A, C, S |
| ADS-B Out | Not observed | Observed |
| **Reported** | | |
| Colours | White | White/grey |
| Lighting | Land, nav, strobes | HISL, beacon |
| Conditions | VMC | VMC |
| Visibility | >10km | >10km |
| Altitude/FL | 2100ft | 2250ft |
| Altimeter | QNH (1024hPa) | QNH (1024hPa) |
| Heading | ~241° | 190° |
| Speed | 74kt | 115kt |
| ACAS/TAS | Not fitted | SkyEcho |
| Alert | N/A | None |
| | **Separation at CPA** | |
| Reported | <50ft V/0m H | Not seen |
| Recorded | 145ft V/<<0.1NM H | |




**THE PA28(A) PILOT** reports they changed frequency to Duxford [Information], entered Duxford into the GPS and then called, a reasonable distance out, requesting airfield information for join. They reported their position, were offered the 'option of long final' and accepted. They completed the pre-landing checks, noted they were off course and changed heading by a few degrees to the right to align with the runway. The next notable event was an aircraft passing overhead from right-to-left, directly above, visible at the very top of the front cockpit window. They estimated the vertical separation as less than 50ft and 'negligible' horizontal separation. They instinctively dived. The pilot of the other aircraft then announced their position. In response, the PA28(A) pilot orbited to maintain separation and allow the other pilot to land first. The flight was then resumed as normal and, upon landing, the aircraft was checked with no damage apparent. The PA28(A) pilot noted the following factors limiting situational awareness: completing landing checks meant their situational awareness was limited for a short time; they had a reasonable amount of time looking out [of] the front window prior to the incident but were focusing on final approach; they had never experienced an aircraft joining north from Cambridge and as such the incident was unexpected.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE PA28(B) PILOT** reports that, when 6NM east of Cambridge Airport, north of both the A11 and Six Mile Bottom, routeing on a track of approximately 170° under a Basic Service with Cambridge Approach, they requested a frequency change to Duxford Information. While completing the frequency change, transponder squawk selection and flight planning checks, the aircraft progressed to the south of the A11 and into the vicinity of Six Mile Bottom. In this area, they initially contacted Duxford Information to advise their routeing towards 'the wind farm' and requested joining instructions. Duxford Information advised that another aircraft was operating in the area and tracking towards the wind farm, and requested that they maintain a lookout and report when at the wind farm. They acknowledged this

Traffic Information and increased their lookout. At no point did they visually acquire the other aircraft. Electronic conspicuity equipment was selected and operating throughout the flight. No traffic was displayed and no alerts or warnings were received. At approximately 1410 they contacted Duxford Information to confirm their position at the wind farm area and request joining instructions. Duxford Information provided joining instructions and queried the position of the other aircraft, whose pilot subsequently transmitted that they were positioned behind their aircraft. No avoiding action was taken as no conflicting traffic was visually identified and no electronic traffic indication or alert was received.

**THE DUXFORD AFISO** reports that [the PA28(A) pilot] called inbound first and reported 15NM to run from the east. [The pilot] wanted a straight in and was [informed] next to report a 4NM final. A while later, [the PA28(B) pilot] called inbound from the east with 8NM to run. Immediately after responding to [the PA28(B) pilot] they requested [the PA28(A) pilot's] range, who then reported 10NM to the east. The AFISO responded to keep a good lookout due to a PA28 being in a similar position. [The PA28(A) pilot] then responded that the traffic was in sight and that they were going to reposition around it. The AFISO then completed passing the two-way Traffic Information and notified [the PA28(B) pilot] that there was a PA28 also in a similar position that was also to join on a straight-in [approach]. [The PA28(B) pilot] responded that they would look out for traffic. The AFISO then confirmed with [the PA28(A) pilot] that they had positioned behind the other PA28, to which they confirmed and stated that they were going to orbit. The AFISO then asked [the PA28(B) pilot] if they had copied the other PA28 pilot's intention, to which they confirmed that they had. The AFISO noted that, at the time of the incident, they were unaware how close the aircraft were, because they do not use a FID, or that a pilot was going to file an Airprox.

## Factual Background

The weather at Cambridge Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGSC 221420Z 18011KT 140V210 9999 FEW026 28/13 Q1023=
METAR EGSC 221350Z 17011KT 140V200 9999 FEW026 28/13 Q1023=
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
## Analysis and Investigation

### CAA ATSI

FISO units are not required to record [the RT], therefore there are no checks on quality and there are no time stamps. At times the AFISO's transmissions were distorted.

[PA28(A) pilot] called at 1403:43 for rejoin, reporting 15NM northeast of Duxford and a straight-in approach was agreed, with the pilot to make their next call at 4 miles. The aircraft was about 1.5NM further east on the radar replay [than their reported position].

[PA28(B) pilot] called at 1410:10 for rejoin, reporting 8 miles to the east. Again, a straight-in approach was agreed but no joining instructions were issued at that time. Taking the times as being accurate, [at that time the PA28(B) and PA28(A) were converging with PA28(B) approaching from the PA28(A)'s] 2:30 position [at a] range of 2NM.




Before anything else was agreed, the Duxford AFISO requested [PA28(A) pilot]'s range, reported as 10NM. On the radar replay it [was at] 8.5NM [at that time].

