# AIRPROX REPORT No 2026048

Date: 18 Apr 2026 Time: 1223Z Position: 5150N 00107W Location: 7.5NM E Oxford Airport

## PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

| Recorded | Aircraft 1 | Aircraft 2 |
|---|---|---|
| Aircraft | DG200 glider | C182 |
| Operator | Civ Gld | Civ FW |
| Airspace | London FIR | London FIR |
| Class | G | G |
| Rules | VFR | VFR |
| Service | Listening Out | Basic[1] |
| Provider | CGFF[2] | Oxford Radar |
| Altitude/FL | ~3080ft | ~3100ft |
| Transponder | Not fitted | A, C, S+ |
| **Reported** | | |
| Colours | White | White/red/blue |
| Lighting | Not fitted | Nav, land, strobe |
| Conditions | VMC | VMC |
| Visibility | >10km | >10km |
| Altitude/FL | 2825ft turn & climb | 2300ft climbing |
| Altimeter | QFE (NK hPa) | QNH (1022hPa) |
| Heading | 260° | 120° |
| Speed | 45kt | 110kt |
| ACAS/TAS | FLARM | PilotAware |
| Alert | None | None |
| | **Separation at CPA** | |
| Reported | 20ft V/100m H | 200ft V/0.5NM H |
| Recorded | <100ft V/<0.1NM H | |




**THE DG200 PILOT** reports flying around Silverstone and heading to the Oakley area, exploring the available thermals of the good soaring conditions, listening out on a Common Glider Field Frequency. They were circling left-hand and climbing and, after a few turns, saw the other aircraft pass to their left, very close, in the opposite direction, probably within their turn diameter, so too late to take avoiding action. They assumed [the other pilot] had not seen them. [The other aircraft] had come from the Oxford Airport direction. They noted the time and altitude and were shocked at what had happened. They had [common glider-specific TAS] fitted as gliders routinely fly close but it won't warn of aircraft using a different system. [The DG200 pilot commented that the other aircraft pilot] must have seen them finally and been equally shocked at what could have happened in Class G airspace.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE C182 PILOT** reports conducting an initial Instrument Rating Test, comprising an RNP approach at Cranfield followed by a radar vectored ILS at Oxford before completing the general handling element and returning to [destination airfield]. The Airprox occurred approximately 3min after the go-around at Oxford. The instruction from ATC for the go-around was "on track WEZCO climbing to 2500ft" and, after the go-around and the left turn, Oxford Tower instructed them to change to Radar. They had checked in with Radar and they believed they had been given a Traffic Service and been told "own navigation, no further height restriction" when the glider was sighted 100ft above and 0.5NM ahead. [Both crew members] saw it at the same time, slightly above and turning from their left-to-right and [the candidate] immediately pitched the aircraft to a descent and turned left to pass the glider underneath and behind. They both remarked that they would have expected to be warned by ATC of the glider's position in

[1] Although the FIS agreed between the Oxford radar controller and the C182 pilot had been a Traffic Service. See Part B.
[2] Common Glider Field Frequency (CGFF).

relation to Oxford's ATZ but assumed that the controller was also not aware of its position or proximity. The remainder of the test was completed without further incident.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

**THE OXFORD RADAR CONTROLLER** reports they were made aware of the Airprox, when they were operating solo as the radar controller, [11 days after it had occurred]. As no Airprox report was made by the pilot at the time, they had no recollection of the event, and their report was based on review of the radar and RTF recordings. [The C182] was departing VFR from a training approach to RW19 at Oxford, under their own navigation to [destination airfield]. When checking in on frequency the pilot requested a Traffic Service, which was agreed after telling the pilot they were identified (they were previously identified and under a Traffic Service during their training approach). At the time, the controller was vectoring [the pilots of] two aircraft, one of whom had checked in only about 11NM north of Oxford for a pre-booked IFR training approach. Due to their relatively close range there was a period of increased workload to place the training aircraft under a service, begin vectoring and descending them for positioning, establishing the routeing of another aircraft near the final approach in case any deconfliction was necessary, passing missed-approach instructions to the training flight [pilot], and coordinating that aircraft's arrival with the Tower controller. The apparent Airprox was visible on the radar recording based on the time given. They did not pass Traffic Information to [the C182] on [the other] aircraft, and did not recall observing the Airprox at the time. They recognised that the traffic met the definition of 'relevant traffic'. They believed that the briefly increased workload and focused attention associated with handling the training aircraft, to whom they were passing missed-approach instructions when the Airprox occurred, reduced their ability to pass Traffic Information to [the C182 pilot]. At that time their increased workload was short-lived enough that they did not believe they would have considered limiting their radar services due to workload, something which was part of their controlling routine. On reflection, a limitation on the Traffic Service they provided to [the C182 pilot] based on the increased density of unknown traffic ahead of them would have been an appropriate mitigation, regardless of workload.

## Factual Background

The weather at Oxford was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGTK 181220Z 27010KT 240V300 9999 SCT039 14/04 Q1022=
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## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

The NATS radar replay was reviewed and the C182 was identified through Mode S data. Only the C182 was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.

The DG200 and C182 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[3] If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.[4] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C182 pilot was required to give way to the DG200.[5] If the incident geometry is considered as overtaking then the DG200 pilot had right of way and the C182 pilot was required to keep out of the way of the other aircraft by altering course to the right.[6]

[3] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[4] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.
[5] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.
[6] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(3) Overtaking.

**Oxford Occurrence Investigation**

1213:18 – [C182 C/S], turn left heading two-three-zero degrees, cleared ILS approach, runway one-nine

1213:25 – Turn left heading two-three-zero degrees, cleared for the ILS one-nine, [C182 C/S]

1214:29 – [C182 C/S], six miles, contact Tower one-three-three decimal four-three-zero

1214:32 – [C182 C/S] to Tower, one-three-three decimal four-three-zero and established on the localiser

1214:39 – Roger

1217:53 – (Tower) [C182 C/S] goes around at one-eight

1217:54 – (Radar) Roger

1219:25 – Oxford Radar, [C182 C/S], request Traffic Service

1219:32 – [C182 C/S], Oxford Radar, identified, Traffic Service, no level restriction

1219:37 – Traffic Service, no level restriction, [C182 C/S]

1238:25 – [C182 C/S], are you still with me?

1238:29 – Affirm

1238:31 – Roger

1242:43 – [The radar controller was seen to hover the mouse over [C182 C/S] as they manoeuvred approximately 4NM northeast of WEZKO, with two aircraft also manoeuvring in the vicinity, one transponding with no Mode C, the other non-transponding. No Traffic Information was passed.]

1245:39 – [C182 C/S], request frequency change to [destination airfield], [frequency]

1245:42 – [C182 C/S], squawk conspicuity and free call [destination airfield], goodbye

1245:46 – Squawk conspicuity and free call [destination airfield], bye-bye, [C182 C/S]

Controller interview

The radar controller was interviewed on 30th April 2026. Due to the radar controller having little to no recollection of the incident, their account was in line with what was observed when reviewing the RTF/radar recordings for this investigation.

The radar controller was asked four pre-prepared questions:

1. As per CAP 774, when is traffic generally considered to be ‘relevant’? The controller correctly answered if the conflicting aircraft flight profile indicates it will pass within 3NM and 3000ft.

2. As per CAP 774, by when should a controller aim to pass Traffic Information to an aircraft? Again, the controller correctly answered before the conflicting aircraft is within 5NM.

3. When operating as the Radar controller, where would you usually keep strips for aircraft receiving a Traffic Service from Oxford? The radar controller answered that they would keep any aircraft under a Traffic or Deconfliction Service in their middle bay, as is standard practice at the unit.

4. When would you, as the controller, consider reducing services for specific aircraft receiving a Traffic or Deconfliction Service? The controller stated they would/would consider reducing services if:

- Controller workload was high and they might not be able to pass timely Traffic Information.
- There was a chance of not seeing a confliction due to high density of traffic in the FIR.
- An aircraft was operating either close to the limits of surveillance cover or at low level due to pop-up traffic.

During the interview with the controller, they said that having reviewed the RTF/radar recordings, and consulted the flight data-strips, they could possibly have intended to reduce the Traffic Service [C182 C/S] was receiving to a Basic Service because, on the strip, it can clearly be seen the 'TS' is crossed out and replaced with a 'BS', and in doing so moved the strip at the same time as annotating it, but did not actually downgrade the service for [the C182 pilot] over the radio.

In addition to this, the controller stated that they did not remember feeling over-worked, they did not feel fatigued and would not have hesitated to ask for help if they felt the traffic situation required [another Radar position] to be open. They also said that they had no external factors, such as administration tasks, distracting them at that time.

Findings and observations

Analysis

This Airprox appears to have occurred 17min into a 52min session, with the Radar controller operating without the assistance of [another Radar controller], though it was available if required. Traffic levels were generally light, with a 5min spike in traffic between 1218 and 1223.

[C182 C/S] had conducted a training approach at Oxford, going around at 1218, and was operating VFR enroute back to [destination airfield] and in receipt of a Traffic Service from Oxford Radar. At the same time, the Oxford Radar controller was vectoring [the pilots of] two aircraft, one inbound from KENET (aircraft A), and a second which called up approximately 12NM north-northwest of Oxford indicating altitude 3000ft (aircraft B). Due to the late call of (B), there was a period of increased workload for the Radar controller as they had to place (B) under a service, allocate an appropriate heading and level, issue low-approach instructions and pre-note the Tower.

During this, another aircraft (aircraft C) called in the vicinity of (B) requesting a Basic Service whilst doing some general handling. The late calls and associated admin tasks appeared to draw the focus of the Radar controller away from [the C182] and, at some point during this busier period, the strip for [the C182] was annotated to say they were in receipt of a Basic Service and presumably placed in the left-hand bay with other aircraft receiving a Basic Service from Oxford Radar.

When [the C182] had the assumed conflicting aircraft in their 12 o'clock at 1NM, the Radar controller was on the phone to the Oxford Tower controller, pre-noting (B), and at the point it is believed the Airprox occurred, the Oxford Radar controller was issuing low-approach instructions to (B). Nothing was declared on frequency by [the C182 pilot] regarding another aircraft coming in close proximity as they transited back to [destination airfield].

It was clear that the Radar controller was fully aware of their responsibilities when providing [a pilot] with a Traffic Service. Throughout the session they could be seen passing relevant Traffic Information on multiple occasions for transponding and non-transponding aircraft, reducing services as required and passing duty of care Traffic Information to those under a Basic Service. They also answered the interview questions correctly.

Conclusion

At approximately 1222 on 18th April 2026 an Airprox occurred between [a C182] and [a DG200]. [The C182 pilot] was operating [under] VFR in Class G airspace and in receipt of a Traffic Service from Oxford Radar, while [the DG200] appeared to be non-transponding and [its pilot] did not make contact with Oxford Radar at any point. During a spike in traffic and increased controller workload, Traffic Information was not passed to [the C182 pilot], and two aircraft came within close proximity to one another.

Problem statement

Two aircraft flew in such proximity that at least one pilot felt safety was compromised.

Direct cause

Two aircraft were operating in Class G airspace and came within close proximity to each other, with at least one pilot feeling safety was compromised and a collision was possible.

Causal factors

- Traffic Information was not passed to [the C182] to best assist the pilot to 'see and avoid'.

Contributory factors

- An unknown aircraft was operating in the vicinity of a known busy GA airfield and did not contact Oxford Radar to inform them of their intentions and altitude.

- The flight data strip states [the C182 pilot] was under a Basic Service, so the flight was not monitored closely.

- [The C182] strip was believed to have been placed in the incorrect strip bay.

**BGA**

The glider pilot was operating in Class G airspace and quite properly monitoring a Common Glider Field Frequency which is authorised for use within 10NM and up to 3000ft QFE from certain airfields. This will have provided the pilot with situational awareness with respect to some other gliders operating in the area and airfield status in the event that they needed to land at Weston on the Green.

