AIRPROX REPORT No 2026017

Date: 03 Mar 2026 Time: ~1150Z Position: 5208N 00003E Location: 6NM SW Cambridge

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	DA40	Grumman Wildcat
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	IFR	VFR
Service	Traffic	None
Provider	Cambridge	N/A
Altitude/FL	1900ft	NK
Transponder	A, C, S	None[1]
Reported		
Colours	White	Yellow/Blue
Lighting	Strobes, Nav, Landing, Taxy	Nil
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	NR
Altitude/FL	1870ft	2000ft
Altimeter	QNH (1027hPa)	QNH
Heading	050°	NR
Speed	105kt	NR
ACAS/TAS	TAS	Not fitted
Alert	None	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	200ft V/NK H	Not Seen
Recorded	NK V/0.4NM H	



THE CAMBRIDGE CONTROLLER reports that Cambridge was on RW05, and that they were vectoring 3 aircraft for RNP approaches. They observed a radar contact get airborne out of Duxford. From the speed and track, they judged it to possibly be a warbird (e.g. Spitfire). They passed the Traffic Information to [the DA40 pilot] and updated, they became visual, later reporting it to be a Spitfire at the same level. The pilot decided to break off the approach with the Spitfire performing a very close pass across the front of the aircraft. They vectored [the DA40] around for a second approach when, what they believed to be the same Spitfire from the previous approach from monitoring the primary radar track, appeared to aim again towards the same aircraft. On this occasion, based on the aircraft being above the terrain safe level, they gave avoiding action. The DA40 finally landed on the third attempt. They had contacted Duxford as per the letter of agreement to advise the approach was active, and the controller further contacted Duxford after the second near miss to request the pilot of the Spitfire contact Cambridge Radar. They were told by Duxford that they had already requested the pilot contact Cambridge and the pilot had refused. The Spitfire had their transponder switched off [they believed] during the entire flight so there was no readout on their level.

THE DA40 PILOT reports that the general weather conditions that day were scattered clouds with some vertical layering below in parts. At the time of the Airprox they were not in cloud and were VMC. The incident occurred when they had been cleared for the approach by Cambridge ATC, and were on the Cambridge RNP RW05 approach, commencing at BEPOX and having passed SCO5I at 2000ft. Whilst they had entered cloud briefly between the two points, they were outside for the rest of the approach. Cambridge Radar advised of some traffic in the area, which initially was not visible. There were also no aircraft showing in the near vicinity on their Traffic and ADS-B systems, so they were relying upon keeping a good lookout, and for Cambridge Radar to identify any potentially conflicting traffic. They ensured that they remained a distance from the cloud, in case any aircraft were to appear from within

[1] The pilot reported transponding Modes A, C and S, but this could not be seen on the radar replay.

it. Between SCO5I and SCO5F they continued the approach, descending on the final approach track to about 1870ft, 0.7NM from SCO5F. They then saw the other aircraft on a track crossing ahead of them, from right-to-left which, given the relative speed and direction of the two aircraft, would not have caused a serious conflict. However, the other aircraft then made a sharp turn to the left, towards them. Depending upon how long the turn was continued for, this could have caused a near-miss or a collision. The altitude of the aircraft was not substantially different from their own, so they immediately turned right to avoid the other aircraft, broke off the approach and advised Cambridge Radar. Based upon its direction when they lost sight of it, the other aircraft presumably passed to their left. Cambridge Radar then provided vectors for them to commence the approach from BEPOX again. The other aircraft was not apparent on the Cambridge frequency.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE WILDCAT PILOT reports that this was a local flight, on an air test. They were general handling in good VMC in uncontrolled airspace to the north of the airfield. They were very familiar with Duxford and the surrounding area and local airspace. They elected to remain on Duxford's frequency to aid their situational awareness in the event that they required a rapid return to the airfield due to this being an air test. They did not see the other aircraft and were not aware of an Airprox at the time.

THE DUXFORD AFISO reports that, at the time of the Airprox, they were the duty FISO; however, they were unaware that the incident occurred, with notification being received via the Airprox Board.

