


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026050

Date: 19 Apr 2026 Time: 1214Z Position: 5100N 00056W Location: Petersfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	HpH Shark	PA28
Operator	Civ Gld	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	Basic
Provider	N/A	F'borough LARS W
Altitude/FL	2500ft	2820ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White	White, blue
Lighting	None	Strobes, nav
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2470ft	2806ft
Altimeter	QNH	QNH
Heading	330°	201°
Speed	60kt	117kt
ACAS/TAS	FLARM	None ¹
Alert	None	N/A
Separation at CPA		
Reported	150ft V/0m H	"not seen"
Recorded	320ft V/10m H	



THE SHARK PILOT reports that they were on a cross-country flight from [takeoff airfield], heading for Kingsclere. At the time of the Airprox, they were in Farnborough CTA 8 [UKAB Secretariat note: they had been below CTA 8, in the London FIR] at the southeastern edge of Petersfield at around 2500ft AMSL in rising air, and about to do a right turn to climb in the thermal they had just entered. It was then that they observed the light aircraft heading directly towards them over their right shoulder [at a reported range of <500m], and estimated it to be around 250ft above as it passed directly above them. The pilot of the Shark reported their avoiding action as "*None, [it was] all too fast*". The aircraft seemed to be moving quickly and was heading on an approximately southerly heading. [The other pilot] made no change of course and did not appear to see them. The registration could not be positively identified as it all happened so quickly, but was something with [three letters similar to those in the callsign of the PA28]. It was close enough to read had it not happened so quickly. They were not in radio contact with any service [provider] but were running transponder Mode S and squawking 7000.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PA28 PILOT reports that they were aware of heavy glider activity in that passage on that day. Before the time of the reported Airprox, they were on an active lookout for gliders, during which they spotted two en-route which they actively monitored, and kept distance from, to avoid potential conflict. They flew east of their magenta [line], over VOUGA [located 3.4NM NNW of Petersfield], to create additional space from the glider launch sites. They do not recall seeing a glider at Petersfield and neither did their passengers when asked. If something was seen at the time and forgotten, it would mean that they viewed it as a non-threat.

¹ The pilot of the PA28 reported that an EC device was fitted to their aircraft but it was "*not connected to SkyDemon*".

THE FARNBOROUGH LARS WEST CONTROLLER reports that they have no recollection of this event.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Odiham was recorded as follows:

METAR EGVO 191220Z AUTO 30008KT 9999 FEW052/// 14/00 Q1025

Analysis and Investigation

NATS Operations Safety Performance and Investigations

Description of the event:

The pilot of [the PA28] reported onto the Farnborough LARS West frequency at 1154:44 (all times UTC) and requested a Basic Service and Odiham MATZ penetration of the western stub. The Farnborough LARS West controller (LF-LARS) issued the pilot with squawk 0432, QNH 1026hPa and a Basic Service, and cautioned the pilot that Lasham gliding site was active and very busy.

At 1213:21 (see Figure 1), prior to the Closest Point of Approach, [the PA28] (0432) displayed Mode C 2700ft and climbing, and [the Shark] (V) displayed Mode C 2500ft and descending, and were on opposite direction tracks.




Figure 1




Figure 2 – Aircraft positions at 1213:47 (2sec before CPA)

There was no record of the pilot of [the Shark] being in contact with Farnborough and neither pilot reported the proximity as an Airprox on the frequency to Farnborough at the time of the event.

Investigation:

The Farnborough LARS West function was split from Farnborough LARS East, North and Approach functions and being operated by the LF-LARS controller.

The [controller's incident report form] stated there was 'high traffic and high RT workload' and RT recordings identified that the LF-LARS had previously cautioned other pilots of reduced Traffic Information due to controller workload and traffic density.

NATS Safety Investigations was notified by the UK Airprox Board on the 28th April 2026 that the pilot of [the Shark] had submitted an Airprox report in relation to the event. Safety Investigations contacted Farnborough ATC to notify the Unit of the report, however, the LF-LARS stated they had no recollection of the event.

CAP774 UK Flight Information Services Chapter 2.1 states:

'Basic Service relies on the pilot avoiding other traffic, unaided by controllers/ FISOs. It is essential that a pilot receiving this ATS remains alert to the fact that, unlike a Traffic Service and a Deconfliction Service, the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight'.

The pilot of [the PA28] had contacted Farnborough LARS at 1154:44 and requested, and was issued with, a Basic Service. The LF-LARS did not issue any Traffic Information to the pilot of [the PA28] prior to the event and neither pilot reported the Airprox on the LARS frequency.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft could be positively identified from Mode S data. Neither aircraft was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.

Both pilots kindly supplied GPS track data for their respective flights. It was by combining the data sources that the diagram was constructed and the separation at CPA determined. The altitudes shown in the diagram have been rounded.

The Shark and PA28 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.³ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the Shark.⁴

Comments

AOPA

This is another Airprox where electronic conspicuity [equipment] could have assisted pilots had there been an integrated system. Similarly, by requesting a Traffic Service in this area, the controller could have alerted the pilots to a possible mid-air collision as the controller would have been more focussed on the aircraft involved (and both parties had operational transponders). If a pilot is refused a service, or entry to airspace, an FCS1522⁵ form should be filed by them. It is believed that the BGA organises free FRTOL courses for their members; it is hoped that this event will spur more glider pilots to gain a FRTOL.

