


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026023

Date: 14 Mar 2026 Time: 1232Z Position: 5050N 00111W Location: ivo Lee-On-Solent Airfield

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	PA28	Europa(A)
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	Lee-On-Solent ATZ	Lee-On-Solent ATZ
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AFIS	AFIS
Provider	Lee Information	Lee Information
Altitude	~585ft	~665ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	White	White
Lighting	Bcn, strobes, ldg.	Strobes, nav, ldg.
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	NR
Altitude	~500ft AGL	650ft
Altimeter	QFE	QFE (1006hPa)
Heading	140°	230°
Speed	75kt	78kt
ACAS/TAS	SkyEcho	PilotAware Rosetta
Alert	None	None
Separation at CPA		
Reported	100ft V/0ft H	150ft V/0ft H
Recorded	~80ft V/<0.1NM H	



THE PA28 PILOT reports that they were the Pilot in Command (PIC) of a PA28 and they were with a student pilot on a circuits lesson. The student was the Pilot Flying (PF) in the standard recommended circuit pattern for RW23 (right-hand circuit) at Lee-On-Solent. Downwind, on their fourth and final circuit to land, they were informed by Air Traffic (Lee Information 118.930MHz) that there were two aircraft ahead of them to land. They could see both aircraft, one appeared to be on a standard right-hand base leg for RW23, confusingly the second aircraft [the Europa(A)] appeared to be east of the aerodrome and circuit pattern, over Gosport heading northwest towards Fleetlands ATZ. As [the PA28 pilot] turned onto base leg, [the Europa(A)] appeared to be over Fareham, now within Fleetlands ATZ and in a left-hand turn. As they descended on base leg it became clear that [the Europa(A)] was now on a long approach for Lee. Because [the Europa(A)] was on their left and they were following the recommended circuit pattern, they considered themselves to be the 'stand on' aircraft and they expected [the pilot of the other aircraft] to either manoeuvre to avoid them or go around. It quickly became clear that [the Europa(A) pilot] had not seen them and was coming in to land. The PIC took control from the student and, because [the Europa(A)] was still to their left but higher, they did not initiate a climbing go-around as this would have brought their aircraft dangerously close together. Instead they closed the throttle and rapidly descended whilst [the Europa(A)] passed closely overhead. Once clear of [the Europa(A)] they did initiate a climbing go-around back into the circuit where they reported the Airprox to Lee Information on 118.930MHz. After landing, the pilot of [the Europa(A)] went over to apologise and [reportedly] readily admitted that they did not know any of the aerodrome procedures and circuit patterns at Lee-On-Solent.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE EUROPA(A) PILOT reports that they were on a flight to Lee-On-Solent, in good weather and great visibility. They transited Southampton CTA (Zone Transits/Traffic Service), then they contacted Lee-On-Solent around 7NM from the runway, and they were told RW05 left-hand circuit. Due to their height

leaving Southampton CTA they opted at that time to announce that they would overfly the airfield and descend on their deadside. Upon descending they noticed that the traffic was landing on RW23 and not RW05.

The controller [sic] then corrected and said it was indeed RW23 with a right-hand circuit. This created now a higher workload as they needed to effectively integrate into the circuit flow. They opted to do a left-base join for RW23 which they announced on the radio, this was so they could see any oncoming traffic either on final or on a right base. It was clear and they were able to commence a left base to final. Due to the runway being occupied, they decided to go around which then meant they could join the normal circuit of RW23 right-hand.

Their primary focus was to do a stable circuit and, due to alertness and looking out for traffic, they realised that they had conducted a normal circuit instead of an increased horizontal distance due to noise sensitive areas. They recognised traffic to their port side front (another Europa(B)) and were unable to see on the downwind, but the PA28 was behind to their port side, obscured by the view of the fuselage. They then had to extend their downwind leg due to the other Europa(B) taking a base leg and then final to land. To increase separation, they opted for a longer, extended downwind which was announced on the radio. They announced the extended final for RW23 to land. At around 650ft [height] they established on a stable final approach path, and a PA28 came from their right and descended below. Neither they nor their passenger (another PPL holder) saw the other aircraft until the sudden descent. They briefly levelled flight before continuing the descent for a safe landing.

