


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026052

Date: 25 Apr 2026 Time: 1055Z Position: 5114N 00135W Location: Thruxton ATZ

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28(A)	PA28(B)
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Thruxton ATZ	Thruxton ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Thruxton Radio	Thruxton Radio
Altitude/FL	1310ft	1210ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Red, white	White
Lighting	Anti-coll, nav, stb	'all standard'
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1000ft	1000ft
Altimeter	QFE (1011hPa)	QFE
Heading	340°	NK
Speed	90kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	SkyEcho/TAS
Alert	N/A	Alert
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/200m H	200ft V/2-3NM H
Recorded	100ft V/0.2NM H	



THE PA28(A) PILOT reports that they had been teaching circuits to an experienced student [using] RW07LH. The student had just levelled on the crosswind leg, and they were carrying out lookout for a left turn onto downwind, when another aircraft was seen on their starboard wingtip at about 300m, joining downwind. The [instructor] took control and did a significant wing rock to show some surface area to the other aircraft, but no course or height deviation was seen. The PA28(A) pilot widened the circuit as much as possible, but there are danger areas to the north so not much separation was possible. The other aircraft passed behind from right-to-left and, after [the PA28(A)] had turned downwind, they flew parallel with [the other aircraft] until it turned tight base. The PA28(A) pilot then extended downwind to gain enough separation for a safe landing.

The PA28(A) instructor pilot later added that they had omitted a detail in the report [that is relevant] that when they spotted the aircraft on their right wingtip it was pointing directly at them. Clearly this, plus the horizontal displacement, was enough to ensure that the aircraft [would have] passed behind them, but (the PA28(A) pilot) then had to execute a left turn (onto the downwind leg) away from [PA28(B)] in the knowledge that it would appear at some point on their left-hand side on completion of the turn, which kept both PA28(A) pilots scanning to the left during the turn in case it had not continued in a straight line and [they] were in conflict again. [PA28(B)] had in fact maintained its track, which is why they then found themselves flying parallel to it on the downwind leg.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28(B) PILOT reports that another aircraft appeared at the end of the downwind leg and, instead of turning left onto base, was seen turning right, crossing in front of them before turning away. [The PA28(B) pilot] saw the aircraft and adjusted their track slightly to remain closer to the inner downwind leg. The aircraft was visible on [EC equipment] as yellow traffic, and on the aircraft's TCAD [TAS]

system as yellow traffic about 200ft above. However, no immediate collision alert was triggered, and the aircraft soon remained no factor.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE THRUXTON AIR/GROUND OPERATOR reports that they had been on duty at the time in question. They had one aircraft remaining in the circuit on an instructional flight. [PA28(B)] had departed earlier in the day and was [at the time] returning to Thrupton. The procedure for joining is [to enter] in to the start of the downwind leg. [PA28(A)] had just completed a touch and go as [PA28(B)] had been approaching to join. The instructor on board [PA28(A)] reported that they would like to file an Airprox. This [the AGO] acknowledged. [PA28(B)] did not transmit. [The AGO] noted that they did not have sight of either aircraft at the time.

Factual Background

The weather at Boscombe Down Airfield was recorded as follows:

METAR EGDM 251050Z AUTO 10004KT 9999 NCD 17/02 Q1021=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: at CPA (1055:14) 100ft V/0.2NM H




Figure 2: at CPA +8sec showing their extension to the crosswind leg as described by the pilot of PA28(A).

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and identified via Mode S data. No other (conflicting) aircraft appeared on radar within the airfield/circuit area at or around CPA. Both aircraft showed on ADS-B and MLAT tracking tools available to the Secretariat, but lacked consistency, with little coverage of both airframes at or around CPA. A third aircraft (uninvolved) was seen to transit the area, north-to-south at an altitude of ~4000ft and a fourth aircraft (uninvolved) was seen to depart Thruxton towards the northeast approximately 1min after CPA. Figure 2 (above) shows the extension to the crosswind leg as described by the pilot of PA28(A). PA28(B) ceased to show on radar at this point and PA28(A) ceased to show at CPA +22sec. Figure 3 (below) shows circuit patterns with noise sensitive areas and the approach path taken by the PA28(B) pilot to the downwind join. Circuit height is 800ft AGL and, with Thruxton sitting at 319ft AMSL, the appropriate altitude for both aircraft in this event would be 1119ft.




