AIRPROX REPORT No 2026022

Date: 18 Mar 2026 Time: 1116Z Position: 5341N 00003E Location: 2NM S of Withernsea

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	AW139	C152
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	IFR	VFR
Service	Traffic	Basic
Provider	Humberside Radar	Humberside Radar
Altitude	1900ft	2000ft
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S+
Reported		
Colours	Red	White/Red
Lighting	Anti-colls, nav, strb, ldg, & search.	Beacon
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	5-10km
Altitude/FL	2000ft	2000ft
Altimeter	QNH (1022hPa)	QNH (1022hPa)
Heading	060°	150°
Speed	135kt	90kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS I	Not fitted
Alert	TA	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	100ft V/<1NM H	500ft V/~2NM H
Recorded	100ft V/0.7NM H	



THE AW139 PILOT reports that, on the outbound leg from Humberside to [destination], operating IFR on a prescribed route, receiving a Traffic Service with Humberside Radar, they received Traffic Information from Radar stating *'contact 11 o'clock 2NM tracking southeast along the coast'*. This was confirmed on TCAS which indicated +100ft. At approximately 1.5NM they made visual contact and it was apparent that avoiding action was needed. The safest course of action was to make a right turn away from the traffic; however, immediately after initiating the turn it was clear that a descent was also required. They preset 'Alt Select' to 1500ft and started descent. They had visual confirmation from the co-pilot that they were 'clear of conflict' and they resumed navigation to [destination] remaining at 1500ft as they coasted out. No guidance or concerns raised from [the] Humberside [controller] throughout, although [the] Anglia Radar [controller] asked if they had just conducted a TCAS RA on handover. [They stated that] if they had a TCAS II fitted aircraft, this would have undoubtedly resulted in an RA.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE C152 PILOT reports that, whilst conducting a local navigational exercise following the coast in a southerly direction, they became aware of a helicopter approaching from their right. At first sighting, the other traffic was noted significantly below their level. They were maintaining 2000ft at the time. They judged the risk of collision to be low and took no avoiding action. They were in communication with Humberside on a Basic Service but did not recall if any alert was given.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE C152 FLIGHT SCHOOL HEAD OF TRAINING reports that they had interviewed the C152 pilot and, as far as they could establish, they had the conflicting traffic in sight to their right and below. They suspected this was after the traffic concerned had descended having been to the right whilst maintaining

speed and heading in accordance with the Rules of the Air. It may be seen from the [flight] log that the pilot of the C152 was essentially following the coast and maintaining 2000ft in so doing.

The pilot of the C152 was in contact with Humberside and in receipt of a Basic Service. Clearly, a Basic Service offers no guarantee of advice of traffic and, in any event, Humberside ATC was suffering degraded radar performance at the time due the NATS Claxby facility being out of commission for long-term maintenance. Their reliance on Great Dunn Fell [radar] meant that traffic at approximately 2000ft may not be seen. The pilot of the C152 could not recollect whether they were advised of rotary traffic in the vicinity, but their normal lookout did not identify the aircraft concerned until the point detailed above, at which point they did not consider avoiding action on their part necessary. Indeed, they were unaware of an Airprox until copied with [a notification from UKAB].

By way of mitigation, they have advised the pilot that there is an established corridor between Humberside and the collection of offshore rigs to the north east. Consequently, there is frequency rotary traffic in the vicinity of Withernsea travelling to or returning from offshore locations. Additional vigilance is thus required together with the anticipation of traffic advice from Humberside ATC.