Cambridge ATC phoned Duxford on the priority line and said that their RW05 instrument approach was active. At this time, the Wildcat was taxying out, so the Duxford assistant told Cambridge ATC that there was a warbird shortly to become airborne for the north/northwest. Before the Wildcat became airborne they [the FISO] passed traffic [information] to the pilot stating that Cambridge RW05 instrument approach was active. The Wildcat became airborne for an air test and departed on RW06 making a left turn to the north. They then received a call from Cambridge ATC on the priority line regarding a warbird, they reminded the Wildcat pilot that the RW05 RNP approach was active and the pilot acknowledged. Cambridge then phoned again and asked them to request the pilot to contact [Cambridge] on their frequency, to which the Wildcat pilot declined to do so stating that they weren't in their way. The FISO fed this back to Cambridge ATC.

Duxford and Cambridge have a Letter of Agreement; the terms of the agreement were adhered to from an ATS perspective with the passing of Traffic Information between the units and messages to the pilot when required. The pilot of the Wildcat is a based operator at Duxford, the Cambridge/Duxford Letter of Agreement is found in Duxford's General Flying Orders in Annex C. Section 10.5 'Local Airspace' also states that aircraft wishing to operate/route north of Duxford beyond 3NM are strongly advised to establish contact with Cambridge ATS.

Factual Background

The weather at Cambridge was recorded as follows:

```
METAR EGSC 031120Z 06005KT 020V120 9999 SCT032 12/07 Q1028=
METAR EGSC 031150Z 05006KT 010V090 9999 FEW032 SCT049 12/07 Q1027=
```

Analysis and Investigation

Cambridge ATC Investigation

Event.

A 'warbird' aircraft flew through the approach to Cambridge airport and in close proximity to aircraft on final approach into the airfield, and continued to 'target' aircraft operating on the published procedures into Cambridge, resulting in the break off of two approaches for [the DA40 C/S] who eventually landed on their third attempt.

Sequence of events

At 1148:17 (Figure 1) a primary-only contact was seen to depart from Duxford.



Figure 1 - Screenshot taken from Cambridge Radar at 1148:17

1148:34 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: [DA40 C/S], *roger, pop up traffic in your right, 2 o'clock, approximately 5 miles, appears to be northwest bound, fast moving, possible warbird out of Duxford*.
1148:43 – [DA40 C/S] to APS : *Traffic not in sight,* [DA40 C/S].
1148:46 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: [DA40 C/S], *roger, thank you, I'll keep you updated, advise at any time if you wish to discontinue the approach.*
1148:52 – [DA40 C/S] to APS: *Wilco,* [DA40 C/S].



Figure 2 - 1148:50

1149:13 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: [DA40 C/S]*, previously mentioned traffic now right, 1 o'clock, 2 miles, converging, no height information.*



Figure 3 - 1149:13

1149:21 – [DA40 C/S] to APS : *Ah, traffic in sight,* [DA40 C/S].
1149:25 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: *[DA40 C/S], roger, thank you, and uh, just confirm, are you happy to continue?*
1149:29 – [DA40 C/S] to APS: *Uh, negative, um *garbled*.*
1149:36 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: [DA40 C/S]*, roger, thank you, and just advise me of your new heading, and I'll position you back around for the approach.*
1149:46 – [DA40 C/S] to APS: *Uh, roger, I'm going to turn, uh, left, um, do you want me to go back to BEPOX,* [DA40 C/S]*?*



Figure 4 - 1149:48

1149:52 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: [DA40 C/S]*, no problem at all, and you can fly heading 005 please, and when able, climb and maintain altitude 3000 feet.*
1150:01 – [DA40 C/S] to APS: *005, and 3000 feet,* [DA40 C/S].
1150:07 – [non-Airprox aircraft] to APS: [C/S]*, just passed over BEPOX.*
1150:09 – APS to [non-Airprox aircraft]: [C/S]*, roger, thank you, and traffic, uh, right, 1 o'clock, 2 miles, appears to be slow-moving, just disappeared off radar… There is however, traffic that's just appeared on the final approach, at uh, in your left, 11 o'clock, approximately 5 miles, manoeuvring, no height information, possible warbird.*
1150:26 – [non-Airprox aircraft] to APS*: Okay, uh, we'll keep a good look out for that, thank you,* [C/S].
1150:29 – APS to [non-Airprox aircraft]: [C/S]*, thank you, as you probably copied, previous aircraft had to take avoiding action.*

3 calls not involving the Airprox aircraft

1150:46 – APS to [DA40 C/S] – [DA40 C/S]*, currently number 3 for the approach, apparent, correction, approximate track miles will be about 3-5, is that okay for you?*
1150:53 – [DA40 C/S] to APS: *Affirm,* [DA40 C/S]*, and it is a war bird, Spitfire,* [DA40 C/S].
1150:57 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: *Spitfire, copied, thanks, we're just speaking to Duxford now*
1150:01 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: [DA40 C/S]*, turn left heading 295.*
1150:06 – [DA40 C/S] to APS: *Left heading 295,* [DA40 C/S].
1151:08 – APS to [non-Airprox aircraft]: [C/S]*, previously mentioned traffic is now left, 11 o'clock, 4 miles, manoeuvring on the final approach, with no height information.*
1151:15 – [non-Airprox aircraft] to APS: *Copied,* [C/S].
11:51:17 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: [DA40 C/S]*, did you get a rough estimate of the level of that warbird at that time?*
11:51:24 – [DA40 C/S] to APS: *Uh, it was uh, pretty much the same height as me, so about 2000 feet,* [DA40 C/S].
1151:28 – APS to [DA40 C/S]: *Copied.*
1:51:29 – APS to [non-Airprox aircraft]: [C/S] *previously mentioned traffic, now left, 11 o'clock, 2 and a half miles, fast moving, manoeuvring, no height information.*

1151:36 – [non-Airprox aircraft] to APS: *Uh yeah, we're visual with him,* [C/S]*… And we're just becoming established on the final approach track, he's uh, just uh, just going off to our left-hand side, approximately, uh, 10 o'clock.*
1151:57 – APS to [non-Airprox aircraft]: *And* [C/S]*, previously mentioned traffic, I'm sure you're still visual, is now left, 9 o'clock, 2 miles, fast moving, westbound.*

1201:57 – APS called Duxford.
1201:58 – APS to Duxford: *Hello Duxford, it's Cambridge Radar, uh I've just had to break off an approach for the third time for an aircraft, so that's 3 approaches, I don't suppose you could get the Spitfire out there to give me a call, could you?*
1202:07 – Duxford to APS: *Understood, we have requested that he calls you, but uh, he has refused to do so.*
1202:13 – APS to Duxford: *Understood, he has now aimed at three of my aircraft*.

Cambridge ATSA

All of the following ATSA phone calls to Duxford were believed to have been initiated by the APS ATSA, and not Duxford.

1123:30 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Cambridge, Duxford.*
1123:33 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *Cambridge Radar Assistant, uh, we have a DA42, doing an approach on Runway 05, do you have any traffic to affect?*
1123:38 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Uh, understood, and we have no traffic to affect at this time.*
1123:42 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *No traffic to affect, thank you.*

Between 1132:50 and 1133:29 , the ADI ATSA had a conversation with Airport Operations regarding parking for an inbound aircraft.

Between 1140:10 and 1141:04 , the ADI ATSA received a call regarding a visitor to ATC.
On PABX1, an outgoing call was attempted (unable to confirm whether this was from ADI ATSA or APS ATSA), but the phone line had an engaged dial tone.

1142:20 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Duxford.*
1142:22 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *Cambridge Assistant, uh, we have a DA40 doing an approach on 05, and following it, there will be a Beech 200, doing an approach on 05 as well, do you have any traffic to affect?*
1142:33 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Uh, understood, we're about to dispatch uh, a Wildcat, that we believe will be going to the north.*
1142:38 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *Wildcat going to the north.*
1142:39 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Yes.*
1142:40 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *Roger, thank you.*

1150:17 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Duxford Tower.*
1150:18 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *Cambridge Radar Assistant, uh, is it Wildcat that you just launched, uh, on our uh, 05 approach?*
1150:26 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Uh, standby, we'll give him a call for you.*
1150:29 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *Thank you.*

1152:01 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Duxford Tower.*
1152:02 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *Cambridge Radar Assistant, is it possible for the Wildcat to give us a call please, on 120.965?*
1152:06 – Duxford to APS ATSA: *Understood, I'll pass that message on.*
1152:09 – APS ATSA to Duxford: *We are quite busy- , yeah, thank you, bye.*

Cambridge MATS contacted Duxford to try to gather evidence of the callsign or registration of the warbird aircraft.

In the email response received from Duxford on 02/04/2026, the Senior FISO stated that:

We have sent a full and comprehensive report over to the Airprox Board which has been acknowledged. I would like to personally reassure you that as a FISO unit [….] we acted in respect to the Letter of Agreement that we hold, we passed all messages that the Cambridge Assistant/Controller passed us, before departure the pilot was passed traffic, including that the 05 Cambridge Instrument Approach was active. When airborne we reminded again, we requested that the pilot make a call to Cambridge when requested by yourselves, to which the pilot declined.

Letter of Agreement – Cambridge & Duxford

A.1 Map of the Airspace

A.1.1 In order to increase pilot awareness of the Cambridge Airport operation and its proximity the following map of the airspace and note has been agreed to be added to the "EGSU information for pilots" located on the IWM website;



Note: When ARR/DEP and/or aircraft intending to route to the North of Duxford outside of the Duxford ATZ it is strongly advised that you establish communication with **Cambridge APP/RAD 120.965** due to Cambridge ATSU operations **please note the Instrument Approach feathers. This is especially pertinent for traffic joining right hand downwind for Runway 06 who will cross the Cambridge Final Approach Track/Climb-out when conducting their join.** Cambridge ATC will endeavour to transfer you to Duxford ATC when clear of their conflictions so you can continue inbound to Duxford safely and without any undue delays.

Arriving pilots please be aware of the dangers of misidentifying Duxford aerodrome.

A.2 Procedures

A.2.1 Direct telephone lines have been established allowing direct communication between Cambridge ATC and the Duxford AFISO and should be used where workload permits for notification or enquiry of traffic information between Cambridge ATC and Duxford.

Upon watch opening, the Duty AFISO at Duxford shall check the serviceability of the direct telephone line between Duxford and Cambridge ATC and exchange which Runways are in use. Subsequently, both units shall advise each other of any subsequent Runway changes and upon closure

Cambridge ATC Shall:

- Pre-note Duxford of any traffic departing Cambridge, inbound to Duxford and advise the aircraft of the Duxford Runway in use.
- Inform Duxford of any traffic conducting an instrument approach for Runway 05.
- Cambridge Approach/Radar shall transfer aircraft transiting to/from or via Duxford who wish a service from Duxford when clear of any known conflicts as soon as practicable.
- Cambridge Radar will endeavour to inform Duxford of any traffic under a service from Cambridge Radar that transits within 2500ft and 2.5NM of Duxford, this is to allow the Duxford FISO to pass any relevant traffic information to Cambridge and/or aircraft operating on the Duxford frequency.
- If a planned event at Cambridge Airport is likely to affect Duxford Aerodrome then Cambridge ATC shall inform the Duxford AFISO e.g. RA(T), fly-ins, practice displays and Open Days. For RA(T) notification shall be made prior to the start and upon cessation of the event.

Duxford AFISOs Shall:

- When possible, maintain a listening watch on 120.965 to gain situational awareness of movements in and out of Cambridge.
- Pre-note Cambridge of any traffic departing Duxford, inbound to Cambridge and advise the aircraft of the Cambridge Runway in use.
- Upon receipt of information on an aircraft conducting an instrument approach for Runway 05 at Cambridge, subject workload, the Duxford AFISO shall inform any traffic they believe to be wishing to cross the Cambridge Final Approach Track of the traffic making an approach to Runway 05 at Cambridge and advise the aircraft to call Cambridge APP/APS when possible.
- Subject workload, the Duxford AFISO shall inform traffic believed to be routing/operating North, North West of Duxford outside of the Duxford ATZ of the Cambridge Runway in use and should the Duxford AFISO believe Cambridge may have traffic inbound then suggest the traffic contact Cambridge APP/APS.
- Upon receipt of information of an aircraft under a service from Cambridge Radar that transits within 2500ft and 2.5NM of Duxford, the Duxford AFISO shall pass any relevant traffic information to Cambridge Radar and/or aircraft operating on the Duxford frequency.

