


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026037

Date: 08 Apr 2026 Time: 1557Z Position: 5119N 00048W Location: ivo Blackbushe Airport

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	S200	C42
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Blackbushe ATZ ¹	Blackbushe ATZ ¹
Class	D	D
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AFIS	AFIS
Provider	Blackbushe Info	Blackbushe Info
Altitude	1000ft	1300ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Silver	White and green
Lighting	Ldg, nav, strb, taxi	none
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude	800ft AGL	NK
Altimeter	QFE	QFE (1009hPa)
Heading	070°	NK (manoeuvring)
Speed	85kt	70kt
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Not fitted
Separation at CPA		
Reported	50ft V/100m H	Not seen
Recorded	300ft V/0.1NM H	



THE S200 PILOT reports that, on the downwind leg of a left-hand circuit from RW25 at Blackbushe, while maintaining a circuit height of 800ft, they observed an aircraft ahead at a similar height tracking towards the Blackbushe overhead. At that point, the aircraft had not yet established contact with the AFISO at Blackbushe and appeared to be entering the ATZ from the south (Farnborough control zone). Given the track, and the fact that the aircraft appeared to be flying at the Blackbushe circuit height, it seemed that the pilot was on a path to join left base despite not having made contact with the AFISO. They reduced the aircraft's airspeed in an attempt to position behind. When the pilot of the aircraft established contact with the AFISO, it became apparent that their intention was to join overhead and position to the deadside. At that point, they [the S200 pilot] extended the downwind leg by 300m and initiated their descent early in order to position behind and below the traffic. They later made a "possible Airprox" call on the radio to advise the AFISO and the crew of the other aircraft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE C42 PILOT reports that their flight was approximately 55min long and had become quite bumpy in the latter stages of the flight due to thermal conditions. They requested a crossing through Farnborough but were initially held in an orbit at Farnham Castle. They had a non-pilot passenger who was finding the conditions quite difficult. The hold, followed by the very bumpy transit, had made them quite anxious. Farnborough cleared them through the zone under radar control with the usual instructions of 'not above 2000ft'. They aimed to cross at 1800ft (respecting the 200ft separation). However, this was quite turbulent air, and they dropped to approximately 1500ft as [the conditions were] marginally better. The handover to Blackbushe was very late, and so, although they were aware that there were 3 aircraft in the circuit, they had no situational awareness of where they were, which would have been the case had they been on the Blackbushe frequency. Once handed over, they switched the radio to Blackbushe but, due to turbulence, they could not change it cleanly and had to make a second attempt. This further delayed the communications with the airfield. On successful changeover, they had

¹ Both aircraft were operating in the Blackbushe ATZ local flying area (LFA) which sits within the Farnborough Class D CTR.

to wait to transmit. After speaking with the Tower AFISO they were given a QFE of 1009hPa, which was different from what they had expected (they calculated against the QNH given by Farnborough), so they immediately requested confirmation, then set this. As soon as they completed setting the QFE, they saw a red aircraft approaching final below and [to their] left and began their manoeuvre to skirt the edge of the noise-sensitive area to the northeast of the airfield. They were still outside the published circuit track. It was at this point that the pilot of the other aircraft (not the red one on final) indicated that they believed an Airprox event had occurred. Not being able to see the aircraft, but based on their radio transmission indicating the [S200 pilot] had [the C42] in their sights, they attempted to maintain their heading to minimise the risk of escalation. They proceeded to the deadside of the airfield before joining the circuit and completing their approach to land. From the point of first communication with Blackbushe to the point at which they heard the transmission was, by their estimation, no more than 1min.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE BLACKBUSHE AFISO reports that, as they recollect, [the C42 pilot], on initial call, reported that they were crossing the M3 for join. [The AFISO] gave them joining information and Traffic Information on all aircraft within the Blackbushe circuit. The circuit was active with 2 fixed-wing and 1 rotary [aircraft]. [The pilot of the S200] asked to pass a message in which they said there was a near Airprox with the joining aircraft at 800ft on the QFE in the base leg section of the circuit. Once they were notified of this, [the C42] was clear of the other aircraft and routed to the deadside. They did not witness the event as their attention was drawn to the arriving traffic.

