AIRPROX REPORT No 2026063

Date: 29 Apr 2026 Time: 1915Z Position: 5624N 00319W Location: 2.5NM SE Perth Aerodrome

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	ATR42	EV97
Operator	CAT	Civ FW
Airspace	Scottish FIR	Scottish FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	IFR	VFR
Service	Procedural	Listening Out
Provider	Dundee Approach	Perth Traffic
Altitude/FL	~2400ft	~1400ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Company	Silver
Lighting	Taxy, Nav, anti-col	Strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2200ft	1100ft
Altimeter	QNH (1030hPa)	QNH
Heading	360°	160°
Speed	170kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	PilotAware
Alert	RA	Information
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	500ft V/0m H	1300ft V/"*minimal*"
Recorded	~1000ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE ATR42 PILOT reports that, whilst flying the ILS 09 Cat C procedure at Dundee, GA traffic was observed in the vicinity of Perth Aerodrome on the IVSI whilst beacon-outbound from the DND. The crew did not receive any notification about this traffic from Dundee ATC due to Perth being closed. Whilst starting the base turn for the procedural approach at 8D I-DDE (2200ft), the GA traffic appeared to be climbing towards the [ATR42]. A Traffic Advisory was received. Within 2sec, this turned into a Resolution Advisory. [The Captain] performed a TCAS RA response and climbed to 3000ft (MSA 2900ft). The crew then decided to head towards the Dundee ATZ and recovered the situation into a visual approach (RH circuit) from the overhead so that protection from Dundee ATC could be gained. [The Captain] telephoned Dundee ATC upon arrival for further information. No visual contact with the traffic was made by either crew member. This event highlights the threat of procedural approaches in Class G airspace.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE EV97 PILOT reports that, while flying SSE, halfway between Scone and Dundee (at 1250ft and with excellent visibility), [they had] visual contact with [the ATR42] passing at right-angles 3 miles in front and 600ft above. It was also displayed on SkyDemon. No action [was taken] at that point, since there was very clear separation. [The ATR42] then turned directly towards [the EV97], so they descended to 1100ft to maintain clear separation. Visual contact was maintained at all times, and clear separation was maintained at all times. There was no risk of collision. [The ATR42] passed overhead at approximately 2400ft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE DUNDEE CONTROLLER reports that, at 1914, [the pilot of the ATR42] inbound to Dundee reported a TCAS RA to the west of the aerodrome while conducting an ILS to RW09. There were no other [pilots] on frequency and no [aircraft] observed from the VCR. [The pilot of the ATR42] reported

climbing to 3000ft in response and requested to continue visually for RW09. The [ATR42] landed safely at 1924 with no further incident.

[During] a telephone call to RAF Leuchars ATSU to report the visual approach, [it was] ascertained that an aircraft was observed on radar three miles east of ABDED, 200ft above the ATR42. Traffic Information was passed to [the pilot of the ATR42]. No telephone call response was obtained from Perth Air/Ground, or from Scottish Information, as both units were closed.

Factual Background

The entry for Dundee Airport in the UK AIP (Instrument Approach Chart - Dundee ILS/DME RW09) includes the following notes:

3 The Category C Instrument Approach Procedure infringes the Perth ATZ at 1800FT above Perth aerodrome elevation. Pilots must notify ATC of their intention to conduct a Category C approach on first contact.
4 The eastern edge of the perth ATZ lies 9.5NM west of THR RWY 09. To prevent confliction with possible VFR traffic in the Perth ATZ, pilots should not extend the outbound leg of the base turn beyond the prescribed procedural distances.



Figure 1 - Dundee ILS/DME RW09

The entry for Perth aerodrome in the UK AIP provides the following hours of operation:

> 0900-1700 (0800-1600); and by arrangement.

The website for Perth aerodrome provides the following information for pilots applying for an 'Out of hours indemnity permit' when wishing to use the aerodrome outside the published hours of operation:

> 4. (i) Pilots should be aware of the proximity to Perth Airport of the Dundee RNP and instrument approach procedures. Traffic information on Dundee inbounds can be obtained from Dundee on 122.905MHz.

The weather at Dundee Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGPN 291920Z 09007KT CAVOK 09/04 Q1030
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Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

This incident follows a familiar pattern. Dundee ATC was not aware of the presence of the pilot of the EV97 who was, apparently, not speaking to anyone in that area.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the ATR42 could be positively identified from Mode S data (Figure 2). At the moment of CPA, the ATR42 was observed in a climb through FL019. A suitable correction was applied to determine its altitude. The EV97 first appeared on the

radar replay at 1917:15 (more than 2min after CPA), at FL017, 4.7NM southeast of Perth Airfield (approximately 4NM east of ABDED). The EV97 was observed before CPA by reference to MLAT and GPS-based data sources.