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

⁴ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

⁵ UK Airspace Access or Refusal of ATS Report:

<https://applications.caa.co.uk/CAAPortal/servlet/SmartForm.html?formCode=fcs1522>

BGA

The Shark pilot sighted the PA28 late as it turned into their path. Having taken the responsible decision to fit both [glider-focussed EC device] and a Mode S transponder, they might have taken the small further step of connecting them together so that the transponder delivered ADS-B Out. In this case though, even if the Shark had ADS-B Out, the PA28 pilot would not have seen the transmission because their [EC device] was not connected to a display, making it of distinctly limited utility and not providing situational awareness.

However, fitting the Shark with ADS-B In (for example by installing a glider-focused EC unit with ADS-B In), they might have had situational awareness of the PA28 and avoided the encounter.

The pilot of the Shark was not taking a service from any ATSU and Farnborough LARS would have been the obvious choice. However, a Basic Service would not necessarily have improved their lot (as the PA28 pilot discovered) and a higher level of service would likely have detracted from the accurate flying required to stay airborne.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an HpH Shark and a PA28 flew into proximity at Petersfield at 1214Z on Sunday 19th April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC. The Shark pilot was not in receipt of a FIS and the PA28 pilot had been in receipt of a Basic Service from Farnborough LARS West.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, GPS track data for the flights of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the Shark. Members agreed that the EC device fitted to the Shark would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the PA28 (**CF5**) and, as there had not been a common frequency in use between the pilots, members agreed that they had not had situational awareness of the PA28 until it had been visually acquired (**CF4**). Members noted that the pilot of the Shark had first sighted the PA28 at a range of less than 500m, and agreed that that constituted a late sighting (**CF6**). It was noted that the Shark pilot had considered that there had not been sufficient time to have taken any meaningful avoiding action.

Members next turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the PA28. It was noted that, reportedly, an EC device had been fitted to their aircraft but that it had not been connected to their SkyDemon display. This, members pointed out, had rendered it unable to have alerted the PA28 pilot to the proximity of nearby traffic. Further, no ADS-B Out emissions had been observed from the PA28, and members noted that the EC device had, therefore, not served as an ADS-B 'beacon' either. It was surmised that the device had not been switched on. Members next discussed the selection of a service, and agreed that, under the terms of a Basic Service, the pilot of the PA28 would not have expected to have received any Traffic Information, and that they had remained responsible for avoiding other traffic without any assistance from the controller. Members noted that the pilot of the PA28 had adapted their initial plan by deviating from their 'magenta line' in order to have provided extra space from glider sites. However, it was suggested that, as they had planned to pass through particularly busy airspace, it would have been prudent to have considered further mitigations for the avoidance of conflict with other traffic. Members agreed that the selection of a surveillance-based service may have provided them with pertinent Traffic Information along their route (**CF3**). Members agreed that the PA28 pilot had not had situational awareness of the Shark (**CF4**) and that they had not sighted it at any stage during the encounter (**CF7**).

Turning their attention to the actions of the Farnborough controller, members agreed that they had not been required to have monitored the flight of the PA28 under the terms of a Basic Service (**CF1**).

Nevertheless, it was noted that the controller had passed a generic caution to the PA28 pilot that Lasham gliding site had been active and very busy. Whilst there may have been an opportunity, if the conditions had allowed, for a controller to have noticed a possible conflict and to have passed Traffic Information to a pilot in receipt of a Basic Service, members noted that, in this particular case, there had been a high level of traffic and a high RT workload at the time of the encounter. Further, members noted that the controller had previously cautioned other pilots of reduced Traffic Information due to controller workload and the density of traffic. It was agreed by members that the transponder codes selected by the pilots had been outside the select frame of the STCA in use at the Farnborough position (CF2). Members agreed that there had been little else that the controller could have done to have assisted matters in this case.

Concluding the discussion, member's thoughts turned to the matter of the risk of collision. It was noted that several safety barriers had either not been present, or had not been fully effective, during the encounter. Members noted that the pilot of the Shark had sighted the PA28 late (and, perhaps, too late to have taken any meaningful action) and the pilot of the PA28 had not sighted the Shark at all. Members noted that neither pilot had been able to have generated an increase in the separation between their aircraft, but it had been fortunate that there had been approximately 320ft vertically between them as their tracks had crossed. It was agreed that safety margins had been reduced, but members were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026050			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Situational Awareness and Action				
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
2	Technical	• Conflict Alert System Failure	Conflict Alert System did not function as expected	The Conflict Alert system did not function or was not utilised in this situation
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
3	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
5	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
• See and Avoid				
6	Human Factors	• Identification/Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁶

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Farnborough controller had not been required to have monitored the flight of the PA28 under the terms of a Basic Service.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **not used** because the selected transponder codes had been outside the select frame of the STCA in use at the Farnborough position.


Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because it may have been prudent for the pilot of the PA28 to have been in receipt of a surveillance-based service.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the EC device fitted to the Shark would not have been expected to have detected the presence of the PA28.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the Shark had visually acquired the PA28 late. The pilot of the PA28 had not sighted the Shark.



⁶ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).