After the incident, they waited for the pilot of the PA28. They learnt at this time it was an instructor and student. They conducted a debrief and it was great to learn some insight from someone local to that particular airfield.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE LEE-ON-SOLENT AFISO reports that the weather conditions were good with a cloudbase around 4000ft and visibility in excess of 10km. The traffic situation was busy with several aircraft joining the circuit and with one aircraft on a circuit detail. On the ground there were 3 aircraft taxiing for departure.

The PA28, was on a circuit detail with 2 visiting aircraft joining the circuit to land. These were [the Airprox] Europa(A) from [departure point], and [another unrelated] Europa(B) from [elsewhere].

The AFISO told both joining aircraft about the PA28 in the circuit and, as they joined the circuit, all 3 were fairly adjacent on the downwind leg with the order being [Europa(B), Europa(A) and the PA28]. They told [the pilot of Europa(A)] about [Europa(B)] and the pilot stated that they had the traffic in sight and were extending the downwind leg. As [the Europa(B)] turned onto final, they realised that, having extended downwind, [Europa(A)] would potentially be [factor] traffic to [the PA28] turning base-leg in the standard position. They informed both aircraft [pilots] about the other [aircraft], with [the pilot of the PA28] stating that they were visual with [Europa(A)]. Shortly after, the pilot of [the PA28] stated that they considered the situation to be an Airprox.

Factual Background

The weather at Southampton Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR ECHI 141220Z 34005KT 270V030 9999 FEW043 10/01 Q1006

Solent Airport Pilot Briefing for arrivals:

All circuits are at 1000FT AAL to the north of the runway. Warbird circuits are at 1200FT AAL to the south of the runway.

No circuits are to be flown outside of the Airports operating hours, or before 1000L on Sundays or Bank holidays.

The standard circuit directions are:

Runway 05 – Left hand circuit

Runway 23 – Right hand circuit

No practice EFATO's are to be conducted off of runway 05, due to proximity to residential areas.

Go-arounds – go-arounds to be made in good time and to the dead side of the runway; all go-arounds are chargeable unless one or more of the following occur and would constitute an unplanned go-around and will NOT be chargeable:

- Due to the runway being occupied,
- Weather conditions dictate or
- The duty AFISO deems it to be a flight safety reason.

Please be aware of the warbird circuit when active.

Orbits for spacing within the circuit are not recommended. Pilots should observe the position of other circuit traffic and synchronise with it before joining. If in doubt, please do not hesitate to ask AFISOs for an update on the circuit traffic's position. Pilots should continue in the circuit and go around if necessary.

Noise Sensitive Areas

Stubbington village, immediately to the west of the airport, and the north western adjoining boundary with Fareham are noise sensitive areas. These are highlighted yellow on the map [see Figure 1].

Due to the close proximity of residential areas it is essential for the airport to operate in a considerate manner. Please observe the noise sensitive areas as much as reasonably possible to help us maintain our good neighbourly relationship.

Non-pilots please note: It is pointed out that noise sensitive areas cannot legally be made mandatory – it is a voluntary procedure which Solent Airport strongly advises all pilots to adhere to, however there may be deviations from the designated circuit from time to time for flight safety reasons.




Figure 1 partial representation of the Solent Airport Local Map.

