


AIRPROX REPORT No 2026013

Date: 14 Feb 2026 Time: 1228Z Position: 5018N 00512W Location: St. Agnes

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	AW169	GT450
Operator	HEMS	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Basic	Listening Out
Provider	Newquay App	Perranporth Traffic
Altitude/FL	1960ft	2460ft
Transponder	A, C, S+	A, C, S
Reported		
Colours	Red, yellow	Grey, white, blue
Lighting	Strobes, nav, ldg	None
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	>10km	>10km
Altitude/FL	2500ft	1600ft
Altimeter	QNH	QFE (1006hPa)
Heading	320°	'southwest'
Speed	120kt	55kt
ACAS/TAS	TCAS II	Not fitted
Alert	RA	N/A
	Separation at CPA	
Reported	300ft V/0.3NM H	600ft V/0.5NM H
Recorded	500ft V/0.3NM H	



THE AW169 PILOT reports they had been a HEMS crew on a VFR training flight, with a TCM in the left-hand seat, a paramedic/TCM in the rear left seat and doctor/med pax in the rear right seat. It had been a beautiful day for flying, CAVOK with light winds. They had discussed GA/paragliders as a threat in the morning brief (first good weekend flying day for a very long time) and had been very alert to them during their first VFR training sector, which was planned as an off-airfield landing at Hayle Rugby Club, to shut down briefly and then proceed on to Land's End for an RNP approach. On the first sector they discussed GA traffic many times and they had briefed the crew to keep eyes out for traffic. They had been receiving a Basic Service from Newquay Approach and, [whilst] transiting at approximately 900ft AMSL and a few miles to the east of the Perranporth zone [sic], they made a position call on the Perranporth frequency and a paradrop aircraft responded with position and '5 minutes to drop' and working RW04. Newquay Approach then alerted [the AW169 pilot] to that same aircraft and, a little later, to a microlight that was operating in the Carbis Bay, which corresponded with a TCAS contact well clear of them. During the recce to land, the AW169 pilot briefed that all needed to keep eyes out for microlights and specifically paragliders as they had come across them inland in that area, often higher than one might expect. Whilst on the ground at Hayle, they were tasked to a patient in Liskeard - again during the departure the pilot checked the TCAS display and requested that all crew keep their eyes out and that they would hold the after take-off checks until they were in the cruise and a good lookout had been achieved. The AW169 pilot believes that they had called Newquay Approach to inform them of their new route and intentions and to request a Basic Service before running the checks but cannot be sure of the exact sequence. They were stood down a few miles west of Truro and the pilot had turned south, with the intention of requesting an ILS recovery to Newquay and to give themselves time to input the approach and climb to 2000ft. Once that was done, and with the TCM and crew instructed to keep eyes out, the pilot reported altitude 2000ft on QNH and heading 320° and Newquay instructed them to climb to 2500ft and approved the vectored ILS RW12. When level at 2500ft and approaching St Agnes from the south, they saw the microlight in the 1 o'clock, slightly above them, approximately 1/2 mile range on a converging course (a south-southwesterly heading) and so the AW169 pilot made an immediate left