- If a planned event at Duxford Aerodrome is likely to affect Cambridge Airport, the Duxford AFISO shall inform Cambridge ATC e.g. RA(T), fly-ins and Open Days. For RA(T), notification shall be made prior to the start and upon cessation of the event
- Subject to workload, the Duxford AFISO will inform Cambridge ATC of any aircraft taxiing who wish to conduct high performance, aerobatic or formation flying that intend to operate to the North, Northwest and West of Duxford.

Notwithstanding the conditions above, in line with legal legislation laid out in SERA 13001, Duxford based operators will switch on their transponder for the duration of their flight where serviceable and squawk 7004 with Mode C unless on a discreet squawk when under a service from an ATSU.

Investigation

A warbird aircraft flew through the approach to Cambridge airport and in close proximity to aircraft on final approach into the airfield, and continued to 'target' aircraft operating on the published procedures into Cambridge, resulting in the break-off of two approaches for [DA40 C/S] who eventually landed on their third attempt.

[A second aircraft] also flew through the approach on departure from Duxford and caused a break-off from the approach for [non-Airprox aircraft] on a training flight. The crew of [the non-Airprox aircraft] did not wish to file a report.

The notification that the Cambridge approaches were active had been made to Duxford, in accordance with the Letter of Agreement. The pilot of the warbird had been advised that the approaches were active. It is not clear if the same information was passed to [the second aircraft], no report was filed against this aircraft as the crew felt it did not require it. APS ATCO requested via Duxford that the pilot of the warbird aircraft make contact. [Duxford reports that] the pilot refused.

The procedure states that all Duxford based operators will switch on their transponders for the duration of their flight where serviceable, and squawk 7004 with Mode C unless on a discrete squawk.

Workload was increased by requirement to advise aircraft of the presence of the warbird and the subsequent Traffic Information and avoidance in relation to it. The workload was medium to high and at times with high complexity. The traffic levels were not a contributing factor. The ATCO workload was significantly increased by the actions of the warbird aircraft in confliction with the traffic on their frequency, and the hugely increased Traffic Information and subsequent actions required.

Conclusion

This event was caused when a warbird (Wildcat) got airborne from Duxford, turned to the north and flew directly through the final approach track for RW05 at Cambridge, forcing [the DA40 pilot] to break off their first approach; the crew reported it was a Spitfire and was at a similar level to them.

Subsequently, whilst still airborne, the warbird flew at high speeds in close proximity to the same aircraft on its second attempt at the approach, forcing the ATCO to issue avoiding action.

[A second aircraft], also departed Duxford and flew directly through the RW05 approach forcing [another aircraft] to break off their approach.

*All notification requirements between the units, as stated in the Letter of Agreement with Duxford, had been completed.

The warbird aircraft continued to operate in the area around Cambridge flying at and around other aircraft. At no time did the warbird have their transponder switched on and therefore no height information was available to the APS controller at Cambridge, nor did they make radio contact.

The Cambridge APS controller managed the situation, passed pertinent Traffic Information as quickly as possible, and issued avoiding action when able to do so. The controller workload was increased significantly by the actions of the warbird in particular, and also by the actions of [the second aircraft].

The warbird did not have an active transponder and the pilot did not make contact with Cambridge APS, even when asked to do so. Cambridge was advised by Duxford FISO Assistant that they had in fact refused to make contact when they were asked.