Factual Background

The weather at Farnborough Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGLF 081550Z AUTO 23007KT 190V260 9999 NCD 24/12 Q1021

Blackbushe Airport website ATZ, LFA, and RW25 circuit diagram:




Figure 1 – RW25 circuit at Blackbushe

BLACKBUSHE - EGLK AD 2.20:

LOCAL AERODROME REGULATIONS

4 LOCAL FLYING AREA

- a. Within a Local Flying Area (LFA) of 2 NM radius, centred on the aerodrome (511926N 0005051W) excluding that part of the circle on or south of the M3 motorway, and that part north of a line joining positions 511705N 0005508W - 512112N 0004247W. The part north of these positions is existing Blackbushe ATZ.

b. Pilots are required to contain their circuits within the LFA and ATZ. In particular, on Runway 25 note to turn base leg west of Hawley Lake to avoid infringing the CTR to the east. On Runway 07 turn base leg east of The Elvetham Hotel to avoid infringing the CTR to the west. See circuit diagrams on Blackbushe Airport website for more information.

c. Pilots of aircraft operating within LFA are responsible for providing their own separation from other aircraft operating within the LFA. VFR flights may take place within the LFA subject to the following conditions:

- i. In compliance with the Class D Airspace weather minima as defined in ENR 1.4;
- ii. Maximum altitude: 2000 FT QNH.

Analysis and Investigation

Blackbushe Airport

Introduction

On 8th April 2026 a notification was received from the pilot of [the S200] over the airband [radio] of a report of an Airprox. The Blackbushe ATSU then filled an MOR as required for Airprox and it was noted within the Blackbushe internal occurrence reporting system as an occurrence. The pilot of [the S200] subsequently filed an Airprox with the Airprox Board as required. A unit investigation has been conducted as below, including reviewing recordings of the Blackbushe frequency 122.305MHz at the time.

Review

[Redacted reports from the AFISO and S200 pilot (as above) were reviewed].

Timeline

1656:30 [C42 pilot] – *Blackbushe information [C/S] crossing M3 from Farnborough request airfield information for join please.*

1656:38 [AFISO] – [C42 C/S] *Blackbushe information RW25 left-hand circuit, QFE 1009 report established deadside circuit traffic C172 final to land, Sonaca [S200] base leg and a rotary downwind.*

1656:54 [The C42 pilot asked for the QFE to be repeated, and this was answered].

1657:02 [C42 pilot] – *1009, 25 left-hand, and not visual but looking for the traffic. Wilco.*

1657:12 [An uninvolved aircraft pilot called on short final and the AFISO responded appropriately].

1657:22 [Another uninvolved aircraft pilot called downwind and the AFISO passed information on the 2 aircraft ahead of them, the 1 on short final and the other turning onto final. This was acknowledged.]

1657:34 [S200 pilot] – [C/S] *Message.*

1657:37 [AFISO] – [S200 C/S] *pass your message.*

1657:40 [S200 pilot] – [C/S] *err near Airprox with [C42 C/S] there. We are at 800ft and they seemed to be same level or [100ft] - 200ft higher.*

1657:55 [The AFISO requested that the S200 pilot call the tower once they had landed].

1658:03 [the AFISO passed landing information to the pilot of the S200, and parking instructions to the previously landed traffic.]

1658:21 [The C42 pilot reported on the deadside and was asked to squawk 7010, which they acknowledged].

[On landing, the pilot of the S200 was given parking instructions at 1659:18. The pilot of the C42 called downwind at 1700:35 and the aircraft landed without incident].

Traces of the Occurrence

[A trace of the S200's circuit patterns was included in the Blackbushe investigation, noting that it] showed quite a wide circuit close to the aerodrome boundary.

CCTV footage

Due to the location of the report, there was no CCTV [footage] of the incident. There was some CCTV [footage] of aircraft overflying the airport boundary fence on final for RW25 from the tower, but this was grainy due to the location of the CCTV cameras.

Review of procedures, legislation, regulation and guidance

Aerodrome Rules & Procedures

5.7 Unless in an emergency, aircraft must observe the Rules of the Air for aerodromes at all times.

10.1.2. From Within Controlled Airspace (south and east), aircraft coming from within the Farnborough CTR shall join overhead at 1600ft AAL to ensure they are within the Local Flying Area (LFA). They shall descend on the deadside and integrate with the visual circuit.

10.2 Downwind, Base Leg, and Long Final joins may be possible depending on circuit traffic, but pilots are advised to plan for a standard join to avoid circuit conflicts if the circuit is busy.

SERA

SERA.3201.General

Nothing in this regulation shall relieve the pilot in-command of an aircraft from the responsibility of taking such action, including collision avoidance manoeuvres based on resolution advisories provided by ACAS equipment, as well best avert collision.

SERA.3225 Operation on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome.

An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall:

- (a) observe other aerodrome traffic for the purpose of avoiding collision;
- (b) conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation;

Root Cause Analysis

Whilst investigations by the Airprox Board will consider any causal factors relating to pilot action and the operation of aircraft, this unit investigation is focussed on any causal factors within the control of Blackbushe ATSU.