turn and initiated a descent, which was followed a few seconds later by an RA 'descend, descend' which they complied with, heading west by that stage. The microlight passed above and behind, the pilot saw +700ft on the PFD traffic symbol and stopped the descent when 'clear of conflict' sounded – they were at approximately 1500ft and had coasted out over the sea by that stage. Neither the pilot nor their TCM had noticed a corresponding TCAS contact on their PFDs or the MFD (inner scale set to 2.5NM) beforehand but a TA aural alert was generated just before the visual acquisition and approximately 10sec before the RA. Despite listening out on the Perranporth frequency before the RA, the AW169 pilot had not made another position and intentions call and had not realised there was a microlight in their immediate vicinity. Newquay Approach had not alerted them to the traffic either. [The AW169 pilot] was not sure why they didn't invite more conspicuity with another position call, but have reflected that this might have been their subconscious relaxation due to receiving instrument vectors, albeit still only on a Basic Service, having passed their own initial heading and in uncontrolled airspace, and knowing that they were still above the height of the Perranporth zone so standard circuit traffic would be beneath them - they have a restriction not to fly above 1850ft - albeit the AW169 pilot had been just outside their zone and so this did not apply to the microlight. Newquay Approach is excellent at keeping them informed of traffic in the area, including Perranporth activity, despite [the AW169] normally operating below the altitude that they can reliably offer a Traffic Service and so there may have been more assumption/negative training on [the AW169 pilot's] part there. Having been very vigilant and vocal about GA traffic throughout the previous, lower level flying, and mentioned that they were transiting close to Perranporth on the downwind leg, with two very experienced crewmembers (their TCM has flown in the area for over a decade, and held a PPL(H) in the past; the doctor is newer to the area but experienced in HEMS) the AW169 pilot didn't think to explicitly remind them all that the lookout was still important, to include the TCAS display in their scan, and that they were slightly more 'eyes in' due to the instrument work. The cockpit design has several large blind spots due to struts and it may have been that the microlight was initially obscured by one of these, for both the pilot and their TCM who would need to look cross-cockpit in this case. After landing, the pilot made contact with the flying club to make sure the other pilot was OK. It was later relayed to [the AW169 pilot] that there had been two microlights flying from Perranporth that morning, and that this pilot had been conducting general handling manoeuvres over the airfield and had been visual with the helicopter for some time, they had estimated that they had been 500ft above [the AW169's] level and they didn't perceive that the separation constituted a threat. Also, that their transponder signals can be blocked in certain directions due to the mounting position and aircraft structure. The AW169 pilot also called the Newquay controller after landing to ask if they had seen the microlight on their screen (they wanted to know if [the AW169 pilot] hadn't noticed it on their PFDs, or if the transponder hadn't been transmitting reliably or was turned on late) and they told them that they did not hold it on radar ahead of time, otherwise they would have alerted them. After [the AW169 pilot] reported the RA over the radio, Newquay Approach struggled with two-way comms with the microlight pilot and asked them to turn up [the volume on] their headset.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Medium'.

THE GT450 PILOT reports that they had departed from [...] airfield on RW04 for some circuits and upper air work exercises. Immediately after departure, the club's parachute aircraft departed for parachuting. With this in mind, [the G450 pilot] had decided to clear the drop zone and head southwest, just inland of the coast. At position 50°19.078 north and 005°12.646 west (approximately 1.8NM from Perranporth airfield) they made visual contact with a red air ambulance helicopter. It was in their 10.30/11 o'clock position estimated 1 mile horizontal 500-700ft lower than themselves. A slight turn to port was made to maintain visual contact and a further turn to port now heading south was made to ensure visual contact was maintained at all times until the helicopter had passed. The helicopter appeared to be tracking south-to-north or their left-to-right and continued that track out over the sea. At no point did the GT450 pilot recall hearing any transmission on the radio from the helicopter saying that they were in the vicinity of Perranporth airfield. The GT450 pilot had continued their flight and landed uneventfully. After landing, the CFI came over, interviewed them and asked if they had seen the helicopter. Their response had been as described above. They had been in full radio contact with Perranporth airfield on 119.755MHz as parachuting was taking place, and transponding code 7000 at all times. Their GPS is a standalone 17-year-old unit used solely for situational awareness.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

THE NEWQUAY APPROACH CONTROLLER reports that the AW169 had been heading 320° under a Traffic Service [they believed] at 2.5A. A C172 had been climbing out of Perranporth and had called for a Basic Service, no initial contact had shown on display. Generic Traffic [Information] not passed immediately during a busy period, controlling head-to-head primary contacts to the north of the aerodrome. The first sighting of the transponder for [the C172] had been within 1NM ahead of the AW169. Traffic [Information] was passed and this also triggered a TCAS RA. The controller spoke to the pilot of the AW169 after landing; the pilot noted it was a busy period and mentioned they had no initial TCAS TA and believes the aircraft transponder may have been selected last minute whilst climbing out of [airfield] which triggered a TCAS RA.

THE PERRANPORTH REPRESENTATIVE reports that, whereas Perranporth Airfield Ltd holds the radio licence for the Air/Ground frequency at Perranporth, it is only occasionally staffed, by volunteer members of PFCL (Perranporth Flying Club Ltd). On the day, date and time of this [reported] incident, there had been no-one operating the Air/Ground station. Under these circumstances, pilots operating at or in the near vicinity of Perranporth Aerodrome monitor the channel (119.755MHz) and make 'blind' calls to let other pilots know of their intentions, usually within 5NM of the aerodrome. Indeed, the Cornwall Air Ambulance pilots routinely do this. Perranporth is an unlicensed aerodrome. There is no recording facility at Perranporth for the channel, nor is there required to be. There is no way to know if the Cornwall Air Ambulance made a call on 119.755MHz on this occasion.