The Letter of Agreement with Duxford states at the end of the Procedures section that:

> *Notwithstanding the conditions above, in line with legal legislation laid out in SERA 13001, Duxford based operators will switch on their transponder for the duration of their flight where serviceable and squawk 7004 with Mode C unless on a discreet squawk when under a service from an ATSU*.

It also states:

> Note: When ARR/DEP and/or aircraft intending to route to the North of Duxford outside of the Duxford ATZ it is strongly advised that you establish communication with **Cambridge APP/RAD 120.965** due to Cambridge ATSU operations **please note the Instrument Approach feathers. This is especially pertinent for traffic joining right hand downwind for Runway 06 who will cross the Cambridge Final Approach Track/Climb-out when conducting their join.** Cambridge ATC will endeavour to transfer you to Duxford ATC when clear of their conflictions so you can continue inbound to Duxford safely and without any undue delays.

As a result of this Airprox, a number of recommendations have been made, including arranging a meeting between Duxford and Cambridge and changes to the wording within the LoA.

UKAB Secretariat

An analysis of the NATS radar replay was undertaken, and the DA40 could be seen and identified using Mode S data. A primary contact, believed to be the Wildcat, showed only intermittently just before the event and did not display any transponder data (Figure 1).



Figure 1 – 1149:47

Third-party ADS-B data sources were also assessed and neither aircraft showed using ADS-B data. However, shortly after the Airprox, at around 1150:50, the Wildcat appeared as an MLAT return, indicating a height of 2000ft. This data also gave callsign information, indicating that the transponder on the Wildcat was transmitting to some extent, although this data was not displayed by either the NATS radars or the Cambridge radar.

The DA40 and Wildcat pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.[2] If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.[3]

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a DA40 and a Wildcat flew into proximity 6NM southwest of Cambridge at approximately 1150Z on Tuesday 3rd March 2026. The DA40 pilot was operating under IFR in VMC in receipt of a Traffic Service from Cambridge Radar, and the Wildcat pilot was operating under VFR in VMC not in receipt of a FIS.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, a report from the air traffic controller and AFISO involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

As this Airprox had been controller reported, the Board first considered the actions of the Cambridge controller. Members noted that Cambridge ATC had followed their LoA and liaised with Duxford as per normal procedures; they had informed Duxford that they were making RNP approaches on RW05 and, as a result, they had rightly expected that any departing Duxford traffic would have called them for a crossing of the approach lane. They had been providing a service to number of aircraft in the pattern making RNP approaches, but traffic levels had been fairly normal and should not have resulted in a particularly high workload, until the Wildcat had appeared on their radar as unknown traffic. As the DA40 had already descended below the terrain safe level, thus preventing the controller from issuing avoiding action, the controller had provided Traffic Information but, because the transponder on the Wildcat had not been displaying on the radar, the controller had not known its altitude and therefore had only been able to pass generic Traffic Information to the DA40 pilot (**CF1**). Once the DA40 pilot had told the controller that the conflicting aircraft had been a 'warbird' at their altitude of 2000ft, the controller contacted Duxford again to ask for the Wildcat pilot to call them. The controller then maintained track ident on the non-squawking aircraft, thus enabling them to continue to provide Traffic Information to subsequent pilots. Members agreed that the controller had made the best of a very difficult situation, with only generic information available on the Wildcat, which had greatly increased their workload, they had continued to try to identify the unknown aircraft and to pass relevant Traffic Information (and subsequently avoiding action) to their traffic.

When looking at the actions of the Duxford AFISO, members thought that they had acted in accordance with their LoA with Cambridge; when notified of RW05 in use at Cambridge, they had informed the pilots on their frequency accordingly. They had also tried to help when the Cambridge controller had subsequently called asking for information on the Wildcat; they had passed as much information as they could and had asked the pilot again to call Cambridge ATC.

Turning to the actions of the DA40 pilot, members noted that at first, when the Cambridge controllers had passed generic Traffic Information (**CF7**) and the pilot had become visual with the other aircraft, they had not been concerned by the Wildcat, as it had been crossing ahead. However, once the Wildcat had turned towards them at the last moment, the DA40 pilot had become concerned by the Wildcat's proximity and had elected to take avoiding action and break off their approach (**CF10**). Members further

[2] (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.
[3] (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.

noted that the EC equipment in the DA40 had not detected the Wildcat (**CF8**), likely due to an apparent problem with the Wildcat's transponder signals.