The AFISO immediately passed Traffic Information to [PA28(A) pilot] *"PA28 similar position for a straight in".* [PA28(A) pilot] reported *"roger traffic in sight. We'll do a loop and go around*". The AFISO then passed reciprocal Traffic Information to [PA28(B) pilot] and the pilot reported that they would look out (for the other aircraft).

Aligning the above [events] with the report from [PA28(A) pilot], it is thought the RTF timing was slightly [in error], and [that] CPA at 1410:40 was possibly during the period that [PA28(B) pilot] was completing their initial call to Duxford, as described by [PA28(A) pilot in their report].

Excellent reciprocal Traffic Information was passed by the AFISO immediately after they had established both aircrafts' positions, and they prioritised that over issuing joining instructions to [PA28(B) pilot]. It [was] unfortunate that the Airprox occurred earlier, before the AFISO had finished receiving the relevant information.

**UKAB Secretariat**

The NATS radar replay and CAA Airspace Analyser Tool were reviewed; the PA28(A) was identified through Mode S data and the PA28(B) was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources. The diagram was constructed using GPS track data kindly provided by both pilots.

Both PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28(A) pilot was required to give way to the PA28(B).[2]

**Duxford Occurrence Investigation**

The Duxford Occurrence Investigation reported the following findings:

Staffing: 2 x FISO, 1 x ATSA [assistant].

Workload: Low.

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Flight Progress Strip (FPS) Board Management: Not a factor.

Post Incident Action Taken: [None] Incident not known at the time.

Equipment: Not relevant.

Other: Not relevant.

Adequate Traffic Information was passed.

**Summary**

An Airprox was reported when 2 PA28s flew into proximity near Six Mile Bottom at 1411Z on Friday 22nd May 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, both in receipt of an AFIS from Duxford Information.

## PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, a report from the AFISO involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members first discussed the pilots' actions and noted that, in general, situational awareness had been a vital defence against flight into proximity and hence a potential mid-air collision (MAC). Neither pilot could have received information on other traffic because both had been in communication with the Duxford AFISO, who had not had access to a Flight Information Display (FID). However, members considered whether the PA28(B) pilot might have benefited from a Traffic Service from their previous agency, Cambridge, and thereby have received Traffic Information regarding PA28(A) before changing to the Duxford frequency. This had left a Traffic Awareness System (TAS) as the remaining source of on-board situational awareness. However, PA28(A) had not been equipped with a TAS, and the TAS fitted to PA28(B) could not have alerted on PA28(A) because the latter had not been transmitting ADS-B Out (**CF2**). Consequently, neither pilot had possessed situational awareness of the other aircraft (**CF1**). Members noted that the pilot of PA28(A) might usefully consider the purchase and installation of a TAS in their aircraft. The remaining barrier against MAC had therefore been see-and-avoid. However, the aircraft had been converging, presenting each pilot with a constant-bearing aspect of the other aircraft, with the attendant reduction in the likelihood of visual acquisition. Nevertheless, the aircraft had been there to be seen, and members questioned the extent to which each pilot's attention had been focused on Duxford aerodrome or the wind turbines reporting point as they had approached from the east, possibly to the detriment of an effective lookout. The PA28(B) pilot had not seen PA28(A), and the Board considered it likely that the PA28(A) pilot had only seen PA28(B) very shortly after CPA (**CF3**). The Board commended the Duxford AFISO for their diligence in passing Traffic Information to each pilot as soon as it had become apparent to the AFISO that the 2 aircraft may have been in proximity. However, based on the PA28(A) pilot's account, the Board considered that this information had likely been passed at approximately the time of CPA and therefore could not have materially affected the outcome. Turning to risk, although two members considered that the vertical separation at CPA had been such that safety had been reduced by an amount that could be considered significantly below the norm, Risk B, the Board determined by majority vote that a serious risk of collision had existed and that providence had played a major part in preventing a collision. Accordingly, Risk Category A was assigned (**CF4**).

Finally, Board members were encouraged to learn that Duxford ANSP was in the process of applying for permission to use a FID, which the Board agreed could significantly mitigate the risk of MAC in the vicinity of Duxford.

## PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

| | 2026082 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CF | **Factor** | **Description** | **ECCAIRS Amplification** | **UKAB Amplification** |
| | **Flight Elements** | | | |
| | **• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** | | | |
| 1 | Contextual | • Situational Awareness and Sensory Events | Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations | Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness |
| | **• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** | | | |
| 2 | Technical | • ACAS/TCAS System Failure | An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations | Incompatible CWS equipment |
| | **• See and Avoid** | | | |
| 3 | Human Factors | • Monitoring of Other Aircraft | Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft | Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots |
| | **• Outcome Events** | | | |
| 4 | Contextual | • Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft | An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles | |

Degree of Risk: A.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Ground Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action** were assessed as **not used** because the Duxford FISO had been providing an AFIS to both pilots who had been well outside the environs of the aerodrome.


**Flight Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had had situational awareness on the other aircraft.

**Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because PA28(A) had not been equipped with a TAS and the PA28(B) TAS had not alerted because PA28(A) had not been equipped to emit ADS-B Out.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had seen the other aircraft before CPA.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026082
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness