


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026045

Date: 18 Apr 2026 Time: ~1121Z Position: 5050N 00114W Location: Lee-on-Solent ATZ

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	PA32
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Lee-on-Solent ATZ	Lee-on-Solent ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AFIS	AFIS
Provider	Lee Information	Lee Information
Altitude/FL	NK	900ft
Transponder	A, C	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	White, blue	White
Lighting	Strobes, anti-col, landing, nav	Strobes, landing, taxi
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	1000ft	1000ft
Altimeter	QFE (1021hPa)	QFE
Heading	180°	050°
Speed	90kt	110kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation at CPA		
Reported	0ft V/NR H	NK
Recorded	NK	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that they were joining to the Lee-on-Solent circuit from the north. They reported at Wickham VRP and received Traffic Information about an aircraft that had reported at the Spinnaker Tower VRP, and were told to report joining base leg. As they were about to turn onto base leg, [the pilot of an aircraft] reported downwind and [the Lee AFISO] passed the Traffic Information along. They spotted the aircraft approaching head on and executed an immediate right turn and orbited to separate from it. After completing the orbit, they landed as normal.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE PA32 PILOT reports that they were approaching Lee-on-Solent from the east. They called abeam the Spinnaker Tower as requested. They heard on the radio that a PA28 was approaching from the north. They then called downwind right-hand for RW23 at 1000ft on the QFE, which was acknowledged by [the Lee AFISO]. They were the instructor on board with a very experienced PPL holder. Having heard that there was a PA28 joining from the north, they were both looking out for the other aircraft, but saw nothing ahead. They are a frequent visitor to Lee-on-Solent so they know that they were exactly on the correct track downwind. They believe the [pilot of the] aircraft ahead said that they would join right base for RW23, and that call came after [the pilot of the PA32] was established downwind. [The pilot of the PA32] turned onto base leg at the correct position and still saw no aircraft ahead of them. They would have expected a pilot joining base leg to give way if they were seen to conflict, although this did not stop them from looking for the other aircraft, and would have given way if necessary. They then turned final and called 'final to land', which was acknowledged. They were very surprised to receive an Airprox [notification] submitted by [the pilot of] an aircraft that they had not seen.

THE LEE-ON-SOLENT AFISO reports that, at the date and time of the reported Airprox, the traffic workload was high, though manageable. [The pilot of the PA32] was joining from the east and first called up on Lee Information 118.930MHz to the east of the Spinnaker Tower. They passed the runway

in use (RW23RH) and QNH (1023hPa) and requested [that they] report passing the Spinnaker Tower VRP.

[The pilot of the PA28] was joining from the north and, on initial call up to Lee Information, reported in the Bishops Waltham area. On initial call, they asked [the pilot of the PA28] to standby (to free up the RT frequency as they needed to pass an instruction to [the pilot of] a taxiing aircraft on the ground). They then went back to [the pilot of the PA28] shortly afterwards (within 1min) to provide the airfield information (RW23RH, QNH 1023hPa) and requested they report passing the Wickham VRP.

[The pilot of the PA32] then reported passing the Spinnaker Tower VRP, at which time they passed the QFE (1021hPa) and provided relevant specific Traffic Information, including information regarding [the PA28] joining from the north to report passing Wickham next, and requested [the pilot of the PA32] report joining downwind (for RW23RH).

Approximately three minutes later, [the pilot of the PA28] reported at the Wickham VRP. They passed the QFE (1021hPa) and provided relevant specific Traffic Information, including information regarding [the PA32] joining from the east, last reported Spinnaker Tower three minutes ago, and requested [the pilot of the PA28] report right base for RW23.

Approximately three minutes later, [the pilot of the PA32] reported downwind (for RW23). They provided an update on relevant specific Traffic Information (being the [PA28] joining from the north, last reported passing Wickham to report right base next, and requested [the pilot of the PA32] to report final. [The pilot of the PA32] acknowledged the Traffic Information (though reported 'not visual') and the 'report final' request.

They then immediately asked [the pilot of the PA28] for a position report update. [The pilot of the PA28] reported right base RW23. They could not see a PA28 (or indeed any aircraft) established on right base for RW23, therefore provided an update on traffic (being the joining traffic from the east, [the PA32], whose pilot reported downwind) and asked [the pilot of the PA28] if they were visual with that traffic established downwind. [The pilot of the PA28] replied "*negative, not visual*".