A courtesy call to Oxford by the glider pilot (provided they held a FRTOL) might have improved flight safety. However, managing an ongoing service from Oxford (if one were available) while working to stay airborne might in fact have degraded flight safety.

A glider climbing in a thermal typically completes one 360° turn every 20sec, during which time an aircraft approaching at 110kt would cover 0.6NM. The pilot of a thermalling glider must look for aircraft approaching from every direction; although continuously turning facilitates 360° lookout, it also leaves the pilot unsighted in any specific direction for about half the time. The difficulties of sighting another aircraft approaching head-on with little relative motion are well-known, and may also have contributed to the late sighting by the glider pilot.

The electronic conspicuity system carried in the DG200 (and almost all UK gliders) provides information (as the pilot reports) about location of, and in particular collision risk with, other gliders. This is the greatest collision risk facing gliders, but basic installations do not detect aircraft equipped only with transponders or ADS-B Out, as the C182 was in this case. However, recent versions of this EC equipment can optionally include a 1090MHz receiver and thereby warn of conflicts with transponder and ADS-B Out equipped aircraft. Updating glider EC hardware to include a 1090MHz receiver provides a useful additional safety barrier in airspace with a high density of transponder or ADS-B Out equipped aircraft.

The TAS fitted to the Cessna 182 primarily provides protection for and from similarly equipped aircraft but also, subject to a small subscription being paid, relayed visibility of GPS-derived FLARM, ADS-L and ADS-B beacons, and Mode S/C targets through multilateration. There appear to be sufficient ground stations in the area. It is not known whether the subscription had been paid or whether the collision alert failed for other reasons.

BGA makes no comment on the provision of a Traffic Service to the Cessna but does note that the 3D location of the glider was freely available to controllers, courtesy of another collaborative network of ground stations. Consulting this source would have highlighted that the DG200 and the Cessna were operating at similar altitudes in the same vicinity. That it is so hard for controllers to have access to this information continues to jeopardise the safety not only of the gliders using the system and providing the ground network but also the aircraft they share airspace with.

**AOPA comment**

Operating in Class G airspace, see-and-avoid can be assisted by electronic conspicuity, which both aircraft had, but were not compatible. Until the DFT announce their preferred type of system, safety will be compromised. It is also worth noting the BGA comment, that if the glider pilot held a FRTOL, communication with Oxford, a very busy airfield, would have assisted the situational awareness of the controller, who was giving a traffic service to one aircraft, of the glider's position and intentions. Similarly, fitting a transponder to the glider would have assisted.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DG200 glider and a Cessna 182 flew into proximity 7.5NM east of Oxford Airfield at 1223Z on Saturday 18th April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the C182 pilot in receipt of a Traffic Service from Oxford Radar and the DG200 pilot not in receipt of a FIS.

## PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS data, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members first discussed the barriers to mid-air collision available to the pilots. From the DG200 pilot's perspective, it had been a good soaring day but they had only seen the C182 at a late stage, at about CPA and hence effectively a non-sighting (**CF8**) in that they could not have increased separation once they had seen the C182. Similarly, the C182 pilot had seen the DG200 at a late stage (**CF7**) but with sufficient time to have taken some avoiding action. The Board noted the similarity between the DG200 pilot's estimated separation at CPA with the radar/GPS-derived separation and the disparity between those and the C182 pilot's estimation of separation. Members wondered whether the C182 pilot had perhaps lost sight of the DG200 in their avoiding manoeuvre and had underestimated the rate of closure. These late sightings had no doubt occurred as a result of the lack of situational awareness in both cockpits (**CF5**) with regard to the location and proximity of the other aircraft. Each aircraft had been fitted with TAS equipment designed to provide situational awareness, albeit with a different manufacturer and underlying system in each, but neither had alerted. The Board members discussed the compatibility or otherwise of the respective equipments at some length and agreed that while the DG200 TAS could not have detected the C182 because they were incompatible (**CF6**), the C182 TAS could potentially have detected the DG200. However, this latter capability requires that a subscription be paid, and it was not known if the C182 pilot had had the appropriate subscription. Given the lack of alert received, the Board concluded that, on the balance of probability, the C182's TAS had been incompatible with that carried by the DG200 (**CF6**).