Factual Background

The weather at Newquay Airport was recorded as follows:

METAR EGHQ 141220Z 06004KT 360V100 CAVOK 06/M05 Q1019=

Analysis and Investigation

Newquay Safety Investigation

At time 1220:20 the pilot of [AW169 C/S] was asked if they were no longer going to Liskeard anymore [which was] prompted by them turning off their track to the south, the pilot advised that they had just been stood down and were prepping for an ILS RW12 if possible and was told by APS 'affirm report ready for vectors'. The pilot of [AW169 C/S] replied "yeah give us 2 mins".

1224:15 *Newquay Radar [AW169 C/S] call ready for the ILS currently at 2A 1019 heading 320°.*

1224:24 [AW169 C/S] *Newquay climb to 2.5A QNH1019.*

1224:32 *Climb to 2.5A [AW169 C/S].*

1224:39 [AW169 C/S] *vectoring for the ILS Approach RW12.*

1224:41 *ILS 12 [AW169 C/S].*

1225:13 *Inbound [...] [uninvolved aircraft] just at Tintagel at the moment cannot hear me on the radio so get you Aldis lamp at the ready mate. (Ayyy OK replied ADI).*

1225:26 *Oh and also from the south [AW169 C/S] ILS.*

[At the] same time transmission from [AW169 C/S] *level 2.5A.*

1225:31 [AW169 C/S] *roger.*

When APS replied with the above at 1225.31 secs, the target ahead of the [AW169 C/S] (GT450 C/S - squawking 7000 overhead [Perranporth]) disappeared from the radar display.

1225:45 *Newquay this is [uninvolved aircraft] requesting a BS.*

1225:48 [Uninvolved aircraft] *Newquay Radar readability 5 BS QNH1019*. No reply was registered to this call.

1226:05 7000 squawk appeared 1NM west of [Perranporth] overhead approximately 4NM ahead of [AW169 C/S].

1226:06 *Newquay radar [uninvolved aircraft] airborne Bodmin airfield just passing 2A on QNH of QNH1019*.

1226:16 [Uninvolved aircraft] *BS squawk 1747*.

1226:26 *Squawk 1747 OK*.

Target cursor on radar display is focused to the NE of [Bodmin Moor] due to a concentration of primary-only contacts and aircraft with transponders. Some on frequency and some not speaking to Newquay APS.

1226:59 [Uninvolved aircraft] *still not identified however you do have traffic in your 12 o'clock about a mile away opposite direction*.

1227:07 *Newquay [uninvolved aircraft C/S] yeah visual with that and taking a left turn and also, we are just approaching umm Davidstow at the moment if nothing else to affect I would like to give Davidstow a shout and come back to you in a minute*.

1227:18 *And what level are you sir?*

1227:21 *Currently at 1900 but I may descend a bit*.

1227:24 *Roger got traffic also just in your right 2 o'clock about 3A routeing SW bound*.

1227:32 *Ah roger looking out for that*.

[AW169 C/S] and [GT450 C/S] converged on the radar display. Approximately 1/4 of a mile apart same level. [AW169 C/S] appeared to start a descent against the traffic ahead in confliction right-to-left.

1227:35 *You can free call Davidstow and I will speak to you in a bit*.

1227:37 *Speak to you in a bit [uninvolved aircraft]*.

CPA at 1227:43.

1227:47 [AW169 C/S] *keep a good lookout it looks like there is traffic getting airborne out of Perranporth for the south*.

1227:53 *Radar [AW169 C/S] RA, descended just regaining height now clear of conflict they are just behind us 700ft above in the Perranporth vicinity*.

1228:03 [AW169 C/S] *roger*.

1228:05 [AW169 C/S] *report ready for vectors again*.

1228:08 *Wilco just in the climb [AW169 C/S]*.

1228:16 *ADI to APS Request release [uninvolved aircraft] DAWLY correction 5 Zero*.

1228:25 *RW12 Straight ahead released / ADI replied Straight ahead released RW12*.