As [the pilot of the PA28] was not visual with the established circuit traffic downwind, [and the pilot of the PA32] was not visual with [the PA28 whose pilot] reported right base, and they could not see [the PA28] established on right base, in that split second they considered there may be a head-to-head traffic conflict between the PA32 (which was by then mid-late downwind) and the PA28 (if [the pilot of the PA28] had reported an early right base joining from the north). [The Lee AFISO] therefore asked [the pilot of the PA28] if they would be happy to give way to the established circuit traffic downwind. [The pilot of the PA28] acknowledged and reported doing an orbit, by which they understood [the pilot of the PA28] would be conducting the orbit to the north-west (remaining outside the established circuit pattern). They replied to [the pilot of the PA28] along the lines of 'roger, thanks, so will be one ahead, the PA32, report re-established right base', which was acknowledged by [the pilot of the PA28]. They then updated [the pilot of the PA32] along the lines of 'the Cherokee joining from the north is orbiting, giving way to you, report final'. [The pilot of the PA32] then reported final RW23 and was allocated the runway: "[PA32 C/S] *RW23 land your discretion, s/w....*". [The pilot of the PA28] then reported right base. They acknowledged, stating "[PA28 C/S], *one ahead on final, report final in turn*".

Factual Background

The entry for Lee-on-Solent in the UK AIP provides the following procedure:

2 Joining and departure procedures.

b. Standard join from the north:

- ii. Downwind for Runway 05 or right base for Runway 23.

c. Standard join from the south, west and east. Aircraft arriving from the south, west and east are suggested to join via Spinnaker VRP, Calshot VRP or Cowes VRP.

The weather at Southampton Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGGH 181120Z 32010KT 290V350 9999 FEW039 SCT049 14/05 Q1022

Analysis and Investigation

Lee-on-Solent Unit Investigation

[The PA28] did not appear on ADS-B Exchange, suggesting either; its transponder was switched off and/or it did not have ADS-B Out, which did not assist with the duty AFISO's situational awareness of its position. The duty AFISO, of course, was providing Traffic Information to [the pilot of the PA28], and relevant Traffic Information regarding [the PA28] to other [pilots], based on last reported positions.

The duty AFISO considers that, in hindsight, they could, and should, have requested [the pilot of the PA28] to report crossing the M27 motorway, as an additional reporting point. This would have prompted the duty AFISO to provide updated Traffic Information on the position of [the PA32] to [the pilot of the PA28]. Traffic Information had been passed when [the pilot of the PA28] reported at Wickham VRP, before they attempted to join right base for RW23 from the north. The duty AFISO regularly does ask [pilots] joining from the north to report crossing the M27 motorway, following their report at the Wickham VRP, so as to provide an update on any reported circuit traffic or other relevant Traffic Information. The duty AFISO is unable to offer an explanation as to why they did not ask [the pilot of the PA28] to report crossing the M27 motorway in this instance, other than they were very busy on the RT at the time managing aircraft ground movements for recently landed station-based and visitor arrivals, station-based departures, and other taxi movement requests.

As part of the investigation, the instructor PIC of [the PA32] reported that relevant specific Traffic Information was passed to them regarding [the PA28] joining from the north (and that the Traffic Information provided by Lee Information AFISOs is generally very good), but that both they and their PPL-qualified passenger did not see [the PA28] ahead on right base, nor orbiting in the downwind and base leg for RW23RH.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and the PA32 could be positively identified from Mode S data. The PA28 was identified by reference to the reported positions and altitude. No Mode C returns were observed on the replay from the PA28 after 1120:06, and primary returns faded after 1120:38. Neither aircraft was observed by reference to ADS-B data sources.




Figure 1 – 1120:38. The PA28 faded from the radar replay on the next sweep.




Figure 2 – The track of the PA32 (MLAT data)

The exact moment of CPA, and the minimum separation, could not be determined. The diagram has been constructed by combining the available data sources. The track of the PA28 has been shown with a dotted line to indicate a probable track.

The PA28 and PA32 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.² An aircraft

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.³

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a PA32 flew into proximity in the Lee-on-Solent ATZ at approximately 1121Z on Saturday 18th April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, and in receipt of an AFIS from Lee Information.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the AFISO involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the pilot of the PA28, and members noted that they had been passed Traffic Information on the PA32 that had been approaching the airfield from the east, "*last reported at the Spinnaker Tower*". It occurred to members that that information had become somewhat 'stale' by the time that the pilot of the PA28 had needed to formulate a plan for sequencing their entry into the circuit pattern. Members agreed that they had had generic situational awareness of the presence of the PA32 but they had not known precisely where it had been (**CF5**). According to their narrative, there had been no further position reports or Traffic Information passed until the pilot of the PA32 had reported downwind a few minutes later.

Members considered the location of the aircraft when certain position calls had been made. A recording of the RT had not been available, and the exact timing of the calls could not be determined. However, it was noted that the AFISO had recalled that, after the pilot of the PA32 had called downwind, they requested the position of the PA28 pilot, who reported right base. When the PA28 pilot was asked by the AFISO if they had visually acquired the PA32 downwind, the PA28 pilot had replied "*negative, not visual*". However, members noted that, in their narrative, the pilot of the PA28 recalled that; "*As they were about to turn onto base leg...they spotted the aircraft approaching head on*". The difference in the accounts could not be fully reconciled. Notwithstanding, according to the PA28 pilot's narrative, members noted that it had not been until "*they were about to turn onto base leg*" that they had heard the pilot of the PA32 call downwind. It was therefore agreed that it may have been prudent to have requested the exact position of the PA32 before they had entered the circuit (**CF4**). Further, it was agreed that the PA28 pilot had not made a sufficiently detailed plan to have ensured that they could have sequenced into the circuit safely (**CF2**). It was concluded that the PA28 pilot had subsequently sighted the PA32 late (**CF6**) and members commended their swift action to have initiated an immediate right turn (instead of a left turn to enter the circuit at the base leg) in order to increase the separation. Nevertheless, members agreed that they had not conformed with, nor had they effectively avoided, the circuit pattern as formed by the PA32 pilot (**CF3**).