The [C42] appeared to join between 800-1000ft AAL according to the report by [the S200 pilot] and the published overhead join is 1600ft AAL. The aircraft joining at a lower altitude would put itself in direct conflict with existing circuit traffic. The AFISO gave information on all the circuit traffic at the time of the incident.

Root cause correction (new procedures)

Blackbushe Airport will undertake to provide a copy of this Airprox to AFISOs and Air Ground Operators to increase awareness of potential Airprox risks in joining from the south and inside the Blackbushe ATZ.

The Blackbushe Safety Action Group (June/Sept 2026) provides an opportunity to disseminate safety information to resident flying schools and operators.

New procedures not required.

Conclusion

Blackbushe Airport Flying Procedures

It is felt the Blackbushe Aerodrome published procedures worked as intended but were not necessarily followed. [The C42 pilot] appeared to join lower than the published altitude and this was the main factor in the conflict.

Blackbushe ANSP Procedures

From the perspective of the Aerodrome AM and ATSU manager, the safety of any of the aircraft within this report was not reduced by the operation as observed – it is not believed the Airprox could have been further mitigated by the actions of the Blackbushe AFISO/Blackbushe Information.

Blackbushe ATO Procedures

The instructor concerned was maintaining a good lookout and was visual with the aircraft joining from the south and took evasive action to avoid a potential conflict, highlighting the importance of lookout whilst in the ATZ. This subject will be discussed further at an upcoming instructor meeting.

CAA ATSI

Analysis and Comments.

According to the Blackbushe transcript the C42 [pilot] called the Blackbushe AFISO at 1656:30.

The C42 was already within the circuit both laterally and vertically when the pilot made their first call to the Blackbushe AFISO, with a C172 ahead on left-base, about to turn final to RW25, and the S200 late downwind. There was a third aircraft in the circuit, not visible on the radar replay at this time as it was in the climb-out from the runway (Figures 2 and 3).




Figure 2- deduct 325ft from the altitudes indicated for height aal



Figure 3 - aircraft positions relative to Blackbushe and the M3 junctions

The AFISO passed Traffic Information to the C42 pilot on all the other aircraft in the circuit and requested a call from the C42 pilot on the deadside.

The C42 pilot did route to the overhead and deadside but remained at a height of 1000ft.

ATSI reviewed what notification and coordination procedures exist between Blackbushe and Farnborough ATSUs:

- The Blackbushe SFISO reported that no such procedure exists. Only IFR inbounds are prenoted to them by Farnborough. VFRs inbound from the south/southeast through the Farnborough CTR are transferred without any warning to Blackbushe, once the aircraft has crossed the M3.
- Blackbushe has no FIDS. Also, ironically, during a review of an ADS-B tracking website post-incident by the Blackbushe investigator, only the S200 was visible.
- This was confirmed by a review of the Farnborough MATS Pt2 but which includes a requirement that: "Traffic within Controlled Airspace on own navigation shall be instructed to remain outside the Blackbushe ATZ/LFA, unless prior notification has been given to Blackbushe ATSU" It is not known what was passed to the C42 pilot by the Farnborough controller, and at what point the pilot was instructed to change frequency to Blackbushe.

According to the UK AIP, the Blackbushe circuit height is 800ft with an option to climb to 1200ft if appropriate and the pilot's intentions are communicated to Blackbushe ATSU. Aircraft joining via the Farnborough CTR from the south are to route to the overhead at a height of 1600ft.

The circuit traffic was at 800ft, but the C42 - by the pilot's own admission - was already below 1600ft at 1000ft QFE due to turbulence.

Blackbushe also publishes its procedures on the airport website, which includes an option for pilots who are in the vicinity of Junction 4 of the M3 to route to the east and north of the noise-sensitive areas of Blackwater, Frogmore and Yateley, to then join the circuit from the north via the overhead. This routeing is not published in the AIP.

Due to limits on the provision of an Aerodrome Flight Information Service, Blackbushe AFISOs are unable to direct pilots to specifically follow this routeing (Figure 4).




Figure 4 – Blackbushe Standard VFR joins

Greater use of the M3 J4 by pilots joining from the Farnborough CTR should they find themselves below 1600ft QFE for reasons such as in this case, turbulence or other weather phenomena, would give both Blackbushe ATSU and the pilots time to assimilate the traffic situation to either then route direct to the overhead from there, or as advised by the Blackbushe website, via the east and northeast.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft were identified using Mode S data. CPA was assessed to have occurred at 1556:58 with 300ft vertical and 0.1NM lateral separation (Figure 5). The S200 and C42 remained 0.1NM apart laterally for approximately 12sec as the S200 continued its descent and the C42 passed 600ft above the S200 at 1557:04.




