

active and that they were established on the crosswind leg. Shortly after their call, the gliding launch point operator at Lasham responded saying they had also spotted the occurrence from the ground and no other traffic had been reported on frequency. They were very surprised to see a PA28 operating in such close proximity to Lasham inside the established circuit at low altitude not on their frequency, given that if they had been even slightly further west they would have flown into direct conflict with the active winch operation, which was operating (as published in the AIP) potentially up to 3000ft QFE several times an hour, and any other associated circuit traffic. Once the PA28 was visibly clear of the circuit, they established back onto downwind and they continued with several more uneventful circuits, an Airprox report was made as soon as possible to Lasham and Farnborough Radar via RT and telephone.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that they believed that the Airprox had occurred 0.5NM northeast of the Lasham RW27 threshold. The other aircraft was ahead of them by 1-2NM. They maintained clear visual contact until the aircraft had passed ahead. Farnborough had advised them of glider activity at Lasham, therefore, they were maintaining an extra vigilant lookout. [They opined that] they were probably lower than they would otherwise have been on account of the cloudbase. They considered that the risk of collision was low, nevertheless, they were sorry that it had caused concern to whoever reported the Airprox. [They noted that] the take-away lesson for them was to avoid glider sites such as Lasham when they are active.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE FARNBOROUGH LARS CONTROLLER reports that they were working Low Level Approach, West and Zone with a co-ordinator in position. [The pilot of the Grob G109] had been on frequency under a Traffic Service on LARS West approximately 30min prior to the Airprox report and had gone en-route to Lasham. They were working the PA28 under a Basic Service, [the pilot of which] had requested a transit of the Odiham MATZ previously and the controller had advised, on giving MATZ approval, [that Lasham] was active. As [the PA28] got closer they could see the track was taking them very close to the Lasham overhead so they passed more generic Traffic Information including Traffic Information on an aircraft that appeared to be climbing out in their 12 o'clock. [The pilot of the PA28] reported traffic just below but did not report an Airprox. At 1219 [the pilot of the Grob G109] reported on frequency to report an Airprox [involving an incorrect aircraft registration] (this was later corrected in a call to the Watch Manager's desk).

Factual Background

The weather at Farnborough Airfield was recorded as follows:

METAR EGLF 041150Z 05007KT 9999 FEW012 OVC020 15/11 Q1014

Analysis and Investigation

NATS Farnborough

Executive Summary

The pilot of [the PA28], in receipt of a Basic Service, had previously been cautioned about the gliding activity at Lasham and was issued with Traffic Information regarding [The Grob G109] by the LARS West controller as they approached Lasham. The pilot of [the Grob G109] subsequently called onto the LARS West frequency to report an Airprox with [the PA28].

Description of event

The pilot of the Grob G109 low wing motor-glider from [departure/destination] had been in receipt of a Traffic Service from Farnborough LARS before the pilot left the frequency when they transferred to Lasham at 1138:19 (all times UTC) where their service was terminated, approximately 34min prior to the event.

The pilot of the Piper PA28 from [departure/destination] reported onto the LARS West frequency at 1155:48, advised they had just crossed the coastline at Goodwood and were at 2000ft on QNH 1015hPa. The pilot did not request a service in their initial transmission. The Farnborough LARS West controller (LF-LARS) issued the pilot with squawk 0430, QNH1014 and asked what service they requested, no response was received from the pilot. The LF-LARS repeated the transmission, again no response was received. The LF-LARS requested a radio check from the pilot with no response.

At 1200:50 the pilot of [the PA28] called back onto the LARS West frequency, the LF-LARS re-issued squawk 0430 and QNH 1014hPa and asked what service they requested outside [controlled airspace], no response was received from the pilot. The LF-LARS asked the pilot if they could hear their transmission, the pilot read back the squawk and QNH at 1201:20 and requested transit of the Odiham MATZ. Again, the pilot did not request a service. The LF-LARS issued the pilot of [the PA28] with a Basic Service at 1201:32, approved their Odiham MATZ transit and cautioned the pilot to keep a good lookout for gliders at Lasham, the pilot replied [with their callsign].

At 1211:49 (Figure 1) the LF-LARS issued the pilot of [the PA28] with Traffic Information on [the Grob G109] (V) *"believed to be a glider, just left of your twelve o'clock by a mile crossing left right, indicating one thousand feet below and climbing."* The pilot initially replied *"looking"* before immediately reporting *"we have one contact below us"*, the LF LARS replied, *"I think that's the one, it was indicating climbing so be careful"*.