Turning to the availability of off-board situational awareness, the C182 pilot had agreed a Traffic Service with the Oxford controller but the controller had inadvertently applied a Basic Service (**CF1**) at some point after the C182 pilot had conducted their missed approach. As a result, the controller had moved

the C182 FPS into the left bay and had not monitored its position, detected a conflict (**CF3**) or passed Traffic Information (**CF2)** on the DG200, which had appeared as a primary track on the Oxford radar. Board members noted that the Oxford controller had been engaged in coordination at around the time of CPA (**CF4**) and, even if they had passed Traffic Information, it would have been on traffic with no known altitude. A controller member noted that the Oxford controller had pre-appended their FPS with 'TS' on the basis that the C182 pilot would likely request the same service when they changed back to the Radar frequency, and commented that they adhered to the advice to 'write as you speak', without adding information in advance. The Board thanked the Oxford controller for their full and frank engagement with both the Oxford ATSU Investigation and the Airprox Board analysis. Pilot members also noted that the C182 pilot had received the non-standard phraseology of 'no level restriction' in the transmission '[C182 C/S], *Oxford Radar, identified, Traffic Service, no level restriction*' and that this may have alerted them that they had in fact not been in receipt of a Traffic Service, or at least that there had potentially been an issue with the service agreed. Some members agreed but others felt this had been too subtle a difference from standard terminology to have been detected and questioned, especially whilst conducting an IR test. A GA member wondered whether the DG200 pilot could usefully have selected the Oxford Radar frequency on their radio and agreed a FIS, thereby providing a degree of additional prompting to the Oxford controller as to their location. Some members agreed, but a gliding member pointed out that the DG200 pilot had been close to their destination airfield and therefore had been building situational awareness for their arrival, by listening out on the relevant frequency.

Turning to risk, members agreed by a majority that safety had been much reduced, Risk B (**CF9**), due to a combination of the lack of situational awareness, both off-board and on-board, late sightings, and separation at CPA.

## PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

| | **2026048** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CF | **Factor** | **Description** | **ECCAIRS Amplification** | **UKAB Amplification** |
| | **Ground Elements** | | | |
| | **• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** | | | |
| 1 | Human Factors | • ATM Regulatory Deviation | An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation. | Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with |
| | **• Situational Awareness and Action** | | | |
| 2 | Human Factors | • ANS Traffic Information Provision | Provision of ANS traffic information | TI not provided, inaccurate, inadequate, or late |
| 3 | Human Factors | • Conflict Detection - Not Detected | An event involving Air Navigation Services conflict not being detected. | |
| 4 | Human Factors | • Task Monitoring | Events involving an individual or a crew/ team not appropriately monitoring their performance of a task | Controller engaged in other tasks |
| | **Flight Elements** | | | |
| | **• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** | | | |
| 5 | Contextual | • Situational Awareness and Sensory Events | Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations | Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness |
| | **• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** | | | |
| 6 | Technical | • ACAS/TCAS System Failure | An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations | Incompatible CWS equipment |
| | **• See and Avoid** | | | |
| 7 | Human Factors | • Identification/ Recognition | Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation | Late sighting by one or both pilots |
| 8 | Human Factors | • Monitoring of Other Aircraft | Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft | Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots |
| | **• Outcome Events** | | | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Contextual | • Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft | An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles | |

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment[7]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Ground Elements:**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance** were assessed as **partially effective** because the Oxford controller had not passed Traffic Information to the C182 pilot.

**Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because the Oxford controller had had no situational awareness of the C182 and DG200 proximity.

**Flight Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had had situational awareness of the other aircraft's proximity.

**Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because the DG200 TAS had not been compatible with the C182's EC and vice versa.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **partially effective** because the DG200 pilot had seen the C182 at about CPA, effectively a non-sighting, and the C182 pilot had seen the DG200 at a late stage and had taken avoiding action.




[7] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.