The diagram has been constructed by combining the data sources. The altitudes of the aircraft have been shown as estimates due to rapidly changing values and, in the case of the EV97, somewhat sporadic data points.



Figure 2 – CPA at 1914:37

Figure 3 – Aircraft positions at 1914:35 (MLAT and GPS-based data)

The ATR42 and EV97 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an ATR42 and an EV97 flew into proximity 2.5NM southeast of Perth aerodrome at 1915Z on Wednesday 29th April 2026. The ATR42 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC, in receipt of a Procedural Service from Dundee Approach. The EV97 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, listening out on the Perth Traffic frequency.

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the air traffic controller involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the ATR42, and members reviewed the entry in the UK AIP for the particular procedure that they had been conducting. It was noted that the prescribed track would have taken them into (or within close proximity to) the Perth ATZ had the encounter have taken place within the hours of operation of Perth aerodrome. Members next noted that the ATR42 pilot had been in receipt of a Procedural Service from the Dundee controller, and recalled the wording of CAP 774 UK Flight Information Services:

> Procedural Service
>
> Definition
>
> 5.1 A Procedural Service is an ATS where, in addition to the provisions of a Basic Service, the controller provides restrictions, instructions, and approach clearances which, if complied with, shall achieve deconfliction minima against other aircraft participating in the Procedural Service. Neither traffic information nor deconfliction advice can be passed with respect to unknown traffic.
>
> A Procedural Service does not require information derived from an ATS surveillance system. Therefore, due to the ability for autonomous flight in Class G airspace, pilots in receipt of a Procedural Service should be aware of the high likelihood of encountering conflicting traffic without warnings being provided by ATC.

Consequently, it was agreed that the pilot of the ATR42 had been required to have maintained a high level of vigilance for any traffic in the area. A member with particular experience of CAT operations explained that they would have engaged the aircraft's automatic systems to have facilitated an emphasis on their lookout. Members noted that, after the ATR42 pilot had started a right turn to the north, the TCAS equipment fitted to the ATR42 had alerted them to a contact in that direction, and that the contact had indicated a climb. Members noted that the ATR42 pilot had continued their turn towards the traffic and, subsequently, a TCAS RA had been triggered (**CF6**).

Members agreed that, despite their awareness of the EV97 to the north, the pilot of the ATR42 had continued their turn and had reduced the separation (**CF4**). It was agreed by members that the ATR42 pilot had been concerned by their proximity to the EV97 (**CF5**) and further agreed that it may have been prudent to have adapted their dynamic plan sooner (**CF3**), terminated the procedure and, for example, changed the radius of their turn to have increased the separation from the EV97. Nevertheless, it was noted that the ATR42 pilot had initiated a climb (prompted by the TCAS RA) which had increased the vertical separation from the EV97.

The Board next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the EV97. Members noted that the EC device fitted to the EV97 had provided information, but not an alert, to the presence of the ATR42. Members also noted that the EV97 pilot had visually acquired the ATR42 at distance and, having observed the ATR42 subsequently turn to the north, had had sufficient time to have descended to have ensured a significant separation.

Members next considered the actions of the Dundee controller, and noted that they had not had use of surveillance equipment with which to monitor any traffic in the area. A CAA advisor to the Board explained that it had been for the aerodrome operator and the ANSP to decide what equipment was necessary to facilitate the services that they provide. Members noted the Dundee controller had had no means by which they could have detected the EV97 and had not had situational awareness of its presence (**CF2**). Consequently, the Dundee controller did not detect the proximity of the ATR42 and EV97 (**CF1**).

Concluding the discussion, members summarised their thoughts. It was agreed that the pilot of the ATR42 had been alerted to the presence of the EV97 but had not visually acquired it at any point during

the encounter (**CF7**). It was further agreed that the ATR42 pilot had not adapted their dynamic plan to have alleviated the reduction in separation until they had responded to the activation of a TCAS RA. Members agreed that the pilot of the EV97 had sighted the ATR42 in plenty of time to have descended to have resolved the situation. Members concluded that normal safety parameters had pertained and were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category E to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026063			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Human Factors	• Conflict Detection - Not Detected	An event involving Air Navigation Services conflict not being detected.	
2	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
3	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Events involving flight crew not taking any action at all when they should have done so	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern despite Situational Awareness
5	Human Factors	• Unnecessary Action	Events involving flight crew performing an action that was not required	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
6	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS RA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory warning triggered	
	• See and Avoid			
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: E.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Dundee controller had not had situational awareness of the presence of the EV97.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the ATR42 had not made a sufficiently detailed plan to have increased their separation from the EV97.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because, despite situational awareness of the presence of the EV97, the pilot of the ATR42 had flown close enough to it to have been concerned by its proximity.