When discussing the actions of the Wildcat pilot, members noted that the pilot had said that they had been conducting an air test and had wanted to remain on the Duxford frequency. However, members with experience in this discipline thought that the pilot may have been better served in choosing another area for the air test, one which would not have affected Cambridge's radar traffic. They noted that the pilot had been told by the Duxford AFISO that Cambridge had been using RW05 (**CF6**), and that, in accordance with Duxford's LOA, and also according to CAA guidance about flying within the vicinity of an airfield with 'feathers' marked on the VFR charts, the pilot should have called Cambridge to advise them of their intentions (**CF2**, **CF3**). Additionally, in choosing to cross the Cambridge approach lane at around 2000ft, the altitude of any IFR traffic, members thought that the Wildcat pilot had not sufficiently adapted their plan to take into consideration other airspace users (**CF4**). The Board agreed that the Wildcat pilot had received generic situational awareness that Cambridge had been active from the Duxford AFISO (**CF7**), but had reported that they had not seen the DA40 (**CF9**). Finally, the Board discussed the lack of transponder data from the aircraft. The pilot had reported that the transponder had been switched on, but it had not displayed on either the Cambridge radar, nor the NATS radars and the DA40 pilot had not received an alert from their TAS. Nevertheless, MLAT data had given some intermittent data, leaving members to conclude that it had potentially malfunctioned on the day (**CF5**). This unfortunate malfunction had the consequence of severely increasing the workload for the Cambridge controller and members urged the aircraft's owners to ensure its serviceability.

When determining the risk, the Board looked at the reports from both pilots together with the reports from the controller and AFISO and the radar data. Members discussed that although the exact separation was not known, the report from the DA40 pilot indicated that the Wildcat had been at a similar altitude to the DA40 and, because the Wildcat pilot had not been visual with the DA40, some members thought that there had been a risk of collision. However, others countered that the DA40 pilot had been visual with the Wildcat throughout and had taken avoiding action when they had seen the Wildcat turn towards them. After a vote, members agreed by a majority that there had not been a risk of collision; Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

	2026017			
CF	**Factor**	**Description**	**ECCAIRS Amplification**	**UKAB Amplification**
	Ground Elements			
	• Situational Awareness and Action			
1	Contextual	• Traffic Management Information Action	An event involving traffic management information actions	The ground element had only generic, late, no or inaccurate Situational Awareness
	Flight Elements			
	• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance			
2	Human Factors	• Use of policy/Procedures	Events involving the use of the relevant policy or procedures by flight crew	Regulations and/or procedures not complied with
	• Tactical Planning and Execution			
3	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
4	Human Factors	• Insufficient Decision/Plan	Events involving flight crew not making a sufficiently detailed decision or plan to meet the needs of the situation	Inadequate plan adaption
5	Human Factors	• Transponder Selection and Usage	An event involving the selection and usage of transponders	
	• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
6	Human Factors	• Lack of Action	Events involving flight crew not taking any action at all when they should have done so	Pilot flew close enough to cause concern despite Situational Awareness

7	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
	• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance			
8	Technical	• ACAS/TCAS System Failure	An event involving the system which provides information to determine aircraft position and is primarily independent of ground installations	Incompatible CWS equipment
	• See and Avoid			
9	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Events involving flight crew not fully monitoring another aircraft	Non-sighting or effectively a non-sighting by one or both pilots
10	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	~~Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement~~	Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment[4]

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Wildcat pilot did not call Cambridge in accordance with Duxford local procedures.

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **ineffective** because the Wildcat pilot flew through the Cambridge approach lane, at the same altitude as the approach traffic, without passing their intentions to the Cambridge controller.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because both pilots had only generic situational awareness on the other aircraft.

Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance were assessed as **ineffective** because the TAS on the DA40 could not detect the inoperative transponder on the Wildcat.



[4] The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the UKAB Website.