Analysis and Investigation

Lee-On-Solent Airport

The PA28 was on a circuit detail with two visiting aircraft joining the circuit to land. These were [the Airprox] Europa(A) and [a second] Europa(B). The duty AFISO had told both joining aircraft about the PA28 in the circuit and, as they joined the circuit, all three were fairly adjacent on the downwind leg with the order being [Europa(B), Europa(A), and the PA28]. [The Europa(A) pilot] was flying a tight, close in circuit and overflowed Stubbington village, therefore not following the published 23RH circuit pattern for noise abatement. As a result of this, [the Europa(A) pilot] extended the downwind leg to the north to allow adequate spacing separation from [Europa(B)] ahead. Consequently, when [Europa(A)] turned final it was on a 'long' final outside the published circuit pattern. [The PA28 pilot] was flying the standard published circuit pattern and on right-base for RW23. Traffic Information was passed by the duty AFISO to [the PA28 pilot] about [Europa(A)], and vice-versa, but [the pilot of the Europa(A)] did not appear to give way to [the PA28] flying the established circuit pattern on right base RW23, and [the PA28] would also have been to [the Europa(A) pilot's] right as [the Europa(A)] was approaching on 'long' final for RW23.

CAA ATSI

Synopsis

The PA28 was on a training flight operating in the Lee-On-Solent circuit for RW23. The Europa(A) was inbound from the west, having just transited the Southampton CTA.

ATSI received copies of the reports from both pilots and the AFISO, and a short investigation summary from the unit.

Area radar surveillance data was used to review the incident, and there were long periods of time when not all the aircraft involved were visible. The unit provided a recording of the RTF but no time code was included. The times provided in this report are estimated to be accurate to within approximately 30sec.

The Airprox was originally reported as having taken place at 1225, which would have been coincidental with the first join and turn onto final by the Europa(A). Having reviewed the area radar replay and the RTF, ATSI has included that earlier period but the Airprox was formally reported by the PA28 pilot on the frequency at 1232:20 coincident with the second circuit by the Europa(A).

There was some confusion in the period running up to the Airprox, with the AFISO mistakenly advising the pilot of the Europa(A), when they reported inbound at 1223:20, that RW05 was in use with a left-hand circuit. The AFISO did pass Traffic Information to the pilot of the Europa(A) on the PA28 turning downwind (albeit for RW23). The Europa(A) pilot acknowledged the runway in use as being RW05 and the circuit direction and, after being given the Traffic Information on the PA28 again, advised that they were *"looking"*.

The AFISO then dealt with aircraft on the ground taxiing to and from the runway – they did refer to the runway in use as RW23 for those movements. For reference, Lee-On-Solent ATSU is not equipped with a FIDS.

At 1224:23 the pilot of the PA28 reported *"downwind 23, touch and go"* (Figure 2).




Figure 2 – Time 1224:23

The AFISO passed the PA28 pilot Traffic Information on the Europa: *“traffic joining er northwest believed to be just turning behind you”* which was acknowledged by the PA28 pilot.

At 1224:33 the Europa(A) pilot requested: *“is it possible to descend on the deadside?”* The AFISO replied: *“there’s nothing to affect ??? is that one downwind. There’ll be a Cessna rolling 23 to look out for”*. The Europa(A) pilot responded: *“looking for the traffic – we’ll descend on your deadside in about a minute”*. The AFISO then approved a discretionary take-off for an aircraft on RW23.

At 1225:17 the pilot of another Europa(B) called the AFISO requesting a joining clearance from the east. Again, the AFISO passed *“Runway 05 left-hand”* which was read back by the pilot (Figure 3).




Figure 3 – Time 1225:17

The AFISO went on to pass Traffic Information to the Europa(B) pilot: *“there’s a couple with one in the circuit, another one just joining through the overhead. Give me a call with about a mile to run to the overhead”* which was acknowledged by the pilot of the Europa(B).

The pilot of the Europa(A) then asked, at 1226:02 *“is it 23 or 05?”* The AFISO replied *“23 – 23 right-hand circuit”* (Figure 4).




