


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026053

Date: 25 Apr 2026 Time: 1356Z Position: 5103N 00148W Location: South of Salisbury

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	AC114	C208
Operator	Civ FW	Civ Comm
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Listening Out	Listening Out
Provider	Boscombe Traffic	Boscombe Traffic
Altitude	4300ft	~3970ft
Transponder	A, S ¹	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White/Red
Lighting	Bcn, nav, strobes	Bcn, nav, strobes
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude	4300ft AGL	3000ft ALT
Altimeter	QFE (1011hPa)	QNH (1030hPa)
Heading	270°	090°
Speed	130kt	NR
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/0.5NM H	300ft V/300m H
Recorded	~330ft V/0.1NM H	



THE AC114 PILOT reports that they were listening on the same frequency and heard the jump plane make a blind call stating departure from [point]. They were going to pass approximately 4 miles south to keep a safe distance. Upon passing south of Salisbury, they saw the aircraft climbing steeply, heading straight towards them. They did not believe they [the C208 pilot] could have seen them at that steep of a climb angle. They immediately took avoiding action, turning to port and descending. Once clear and settled back on track, they made contact with the aircraft [pilot] to say they were very close and asked if [the pilot] had seen them. The [C208 pilot] stated that they had seen them. They [the AC114 pilot] said they were a bit surprised to see [the C208] so close and that it made them jump. [The C208 pilot] also [replied] they were surprised to see [the AC114], and that 'they had to climb somewhere'.

[The AC114 pilot stated that they] really did not think [the C208 pilot] could have seen [the AC114] in the steep angle they were at, and they seemed slightly annoyed that they had commented on it. They believed that, if they had not taken avoiding action, and [in their opinion] the [C208 pilot] clearly was not going to do so, they would have been in dangerously close proximity.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE C208 PILOT reports that, on the climb-out after take-off, they made a blind call to Boscombe traffic, 'Boscombe traffic [C/S] airborne at [airfield] climbing to FL150 for para drop'. They vary the climb-out direction as they fly up to 25 lifts a day and this ensures no locals are subject to noise all day long. Some while after the Airprox, the other pilot called on Boscombe frequency to report that they had an incident that was a near miss and had to take avoiding action. The C208 pilot acknowledged the call and briefly explained that they have to climb and descend somewhere and that is unavoidably outside the Drop zone area marked on aviation charts and GPS. No calls were heard from any other aircraft in

¹ The aircraft was detected and identified using Mode S data without the altitude readout.

the area. If they hear another aircraft they always transmit '*please be advised, parachuting taking place at [airfield]*'.

The pilot further noted that, for planning purposes, they generally avoid the Stonehenge area which is a draw to sightseeing pilots. [When they saw the] other aircraft it was already turning and not deemed to be on a collision course.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

Factual Background

The weather at Boscombe Down was recorded as follows:

METAR EGDM 251450Z AUTO 25002KT 9999 NCD 20/M02 Q1020

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft were detected and identified using Mode S data, although the AC114 had no altitude display (Figure 1).




Figure 1 – Time 1355:55

A further analysis of third party aircraft tracking software detected the C208 using ADS-B sources. The AC114 was seen on MLAT with a spurious altitude, showing the aircraft at a considerably lower level than that reported. However, the AC114 pilot provided their GPS track and altitude information for the flight and CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1355:55 with 0.1NM lateral and 330ft vertical separation.

The AC114 and C208 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the AC114 pilot was required to give way to the C208.³

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an AC114 and a C208 flew into proximity south of Salisbury at 1356Z on Saturday 25th April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and listening out on the Boscombe Zone frequency for Boscombe traffic. The C208 pilot was also operating on a separate parachute drop-zone frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and GPS track data for the flight of the AC114. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the AC114 pilot, and noted that they had been tuned into Boscombe Zone's frequency and listening out for Boscombe traffic. The Board discussed the suitability of the frequency in use and, after discussing the availability of other operative LARS units available to the pilot, members agreed that they had been on the most appropriate frequency given that they had heard the C208 pilot making a blind traffic call, and that there may have been other local traffic operating in the vicinity. The Board noted that the AC114 pilot had had generic situational awareness of the position of the C208 after having heard the pilot announce their para-dropping activities (**CF2**), but they had not had any additional electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment that may have assisted them in locating its position. Members noted that, although the pilot had heard the C208 pilot, they had neither responded nor reciprocated by passing their own routeing and intentions on the Boscombe frequency (**CF1**). The Board noted that, although the AC114 pilot had routed to the south of Salisbury, possibly hoping to avoid the C208, they had then been surprised to see the aircraft '*climbing steeply, heading straight towards them*'. Members agreed that, as the AC114 pilot had manoeuvred to avoid the C208, they had been startled and concerned by its proximity (**CF4**).

The Board then considered the actions of the C208 pilot, noting that the pilot had also been listening to the Boscombe frequency and had made a blind call to all traffic that they had been '*climbing to FL150 for a para-drop*'. Members agreed that the C208 pilot had had no situational awareness of the presence of the AC114 (**CF2**), having heard no response to their blind call or other generic routeing information from the AC114 pilot. The Board also noted that the C208 had not had any EC equipment fitted that may have indicated the presence of the AC114 to the C208 pilot, and members agreed that the pilot had been surprised to have seen the AC114 turning away from them at or around CPA, effectively a non-sighting (**CF3**). Members further agreed that the C208 pilot's forward visibility had been reduced due to the aircraft's high nose attitude, combined with the pronounced length of the forward fuselage, which had likely obstructed their view of the AC114 (**CF5**).

In concluding their discussion, members agreed that the pilot of the AC114 had had situational awareness of the C208 and, on seeing it, had taken timely and effective action to have effectively avoided it. The Board assigned Risk category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026053			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• See and Avoid			

3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
4	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft
5	Contextual	• Visual Impairment	Events involving impairment due to an inability to see properly	One or both aircraft were obscured from the other

Degree of Risk: C.


Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the AC114 had not communicated their position or intentions on the Boscombe frequency.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the C208 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the AC114, and the AC114 pilot had only generic awareness of the presence and position of the C208.



⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).