THE HUMBERSIDE RADAR CONTROLLER reports that, at 1115 during CAVOK conditions, they were the oncoming Radar controller. During the handover of the position in a busy traffic environment, [AW139 CS] (operating under a Traffic Service) had an Airprox whilst coasting out around the Hornsea/Withernsea area at 2000ft [with] a C152. Due to poor primary radar coverage and no SSR coverage (due to operating with the Great Dun Fell radar) the confliction was observed late and was called when within 2NM but with no height information. [The C152 pilot] was on frequency operating under a Basic Service. However, due to their operating altitude and base of radar coverage, track identification was difficult to maintain and contributed to Traffic Information being passed later than desired. They then received a telephone call from Anglia Radar, who advised them that it appeared that [the AW139] was descending and turning to avoid. They advised Anglia that traffic had been called but [the controllers] could not see either aircraft at that point. They asked [the pilot of the AW139] to report 'coasting out' and then transferred to Anglia once this was reported; no information regarding the Airprox was passed on frequency. Once [the AW139] had returned to Humberside the pilot contacted ATC to discuss the situation. The controller spoke directly to the pilot and advised them of the limited coverage in the area and [the pilot] advised them that an Airprox was being filed. [Documentation was] submitted once advised by the pilot.

Factual Background

The weather at Humberside Airport was recorded as follows:

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METAR EGNJ 181120Z 16006KT 130V190 CAVOK 16/10 Q1022
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Analysis and Investigation

Humberside Airport

Summary

[The AW139] was routeing offshore at 2000ft under a Traffic Service. [The C152] was transiting via Hornsea & Spurn Point at 2000ft under a Basic Service [with a 4270 squawk]. [The pilot of the AW139] experienced a TCAS alert and subsequently filed an Airprox report.

The APS ATCO's start time of shift was 0730, on day 2 of [a 6 day] shift cycle, and the [Tower controller took over] at 1115 [following a session monitoring a] student under instruction as OJTI. Great Dun Fell (GDF) radar was in use with patchy and limited cover at low levels, and the traffic level was medium with 2 [aircraft on a] Traffic Service and 6 [aircraft on a] Basic Service.

Details

1103:25 [the C152] was tracking down the coast passing Hornsea towards Spurn Point at 2000ft [on QNH 1022hPa] under a Basic Service, [with a] 4270 squawk seen on radar.

Various other aircraft called on the Radar frequency.

1107 [the AW139] got airborne and departed [enroute].

1110:12 [the AW139] was identified [as a primary return] and placed under a Traffic Service at 2000ft. At this time [the C152] was showing as an intermittent primary contact on the coast, abeam Garton.

1115:03 [there was a handover of watch] to the oncoming ATCO who told [the pilot of an unrelated aircraft] to squawk 4251 and standby, and changed the radar label display. [The AW139] showed only in primary while 4NM from the coast, and [the C152 was believed to be a faint primary contact 0.5NM east of Garton in [the AW139's] left, 11 o'clock [position], at 4NM (Figure 1).

Figure 1 – Time 1115:03

1115:24 The off-going ATCO used the Radar 2 position to telephone Anglia Radar to pre-note the [AW139] and stated to the oncoming ATCO "[AW139 C/S] *has traffic, left 11 o'clock, 2 miles, same height, its* [on a direct heading towards] *the other one*". The Radar 2 position had Cromer selected which showed the [AW139] and [the C152] in SSR (Figure 2).



Figure 2 – Time 1115:24

1115:27 The oncoming ATCO changed the label font size from 1 to 2.

1115:30 [The controller announced] *"[AW139 C/S] traffic left, 11 o'clock, 2miles indicating similar altitude".* Level information was provided by the off-going ATCO from the Radar 2 position using Cromer [radar] feed [to the] Radar 2 screen (Figure 3).



Figure 3 – Time 1115:30

1115:40 [The AW139 pilot] stated that they just had it pop up on TCAS and were looking.

1115:42 [The controller said] *"[C152 C/S] traffic believed to be you has traffic, southwest, 1 mile tracking east at 2000ft, an A139 routing offshore".* No reply was received from [the pilot of the C152].

1115:50 The off-going ATCO carried out the pre-note of [the AW139] to Anglia Radar from the Rad2 position.

1116:00 [The pilot of an unrelated aircraft] called for a Basic Service and was told to standby.

1116:13 [The controller:] in the pre-note, [the Anglia Radar controller] identified [the AW139] and instructed [the pilot] to contact Anglia Radar on 125.275MHz. There was no mention of conflicting traffic by either controller (Figure 4).



Figure 4 – 1116:13

[The AW139] turned right, [the C152] was slightly left of its 12 o'clock [position] at less than 1NM.

1116:18 An A400 (carrying out steep approaches under a Traffic Service from FL100) was given Traffic Information.

1116:25 Anglia Radar telephoned to advise [that the AW139] looked like it was taking [collision avoidance action] and descending to 1600ft, turning south against the 4270 [squawk]. The ATCO asked [the Anglia Radar controller] to confirm [that the AW139] was descending. [The Anglia Radar controller] confirmed and said that the aircraft was right across their nose very close together. The Humberside ATCO stated [that the pilot of the AW139] had not advised them that they were descending. [The C152] was less than 0.5NM to the north of [the AW139].

1116:52 The phone call to Anglia [Radar] ended. No updated Traffic Information was provided to [the pilot of the AW139].

ATC Action

Reports were filed by the controller, and a retrospective entry was made in the [watch] log book.

Investigation

The occurrence was investigated by two authorised investigators/assessors using recordings. As part of the investigation, a review of [all appropriate documentation] and the [watch] log book was undertaken.

The following information was provided at ATSI's request:

The student ATCO noted that the Traffic Service was not reduced due to poor radar performance, it was a slip during a busy session with multiple injects and ongoing discussion with the OJTI on integrating an A400 tactical continuous descent approach from medium level. On handover, they went through the strips on, and mentioned generically, [the C152] in the vicinity of Hornsea routeing along the coast but did not have track ident on the intermittent contact to point it out specifically to the oncoming ATCO.

The oncoming ATCO reported that the [C152] or the potential conflict with the [AW139] had not been pointed out specifically during the handover process. At the point that they sat down they did not have ident on [the C152].

The OJTI had no recollection of the specific details of the handover process.

Conclusion

The Humberside radar system was not equipped with an STCA system. This incident occurred immediately following a hand-over and take-over between an OJTI (monitoring a trainee ATCO) and a validated ATCO.

Both controllers were dealing with a busy and diverse traffic situation. There were multiple distraction elements as well as patchy and poor radar coverage without either the Claxby radar, which was subject to a NATS refurbishment program until the end of 2026, or a feed from the Cromer radar, which was subject to a safety management process to authorise and enable its use by Humberside. This combination of circumstances exacerbated the ATCO's workload and reduced situational awareness.

Note: The GDF [radar] feed resulted in patchy and limited coverage at low levels. Primary-only contacts could be very small and fade in and out of coverage, making the maintenance of track identification very difficult and upping ATCO's workload when re-identification was required.

In accordance with CAP774 Ch3, Under a Traffic Service:

> "…..the controller provides specific surveillance derived Traffic Information to assist the pilot in avoiding other traffic….; however, the controller is not required to achieve deconfliction minima, and the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance.
>
> The controller shall pass Traffic Information on relevant traffic, and shall update the Traffic Information if it continues to constitute a definite hazard, or if requested by the pilot. However, high controller workload and RTF loading may reduce the ability of the controller to pass Traffic Information, and the timeliness of such information.
>
> Traffic is normally considered to be relevant when, in the judgement of the controller, the conflicting aircraft's observed flight profile indicates that it will pass within 3NM and, where level information is available, within 3000ft of the aircraft in receipt of the Traffic Service….. Controllers shall aim to pass information on relevant traffic before the conflicting aircraft is within 5 NM, in order to give the pilot sufficient time to meet [their] collision avoidance responsibilities and to allow for an update in Traffic Information if considered necessary."
>
> "Under a Basic Service, the pilot remains responsible for collision avoidance without assistance from the controller and the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight, however, if a controller considers that a definite risk of collision exists, a warning shall be issued to the pilot."

