AIRPROX REPORT No 2026035

Date: 31 Mar 2026 Time: 1224Z Position: 5127N 00123W Location: Welford

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C150	T67
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Traffic	None
Provider	Brize Norton LARS	N/A
Altitude/FL	4000ft	3800ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White	Yellow
Lighting	Bcn, ldg	Strobes, nav, ldg
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	4000ft	3200ft
Altimeter	QNH (1029hPa)	QNH (1030hPa)
Heading	170°	080°
Speed	100kt	80kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	Not fitted
Alert	Information	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	250ft V/300m H	300ft V/0.25NM H
Recorded	200ft V/0.2NM H	

THE C150 PILOT reports that they had been flying from […] to […]. Brize Radar made them aware of the aircraft in proximity. It had also been visible on SkyDemon. The aircraft was approximately 10NM away [and they] could see aerobatics were being performed. The aircraft initially turned away from them, so they believed [its pilot] had been visual with them as they were to their left on the same heading. As [C150 C/S] approached Newbury, [the other] aircraft was getting closer, but not requiring them to manoeuvre. Approximately 40sec later, the [other] aircraft made an abrupt climbing right turn towards them, resulting in [the C150 pilot] performing a climbing right turn to avoid a collision. After the incident, the C150 pilot asked Brize Radar for proximity and they said approximately 300ft.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE T67 PILOT reports that they had been operating as PIC for an advanced UPRT-A instructional flight on behalf of […] in the area of Welford disused aerodrome, completing the manoeuvres required from lesson 3 of the […] syllabus. The lesson brief is headlined with a Threat and Error Management analysis, where operation within Class G airspace and maintenance of a good lookout is paramount. At approximately 1224, in control and in the climb, recovering from a manoeuvre, both the student and [the PIC] visually contacted a white C150, at what looked to be approximately 300ft above and on a relative bearing of 020°. Without any startle, [the T67 PIC] took standard evasive action and adjusted the pitch attitude into a descent, turning left, maintaining visual contact and rocking their wings. At no point during the encounter was there any evident threat of collision due to maintained visual contact. Throughout the delivery of the flight and regulatory syllabus, regular HASELL and HELL checks were completed. The flight was undertaken using squawk 7004 in Class G airspace. They operated in accordance with Company procedures with single VHF to deconflict their […] Company aircraft. This has been assessed as the greatest MAC risk. They normally carry ADS-B Out, but this was unserviceable on this sector. A short period after landing, the [Company] Operations Manager received a telephone call from the PIC of the other aircraft, requesting to speak with the Commander of [the T67].

The T67 PIC asked the purpose of the call, to which they replied that they were going to file an Airprox as they believed [the T67 pilot] had not seen them. As [the T67 pilot] was able to describe the high-wing white Cessna aircraft and its track southbound as it had passed them, [the T67 PIC] thought this was sufficient to demonstrate their airmanship. Unfortunately, [the C150 pilot] then stated that they had seen [the T67] performing 'reckless manoeuvres' and stated that they had 'not seen them completing 180° turns beforehand'. They reiterated that they would file an Airprox, to which [the T67 pilot] stated that they would too, as they are happy to learn lessons. [The T67 pilot opined that] the Commander of the other aircraft may not be familiar or particularly experienced with GA operations in general and especially with close proximity traffic operations in Class G airspace and, in accordance with their Flight Radar submission, may have frozen or become startled as no evasive action was taken, given the claim of visual contact and their observations and the statements they had made towards them.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'None'.

THE BRIZE NORTON LARS CONTROLLER reports that on 31st Mar 26 between 1215-1225 while controlling on LARS 124.800MHz at RAF Brize Norton, [C150 C/S] was on frequency under a Traffic Service transiting south from […] to […] at 4000ft on QNH 1030hPa. While transiting in Class G airspace west of RAF Odiham by 5-10 miles, [C150 C/S] had traffic called "*Left 11 o'clock, 3 miles, crossing left-right ahead, indicating 300ft below"*. The C150 pilot responded with "*Traffic in sight [C150 C/S]"*. The traffic called was [T67 C/S] which was squawking 7004 (aeros). The traffic was called again when the contacts were converging: "[*C150 C/S] previously reported traffic below you, indicating 300ft below, climbing"*. The pilot responded with *"[C150 C/S] we have got the traffic in sight*". The C150 pilot was told "*unable to arrange handover with Farnborough, radar service terminated, squawk conspicuity, free call Farnborough 125.250MHz"*. The pilot of the C150 asked how close the [T67] got on Mode C and was informed roughly 300ft. The C150 pilot announced on frequency that they would raise an Airprox.

The controller perceived the severity of the incident as 'Medium'.

THE BRIZE NORTON SUPERVISOR reports that they witnessed the event and have nothing further to add to the report narrative. The pilot mentioned on frequency that they would be filing a report against the conflicting traffic and so [the Supervisor] asked the [controller] to also raise this report.

Factual Background

The weather at Brize Norton was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGVN 311220Z 28008KT 9999 FEW028 17/10 Q1030 NOSIG=
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Analysis and Investigation

Military ATM

Background

The C150 was under a Traffic Service with Brize Norton conducting a lower airspace transit. The T67 was not in communication with Brize Norton and was squawking 7004, indicating that they were conducting aerobatics.

Sequence of Events

At 1221:15, Traffic Information was provided to the C150 [pilot] about the T67 "*traffic left 11 o'clock, 3-miles, crossing left-right ahead, indicating 300ft below.*" The C150 pilot responded that they were visual.