Figure 4 – Time 1226:02

The AFISO continued: *“I might have told you 05 – I do apologise for that”*. The AFISO then advised the pilot of the Europa(B): *“just confirm the runway is 23 – 23 right-hand”*. The pilot of the Europa(B) replied: *“I was wondering if you were just changing direction, but roger for 23. I can see one in the climb out - I’ll join in behind that.”* The AFISO responded; *“report south of the airfield please on the crosswind leg”*.

At 1226:42 the PA28 pilot reported on final for RW23 for a touch and go (Figure 5).




Figure 5 – Time 1226:42

The Europa(A) pilot then reported: *“sorry – we heard 05 – we’re now left base 23 – contact one ahead”* (Figure 6).




Figure 6

On the area radar replay the radar contact for the PA28 disappeared at 1227:00.

At 1227:05 the pilot of a DA42 reported south abeam the airfield for rejoin for circuits on RW23 (Figure 7).




Figure 7 – Time 1227:05

The AFISO confirmed “23 right-hand, 23 right-hand (QFE). Look out for a Europa believed to be in the ??? area, also joining”. The DA42 pilot acknowledged the Traffic Information and reported visual with the Europa(B).

At 1228:14 the AFISO requested the PA28 pilot to report downwind, passing Traffic Information “??? Two from the er southeast crosswind ahead of you” which they acknowledged (Figure 8).




Figure 8 -Time 1228:14 – Europa(A) no longer visible

The AFISO then passed Traffic Information to the pilot of the Europa(B) on Europa(A): *“look out for a Europa just doing a go-around into a right-hand circuit”*. The Europa(B) pilot replied: *“I’m just er joining south abeam now and I can see traffic just passing underneath me.”*

The AFISO then advised them that *“there’s a Cherokee and just behind that is a Europa”*, to which the Europa(B) pilot replied: *“er roger and visual”* (Figure 9).




Figure 9

The AFISO then dealt with ground movements following which, at 1229:18, the pilot of the DA42 reported: *“we’re going to extend out upwind and come in behind the two Europas on downwind”*. The AFISO replied: *“thank you – report final in turn”*.

The Europa(A) pilot then reported downwind to land and was requested to report final, followed by the Europa(B) pilot reporting *“just turned downwind not visual”*. The AFISO responded; *“Think you are the first one there – er report turning base”*, which the Europa(B) pilot acknowledged. The AFISO then asked the Europa(A) pilot: *“do you see a Europa slightly outside you?”*

There was no reply and at 1229:31 the AFISO repeated: *“do you see a Europa in your 2 o’clock?”* The Europa(A) pilot replied at 1229:58: *“yeah – we are short downwind, er sorry, midfield downwind now – 23 to land – we can see the traffic on the outside ???”* (The area radar only showed the PA28 at this time). The AFISO responded: *“Number 2 to that traffic please.”*

The AFISO then dealt with ground movement, following which at 1230:20 the PA28 pilot reported downwind. The AFISO replied: *“thanks – there’s two Europas ahead of you – report final”* to which the pilot responded: *“report final”*.

The AFISO then spoke to other traffic on the ground, with the Europa(A) pilot then reporting, at 1231:00, *“extending downwind 23 – contact one ahead”* which was acknowledged by the AFISO (area radar still not displaying any aircraft other than the PA28) (Figure 10).





Figure 10 – Time 1231 – only the PA28 visible on radar.


Then the pilot of Europa(B) reported turning final, but before the AFISO could reply, the DA42 pilot reported *“we’re just joining right downwind – we’re visual with traffic just turning base now”*. The AFISO replied to the DA42 pilot: *“there’s 3 ahead of you – one short final, one over Fareham, another on base leg.”* The DA42 pilot replied: *“roger that’s copied – we are visual with all the traffic for (callsign).”*

At 1231:43 the AFISO gave the runway to the Europa(B) pilot (Figure 11).



