


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026038

Date: 08 Apr 2026 Time: ~1012Z Position: 5240N 00044W Location: Oakham

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	Prefect	Unknown
Operator	HQ Air (Trg)	Unknown
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	NK
Service	Listening Out	
Provider	Low-Level Common	
Altitude/FL	1070ft	
Transponder	A, C, S+	None
Reported		
Colours	White, blue	NK
Lighting	Strobes, nav	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	650ft AGL	
Altimeter	RPS (1008hPa)	
Heading	021°	
Speed	180kt	
ACAS/TAS	TAS/FLARM	
Alert	None	
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	100ft V/400m H	NK
Recorded	NK	



THE PREFECT PILOT reports that, whilst conducting a low-level navigation exercise, they had been routing north past Oakham approaching a turning point for recovery to [destination airfield]. At 650ft on the RADALT they looked to their 4 o'clock as part of the lookout, picture, instrument work cycle [and] spotted a small, single engine propeller aircraft at the same height, approximately 400m away. There had been no indication on their TAS display. The Prefect pilot rocked their wings to acknowledge presence, but the [other] aircraft [pilot] did not respond. The aircraft had then been clear of conflict at their 7 o'clock. The Prefect pilot put out a radio call on the Low-Level Common frequency [130.490MHz] to state their further intention to route northeast. No response was heard. Subsequently, the Prefect pilot reports having checked their [branded EC equipment] which indicated no aircraft. The sortie then continued as planned. The [other] aircraft was spotted only as part of a lookout scan. No internal indications or planning steps before departure highlighted the aircraft operating in the same area.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE UNKNOWN AIRCRAFT PILOT could not be traced.

Factual Background

The weather at RAF Barkston Heath was recorded as follows:

METAR EGYE 080950Z 21004KT CAVOK 16/08 Q1023 RMK BLU=

Analysis and Investigation

UKAB Secretariat




Figure 1: At CPA (~1011:58). White cross marks reported position of CPA. The Prefect is shown at FL008 (which equates to ~1070ft QNH and, therefore, with the terrain in this area at ~420ft, at 650ft AGL)



Figure 2: Military radar snapshot (not time stamped)




Figure 3: At CPA. Only the Prefect shows on any of the open-source tracking tools available to the Secretariat.

The Prefect was tracked by radar and identified through Mode S data. The unknown aircraft was not visible on NATS radar¹ and did not show on any of the open-source tracking systems available to the Secretariat.

The Prefect and untraced aircraft pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the Prefect pilot was required to give way to the untraced aircraft.³

Comments

HQ Air Command

The Airprox occurred in Class G airspace as the Prefect was routeing NE towards Oakham on a low-level training sortie. The unknown aircraft is [believed to be] civilian operated, so no route information was available on the Centralised Aviation Data Service (CADS). Additionally, there were no related NOTAMs or notified activity in the area and so it was not possible to deconflict the sorties at the planning stage. Due to their height, the Prefect crew were unable to receive an ATS and were listening out on Low-Level Common (LL-Com). They did transmit on LL-Com after the encounter but received no reply so it is unlikely that the pilot of the unknown aircraft was monitoring that frequency. The Prefect is fitted with TAS and [branded EC equipment], but the crew received no warning or indication that the unknown aircraft was in their vicinity. The handling pilot of the Prefect did become visual with the unknown aircraft at 400m in their 4 o'clock and 100ft above them. At this stage, it was clear that the unknown aircraft would pass behind them, so the handling pilot waggled the wings to indicate they had sighted the unknown aircraft.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a Prefect and a unknown aircraft flew into proximity at Oakham at approximately 1012Z on Wednesday 8th April 2026. The Prefect pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been monitoring the Low Level Common frequency. Unfortunately the pilot of the unknown aircraft could not be traced.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of a report from the Prefect pilot and radar photographs/video recordings,. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members discussed this event being cognisant of the limited information available. They noted that the Prefect pilot had been on a planned and well-prepared flight and had been monitoring the Low-Level Common frequency (130.490MHz) as it had been the most appropriate option for the bulk of their flight. They accept that that frequency is not universally considered as an option amongst the General Aviation community and wished to remind all operators in Class G airspace that monitoring and information calls through that channel can help to build their own and others' situational awareness where active Air Traffic Services are not available. Although the Prefect had been equipped with both a TAS and an electronic conspicuity (EC) unit common amongst glider operators, they had received no indications from the untraced aircraft (**CF2**) and the combination of no EC and no RT had left them with no situational awareness of the presence of the untraced aircraft (**CF1**). As the Prefect pilot had first seen the untraced aircraft to their 4 o'clock, with its track taking it further away from the Prefect, members felt the pilot had only sighted the aircraft after it had no longer been a factor – effectively a non-sighting (**CF3**).

¹ An unidentified aircraft was briefly seen as a primary contact on the military radar system at/around CPA (Figure 2).

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity. MAA RA 2307 paragraphs 1 and 2.

³ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging. MAA RA 2307 paragraph 12.

The Board felt that the lack of RT, transponder and electronic conspicuity equipment on the untraced aircraft had significantly contributed to the Secretariat's inability to trace that aircraft and wished to stress the significant added value available of such equipment to a pilot in generation of their situational awareness and that of others in Class G airspace operations. They also wished to remind all that the role of the UK Airprox Board is not to apportion blame, rather to examine the performance of known barriers to and contributing factors for Airprox incidents to enable learning for all.

Concluding their discussion, members determined that the pilot of the Prefect, having seen the untraced aircraft towards their 4 o'clock and then reappearing to their 7 o'clock, had been concerned by its presence without having had any indication by RT or onboard equipment, but had been satisfied that there was no risk of collision. Members agreed that, although the proximity may have been uncomfortable, there had been no risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026038			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
2	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Prefect pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the untraced aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the equipment carried by the Prefect pilot had been unable to register any electronic emissions from the untraced aircraft.

See and Avoid were assessed as **ineffective** because the Prefect pilot had first sighted the untraced aircraft after having passed ahead of it.

⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026038

Outside Controlled Airspace

		Provision	Application	Effectiveness		
Barrier				Barrier Weighting		
		0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance					
	Manning & Equipment					
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance					
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance					
	Tactical Planning and Execution					
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action					
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance					
	See & Avoid					
Key:		<u>Full</u>	<u>Partial</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Not Present/Not Assessable</u>	<u>Not Used</u>
Provision						
Application						
Effectiveness						