


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026055

Date: 25 Apr 2026 Time: ~1716Z Position: 5205N 00208W Location: Defford

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	EV97	Jodel D140
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	Unknown
Service	Listening Out	
Provider	SafetyCom	
Altitude/FL	300ft ¹	
Transponder	A, C, S	
Reported		
Colours	Silver, blue	
Lighting	Nil	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	250ft AGL	
Altimeter	QFE (1021hPa)	
Heading	090°	
Speed	52kt	
ACAS/TAS	PilotAware	
Alert	None	
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	0ft V/150m H	N/R
Recorded	NR	



THE EV97 PILOT reports that, whilst returning from [...] to [...] at approximately 10 miles east of the field, they made an initial blind transmission on SafetyCom (135.480MHz). The wind was calm and, due to the significant glare from the low setting sun, they elected to join downwind for RW09RH to maintain better visibility and broadcasted their intentions accordingly. While established on the downwind leg, they made a second blind call to confirm their position. Shortly thereafter, they identified an aircraft low in their 2 o'clock position, established on short final for RW09. The EV97 pilot turned and called 'final' at their usual 1.5 miles, maintaining a visual on the aircraft ahead as it touched down. As the EV97 pilot continued the approach, they observed that the aircraft failed to vacate at the only available runway exit. Assuming the pilot's ground roll had simply carried them beyond the exit point, they reduced their speed to allow them time to vacate. However, the aircraft continued to the far eastern end of the runway. At first, the EV97 pilot thought they were going to pull off the runway and clear it [to allow them] to land, but they began a backtrack. Given their relatively high taxi speed, the EV97 pilot assumed the pilot had identified them and was quickly returning to the exit point to clear the runway. Instead, the aircraft accelerated and rotated on RW27, climbing directly toward them in a head-on conflict. The EV97 pilot was about to execute a standard avoiding turn to the right but, before they did, the other aircraft performed a sharp left turn and passed down their starboard side at approximately the same altitude, with a lateral separation of maybe 150m. As the approach and runway were now clear, the EV97 pilot continued to land. No transmissions were heard from the other aircraft on SafetyCom throughout their airfield approach or during the incident. [The EV97 pilot reports that] their [branded EC equipment] did not detect any active signals from the other aircraft. The incident was witnessed by a person mowing the airfield. Post-flight, that person identified the other aircraft as being based at a private strip [to the west of Defford]. The EV97 pilot believes this incident represented a complete disregard for safety and fundamental airmanship. [The EV97 pilot opined that] it was of particular concern that the other pilot chose to depart on RW27 directly into a blindingly low setting sun, which severely compromised their

¹ Radar recorded altitude of 300ft. Defford lies at ~69ft AMSL. EV97 then calculated to have been at or around 230ftAGL at CPA.

ability to see conflicting traffic. It is also highly irregular that the pilot elected to depart against the very circuit direction they themselves had just established and utilised for landing. By taking off in the opposite direction to an active approach, without maintaining a listening watch or a visual lookout especially in high-glare conditions, the pilot created an entirely avoidable and high-risk head-on conflict.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE JODEL D140 PILOT declined to contribute to the Airprox process.

Factual Background

The weather at Gloucester airfield was recorded as follows:

METAR EGBJ 251650Z 35004KT 300V040 CAVOK 20/M01 Q1020=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At 1716:23 (~CPA +32sec)

Airfield/Pilot Information available on the Croft Farm (Defford) website: at 12th June 26:

Due to recent drainage works, the Eastern half of the runway is rougher than usual with some small areas of bare soil. Please call for PPR/briefing. PPR Essential.

Please call or text [...] or you can fill out the PPR form. Leave details of your name, registration and arrival date and ETA.

Suitable Aircraft and Helicopters welcomed with prior permission and at pilots own risk.

Location - N52 05.22 W002 08.22. Elevation - 69 Ft AMSL.

Runway - 09/27 570mx15m. Grass. Red markers at 285m, white at 140m.


Good clear approaches. Surface is good but can become soft after heavy rain. Please check before setting out. Taxiing to either side of the runway, centre for take-off / landing only.

Alternate Airfields - Gloucestershire, Wolverhampton, Wellesbourne. (All with maintenance and 100LL/JetA1).

