


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2026036**

Date: 06 Apr 2026 Time: 1232Z Position: 5252N 00258W Location: ivo Babbinswood

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	C152
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Listening Out
Provider	London Info	London Info
Altitude/FL	FL046	FL046
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	White	White/blue.
Lighting	Nav, beacon, land	Nav, strobe
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	4570ft descending	FL045
Altimeter	QNH (1024hPa)	SPS (1013hPa)
Heading	050°	270°
Speed	121kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
	<b>Separation at CPA</b>	
Reported	0ft V/0.5NM H	50ft V/100m H
Recorded	0ft V/0.2NM H	



**THE PA28 PILOT** reports that they were flying a leg from [overhead] Welshpool to Elsmere Lake at [altitude] 5000ft, QNH 1024hPa given to them by London Information, on a Basic Service. They noticed the heading of [an aircraft] was moving erratically on their [TAS display], initially giving them the impression [it was] orbiting west of Sleaf. They were not in sight of the traffic and, due to its movements on [the TAS display], they were unsure if the information was reliable. They proceeded with the leg and both they and the passenger continued to keep a lookout for the traffic. During the start of the descent, heading towards Elsmere Lake, they passed [C152 C/S] at the 2 o'clock position and made a slight left-hand turn. Around 1min after the sighting they heard [C152 C/S] contact London Information and request a Basic Service [with their routing]. They did not report the incident in the air [as the] frequencies were very busy.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE C152 PILOT** reports that they had just levelled out at FL045 heading west towards the Welsh hills. They believed that they were waiting to get a call in to London Information to get a Basic Service. The frequency was busy. Shawbury was closed. When they saw the aircraft passing left-to-right, in front and slightly above, it was already moving away from their flightpath.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

**THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO** reports they had been advised through the UK Airprox Board that the pilot of [PA28 C/S] reported an Airprox. This was not reported on the R/T and therefore they had no knowledge of the event.

## Factual Background

The weather at RAF Shawbury was recorded as follows:

METAR EGOS 061250Z AUTO 17014KT 9999 NCD 13/00 Q1024=  
 METAR EGOS 061220Z AUTO 16012KT 9999 NCD 13/03 Q1024=

## Analysis and Investigation

### UKAB Secretariat

The PA28 and C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.<sup>1</sup> If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the PA28 pilot was required to give way to the C152.<sup>2</sup> The C152 transponder code changed to the allocated London Information code about 4min after CPA. The Airprox C152 was not emitting ADS-B Out and so could not be detected by the PA28 TAS. UKAB Secretariat analysis of the radar picture established an aircraft in the circuit at Sleaf that was emitting ADS-B Out and was likely the aircraft identified by the PA28 pilot on their TAS.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a C152 flew into proximity near Babbinswood at 1232Z on Bank Holiday Monday, 6<sup>th</sup> April 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the PA28 pilot in receipt of a Basic Service from London Information and the C152 pilot listening-out on the London Information frequency, shortly before establishing a Basic Service.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings and a report from the FISO involved. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members discussed the pilots' actions and commented that an Airprox could best be analysed if it was declared on frequency at the time. The Board also recognized that an Airprox might be filed after flight and upon reflection. In the event, on the Bank Holiday Monday in question, neither pilot had been operating in an area where they could have obtained a surveillance-based FIS, with one in communication with London Information, in receipt of a Basic Service only (**CF1**), and the other in the process of establishing a service with the same ANSP. The Board agreed, therefore, that neither pilot had had any 'off-board' situational awareness available (**CF2**). Additionally, the PA28 TAS had been unable to detect any emissions from the C152 (**CF3**) and the C152 had not been equipped with a TAS, resulting in no 'on-board' situational awareness for either pilot (**CF2**). The Board also noted that the procedural barrier had been rendered ineffective through circumstance, with both aircraft at an altitude where the semi-circular rule could have provided sufficient vertical separation, but with the PA28 descending at the time and through the C152 pilot's level. The remaining barrier, the see-and-avoid barrier, had only been partially effective; the C152 pilot had seen the PA28 as it had crossed in front, at about CPA and therefore effectively a non-sighting (**CF5**), and the PA28 pilot had seen the C152 at what the Board members considered to be a late stage (**CF4**).

Turning to risk, some members felt that separation at CPA had been such that a risk of collision had been avoided (Risk C), but the majority of members felt that the lack of fully effective situational awareness, EC and lookout barriers had resulted in a situation where safety had been much reduced, Risk B (**CF6**).

<sup>1</sup> (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

**PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK****Contributory Factors:**

2026036				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
<b>Ground Elements</b>				
• <b>Situational Awareness and Action</b>				
1	Contextual	• ANS Flight Information Provision	Provision of ANS flight information	The ATCO/FISO was not required to monitor the flight under a Basic Service
<b>Flight Elements</b>				
• <b>Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action</b>				
2	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• <b>Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance</b>				
3	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
• <b>See and Avoid</b>				
4	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
• <b>Outcome Events</b>				
6	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

**Degree of Risk:** B.

**Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>3</sup>**

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

**Ground Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **not used** because the London Information FISO had not been required to monitor the aircrafts' positions.

**Flight Elements:**

**Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action** were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had had situational awareness on the other aircraft until they had sighted it.

**Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance** were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28 TAS could not alert on the C152 EC and the C152 had not been fitted with a TAS.

**See and Avoid** were assessed as **partially effective** because the C152 pilot had seen the PA28 at about CPA, effectively a non-sighting, and the PA28 pilot had seen the C152 at a late stage.

<sup>3</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

<b>Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026036</b>		Outside Controlled Airspace					
Barrier	Provision	Application	Effectiveness				
			Barrier Weighting				
			0%	5%	10%	15%	20%
Ground Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓				
	Manning & Equipment	✓	✓				
	Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action	✗	○				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	●	●				
Flight Element	Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance	✓	✓				
	Tactical Planning and Execution	✓	✓				
	Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action	✗	✓				
	Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance	✗	✓				
	See & Avoid	⚠	⚠				
<b>Key:</b>							
	Full	Partial	None	Not Present/Not Assessable	Not Used		
Provision	✓	⚠	✗	●			
Application	✓	⚠	✗	●	○		
Effectiveness							