Figure 1

The Closest Point of Approach between [the PA28] (0430) and [the Grob G109] (V) occurred at 1212:19 and was recorded on the NODE Multi-Track radar as 0.2NM and 800ft (Figure 2).



Figure 2

At 1207:02 the pilot of [the Grob G109] called onto the LARS West frequency and advised they “*wished to report an Airprox in the Lasham Circuit with a PA28 [misidentified callsign]*”. The pilot reported the Airprox time as 1212 UTC and “*approximately 1400ft*”. The pilot of [the Grob G109] rang the Watch Manager desk after the event to state that there had been some confusion around ADS-B callsigns and the aircraft that they had the Airprox with was [the PA28’s C/S and not the previously stated, misidentified, aircraft C/S].

Investigation

Information available to the investigation included:

- CA4114 from the Farnborough LARS controller
- CA4114 from the Farnborough Radar coordinator
- NATS4118 Initial Watch Management Investigation Report
- UKAB Airprox [redacted] report from the pilot of [the Grob G109]
- UKAB Airprox [redacted] report from the pilot of [the PA28]

The Farnborough LARS West, Zone and Approach function were operating in a band-boxed configuration by the LF-LARS controller with a coordinator in position. The NATS4118 described the traffic loading as light. The pilot of [the PA28] first contacted Farnborough LARS at 1155:48 and reported their location as crossing the coastline near Goodwood without stating the type of service they were requesting. The NATS4118 noted ‘*it is not unusual to lose two-way comms with traffic at 2000ft on the south coast*’. The LF-LARS [controller] made multiple transmissions to the pilot to identify what service they required with no response before they issued them a Basic Service at 1201:32.

CAP774 UK Flight Information Services Chapter 2.1 stated that a:

‘Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/ FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight’.

Lasham Glider Site is identified on the ICAO VFR Aeronautical Chart as an area of Intense Glider Activity (see diagram above). After issuing the pilot a Basic Service, the LF-LARS [controller] cautioned the pilot to keep a good lookout for gliders at Lasham at 1201:32.

CAP774 UK Flight Information Services Chapter 2, 2.7 stated:

‘A controller with access to surveillance derived information shall avoid the routine provision of Traffic Information on specific aircraft but may use that information to provide a more detailed warning to the pilot. If a controller/ FISO considers that a definite risk of collision exists, a warning shall be issued to the pilot ((UK) SERA.9005(b)(2) and GM1 (UK) SERA.9005(b)(2)). Whether traffic information has been provided or not, the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance without assistance from the controller.’

The LF-LARS [controller] issued Traffic Information to the pilot of [the PA28] regarding [the Grob G109] at 1211:49 (Figure 1 above). The pilot of [the PA28] continued their northerly track and flew within 1NM of Lasham and into conflict with [the Grob G109], who subsequently reported the encounter as an Airprox.

Conclusions

Causal Factor - The pilot of [the PA28] was receiving a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS and had been cautioned about glider activity at Lasham and passed Traffic Information regarding [the Grob G109]. However, the aircraft subsequently came into conflict before the pilot of [the Grob G109] called onto the LARS Frequency to advise they wanted to report the encounter as an Airprox.

There were no actions recorded and no Safety Investigation recommendations as a result of this investigation.

CAA ATSI

The Farnborough investigation has been reviewed and ATSI has nothing further to add.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft were positively identified using Mode S data (Figure 3).



Figure 3 – CPA 1212:22

Further analysis of third party aircraft tracking software was undertaken and neither aircraft was detected using ADS-B sources. Both pilots provided their GPS track data, which was coincident with the radar tracks, however, the PA28's GPS altitude data was unreliable and not used for analysis. CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1212:22 with 0.2NM lateral and 800ft vertical separation.

The Grob G109 and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.³

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Grob G109 and a PA28 flew into proximity at Lasham at 1212Z on Monday 4th May 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the Grob G109 pilot was providing position reports on the Lasham Traffic frequency, and the PA28 pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough Radar.

