


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026049

Date: 19 Apr 2026 Time: 1131Z Position: 5342N 00127W Location: 2NM NE of Wakefield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Sportcruiser	Pioneer
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Listening Out
Provider	Leeds/Bradford Radar	Leeds/Bradford Radar
Altitude/FL	~1825ft	NK
Transponder ¹	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, blue	White, blue, red
Lighting	Strobe	Strobes, nav, anti-coll
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1800ft	~2000ft
Altimeter	QNH (1025hPa)	QNH
Heading	100°	'westerly'
Speed	105kt	~115kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho+FLARM	SkyEcho
Alert	None	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/20m H	Not seen
Recorded	NK V/<0.1NM H	



THE SPORTCRUISER PILOT reports that, whilst flying around the control zone and receiving a Basic Service, they became aware of a commercial aircraft being vectored to final approach over them and momentarily pointed this out to their passenger. The Sportcruiser pilot then brought their eyes back into the cockpit and saw a light aircraft suddenly appear slightly ahead from beneath their starboard wing passing right-to-left. The aircraft was close enough to read the registration on the fuselage, but [they] could not recall it. It was then that the Sportcruiser pilot had pitched up to increase the vertical distance as the other aircraft disappeared under the nose of their aircraft. After a few seconds, the Sportcruiser pilot had seen the aircraft off their port wing continuing on a northeasterly track, and felt that it was no longer in conflict. The radio was very busy at the time and it took a few minutes to report the Airprox. Although other traffic was visible, this traffic was not seen on SkyDemon. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE PIONEER PILOT reports that they had been flying VFR from [...] to [...] following a regular route in Class G airspace. They saw no other aircraft and had not been aware of any Airprox.

THE LEEDS/BRADFORD RADAR CONTROLLER reports that at 1135 the Sportcruiser from [...] to [...] was transiting outside CAS under a Basic Service [and the pilot] advised that they had had an "Airprox in the Pontefract area and would be filing a report." Due to severe limits of radar coverage, the Sportcruiser occasionally appeared on radar but, for the vast majority of this transit, the controller

¹ Both pilots report equipment with an A/C/S transponder but neither show on radar at or around CPA. Transponder signals from both aircraft were detected at other times.

[reports that] they had been monitoring all aircraft in relation to their ground position. The other aircraft involved in this Airprox was never seen on radar.

Factual Background

The weather at Leeds/Bradford Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGNM 191120Z VRB05KT 9999 SCT045 10/00 Q1026=

Analysis and Investigation

Leeds/Bradford Safety Investigation

Final report for reported Airprox event that occurred on 19th April 2026. Event time as per the report had been 1135. Ricochet was reviewed on 26th April 2026.

The Sportcruiser was visible only intermittently throughout its time on frequency, and not visible at all when the Airprox was reported. At the reporting time, a faint primary return could be observed north of Pontefract tracking east but it was not possible to determine if this was the conflict aircraft and was not visible until after the event.

CAA ATSI

ATSI has nothing to add to the Leeds report other than noting the poor radar coverage and that the Sportcruiser pilot was under a Basic Service –.

UKAB Secretariat

The Sportcruiser was seen on radar, although intermittently, and not until CPA +45sec. The Pioneer did not appear on radar. Both aircraft were displayed on the CAA's Airspace Analyser tool and the diagram at page 1 was constructed using that information. The Pioneer did not show a stable altitude reference (fluctuating between 1000ft and 43,000ft in the period of +/- 1min of CPA) and a direct altitude comparison is therefore not possible to determine.

The Sportcruiser and Pioneer pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Sportcruiser pilot was required to give way to the Pioneer.³ If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the Sportcruiser pilot had right of way and the Pioneer pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.⁴

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Sportcruiser and a Pioneer flew into proximity 2NM east of Wakefield at 1131Z on Sunday 19th April 2026. The Sportcruiser pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Leeds/Bradford, and the Pioneer pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been Listening Out on the Leeds/Bradford Radar frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

⁴ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

Board members firstly discussed the actions of both pilots, noting that they had been operating under Visual Flight Rules in Class G airspace with the Sportcruiser pilot having established themselves under a Basic Service with Leeds/Bradford Radar whilst the Pioneer pilot had been monitoring that same frequency. Members suggested that, where possible, pilots should aim to secure the highest level service possible to meet their needs at the time. In this case, they advised that a Traffic Service may have produced Traffic Information and helped to avoid the reported event (**CF3**). The Board was pleased to note that both aircraft had been equipped with compatible electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment but that, in this case, neither had received notification of the presence of the other aircraft (**CF5**) which had been unfortunate. The lack of EC alerts and with no Traffic Information having been passed, meant that neither pilot had gained any situational awareness of the proximity of the other aircraft (**CF4**). Members felt that it had been fortunate that, as the Pioneer pilot reports not having visually acquired the Sportcruiser, the Sportcruiser pilot had gained very late sight of the crossing Pioneer (**CF6**) and had been able to initiate an avoidance action to increase separation. The Board acknowledged that this was a prime example of VFR operations in Class G airspace, with two aircraft on a constant bearing from each other with little vertical separation, no TI and no EC warnings and was a timely reminder to all to utilise all available aids to improve situational awareness.

In reviewing the contribution from the Leeds/Bradford Radar controller, members noted that one of the key radar sites serving their air picture had been, at the time of the event, unserviceable and had reduced their ability to generate an optimum view of surrounding events (**CF1**). The safety investigation highlights the intermittent nature of the radar returns in that area and, as the Pioneer pilot had been passively monitoring their frequency, and there had been no requirement for the controller to pass Traffic Information (had there been any) to the Sportcruiser pilot under a Basic Service (**CF2**), there had been little more that they could have done in this case.

The Board, in assessing a Risk category for this event, noted that a combination of restricted Traffic Information, no reported interaction between compatible EC units and with both aircraft on a constant and co-altitude bearing, it had been fortunate that the Sportcruiser pilot had gained visual contact, albeit late, with the Pioneer and had initiated avoidance action. Members considered that safety had not been assured (**CF7**) and, as such, assigned Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026049			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Manning and Equipment			
1	Technical	• Radar Coverage	Radar Coverage	Non-functional or unavailable
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
2	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
3	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			

6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
• Outcome Events				
7	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Manning and Equipment were assessed as **partially effective** because the radar system was subject to maintenance work and had not been able to effectively track either aircraft.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **not used** because the Leeds/Bradford Radar controller was not required to monitor the flight of the Sportcruiser under the terms of a Basic Service.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because both the Sportcruiser and Pioneer pilots could have sought a Traffic Service from Leeds/Bradford Radar.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any situational awareness of the presence of the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because both pilots report having been equipped with conspicuity equipment capable of receiving electronic emissions from the other aircraft but neither had done so.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because the Pioneer pilot had not seen the Sportcruiser and the Sportcruiser pilot had visually acquired the Pioneer only at a very late stage.

⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