1228:33 *Newquay radar OK we are hoping to route down the coast and do a couple of touch and goes at Perranporth.*

1228:44 [Uninvolved aircraft] *roger report reaching the coast and ready to route Southbound.*

1228:50 *Report reaching the coast and heading southbound OK.*

1228:59 [Uninvolved aircraft] *Newquay radar radio check.*

1229.22 *Newquay radar this [...] requesting B.S.*

1229:24 – 1229:56 [comms with uninvolved aircraft].

1229:56 [AW169 C/S] *radio check.*

1229:58 [AW169 C/S] *Loud and clear we are now maintaining 2.5A.*

1238:04 [AW169 C/S] transferred to Newquay Tower 134.380MHz.

Conclusions:

Aircraft requiring vectors for an approach as a matter of best practice normally have their level of ATC service upgraded if under a Basic Service to a Traffic Service. On this occasion [AW169 C/S] remained on a Basic Service.

The traffic levels were higher than normal for a February day, with a significant amount of non-transponding aircraft operating to the northeast around the Bodmin area drawing the attention of the APS controller. On a few occasions the non-transponding aircraft were in close proximity to each other requiring the attention of the APS controller.

[Uninvolved aircraft] was inbound to Newquay from the northeast following the coastline. The aircraft attempted to get communications with APS on a couple of occasions (APS could hear the aircraft, aircraft could not hear ATC). This was another distraction to the APS controller, drawing their attention to the northeast sector.

There was a target displaying on the radar in the vicinity of Perranporth whilst [AW169 C/S] was being vectored from the south, however, it was well outside the requirements for passing Traffic Information even if the [AW169 C/S] had been under a Traffic Service.

At time 1225.31 APS replied to a transmission from the pilot of [AW169 C/S]. At the same time this transmission was made, the target in the vicinity of Perranporth disappeared from the radar display which meant when the APS controller looked at the [AW169 C/S] position there was no [apparent] confliction ahead.

At the time of the TCAS RA, APS was engaged in RT with a light-aircraft to the northeast of Newquay. APS response to the notification of the RA from the [AW169 C/S] was correct and followed the standard procedure.

A combination of events noted above were attributed to [AW169 C/S] reporting a TCAS RA. Scanning of the radar display was a factor in the incident, however, the APS controller was dealing with another scenario of 2 aircraft being close to each other to the northeast, drawing the attention away from [AW169 C/S].

ATC Human Factors considerations

Minimum staffing levels/seasonal variation in ATC traffic levels. The traffic levels were significantly higher than normal for February. [There is] no ATC simulator currently available to allow ATCOs to simulate higher traffic loadings [to mitigate against] skill fade over the quieter months.

Root cause analysis

Combination of ATC and pilot human factors due to workload and environment.

Corrective action plan proposed by ATC - no corrective action planned.

CAA ATSI

Synopsis

The AW169 [pilot] had been recently stood-down from a task and was preparing to carry-out a couple of ILS approaches to RW12 at Newquay. The pilot had been provided with a Basic Service when they first called the Newquay Radar controller at 1212:36 and this was never changed by the controller, nor any upgrade requested by the pilot. The pilot of the GT450 was monitoring the Perranporth frequency. ATSI received copies of reports from both pilots, the initial controller report and final unit investigation report from Newquay ATC. The area radar replay was reviewed but did not show the incident. Newquay ATC provided recorded RTF and surveillance data to ATSI which has been used in this report.

At **1224:15** the pilot of the AW169 reported “*ready for the ILS – currently at 2000ft heading 320*”. The Newquay Radar controller instructed the pilot to climb to an altitude of 2500ft and confirmed the QNH which was acknowledged by the pilot. The controller continued: “*vectoring for the ILS approach RW12*”, which was acknowledged by the pilot: “*ILS 12 [AW169 C/S]*”.

Also on the frequency were a number of other aircraft, all but one of which were operating to the north and northeast of Newquay. All were in receipt of a Basic Service from the Newquay controller with the exception of one aircraft to the north whose pilot called 4 times during this period, which the controller replied to, but with which 2-way communications were never established at the time (Figure 1).




Figure 1 – (Ringed) aircraft in comms with Newquay controller (one off-screen to SW)

At **1224:55** the GT450 became visible on the controller's display, approximately 6NM to the north-northwest of the AW169. The secondary label included the aircraft's registration/callsign (Figure 2).