Members turned their attention to the actions of the pilot of the PA32, and noted that they had been aware that the PA28 pilot had been approaching from the north. As such, members agreed that they had had generic situational awareness of its presence (**CF5**). Members acknowledged that the pilot of the PA32 had been established in the circuit pattern and noted that they had already called downwind when the pilot of the PA28 had called to join right base for RW23. Whilst it had been for the pilot of the PA28 to have arranged their safe integration into the circuit, members agreed that it would have been reasonable to have anticipated that the PA32 and PA28 might arrive at the same location (the turn from downwind to base leg) at the same time. It was agreed that the pilot of the PA32 had not sighted the PA28 at any stage during the encounter (**CF7**). As such, members also agreed that they had not adapted their plan sufficiently to have ensured the safety of their aircraft (**CF2**) but had, without specific information on the exact position of the PA28 or their proximity to it, assumed (incorrectly) that there would not be a conflict.

³ (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

Members next considered the actions of the Lee AFISO, and it was agreed that, without the use of surveillance equipment, they had had generic, rather than specific, situational awareness of the positions of both aircraft (**CF1**). It was noted that the Lee AFISO had passed Traffic Information on the PA28 to the pilot of the PA32 when they had passed the Spinnaker Tower VRP, and had passed Traffic Information on the PA32 to the pilot of the PA28 when they had passed the Wickham VRP. Further Traffic Information had been passed on the PA28 to the pilot of the PA32 when they had reported downwind. Whilst it was noted that an additional reporting point of 'crossing the M27', or indeed, 'entering the ATZ', may have aided the situational awareness of all involved parties, members noted that the AFISO had been busy attending to other tasks and agreed that sufficient Traffic Information had been passed to have assisted the pilots. Members next pondered the AFISOs transmission to ask the pilot of the PA28 *"if they would be happy to give way to the established circuit traffic downwind"*. Recalling the wording of CAP797 Flight Information Service Officer Manual;

1.16 FISOs are not permitted to issue instructions [...].

1.19 In providing advice to aircraft, FISOs should carefully consider whether such advice could be misconstrued as an instruction and should phrase that advice accordingly. The provision of advice by a FISO should be limited to those occasions where they consider that it is essential for the safe conduct of flight; for example, the provision of advice on local joining procedures to arriving aircraft approaching the traffic circuit.

Members agreed that the Lee AFISO had phrased their question in such a way that it had not been considered an instruction, and agreed that the PA28 had responded by considering their position in the sequence to land and had taken action accordingly.

Concluding their discussion, members agreed that both pilots had had generic situational awareness of the other aircraft but neither pilot had taken timely, positive action to have resolved the somewhat predictable conflict. Members were keen to highlight that neither aircraft had been fitted with an additional EC device and that, had they been equipped with compatible devices, both pilots may have received an alert to the proximity of the other aircraft in plenty of time to have taken early action. Notwithstanding, members agreed that it had been the urgent avoiding action by the pilot of the PA28 (perhaps prompted by the interjection by the AFISO) that had increased the separation at the last minute. Although it had been unfortunate that the PA28 had faded from the radar replay in the moments before CPA, members were satisfied that sufficient information was available to make a sound judgment of risk. It was agreed by members that safety margins had been much reduced, and concluded that there had been a risk of collision (**CF8**). The Board assigned Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026045			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
4	Human Factors	• Lack of Communication	Events involving flight crew that did not communicate enough - not enough communication	Pilot did not request additional information

5	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid				
6	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
• Outcome Events				
8	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk: B.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the Lee AFISO had generic situational awareness of the positions of the PA28 and PA32.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the PA28 had not adapted their dynamic plan sufficiently to have integrated into the pattern of traffic.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because it may have been prudent for the pilot of the PA28 to have requested the position of the PA32 to have assisted with their integration into the circuit pattern.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the pilot of the PA28 visually acquired the PA32 late. The pilot of the PA32 did not sight the PA28.

⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026045		Outside Controlled Airspace				
Barrier		Provision	Application	Effectiveness		
				Barrier Weighting		
				0%	5%	10% 15% 20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓			
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓			
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	!	!			
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●			
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓			
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	!			
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	!	!			
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●			
	See & Avoid	!	!			
Key:		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Not Present/Not Assessable</u>	<u>Not Used</u>
Provision		✓	!	✗	●	
Application		✓	!	✗	●	
Effectiveness						