AIRPROX REPORT No 2026066

Date: 19 Apr 2026 Time: 1454Z Position: 5112N 00104W Location: Ellisfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	K8	PA32
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Listening Out
Provider	N/A	F'borough Radar
Altitude/FL	~3620ft↓	~3650ft
Transponder	Not fitted	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White, red, blue	White, blue
Lighting	Nil	Bcns
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	3000ft	4000ft
Altimeter	QFE	QNH
Heading	*'Southeast'*	350°
Speed	60kt	140kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	100ft V/300ft H	~300ft V/~200m H
Recorded	<50ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE K8 PILOT reports that they had been descending to Lasham at 60kt when an aircraft crossed in front of them from their right-hand side, flying at about 120kt. [The pilot opined that] it looked like a Piper Lance. The K8 pilot dived lower to get some vertical separation, the other pilot took no evasive action [they believed]. There were many other gliders in the air nearby so the course taken by the other aircraft at 3000ft maximised the possibility of a collision.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA32 PILOT reports that they were conducting a VFR flight from […] to […], climbing to 4000ft and routeing west of Lasham, outside the ATZ [sic]. After passing Lasham, they began their descent for the approach into […]. There were two pilots on board and visibility was good. Late in the sequence, they spotted a glider approaching from the west, approximately 200yd away and 200–300ft below them. By the time [the PA32 pilot] identified it, it was clear the glider would pass safely below and behind them without conflict.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Odiham was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGVO 191450Z AUTO 34008KT 9999 FEW053/// 13/M00 Q1025=
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Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat



Figure 1: CPA minus 2sec



Figure 2: A snapshot taken from the CAA's Airspace Analyser tool showing the path taken by the PA32 pilot.

The K8 showed on radar only as an intermittent primary contact, whilst the PA32 was tracked via radar and identified via Mode S data; however, continual tracking and altitude reference was not available at or around CPA. Both aircraft showed on some of the open-source tracking systems available to the UKAB Secretariat and the diagram at page 1 is constructed using a combination of all the available information. Figure 2 shows the density of traffic in this area at this time (Note: not all traffic is captured by the CAA's Analyser tool; like all such systems it harvests and displays only those aircraft carrying equipment compatible with its filters). The PA32 pilot had aimed to avoid the overhead and highest density of traffic between both Lasham and Popham. Lasham launches (via Tug and Winch) up to 3700ft AMSL. The PA32 had transited the area at ~3650ft and at ~2.5NM from the Lasham overhead. The Popham overhead had been equally busy with light aircraft and glider activity.

The K8 and PA32 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA32 pilot was required to give way to the K8.[2]

Comments

AOPA

This is a known hotspot for Airproxes and gliders are difficult to see. Past experience has shown that obtaining a Traffic Service assists in lookout and mid-air collision avoidance; if refused, submit a form FCS1522. Suitable electronic conspicuity [equipment] can also assist, however, until the Department for Transport announces its preferred system, electronic conspicuity equipment may not show other aircraft.

BGA

The incident involved converging tracks with a constant relative bearing, so each aircraft appeared almost stationary in the other's canopy. The gradual descent of the K8 will have created a very small vertical apparent movement but the relative configuration remains the problematic case. The airspace the PA32 had been transiting is known to be busy, sandwiched between Lasham and Popham, but the BGA [opined that] the pilot, who actually bisected the "S" in "INTENSE GLIDER ACTIVITY", might have tracked a little further west to avoid the marked activity area. That assumes the pilot had access to the activity annotations on whatever moving map system they had been using. We remain concerned that these can be removed to declutter the screen, if they were even there in the first place.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a K8 glider and a PA32 flew into proximity at Ellisfield at 1454Z on Sunday 19th April 2026. The K8 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had not been in receipt of a FIS, and the PA32 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been Listening Out on the Farnborough Radar frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and GPS track data. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly considered the actions of the K8 pilot, noting that they had been on their recovery run and therefore keen to conserve energy for approach and landing. Members noted that they had been equipped with a basic version of the electronic conspicuity equipment popular amongst the glider fleet, but in this case had been unable receive any electronic emissions from the PA32 (**CF3**) and, although

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

they had likely been monitoring the Lasham gliding frequency (131.030MHz), did not report as having heard any calls from the PA32 pilot. The combination of these two facts had led them to have no specific situational awareness of the presence of the PA32, although members felt that those operating from airfields in this area would have generic situational awareness (**CF2**) that other transiting traffic utilises this area on a daily basis. The Board recognised that the K8 pilot had, on visually acquiring the PA32 at a late stage (**CF4**), deemed it necessary to dive to increase separation. Members agreed that, as altitude is a key energy source for gliders, this action had highlighted the apparent proximity of the two aircraft.

In reviewing the contribution by the PA32 pilot, members noted that the aircraft had been equipped with a transponder, but had carried no electronic conspicuity equipment and had maintained a listening watch on the Farnborough frequency for this area. The Board stressed that, where possible, an active Air Traffic Service should be sought (**CF1**) to enable situational awareness of surrounding traffic. In this case, the PA32 pilot had had only generic situational awareness of glider traffic in this area (**CF2**). The PA32 pilot reported having visually acquired the K8 at a late stage (**CF4**) and had judged that the glider would pass safely behind and below them.

When determining the risk, members considered the reports from both pilots and utilised open-source and pilot-provided GPS files to determine parameters at CPA, noting that both pilots had seen the other aircraft, though at closer range than ideal. They agreed that the avoidance action taken by the K8 pilot had increased separation as the aircraft had passed, but believed that safety had not been assured and that there had been a risk of collision (**CF5**), agreeing Risk Category B for this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026066			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
	• Outcome Events			
5	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the PA32 pilot could have sought an active Air Traffic Service.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because both the K8 and PA32 pilots had only generic situational awareness of the presence of other aircraft in the area.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by the K8 had been unable to register any electronic emissions from the PA32.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because both the K8 and PA32 pilots had achieved only late sightings of the other aircraft.



[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.