Figure 2 – 1224:55

At **1225:30** the secondary return from the GT450 disappeared and then at **1225:44** the pilot of an aircraft to the north of Newquay made their 4th unsuccessful attempt to establish communications with the controller, who had already pre-warned the tower controller that the aircraft was returning but with no radio communications.

At **1226:08** another pilot reported on frequency to the northeast of Newquay and a Basic Service was agreed. The secondary return for the GT450 had reappeared by this time (Figure 3).



Figure 3 – 1226:08

From **1226:39** the recorded surveillance data showed the controller adjusting the labels of those aircraft in the northeast sector of their display, likely to prevent garbling.

At **1226:59** the controller passed specific Traffic Information to the pilot of a Shadow microlight believed to be approximately 15NM northeast of Newquay (non-transponding): “(callsign), *still not identified you, but however you do have traffic in your 12 o'clock about a mile away, opposite direction.*” The AW169 and GT450 were now approximately 2NM apart (Figures 4 & 5).



Figure 4 – 1226:59



Figure 5 – 1226:59

At **1227:25** the controller passed more Traffic Information to the pilot of the Shadow: “*got traffic also just in your right 2 o'clock about 3000ft routing southwest-bound*”, with the AW169 and GT450 now approximately 1NM apart at the same level (Figure 6).



Figure 6 – 1227:25

At **1227:31** the cursor on the controller's surveillance display was seen to move to and then adjust the secondary label of the AW169 followed by that of the GT450 (Figure 7).



Figure 7 – 1227:31

At **1227:35** the controller approved a change of frequency for the pilot of the Shadow. The AW169 and GT450 were approximately 0.5NM apart with the AW169 observed to have commenced a descent (Figure 8).



Figure 8 – 1227:35

At **1227:47** the controller passed the following to the pilot of the AW169: *“(AW169 C/S) keep a good lookout, it looks like there is traffic getting airborne out of Perranporth to the south.”* The AW169 pilot reported already having received a TCAS RA descent instruction and was in the process of climbing again (Figure 9).



Figure 9 – 1227:47

Analysis

Prior to the Airprox, the majority of the traffic receiving a service from the Newquay controller was in the north and northeast sector of their surveillance display. The controller did subsequently spot that the AW169 was no longer routing to its original destination, which they queried, and at which point the AW169 pilot reported that they would be requesting a couple of ILS approaches at Newquay. The pilot did not specify if they would be self-positioning for those approaches or requesting radar vectors. However, the Newquay controller did then request that the pilot report *“ready for vectors”* which was not questioned by the pilot. When the AW169 pilot went on to report ready for the ILS, again they did not specifically request vectors but did report their heading (320°). The controller did not make any reference to that heading (e.g. *“continue heading 320°”*) but did instruct the pilot to climb to an altitude of 2500ft.

CAP774 (UK Flight Information Services) Chapter 2 Basic Service, states that:

“Other than for the purposes of identification, a controller shall not issue specific heading instructions; however, generic navigational assistance may be provided on request.”

CAP774 is less prescriptive about the allocation of levels:

“Unless the pilot has entered into an agreement with a controller to maintain a specific level or level band, a pilot may change level without advising the controller/FISO.”

ATSI noted that, following the Airprox, the controller did then go on to provide vectors to the AW169 pilot whilst technically still on a Basic Service.

The initial report from the Newquay controller stated that they had been providing a Traffic Service to the AW169 pilot but wrongly identified the second aircraft involved in the Airprox.

The unit investigation report stated *“TS”* (Traffic Service) in the opening description of the occurrence, but which had then been corrected to a BS (Basic Service) by hand.

ATSI went back to the unit management to clarify a number of points including:

- **Did the controller actually believe that they were providing a TS?**
 - (Unit response) *The ATCO thought the (AW169) was under a Traffic Service and was unaware that that they had not upgraded the service from Basic.*

ATSI noted from the recorded surveillance data and RTF that [the pilot of] a parachute aircraft operating out of Perranporth had called the controller earlier and was in receipt of a Basic Service.

- **With Perranporth known to be active, why did the controller not pass generic Traffic Information to the (AW169) pilot on that activity, when their track (without vectors) would take it close to the area.**
 - *ATCO has stated controller workload.*

A mention was made in the unit investigation report of it being “*best practice*” to upgrade from a Basic Service to a Traffic Service for the provision of vectors for an instrument approach – this comment has effectively been withdrawn by unit management.