At 1251:54 the AFISO called the pilot of the Europa(A): “??? a bit wide – look out for traffic, a Cherokee on your right-hand side on base leg” to which the Europa(A) pilot responded “looking”.

The AFISO then advised the PA28 pilot: *“if you turn onto final, lookout for a Europa who’s gone a bit wide on final”*. The PA28 pilot reported *“we’re visual”* (Figure 12).



At 1232:06 the radar return for the Europa(A) disappeared and was not seen again.

At 1232:20 the PA28 pilot announced: *"I think that was an Airprox"* which was followed by the Europa(A) pilot reporting *"this is chaos – er finals 23 to land"* and was advised by the AFISO *"thanks*

– *the runway is occupied*” (by the Europa(B)) which the Europa(A) pilot acknowledged “*visual*” (Figure 13).




Figure 13 – Time 1232:20

The DA42 pilot then reported climbing out of the circuit to return to the overhead at 2000ft, after which the AFISO gave the runway to the [pilot of] Europa(A) for landing. There were a couple of other very short transmissions which were undecipherable, but the PA28 pilot was not heard again until they reported downwind once more a minute or so later.

Analysis

Having been given the runway in use as 05 and, according to their written report, still being too high, the pilot of the Europa(A) appeared to correctly position for an overhead join for a left-hand circuit to RW05. By the time they had apparently fully assimilated the correct runway as being RW23, they were in a crosswind position for RW05 which they appear to have converted to a left-base for RW23, which they called in.

Having then realised that they would not be able to land (due to the PA28 ahead), they went around, although no call was heard on the RTF.

With only the PA28 being detected on the area radar replay following their climb-out and turn downwind, it was not possible to determine the position of the Europa(A), nor the Europa(B) which had apparently already joined downwind ahead of both the PA28 and the Europa(A). The AFISO confirmed to the Europa(B) pilot that they were number one, although the Europa(A) pilot had called downwind first.

When the Europa(A) reappeared on the radar replay at 1231:43 they were inside the Fleetlands ATZ.

The UK AIP entry for Fleetlands (and the local airport website – “Pilot Briefing”) advises that “aircraft should remain outside of Fleetlands ATZ, unless in good two-way communication with Fleetlands Information (135.705).” It is not known if the Europa(A) pilot had called Fleetlands.¹

When the DA42 pilot called downwind right-hand, the response from the AFISO suggested that they still had good situational awareness, reporting the positions of the 2 Europas and the PA28 ahead.

According to CAP797 (Flight Information Service Officer Manual) a FISO:

...may issue advice and shall issue information to aircraft in their area of responsibility, useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights.

FISOs are not permitted to issue instructions, except for those circumstances in paragraph 1.17, or when relaying a clearance from an air traffic control unit (ATCU). Pilots therefore are wholly responsible for collision avoidance in conformity with the Rules of the Air.

(Paragraph 1.17 refers to operations wholly on the ground.)

The AFISO continued to demonstrate a good awareness of the traffic situation by advising the Europa(A) pilot that they appeared to be very wide (the pilot had reported extending downwind earlier) and passing Traffic Information to them on the PA28 on base leg. The AFISO then passed reciprocal Traffic Information to the PA28 pilot on base leg on the Europa(A) on long final. The PA28 pilot reported visual.

The Europa(A) pilot, based on the information provided by the AFISO, had initially positioned correctly for a RW05 arrival. The decision to convert to left base for RW23 increased the complexity and preceded a go-around and reposition for a right-hand circuit for RW23.

The RTF suggested that the next landing order was Europa(B), Europa(A) and PA28. This was confirmed by the AFISO when the PA28 pilot reported downwind and was told there were two aircraft ahead. The PA28 pilot then turned onto base, now effectively inside Europa(A) and making themselves number 2. When the AFISO then advised them of the Europa(A) on final outside them, and which they reported visual with, they did not appear to give way to the Europa(A) which now had priority.