Figure 3 Thruxton Circuit patterns and noise sensitive areas

UK AIP entry for Thruxton:

3 CIRCUITS

- Unless otherwise notified by A/G, circuit height is 800 FT AAL (Thruxton QFE) for all runways.
- During times that the Boscombe Down CMATZ is not in operation, circuit joining height is 1500 FT AAL, or the maximum possible below this level to maintain VMC and circuit height 1000 FT AAL.
- There is no dead-side for Runway 07/25. Helicopters operate south of Runway 07/25 up to 1000 FT AAL.
- The following are recommended circuit joining procedures:
 - Runway 07 in use
 - Joining from the east, notify A/G of intent to join downwind, descend to circuit height at the ATZ boundary, enter the circuit via the downwind leg.
 - Joining from the west, fly along the runway centreline, turn crosswind at the RWY 25 threshold, descend to circuit height when crosswind.
 - Runway 25 in use
 - Joining from the east, fly along the runway centreline, at the Runway 07 threshold turn crosswind, descend to circuit height when crosswind.
 - Joining from the west, notify A/G of intent to join downwind, descend to circuit height at the ATZ boundary, enter the circuit via the downwind leg.
 - Runway 12/30 in use
 - If entering the ATZ from the north or east, fixed wing and helicopters should position to join the circuit from the north-east, continue on south-westerly heading and join on the downwind leg of the runway/helicopter aiming point in use, as applicable.
- The following circuit directions apply for fixed wing aircraft when the specified runways are in use:
 - Runway 07 - LH
 - Runway 25 - RH
 - Runway 12 - RH
 - Runway 30 - LH
- Due to the proximity of the Middle Wallop ATZ, aircraft using Runway 12/30 are advised to remain north of the Andover-Salisbury railway line.

The PA28(A) and PA28(B) pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when two PA28s flew into proximity at Thruxton at 1055Z on Saturday 25th April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, in receipt of an AGCS from Thruxton Radio.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members firstly considered the actions of the PA28(A) pilot, noting that they had been instructing a student on circuit flying and had visually acquired the PA28(B) to their right-hand side at approximately 300m, which members deemed an effective non-sighting (**CF4**) as this had been very close to the event CPA (Closest Point of Approach) and too late for the PA28(A) pilot to have manoeuvred to effectively increase separation. They noted that the PA28(A) pilot had rocked their wings to signal their presence to the other pilot, but had seen no response. As there appears to have been no Traffic Information passed or calls made regarding PA28(B), and PA28(A) had no electronic conspicuity equipment to register any possible electronic emissions from PA28(B), the Board agreed that the pilot of PA28(A) had had no situational awareness of the presence of PA28(B) (**CF2**) prior to having sight of it. The Board recognised the circuit limitations for the pilot of PA28(A) in their efforts to generate space between themselves and PA28(B), and accepted that there had been little else they could have done in this case.

Moving to the actions of the PA28(B) pilot, members noted that the pilot had followed the correct procedure for a downwind join at Thruxton and had carried electronic conspicuity equipment which had registered an aircraft on the downwind leg but had not done so at or approaching CPA with PA28(A) (**CF3**). This, together with an apparent lack of radio calls, had led to the pilot of PA28(B) having had no situational awareness of the presence of PA28(A) (**CF2**). On reviewing the report from the pilot of PA28(B), members opined that they had potentially misidentified a second aircraft, towards the base-leg end of the downwind leg, rather than PA28(A) which had been at the crosswind end of the downwind leg and therefore deemed them to have not sighted PA28(A) in this event (**CF4**). Members agreed that the pilot of PA28(B) had therefore not conformed with the traffic pattern as established by PA28(A) (**CF1**).

In considering the role played by the Thruxton Air/Ground Operator, members noted that there was little description of radio exchanges between the 2 pilots and themselves which had made it difficult to determine what Traffic Information, if any, had been passed and at what stage. This, which was a critical element of the understanding of situational awareness present at the time, led the Board to the belief that the Air/Ground operator had not influenced the Airprox.

When determining the risk, members considered the reports from both pilots, together with the radar replay screenshots. Members quickly agreed that, with a late sighting by the PA28(A) pilot and that they believed that the PA28(B) pilot had not seen PA28(A) at or approaching CPA, safety had not been assured and that there had been a risk of collision (**CF5**), agreeing Risk Category B for this event.

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK**Contributory Factors:**

	2026052			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
3	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
4	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
	• Outcome Events			
5	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Thruxton Air/Ground operator did not influence the Airprox.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of PA28(B) did not conform with the pattern of traffic as established by the pilot of PA28(A).

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by PA28(B) had not registered any emissions from PA28(A) at or prior to CPA.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because the pilot of PA28(A) had not seen PA28(B) in time to effectively increase separation, and the pilot of PA28(B) had not seen PA28(A) prior to CPA.

³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026052		Outside Controlled Airspace			
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness	
				Barrier Weighting	
				0%	5% 10% 15% 20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓		
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓		
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✗	○		
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	○	○		
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓		
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	!		
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓		
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	!	✗		
	See & Avoid	✗	✗		
Key:		Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable
Provision		✓	!	✗	○
Application		✓	!	✗	○
Effectiveness		■	■	■	■