In the unit investigation it was stated that “*The traffic levels were higher than normal for a February day with a significant amount of non-transponding aircraft operating to the northeast around Bodmin area drawing the attention of the APS controller. On a few occasions the non-transponding aircraft were in close proximity to each other requiring the attention of the APS.*”

A review of the recorded RTF confirmed that no aircraft in those areas was in receipt of anything other than a Basic Service. On three occasions the controller passed specific Traffic Information to the pilot of an aircraft which they had not identified, and which was in receipt of a Basic Service from the controller.

The AW169 was observed to be tracking towards the Perranporth area, and for approximately 90sec prior to the Airprox, both aircraft were converging at the same level. The unit was asked why this was not spotted by the controller. The unit responded: “*the ATCO was exercising a duty of care with regards to the non-transponding traffic. Poor scan resulted in missing the conflict for (AW169) and (GT450).*”

CAP774 states:

“Given that the provider of a Basic Service is not required to monitor the flight, pilots should not expect any form of Traffic Information from a controller/FISO. A pilot who considers that they require a regular flow of specific Traffic Information shall request a Traffic Service.”

Traffic Information being passed by the controller to the pilot of the Shadow microlight was phrased as if they were in receipt of a Traffic Service with regards to the details of the position and level of the other aircraft.

The written report from the pilot of the AW169 confirmed that they believed they were receiving a Basic Service although their own analysis suggested that, with the Newquay controller having mentioned vectors, the crew may have operated as if they were receiving a Traffic Service. They reported becoming visual with the GT450 in their 1 o'clock range of 0.5NM, slightly above, on a converging course. They took an avoiding action left turn and descended before receiving a TCAS RA as well.

The pilot of the GT450 reported becoming visual with the AW169 in their 10.30/11 o'clock range of approximately a mile and 500-700ft below, suggesting this was after the AW169 pilot had already taken avoiding action.

Conclusion

If the controller believed at the time that they were providing a Traffic Service to the AW169 pilot, then that was not prioritised over Duty of Care considerations for other traffic on a Basic Service. There was no generic Traffic Information passed to the AW169 pilot on their track and its proximity to the Perranporth area, nor specific Traffic Information passed to them on the GT450.

The level of service being provided to other aircraft in receipt of a Basic Service exceeded the purpose of that service, being more akin to, and using phraseology as if it were, a Traffic Service. This appears to have distracted the controller from the provision of Traffic Information and even possible advice on avoiding action to the pilot of the AW169.

UKAB Secretariat

Both aircraft were tracked by radar and identified by Mode S data.




Figure 10: At CPA (1227:43) 500ft V/0.3NM H



Figure 11: ADS-B data showing the AW169 at CPA. The GT450 did not show on the ADS-B tracking tools available to the UKAB Secretariat.

The AW169 and GT450 pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as converging then the AW169 pilot was required to give way to the GT450.²

Summary

An Airprox was reported when an AW169 and a GT450 flew into proximity at St Agnes at 1228Z on Saturday 14th February 2026. The AW169 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC in receipt of a Basic Service from Newquay Approach, and the GT450 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and had been Listening Out on the Perranporth Traffic frequency.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, GPS track data, a report from the air traffic controller involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

The Board firstly considered the actions of the AW169 pilot, noting that the nature of their flight had changed during its course and that, at the time of the event, they had been establishing themselves for an ILS approach to Newquay. The crew had been thoroughly briefed on the local flying environment and all crew members were engaged in lookout for light aircraft in the area. The AW169 pilot had been in receipt of a Basic Service from Newquay but had not received any RT calls referring to the GT450 and, although they had also been Listening Out on the Perranporth frequency, they had not made further position or information calls regarding their presence. Members opined that, had they done so, this may have raised greater awareness for others operating in the area (**CF5**) and perhaps even granted them some situational awareness of the presence of the GT450 of which, the Board agreed they had had none (**CF6**). As they had transited north, the AW169 pilot had seen the GT450 to their right, 1 o'clock and judged that a turn to the left to keep clear had been warranted; this was reinforced with a TCAS instruction to 'descend, descend' which they had followed (**CF7**), and had raised their concern regarding the proximity of the GT450 (**CF8**).