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data for the flight of both the Grob G109 and the PA28, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the Grob G109 pilot, and noted that the pilot had been conducting type conversion training in the circuit at Lasham and making calls on the Lasham Traffic frequency. Members noted that the student had seen an aircraft above them and in their 9'o'clock position during their recovering climb, following a practice partial power-loss. The Board further noted that, at the point at which the student had sighted the PA28, it had already passed them and had no longer posed a threat, however, members acknowledged that the instructor pilot had initially perceived the PA28 as *'potentially joining the Lasham circuit and had just cut inside them'*, and members agreed that the Grob G109 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the PA28 (**CF8**). The Board noted that the pilot had heard nothing from the PA28 on the Lasham frequency and had had no warnings on their electronic conspicuity (EC) device. Members agreed, therefore, that the Grob G109 pilot had had no situational awareness of the presence of the PA28 prior to sighting it (**CF6**), and that their EC device had not been able to detect any emissions from the PA28 (**CF7**).

The Board then considered the actions of the PA28 pilot, noting that they had been flying approximately northbound from the south coast, an area known to the Farnborough controller as challenging for both radar and radio transmissions, and had contacted Farnborough Radar. The Board noted that there had been some difficulty in establishing contact and that the pilot had been provided with a Basic Service. Members noted that the controller had provided clearance through the Odiham MATZ to the PA28 pilot and then passed Traffic Information on what was *'believed to be a glider'* climbing out of Lasham. The Board questioned the PA28 pilot's Threat and Error Management (TEM) in relation to the active glider site and what mitigations had been employed. Members felt that the absence of EC was considered inadvisable and, where practicable, a brief call to Lasham traffic (e.g. on a second radio if so equipped) could have enhanced the situational awareness of traffic operating from the site). Members agreed that the PA28 pilot had not adapted their plan to remain clear of Lasham (**CF4**), and had instead flown through a promulgated and active glider site, not avoiding the pattern of traffic within it (**CF2**, **CF4**). Members further agreed that, despite situational awareness of activity at Lasham, the PA28 pilot had flown close enough to the Grob G109 to have caused concern (**CF5**).

Moving their attention to the actions of the Farnborough LARS controller, the Board noted that the Farnborough Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) had not been used in this instance because the transponder codes on both aircraft had been outside the select frame (**CF1**), but praised the controller for having passed Traffic Information on the traffic departing Lasham to the pilot of the PA28 in any case, even though they had been providing a Basic Service.

In concluding their discussions, the Board recognised that the CPA had been before the Grob G109 pilot had first seen and become aware of the PA28. Members acknowledged that the pilot of the Grob G109 had been surprised by the sight of the PA28 and that their immediate perception may have led them to believe that the aircraft was closer than it was. The Board also noted that the PA28 pilot had, likely, attempted to maintain an altitude close to the base of the cloud but may have been able to have transited slightly higher as the weather had improved. Some members felt that, although the situation had met the criteria for reporting, the 800ft separation had been sufficient for normal safety parameters to have pertained (Risk Category E) while other members considered that, although there was no risk of collision, safety had been degraded, and that it had been fortuitous that the PA28 had passed clear of the Grob G109 (Risk Category C). The decision was put to the vote and an equal number of votes for each position were cast. In this case, the Chair took the casting vote, and the Board consequently assigned a Risk Category C to this Airprox event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**Contributory Factors:**

	2026067			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
1	Technical	• Conflict Alert System Failure	Conflict Alert System did not function as expected	The Conflict Alert system did not function or was not utilised in this situation
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
2	Human Factors	• Aircraft Navigation	An event involving navigation of the aircraft.	Flew through promulgated and active airspace, e.g. Glider Site
3	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
5	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Events involving flight crew not taking any action at all when they should have done so	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern despite Situational Awareness
6	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
7	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
• See and Avoid				
8	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **not used** because the transponder codes in use were outside the select frame for Farnborough's STCA.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot had flown through a promulgated and active glider site and not avoided the pattern of traffic.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Grob G109 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the PA28.

⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the Grob's EC device was unable to detect any emissions from the PA28.

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026067		Outside Controlled Airspace				
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness		
				0%	5%	10% 15% 20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓			
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓			
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✓	✓			
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✓	○			
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓			
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	⚠			
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓			
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✗	✓			
	See & Avoid	✓	✓			
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used
Provision		✓	⚠	✗	●	
Application		✓	⚠	✗	●	○
Effectiveness		■	■	■	■	■