Figure 5 – Time 1556:58

Further analysis of third party software was undertaken, and neither aircraft was detected using ADS-B data sources. Intermittent aircraft tracking was available via MLAT sources, and the C42 was detected passing overhead the S200 at approximately 1557:04 (Figure 6).




Figure 6 – Time ~1557:04 vertical separation 600ft

The S200 and C42 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.³

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an S200 and a C42 flew into proximity in the vicinity of Blackbushe airfield at 1557Z on Wednesday 8th April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an AFIS from Blackbushe Information.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the AFISO involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the S200 pilot, and noted that they had been downwind to land on RW25 at Blackbushe when they had first seen the C42 approaching the overhead. Members noted that the pilot had had no situational awareness of the presence of the C42 (**CF7**) prior to sighting it, as the pilot of the C42 had not made their initial call to Blackbushe until shortly after the S200 pilot had seen them. The Board was mindful that the S200 had not been fitted with additional electronic conspicuity (EC) equipment and that the pilot had had no potential opportunity of being forewarned of the C42's presence by the use of EC, rather than RT communications alone. The Board acknowledged that the S200 pilot had slowed down to allow the C42 to pass in front of them, believing the aircraft to be positioning for a left base join to RW25, before they had realised that the C42 had actually been positioning via the overhead to the deadside. Members agreed that the S200 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the C42 due it having been closer to circuit height than expected for an aircraft joining from the south (**CF9**).

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

³ (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

The Board then considered the actions of the C42 pilot, noting that the pilot had been challenged with both rough flying conditions and an unsettled passenger. Members wondered whether the C42 pilot may have been rushing to get their passenger on the ground, rather than allowing themselves sufficient time to adjust their flightpath and correctly follow the Blackbushe joining procedures by joining overhead at 1600ft (**CF3**, **CF5**). The Board acknowledged that the C42 pilot had taken more time than originally intended, both in selecting the frequency on handover to Blackbushe and in entering the correct pressure setting on their altimeter after having miscalculated it. Members were sympathetic to the C42 pilot's circumstances and suggested that, had their passenger been unwell, then the pilot could have made a PAN call and initiated a more expeditious approach to land. However, the Board agreed that the joining procedure had been incorrectly executed (**CF4**) and that the pilot had not sufficiently avoided the active circuit pattern, having disrupted the S200 pilot's circuit on the downwind leg (**CF6**). The Board considered that the event had occurred shortly after the C42 pilot had been transferred to the Blackbushe frequency, and members agreed that the pilot would only have had generic situational awareness of the presence of circuit traffic in the vicinity of the airfield (**CF7**), but no specific positions of that traffic. The Board felt that it was unfortunate that neither aircraft had been fitted with additional EC equipment, and that it may have been beneficial for the C42 pilot to have also had the potential for greater situational awareness presented by such a device. Notwithstanding, the Board agreed that, as it was, the C42 pilot had heard the S200 pilot report a '*possible Airprox*' on the RT but had not seen the aircraft until after CPA (**CF8**).

Turning their attention to the actions of the Blackbushe AFISO, the Board noted that Blackbushe is only prenoted for IFR traffic transferring from the Farnborough CTR, and not VFR traffic. The Board felt that this, combined with the C42 pilot's challenges with a late call to Blackbushe, had contributed to the AFISO having had late situational awareness of the presence of the C42 (**CF2**) and had affected their ability to pass Traffic Information on the C42 to other circuit traffic any sooner (**CF1**).

In finalising its discussion, the Board noted that the S200 pilot had seen the C42 prior to having received any information on the C42 pilot's intentions and had been able to take effective action based on their perception of having seen an aircraft potentially entering left base for RW25. Members agreed, therefore, that although safety had been degraded, there had been no risk of collision. As such, the Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026037			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Human Factors	• ANS Traffic Information Provision	Provision of ANS traffic information	TI not provided, inaccurate, inadequate, or late
2	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
3	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
4	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
5	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
6	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			

7	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid				
8	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
9	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:


Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Blackbushe AFISO had late situational awareness of the presence of the C42.

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the C42 pilot had not followed the promulgated joining procedures for Blackbushe.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the C42 pilot had not conformed with, nor sufficiently avoided, the pattern of traffic already formed in the Blackbushe circuit.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the S200 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the C42, and the C42 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the possibility of circuit traffic in the Blackbushe circuit pattern.



⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).