Conclusion

The continued references to RW05 by the AFISO at the beginning of this period possibly led to an increased workload for both them and the Europa(A) pilot. Had the correct runway been passed and the Europa(A) pilot positioned for RW23 instead, then the traffic situation which preceded the reporting of an Airprox may not have developed.

However, the manner in which the subsequent traffic situation was handled by the AFISO, after realising their slip in referencing the incorrect runway, did not appear to distract them and they went on to demonstrate good situational awareness, with timely Traffic Information being passed appropriately enabling the PA28 pilot to obtain visual contact with the Europa(A) on final approach.

The PA28 pilot on base leg did not give way to the Europa(A) which was established on final approach.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft were identified using Mode S data. The Europa displayed intermittently on radar at low level, and was detected on a final

¹ UK AIP ENR 2.2 entry for PORTSMOUTH/FLEETLANDS operational hours are MON-FRI only and it was, therefore, not active on this occasion. This is also noted in the Solent Airport Pilot Briefing available on their website (as directed to in the UK AIP).

approach with the PA28 on a right base for RW23. The final radar trace for the Europa was at 1232:11 (Figure 14).




Figure 14 – Time 1232:11

Further analysis of third-party aircraft tracking software was undertaken and both aircraft were detected using ADS-B sources. The PA28 and Europa were both seen in the right-hand circuit for RW23 at Lee-On-Solent at 1230 (Figures 15 and 16).



Figure 15 – Time 1230:10



Figure 16 – Time 1231:10

Both the PA28 and Europa pilots provided their respective aircraft's GPS navigation files. Using the combined information available, CPA was assessed to have been at 1232:08 with approximately 80ft vertical and less than 0.1NM lateral separation.

The PA28 and Europa pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.² An aircraft operated on or in the

² (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation.³

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a PA28 and a Europa flew into proximity on the final approach to RW23 at Lee-On-Solent Airport at 1232Z on Saturday 14th March 2026. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC and in receipt of an AFIS from Lee Information.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data for the flights of both the PA28 and Europa, a report from the AFISO involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the PA28 pilot, noting that they had been on an instructional flight in the circuit. Members noted that the instructor had been monitoring the Europa which had joined the circuit from a go-around, and that they had been aware of the Europa's extended downwind leg and long final approach both visually and from the RT communications. The Board agreed that the pilot had had good situational awareness, although on this occasion it had not been assisted by the use of the electronic conspicuity equipment which had not alerted them to the presence of the Europa as it might have been expected to have done (**CF7**). The Board further agreed that, although the PA28 pilot had been aware of the Europa's positioning, they had continued their base leg without apparent intent to give way to the Europa on long final and no obvious attempt to slow down or avoid it (**CF6**)⁴. Members further agreed that the PA28 pilot had delayed the decision to avoid the Europa as they 'stood on' (**CF4**), expecting the Europa pilot to have given way to them, and had resultantly flown into closer-than-necessary proximity with the Europa (**CF9**).