The oncoming ATCO accepted the hand-over during a busy traffic situation, the screen was cluttered from extended label lead lines and time was spent settling into the seat, adjusting the displayed labels and font size.

At the point that the ATCO sat down, the primary paint of [the C152] was faint and intermittent, it is not clear whether they had track ident on [the C152] from the handover. It is not known if the potential confliction with [the AW139] was pointed out during the handover or noted by the oncoming ATCO at this point.

In accordance with CAP774 above, pertinent Traffic Information was passed to both aircraft, albeit later than recommended but assisted by the off-going ATCO with Traffic Information derived from the Radar 2 position showing the Cromer feed. At the time of ATCO hand-over/take-over, [the AW139] closed to within 5NM of [the C152].

[The pilot of the AW139] subsequently manoeuvred (as advised by [the Anglia Radar controller]). [It was] not known as to whether this was due to a late sighting or TCAS-derived information.

Due to the proximity of both tracks, Traffic Information was passed to [the pilot of the C152] (under duty of care) but no acknowledgement was received from [the C152 pilot].

[The Anglia Radar controller] phoned to advise that [the AW139] was manoeuvring close to conflicting traffic. The ATCO did not ask them if [the AW139] was clear of [the C152]. Immediately following the call, [the AW139 pilot] was asked to report coasting out and did so. At this point, [the AW139] was not visible on radar and the service was not downgraded to a Basic Service.

The off-going ATCO stayed in the Radar 2 position (IAW: MATS Pt 1, Sect 8, Chapt 1, para 5.2) to facilitate a pre-note to Anglia Radar and assist with situational awareness. They alerted the ATCO to the conflict using information derived from the Cromer feed selected 'on' in the Radar 2/OJTI's position.

This situation highlights the need to gain approval, as soon as possible, to use the Cromer feed. This will greatly enhance coastal low-level coverage and help prevent these occurrences as coastal GA traffic inevitably increases during the summer.

Recommendations

Highlight to the ATCOs involved the areas to be especially wary of, both prior to, during and following handovers, on a busy day with reduced surveillance coverage and how to mitigate a potential conflict in partnership with the aircraft's captain (without necessarily overcontrolling Traffic Service traffic) against transit traffic in Class G airspace:

1. In accordance with CAP774, an ATCO is not required to achieve deconfliction minima under a Traffic Service. However, both ATCOs, either prior to or post-handover, could have resolved this situation by noting the potential confliction earlier, passing Traffic Information to [the AW139 pilot] and suggesting a climb to 3000ft with the captain's agreement whilst also requesting [the C152 pilot] to remain not above 2000ft for co-ordination.

2. Subsequently calling the traffic once to [the pilot of the AW139], late or not, would have discharged the ATCO's duty under a Traffic Service and have allowed [the AW139 pilot] to pass safely offshore without conflict.

3. It is preferable to enhance our duty of care and pro-actively resolve potential conflict early for flights carrying passengers, aiming to provide as safe a transit as possible without the unnecessary complications arising from late sightings, and subsequent deconfliction manoeuvring.

4. Whilst the off-going ATCO pre-noted [the AW139] to Anglia [Radar], de-brief them on their failure to mention the conflicting traffic or that Humberside would pass Traffic Information on it at that point.

MATS Pt 1, Sect 8, Chapt 1 (para 3 to 5) (Taking-over/Handing-over watch)

Handing-over

4.1 Controllers handing-over watch shall ensure that they provide their successor with the fullest possible information regarding the prevailing traffic situation etc……

5.2 Controllers taking over should be alert to the possibility of errors and omissions in the information being provided and must verify the data passed to them by a thorough check of the situation display, flight strips and any other relevant information.
Only when they are completely satisfied that they have total awareness of the situation, should they indicate to the controller handing-over that they are ready to accept responsibility for the operational position.
On the occasions when controllers hand-over a busy and complex situation, they should remain available adjacent to the position for a short period following the hand-over. This will enable the accepting controller to seek immediate clarification of any points that may arise during this time.

Taking-over

3.1 (4) ensure that they have a full understanding of the prevailing air traffic situation, with particular reference to separation standards.

5. When taking over a busy and diverse traffic situation, and to avoid unnecessary distraction, prioritise the traffic situation before screen changes are carried out and ensure you have full awareness of the traffic situation.

6. The Traffic Service (TS) provided to [the AW139 pilot] should have been reduced due to controller workload and poor radar performance and also should have been downgraded to a Basic Service once the primary contact was lost approaching the coast.

7. Update Traffic Information following an initial call if it is still pertinent – [AW139 pilot]

8. [Humberside ATCO] could have checked if [the AW139 pilot] was visual with [the C152] prior to transfer to Anglia Radar at the coast. At this point it was unknown whether [the AW139 pilot] was still manoeuvring or clear of conflict.

9. Best practice would be to either confirm [the AW139 pilot] was visual with [the C152] or confirm that the Anglia [Radar controller] was happy to accept [the AW139] in close proximity or was subsequently clear of [the C152] as this was not evident from the display or aircraft transmission.

10. The off-going ATCO followed best practice in accordance with MATS Pt1, remaining in the Radar2/OJTI position to assist during a busy transition, this was critical in ensuring [that the AW139 pilot] did receive Traffic Information, albeit late.

CAA ATSI

Due to poor radar coverage in the area of the Airprox and the possible distraction of other traffic, the confliction was not spotted by the controller at the time who had just taken over the position from a trainee controller and OJTI. The pilot of [the AW139] was not advised that the Traffic Service would be reduced by the trainee controller, and this was not picked up by the OJTI. No traffic Information was passed by the trainee controller to [the pilot of the AW139] on [the C152] in the period leading up to the Airprox, however, the unit reported that the controller was busy with other traffic during this period, and the radar contact for [the C152] was intermittent. Traffic Information was passed by the incoming controller just prior to the Airprox as a result of being advised of the proximity of both aircraft by another controller. That information had been derived from a radar display which was using a radar source not authorised for use by Humberside at the time, but which showed both [the AW139] and [the C152] as primary and secondary radar contacts.

It was further noted that the NATS Cromer radar via ORRD feed source is under a coverage assessment on RAD2 and not for operational use.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken and both aircraft were detected and identified using Mode S data. CPA was assessed to have been at 1116:15 with 0.7NM horizontal and 100ft vertical separation (Figure 5).



Figure 5 – Time 1116:15

Further analysis of third-party aircraft tracking software was undertaken and both aircraft were detected using ADS-B data. The AW139 was seen to have made a right descending turn, increasing vertical separation from 100ft to 200ft 8sec after CPA, and horizontal separation began to increase from 0.7NM to 0.8NM 16sec after CPA.

The AW139 and C152 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[1] If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the C152 pilot was required to give way to the AW139.[2]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a AW139 and a C152 flew into proximity 2NM south of Withernsea at 1116Z on Wednesday 18th March 2026. The AW139 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Traffic Service from Humberside Radar, and the C152 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Humberside Radar.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller involved and a report from the appropriate operating authority. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board first considered the actions of the Humberside Radar controller, noting that there had been a handover of controllers in progress and a student controller with an OJTI initially. The Board noted that the controller had provided the AW139 pilot with a Traffic Service. However, as the radar tracking had initially been primary-only, and there had been intermittent detection of some traffic, including that of the C152, members agreed that the controller had not informed the AW139 pilot that the Traffic Service was 'reduced' due to the poor radar coverage, as required by procedure (**CF1**), and that this had gone unnoticed by the OJTI (**CF2**). The Board also discussed the non-issuance of a Basic Service once the AW139 had coasted out and its primary radar return had faded, and a member with experience of helicopter procedures in that area noted that they had often received a Traffic Service up to 40NM[3] from Humberside and that this had not contributed towards the Airprox in any case. The Board noted that that the controller had only had generic situational awareness of the position of the C152 as a primary-only target (**CF3**, **CF6**) until they had been made fully aware by the Anglia Radar controller of a potential conflict, and that this had been confirmed from the unauthorised feed to the Rad 2 position. Members noted that the lack of SSR available on the authorised radar feed had meant that the controller had not detected the conflict until they had received further information from Anglia Radar, backed-up by the off-going controller at the Rad 2 position (**CF5)**, and that the late detection had led to late provision of Traffic Information to both the AW139 and C152 pilots (**CF4**). The Board acknowledged that it had been unfortunate that Humberside ATC had been left without coverage from Claxby Radar at short notice, which had not allowed Humberside Airport to mitigate the lack of cover beforehand. Members further suggested that it may have been prudent to advise pilots to transit at a higher level where it may have been possible to increase radar visibility.