Facilities - Ample parking, No Fuel. Please park well clear of the strip, either East or West of the "C" cabin. Please enter the "C" cabin and sign in.

Radio SAFETYCOM - 135.480MHz. SAFETYCOM is a common frequency introduced for use by aircraft in the vicinity of an airfield or landing site that does not have a notified VHF frequency for radio communication. SAFETYCOM is to assist pilots to avoid potential conflict and should only be used to broadcast the pilot's intentions. It is a single common frequency for many landing sites. Therefore it is important that transmissions are concise and correct. Remember to make clear that the reference is to Defford. Transmissions should be below 2000 ft above landing site and within 10 miles radius.

Circuits - All Circuits to be flown to the south. Please make Standard Circuit calls and keep a good lookout for other traffic.



The EV97 was tracked by radar and identified via Mode S data. The D140 did not show on radar. Neither aircraft was displayed on ADS-B/MLAT tracking tools available to the UKAB Secretariat within 3min of CPA.

The EV97 and Jodel D140 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.³ An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

by other aircraft in operation.⁴ A person must not recklessly or negligently act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person in an aircraft.⁵

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an EV97 and a Jodel D140 flew into proximity at Defford at approximately 1716Z on Saturday 25th April 2026. The EV97 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been utilising the SafetyCom frequency (135.480MHz). The D140 pilot declined to contribute to the Airprox process.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the EV97 pilot and radar photographs/video recordings. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

In reviewing this event, members noted with disappointment that the Jodel D140 pilot had declined to contribute to the Airprox process and that that, combined with no RT coverage at Croft Farm/Defford, had led the Board to discuss this event in the round. Members noted that the EV97 had carried an electronic conspicuity unit with a broad capability but had been unable to detect any electronic emissions from the D140 (**CF5**). The Board agreed that the EV97 pilot had made appropriate calls on the SafetyCom frequency (135.380MHz) and had gained visual contact with the D140 at an early stage, but had been unable to anticipate its pilot's unusual manoeuvre (**CF6**), with members agreeing that the EV97 pilot had had no situational awareness of the intended actions of that pilot (**CF4**). In reviewing the D140 pilot's involvement, the Board wished to remind all pilots that the role of the UK Airprox Board is not to apportion blame, but to analyse the circumstances and determine which known barriers to an Airprox had not been present and which, if any, factors had contributed to the event, thereby enabling learning for all. In this case, the Board opined that the manoeuvre carried out by the D140 pilot had been irregular and had led to confusion for the EV97 pilot as there had been no RT calls from that pilot (**CF1**) and their decision to turn after landing and take-off in the opposite direction had been inappropriate (**CF2**) and had led to them not conforming with the traffic pattern they themselves had set in their initial approach and the EV97 pilot had followed (**CF3**).

When determining the risk, members considered the report from the EV97 pilot together with the radar replay screenshots. Members quickly agreed that the D140 pilot's irregular landing, turn and take-off manoeuvre had left the EV97 pilot with no situational awareness of that pilot's intended action, had meant that safety had not been assured and that there had been a risk of collision (**CF7**), agreeing Risk Category B for this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2026055				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
1	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
2	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				

⁴ (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

⁵ UK ANO (2016) Part 10. Chap 1. 240 – Endangering an aircraft.

4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
5	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
• See and Avoid				
6	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	
• Outcome Events				
7	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁶

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the D140 pilot did not communicate their intention to immediately take off from the opposite runway to the one used for landing, and this had led to them not conforming with the traffic pattern as established.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the EV97 pilot had no situational awareness of the intentions of the D140 pilot after they had landed.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by the EV97 had received no electronic emissions from the D140.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the EV97 pilot had recognised at a late stage the D140 pilot's intention to take off from the opposite runway to the one used for their landing.

⁶ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026055		Outside Controlled Airspace			
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness	
				Barrier Weighting	
				0%	5% 10% 15% 20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance				
	Manning & Equipment				
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance				
	Tactical Planning and Execution				
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
	See & Avoid				
Key:		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Not Present/Not Assessable</u> <u>Not Used</u>
Provision					
Application					
Effectiveness					