Turning their attention to the actions of the Europa pilot, the Board noted that the pilot had been put into the challenging position of entering the deadside of, what they had been informed to have been, RW05 but, after noticing that another aircraft had been making an approach to RW23, had checked with the AFISO and promptly altered their plan from a crosswind join for RW05 to a left base join for RW23. The Board noted that the decision to make an approach from their position at the time had not worked as intended and that, although the initial approach had not, seemingly, caused an issue, the subsequent go-around and circuit pattern had. Members agreed that, overall, it may have been more prudent to have positioned back to the deadside and have facilitated more time to review the promulgated circuit pattern for RW23 before proceeding further. As it was, the Board noted that the Europa pilot had needed to perform a go-around from their first approach behind the PA28, and had positioned themselves significantly closer to the airfield than the published Lee-On-Solent circuit procedure for RW23. Members agreed that the Europa pilot had not complied with the Lee-On-Solent procedures in doing this and again in having extended the downwind leg outside the Lee-On-Solent ATZ (**CF2**). The Board agreed, therefore, that the Europa pilot's execution of the circuit pattern had not been effective (**CF3**), and members agreed that the pilot had not conformed with the pattern of traffic already formed by the PA28, which had initially been ahead of the Europa (**CF5**). The Board discussed that, particularly as Lee-On-Solent had a published circuit ground-track, it would have been prudent for the Europa pilot to have followed it rather than risk having extended the circuit, exiting the ATZ and potentially entering other active airspace. Some members remarked, however, that the Fleetlands ATZ was not active at the time of the Airprox (see Factual Information above), being closed at weekends and, therefore, not a consideration. The Board noted that, as the Europa pilot had positioned themselves onto a long final, they had kept the AFISO and, therefore, other traffic informed of their actions. The Board agreed that the Europa pilot had benefitted from having heard position reports of other traffic and had, therefore, been aware of the PA28's position in the circuit but that the electronic conspicuity equipment fitted in the Europa had not alerted the pilot to the presence of the PA28 as it

³ (UK) SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

⁴ (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (4) Landing.

had converged with them from the base leg position (**CF7**). Members also agreed that the Europa pilot had not seen the PA28 until it had dived beneath them on the final approach (**CF8**).

In considering the actions of the Lee-On-Solent AFISO, the Board noted that the earlier incorrect information provided to the Europa pilot had, likely, created a challenging situation for the pilot, and that in doing so, the AFISO had not followed correct procedure (**CF1**). However, members acknowledged that the AFISO had corrected their error once prompted by the Europa pilot, and had subsequently provided significant Traffic Information to all circuit traffic from there onwards.

In concluding its discussion, the Board noted that the PA28 pilot had been visual with the Europa for some time, including the extended downwind and long final approach, and had been in a position to avoid a near collision sooner than they had, whereas the Europa pilot had not seen the PA28 on base leg. Members agreed that safety had been much reduced below the norm and that the last minute emergency avoiding action taken by the PA28 pilot had averted a likely collision (**CF10**). The Board assigned Risk Category B to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026023			
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance				
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
Flight Elements				
• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance				
2	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
3	Human Factors	• Action Performed Incorrectly	Events involving flight crew performing the selected action incorrectly	Incorrect or ineffective execution
4	Human Factors	• Late Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew making a decision too late to meet the needs of the situation	
5	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Environment	Events involving flight crew not to appropriately monitoring the environment	Did not avoid/conform with the pattern of traffic already formed
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
6	Human Factors	• Flight crew response to communications	An event related to the flight crew taking the incorrect action following communication	
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
7	Human Factors	• Response to Warning System	An event involving the incorrect response of flight crew following the operation of an aircraft warning system	CWS misinterpreted, not optimally actioned or CWS alert expected but none reported
• See and Avoid				
8	Human Factors	• Identification/Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
9	Contextual	• Loss of Separation	An event involving a loss of separation between aircraft	Pilot flew into conflict
• Outcome Events				
10	Contextual	• Near Airborne Collision with Aircraft	An event involving a near collision by an aircraft with an aircraft, balloon, dirigible or other piloted air vehicles	

Degree of Risk:

B.

Safety Barrier Assessment⁵

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the AFISO passed the incorrect joining information to the Europa pilot.

Flight Elements:


Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Europa pilot had not flown the promulgated circuit pattern.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the Europa pilot had not conformed with the pattern of traffic formed by the PA28 pilot and the PA28 pilot had delayed their decision to avoid the Europa on a long final approach.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the PA28 pilot had positioned on base leg despite situational awareness of the Europa on a wider-than-usual circuit.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because neither the PA28's nor the Europa's electronic devices had detected the other aircraft.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the PA28 pilot had flown into close proximity with the Europa, and the Europa pilot had not seen the PA28 until the PA28 pilot initiated last minute avoiding action.



⁵ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).