The Board next considered the actions of the AW139 pilot, noting that the pilot had had no situational awareness of the position of the C152 until they had received late Traffic information on it at only 2NM, which had been followed by a TCAS TA at 1.5NM (**CF8**, **CF9**). Some members wondered if, on receipt of the information from the controller and/or their TCAS, the pilot had considered altering the helicopter's altitude, noting that (UK)SERA..3210 requires that they continue to maintain course and speed in situations such as this, although it was agreed by the Board that the pilot had deliberately chosen to turn away from the conflict instead. Members agreed that the AW139 pilot had been concerned by the proximity of the C152 (**CF11**), initially having made a right turn away from it, followed by a descent.

[1] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[2] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.
[3] UKAIP PT3 EGNJ AD 2.17 Air Traffic Services Airspace. Radar 40NM/20,000ft.

Moving their attention to the actions of the C152 pilot, the Board noted that the pilot had had generic situational awareness of the routeing or potential position of the AW139 from the RT (**CF8**), although members agreed that the pilot had not possibly not been effectively monitoring their radio, as they had not responded to or acknowledged the Traffic Information call made to them by the Humberside controller (**CF7**). The Board further noted that the C152 pilot had not given way to the conflicting AW139 on their right-hand side, and had not seen it until the AW139 had descended away from them in their approximate 3 o'clock position (**CF10**).

In assessing a category of risk, the Board concluded their discussion by noting that the AW139 pilot had effectively reacted to both the late Traffic Information and the subsequent TA from their TCAS. Members agreed that, although safety had been degraded, the reactions of the AW139 pilot to the warnings had prevented the AW139 and C152 from coming into close proximity, and there had been no risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026022			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
	• Manning and Equipment			
2	Human Factors	• Recurrent/OJT Instruction or Training	Events involving on the job training of individuals/ personnel	
3	Technical	• Radar Coverage	Radar Coverage	Non-functional or unavailable
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
4	Human Factors	• ANS Traffic Information Provision	Provision of ANS traffic information	TI not provided, inaccurate, inadequate, or late
5	Human Factors	• Conflict Detection - Detected Late	An event involving the late detection of a conflict between aircraft	
6	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
7	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Communications	Events involving flight crew that did not appropriately monitor communications	
8	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
9	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS TA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system traffic advisory warning triggered	
	• See and Avoid			
10	Human Factors	• Identification/ Recognition	Events involving flight crew not fully identifying or recognising the reality of a situation	Late sighting by one or both pilots
11	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Traffic Service provided by the Humberside controller had not been announced as a 'reduced' Traffic Service due to poor radar coverage.

Manning and Equipment were assessed as **partially effective** because the Humberside OJTI had not identified their student controller's errors in providing a Traffic Service when only a reduced Traffic Service or Basic Service were available, and there had been no SSR information on the authorised feed.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the Humberside controller only had generic situational awareness of the aircraft initially and detected the closing relative positions at a late stage.

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **partially effective** because the AW139 pilot had late situational awareness of the position of the C152, and the C152 pilot had only generic situational awareness of the AW139 from the Humberside RT.



[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.