Members moved on to consider the actions of the GT450 pilot, noting that they had been engaged in circuit practice at Perranporth and had departed when alerted to the parachuting aircraft operating in

¹ (UK) SERA.3205 Proximity.

² (UK) SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(2) Converging.

that area. Although the GT450 pilot had utilised the Perranporth Radio frequency, they had not heard calls from, or reference to, the AW169 and that, combined with a lack of electronic conspicuity equipment, had denied them any situational awareness of its proximity (CF6). The pilot had visually acquired the AW169 at a range of approximately 1NM and at a height of 500-700ft below them and did not deem there to have been a risk of collision and had maintained good visual contact with the helicopter throughout.

In considering the role played by the Newquay controller, members recognised that they believed that they had agreed a Traffic Service with the AW169 pilot, whereas investigation after the event confirmed that they had agreed a Basic Service 15min before CPA and which had remained unchanged for the period. Members considered, then, the actions of the controller in relation to the service they believed they had agreed with the AW169 pilot. They noted that the controller had been extremely busy with other traffic in the area and had not fully complied with the requirements in provision of that level of service (CF1) and had not prioritised Traffic Information to the AW169 pilot regarding the GT450 until shortly after CPA (CF2). The Board noted that the controller had been distracted by a number of other aircraft in the area and agreed that they had not detected the event between the AW169 and the GT450 (CF3) and had rather offered Traffic Information to those pilots elsewhere in receipt of a Basic Service (CF4). In mitigation, members recognised that this event had occurred towards the end of a winter period where non-commercial aviation is at a numerically low level, that this had been the first 'good weather' day for some time, allowing general aviation pilots to enjoy their sport, and that this change in tasking level may have created a degree of unexpected 'stretch' for the unit.

The Board concluded their discussion and considered the risk of collision, noting that both pilots had achieved visual contact with the other aircraft and that the AW169 pilot had received a TCAS RA resulting in a CPA of approximately 500ft and 1/3NM. Members were in agreement that safety margins had been reduced but were satisfied that there had not been a risk of collision. The Board assigned Risk Category C to this event.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2026013				
CF	Factor	Description	ECCAIRS Amplification	UKAB Amplification
Ground Elements				
• Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance				
1	Human Factors	• ATM Regulatory Deviation	An event involving a deviation from an Air Traffic Management Regulation.	Regulations and/or procedures not fully complied with
• Situational Awareness and Action				
2	Human Factors	• ANS Traffic Information Provision	Provision of ANS traffic information	TI not provided, inaccurate, inadequate, or late
3	Human Factors	• Conflict Detection - Not Detected	An event involving Air Navigation Services conflict not being detected.	
4	Human Factors	• Task Monitoring	Events involving an individual or a crew/team not appropriately monitoring their performance of a task	Controller engaged in other tasks
Flight Elements				
• Tactical Planning and Execution				
5	Human Factors	• Accuracy of Communication	Events involving flight crew using inaccurate communication - wrong or incomplete information provided	Ineffective communication of intentions
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action				
6	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Events involving a flight crew's awareness and perception of situations	Pilot had no, late, inaccurate or only generic, Situational Awareness
• Electronic Warning System Operation and Compliance				
7	Contextual	• ACAS/TCAS RA	An event involving a genuine airborne collision avoidance system/traffic alert and collision avoidance system resolution advisory warning triggered	

• See and Avoid			
8	Human Factors	• Perception of Visual Information	Events involving flight crew incorrectly perceiving a situation visually and then taking the wrong course of action or path of movement Pilot was concerned by the proximity of the other aircraft

Degree of Risk: C.

Safety Barrier Assessment³

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Ground Elements:


Regulations, Processes, Procedures and Compliance were assessed as **partially effective** because the Newquay Approach controller did not pass Traffic Information to the pilot of the AW169.

Situational Awareness of the Confliction and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the Newquay Approach controller had been engaged with a separate conflict and did not detect the conflict between the AW169 and the GT450.

Flight Elements:

Tactical Planning and Execution was assessed as **partially effective** because the AW169 pilot could have made a further call to Perranporth as they had neared that area.

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because the AW169 pilot had gained only late situational awareness of the proximity of the GT450, and the GT450 pilot had no situational awareness of the presence of the AW169 until sighted.



³ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).