CPA occurred at 1224:04 and is reported as 0.2NM laterally and approximately 200ft vertically.

At 1224:07, updated Traffic Information was provided "*previously reported traffic, below you, indicating 300ft below, climbing*." The C150 pilot responded that they were visual.

At 1224:28, the C150 [pilot] asked the Brize Norton controller how close the other aircraft [had been]. They were informed 300ft and the C150 [pilot] stated that they were going to have to file an Airprox.

At 1224:33, the C150 [pilot] was informed that they could not be handed over and that the radar service was terminated.

Local BM Investigation(s)

A local investigation was conducted by RAF Brize Norton following the event to identify the ATS-related causal/aggravating factors. It was found that the controller acted appropriately, and no further action was required.

2 Gp BM Analysis

Having reviewed the evidence submitted, 2Gp concurs with the findings of the local investigation. The controller acted appropriately and demonstrated good duty of care by continuing to update Traffic Information, even after the pilot reported visual, given the nature of the conflicting traffic.

UKAB Secretariat



Figure 1: At CPA 1224:04 200ft/0.2NM

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and identified through Mode S data.

The C150 and T67 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the T67 pilot was required to give way to the C150.[2]

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C150 and a T67 flew into proximity at Welford at 1224Z on Tuesday 31st March 2026. The C150 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Traffic Service from Brize Norton LARS, and the T67 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and not in receipt of a Flight Information Service.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Members firstly considered the actions of the C150 pilot, noting positively that they had been in receipt of a Traffic Service from Brize Norton and had been passed timely and relevant Traffic Information. That, together with an active electronic conspicuity (EC) unit which had informed them of the presence of the T67 had given them comprehensive situational awareness. Members did note that the EC unit had been compatible with the transponder carried by the T67 and should have offered an alert as the two aircraft had closed but had not done so (**CF5**). The Board discussed the sequence of events, noting that the C150 pilot reports having been aware of the T67 from approximately 10NM range, and had noted its aerobatic nature and could then have adapted their plan (**CF2**) to avoid the T67 by a wider margin (**CF3**) but had not done so and, ultimately, had flown close enough to the manoeuvring aircraft to cause themselves concern (**CF7**). Members suggested that in such circumstances, with all other constraints in place, pilots becoming aware of such activity from a nearby aircraft should aim to make early, positive route changes to allow for unpredictable flightpath changes of the aerobatic aircraft.

Moving on to the actions of the T67 pilot, members thanked them for a full and frank report. They acknowledged the statement from that pilot that the company's highest risk factor is mid-air collision between 2 company aircraft and that this had driven the need for maintaining a listening watch on the company frequency. However, they opined that a combination of outreach from the company offices to surrounding air traffic units and local airfields to inform them of activity, together with an information check in with, for example, Brize Norton LARS, would allow for greater information dissemination and situational awareness. Members would advise the utilisation of an active air traffic service (such as a Traffic Service) (**CF1**) could have allowed for a 2-way information share regarding their activity to all aircraft in that area. The Board also noted that the T67 had not carried EC equipment and this, together with a lack of air traffic service, had led to the T67 pilot having had no situational awareness of the proximity of the C150 (**CF4**) and members felt it fortunate that the T67 pilot had visually acquired the C150, albeit late (**CF6**) and performed an avoidance manoeuvre.

In considering the contribution from the Brize Norton LARS controller, members noted that they had provided a Traffic Service with timely Traffic Information to the C150 pilot regarding the T67 and had acknowledged their intent to report an Airprox at the time. The Board noted that there had been no reference within the initial controller report and the subsequent investigation as to whether or not the Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) had activated. Unfortunately radar recordings had not successfully captured the point at which this may have initiated and been acknowledged and the controller themself was unable to recall whether or not it had triggered and, therefore, the Barrier was on this occasion marked as 'not-assessable' although it was acknowledged that the controller had been aware of the conflict and acted appropriately, regardless of the lack of STCA. Members felt that the Brize Norton LARS controller had done all expected of them on this occasion.

The Board concluded their discussion and considered the risk of collision, noting that both pilots had achieved visual contact with the other aircraft and both had taken avoiding action. Members were in agreement that safety margins had been reduced but were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026035			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Flight Elements			
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
1	Human Factors	• Communications by Flight Crew with ANS	An event related to the communications between the flight crew and the air navigation service.	Pilot did not request appropriate ATS service or communicate with appropriate provider
2	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
3	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Events involving flight crew not taking any action at all when they should have done so	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern despite Situational Awareness
4	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
5	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
	• See and Avoid			
6	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
7	Human Factors	• Lack of Individual Risk Perception	Events involving flight crew not fully appreciating the risk of a particular course of action	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[3]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the C150 pilot, having been informed of the presence of the T67 via their SkyDemon, could have afforded that aircraft a wider berth, and the T67 pilot could have sought a Flight Information Service whilst operating in that area.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the T67 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the C150 and the C150 pilot, having gained situational awareness of the presence of the T67, had then flown close enough to cause themselves concern.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the conspicuity equipment carried by the C150 had been capable of registering emissions from the T67 but had not issued an 'alert' indication.

[3] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.


Airprox Barrier Assessment: 2026035
Outside Controlled Airspace
Barrier
Provision
Application
Effectiveness
Barrier Weighting
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Ground Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Manning & Equipment
Situational Awareness of the Confliction & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
Flight Element
Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance
Tactical Planning and Execution
Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft & Action
Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance
See & Avoid
Key:
Full
Partial
None
Not Present/Not Assessable
Not Used
Provision
Application
Effectiveness